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Abstract
ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses a significant gap in the empirical research on concurrent 
engineering (CE) implementation, namely the process of change in CE introduction over 
time. This study captures the dynamic and temporal reality of this process and explores 
the way CE is shaped and transformed in a setting that is different from its. original 
context. The setting is an Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company. The researcher 
employs Dawson’s (1994) processual approach to organisational change as the basis for 
a research framework to address this important issue.
CE implementation is conceptualised and operationalised as a change process in the 
organisation and management of new product development, influenced by both internal 
and external contexts as well as organisational power and politics. CE is considered as a 
loose set of initiatives in product development programs grouped into five categories: 
(1) organisational integration; (2) communication and decision-making mechanisms; (3) 
enabling technology; (4) external integration; and (5) human resources. The focus of this 
study is restricted to the first two of these.
The case study reveals a complex and multidimensional process of CE introduction from 
a pre-CE stage to the premature conclusion of the implementation. Four implementation 
stages are identified, each with a different structure and different CE characteristics: (1)
l
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program initiation; (2) engineering matrix; (3) engineering integration; and (4) design- 
production coupling. The absence of initiatives in ensuring the availability o f competent 
human resources, especially engineers, as well as the availability of systematic protocols 
to guide the course of the change process significantly and adversely affected the 
process and final form of CE in the company.
Organisational context and politics also provide important insights into the CE 
implementation that occurred. A number of important factors are identified. The 
centralised and compartmentalised organisational structure, the dominant engineering 
culture, the company’s state of maturity as well as the power sources and ‘will and skill’ 
of key personnel all contributed to the shape of CE and how it was implemented. The 
extent of the interrelationship among companies within the aircraft industry and the 
pursuit of Indonesia’s national development and industrialisation contributed to the 
decision to introduce CE while Indonesia’s economic crises forced the abrupt 
termination of its implementation.
Implementing CE is a major strategic change that requires a thorough preparation and a 
committed change champion. Internal and external contextual factors as well as power 
and politics in an organisation are influential in determining which particular set of 
operational initiatives is selected and how it is implemented.
The complexity of this change process requires more research in order to define 
operational CE model and framework more clearly. Further research focusing on 
enabling technology, external integration, and human resource aspects of CE 
implementation as well as further comparison across industries and across countries are 
recommended.
li
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Chapter 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In recent years, the importance of new product development for competitive success 
has increased, particularly in terms of the ability to bring excellent products to market 
before the competitors. The necessary speed in product development is derived from 
quick problem solving and integration of engineering understanding with critical 
manufacturing knowledge. These capabilities are also seen as critical in achieving 
cost reduction (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993).
Concurrent engineering (CE) has been introduced in a number of companies as an 
approach to product development that proposes simultaneous rather than sequential 
processes in order to achieve better, cheaper and faster product development. It has 
been advocated as a solution, particularly for Western companies, for coping with the 
shorter life cycle of the products and the continuous improvement and rapid response 
to the market, which marked the Japanese success in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The term CE was first used in the United States to capture various best practice 
initiatives in product development by several ‘high-tech’ companies involved in 
tendering for U.S. Defense procurement (Winner, Pennel, Bertrand and Slusarczuk, 
1988). Such initiatives were implemented in order to achieve three important
l
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objectives:
1) to achieve high quality products to meet customer expectations;
2) to achieve faster product development time to gain an early marketing advantage;
3) to obtain lower product development costs in order to stay competitive.
As high-tech and complex industries typically have a long product development time, 
CE was initially proposed as a means of minimising this. Over the years, the 
popularity o f CE has grown (Patti, Gilbert and Hartman, 1997), and been adopted 
across industries and countries. Along with this growing popularity, the rhetoric 
around CE’s objectives and advantages has also increased. The objectives have been 
expanded to encompass the total effectiveness o f the product development process, 
considering every aspect of the product life cycle from conceptualisation to disposal. 
The term CE has become a fuzzy concept with this change in its scope, because it 
means different things to different people and hence has many definitions (e.g. 
Winner, et al, 1988, Cleetus, 1992).
In this study, CE is conceptualised as a strategic approach to product development 
that relies on a multi-disciplinary approach to integrate all product life cycle 
considerations up-front, minimise changes in the later stages of development and 
maximise overlap and parallel activities in order to produce products that meet 
customer expectations with reduced lead time and cost. This conceptualisation o f CE 
is used to guide in the empirical investigation.
In the research literature, a CE approach typically means that the product 
development process has distinct features of organisational integration, holistic design 
and concurrence processes (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert, and Zainuddin, 
1998). A CE product development project is often associated with bringing together
2
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departmental representatives across functions in cross-functional teams, emphasising 
early and intensive dialogue between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ functions, using 
collocation to foster further effective communication, and utilising advanced 
computer technology for complex development tasks.
Taking these features into account, CE calls for an organisational arrangement which 
is designed differently to the traditional ‘functional silos’ in the sequential product 
development process. The sequential arrangement usually employs a ‘throw over the 
wall’ approach (Stoll, 1990), where the task of developing a new product is handed 
over sequentially from one function to the next, i.e. from design to manufacturing, 
and then to sales and marketing. This arrangement is associated with problems o f time 
and cost as well as losing the focus on the customer’s desires. For a concurrent 
process, Wheelwright and Clark (1993) suggest the formation of a ‘heavyweight’ 
project team in which the project manager has direct access to, and is responsible for, 
the work of all those involved in the project. This arrangement is believed to be able 
to overcome most problems associated with the traditional sequential approach in 
delivering better products faster and cheaper.
1.2 Research Problems
During this period of the growth in popularity o f CE, an Indonesian aircraft 
manufacturing company (due to confidentiality issues, the pseudonym ‘Indaco’ has 
been used) decided to adopt this approach in its new development program o f a 100- 
passenger jet airplane. This decision raised questions about CE’s suitability for the 
IndacQ context, which in turn, led to the researcher’s interest to investigate the process 
of CE introduction. As an engineer who has worked in Indaco for 13 years, the
3
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researcher has first hand experience and understanding of Indaco and its context.
The decision to use CE by Indaco also raised more fundamental questions about the 
process o f introducing CE in general. Despite the growing research literature on CE, 
there is very little empirical research on its introduction in an organisation (Gerwin 
and Susman, 1996). The CE approach is often presented as the application of new 
tools or methods, emphasising the result, e.g. the percentage of time and cost saving 
compared with the previous approach, rather than on the process.
CE is claimed as able to overcome the barriers for competing in an increasingly tough 
environment. Its introduction, however, is far from easy. Moving away from the 
sequential process, overcoming the functional silos and associated ‘throw over the 
wall’ attitudes to create integrated processes involves not only technological change 
but also substantial organisational and cultural changes. Despite the growing literature 
on the importance of managing change for organisations that undergo technological 
and organisational changes (e.g. McLoughlin and Clark, 1994; Carnall, 1991), there is 
very little in CE literature that has paid attention to this change process.
The CE research literature can be broadly divided into two main groups: firstly, 
engineering which focuses on manufacturing and design automation and secondly, the 
management of technology and innovation (Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). The first is 
heavily influenced by the engineering knowledge domain and primarily concerned 
with the technical aspect of complex development process (e.g. Kusiak, 1993; Syan 
and Menon, 1994). The aim is to develop various “enabling technologies” to support 
CE implementation, such as software development for Design for X-ilities (DFX) and 
Quality Function Deployment (QFD), integration simulation models, etc. (e.g. Syan 
and Menon, 1994; Halevi and Weill, 1992). Although this domain acknowledges that
4
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process complexity has implications for organisation and management (e.g. Vasilash, 
1990, Evans, 1990), it does not explore this aspect further.
The second grouping in the CE literature is grounded in the management of 
technology and innovation domain. This literature recognises the complexity o f the 
process but is primarily concerned with the organisational complexity and the 
implication of CE initiatives, such as the cross-functional team and the heavyweight 
project team in work organisation and management (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Adler,
1995). This domain often ignores the complexity of the CE process and therefore does 
not provide enough depth and richness in its analysis. Klein and Maurer’s study 
(1995), for example, acknowledges the existence o f more than one group supporting a 
single product by mentioning the existence o f product teams and process teams (who 
support the product teams), but focuses only on the communication mechanism within 
a single team and between the team and management. In this domain, CE might be in 
danger of becoming a management fashion (Abrahamson, 1996) emphasising the 
rhetoric o f the objectives and advantages of the approach. Only in the mid 1990s did 
detailed empirical studies of CE implementation begin to appear in the literature but 
the complex and often messy change process that is associated with CE has not been 
adequately addressed (e.g. Haddad, 1996; Klein and Maurer, 1995).
In order to address this knowledge gap, this study uses the introduction process of CE 
at Indaco as a case study and seeks to provide a rich and in-depth empirical study of 
this process using a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson, 1994) as its 
research framework to analyse organisational change. The processual framework is 
used because it provides the necessary in-depth and longitudinal analysis of the 
introduction process by considering historical events, internal and external contextual
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factors and the organisational politics surrounding the process. It enables the study to 
bring out the dynamic reality of the messy change process underlying the application 
of the new approach often superficially seen as smooth. So far, this form of research 
has never been used to investigate CE implementation and by doing so, this study 
aims to make a significant contribution to CE literature.
Apart from the theoretical and conceptual contribution to the literature, this research 
is also expected to offer practical benefits, particularly for companies that attempt to 
introduce CE in their new product development program. By thoroughly investigating 
the introduction process o f CE, this study provides information that will assist the 
implementation process and increase the readiness for technological, organisational 
and cultural changes that are inherent in introducing CE.
In addition, the effect of cultural differences in business and workplace is strongly 
advocated by several researchers (e.g. Hall, 1960; Trompenaars, 1994; Hofstede, 
1984) and widely recognised (Katz and Seifer, 1996; Morden, 1995; Foster, 1995; 
Weldon, 1996; Bridges, Floersheim and John, 1996) albeit some criticisms, 
particularly upon its deterministic influence (Kanter and Corn, 1994; Wilkinson,
1996). Although CE has been applied across countries (Ashley, 1990), cultural aspect 
of its implementation has never been explored. Therefore, by investigating the 
introduction o f CE in a country different from its cultural origin, this study may 
provide insights in implementing and adjusting CE to culturally different context.
1.3 Research Objectives
This study investigates the process of introducing CE into Indaco, an Indonesian
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aircraft manufacturing company. The case study specifically involves the aircraft 
industry where CE has been a very influential part on product development initiatives 
(Winner et al, 1988). The first main objective o f the study is to explore and bring out 
the dynamics of introducing a ‘vague and fuzzy’ concept, such as CE in a particular 
and changing context that is significantly different from its origins. The second main 
objective is to longitudinally capture the dynamic reality o f the change process during 
the introduction of CE using the processual change analysis (Pettigrew, 1973; 1997; 
Dawson, 1994). Processual analysis enables the exploration of the ‘constellation of 
forces’(Hofstede, 1997) shaping the character of the process and its outcomes.
Using this processual change framework, research questions are developed around the 
following two main issues:
• Defining the process of CE introduction in Indaco:
1) What does the introduction of CE in a product development project look like 
in practice? What are the key characteristics of CE that are significantly 
different from the traditional development process?
2) What stages occur in the introduction of CE and how does the organisation 
introduce it?
• Explaining how the process took a particular form:
3) What are the key factors that influence the change process?
4) How do those factors influence such a transformation?
Thus, this study explores the way CE is shaped and transformed into a specific form 
during its introduction in Indaco. The generic holistic, integration and concurrent 
features o f CE (Zanko et al., 1998) and the particular model o f CE from a Western 
aircraft manufacturing company (due to confidentiality issues, the pseudonym
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‘Westaco’ has been used), are viewed as the substance of change. This ‘substance of 
change’ was transformed into a specific model o f CE during the implementation 
process as the result of adjustment processes and was influenced by contextual factors 
as well as organisational power and politics.
1.4 Processual Approach to Change
Processual research is defined as “research concerning any process that exists 
between two points in time, regardless of whether the actual processes are 
observable” (Tuttle, 1997, p. 350). Pettigrew (1997) defines a process as “a sequence 
of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time in 
context” (p. 338). He further contends that while resulting from actions, processes 
cannot be explained only by reference to individuals or groups. Actions are embedded 
in context, which limit individuals or groups information, insight and influence. 
Contexts are shaping and shaped by actions. Processual analysis draws on phenomena 
at vertical and horizontal levels o f analysis of the context of a process and the 
interconnection between those levels through time (Pettigrew, 1990).
A source o f change is the assymetries between levels o f context, where processes at 
different levels often have their own momentum, pace and trajectory (Pettigrew,
1997). The processual approach emphasises that change, particularly a large scale 
transition, is a complex and dynamic process and should not be treated as a series of 
linear events (Dawson, 1994). Dawson (1994) argues that organisations undergoing 
change should be studied ‘as it happens’ so that the processes can be examined over 
time and in context. He further argues that the dominant or official version of change 
may often reflect the political position o f certain key individuals or groups rather than
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being a true representation of what actually happens.
The usefulness o f the processual framework in studying an organisation’s dynamic 
process o f change or decision-making can be seen in Pettigrew’s (1973) study of 
politics in decision-making. This study sought to complement existing work by 
exploring the nature of organisation politics in the context of an innovative decision 
process. The decisions were empirically tracked back to find out what actually 
happened rather than what ideally was expected or was represented by particular 
actors reflecting the argument that an organisation or any other social system may 
most usefully be explored as an ongoing system with a past, a present, and a future.
Pettigrew (1997) offers five guiding assumptions for carrying out processual analysis:
1) Embeddedness across a number of levels o f analysis.
2) Temporal interconnection between past, present and future.
3) A role in explanation for context and action; action derives process.
4) A search for holistic rather than linear explanation.
5) A need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes.
Reflecting the above guiding assumptions, Dawson (1994) formulates the processual 
approach to cover three stages that reflect the temporal elements of change and three 
main groups of determinants used to explain the process of change. The three 
temporal stages are (1) the conception of a need to change, (2) the process of 
organisational transition, and (3) the operation o f new work practices and procedures. 
In between these stages lie complex non-linear processes of change. Transition rarely 
occurs in a neat linear fashion; it is difficult to identify the start or completion of a 
major change. According to Dawson (1994), three basic determinants o f processual 
change are (1) the substance, (2) the context and (3) the politics of change. The
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substance of change refers to the type and scale o f organisational change. The context 
of change refers to the past and present, external and internal operating environments 
as well as the influence of future projections and expectations on current operating 
practice. The politics of change refers to the ‘political activities’ of consultations, 
negotiations, conflicts and resistance that occur at various levels within and outside an 
organisation during the process of change.
Pettigrew (1973) considers that behaviour observed in a change process cannot be 
adequately explained without reference to the past. A historical perspective on both 
internal and external contexts is central to understanding the opportunities, constraints 
and organisationally defined route to change (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991, p. 610). 
The coexistence o f a number of competing histories of change can significantly shape 
the process and outcomes of an ongoing change program. The context is divided into 
the internal organisational context and the context pertaining to the environment in 
which the organisation operates (Dawson, 1994).
The third basic determinant of change in the processual approach is the politics of 
managing change. Pettigrew (1973) considers the organisation as an open political 
system in which its sub-units are both interdependent and have different interests that 
may lead to conflicts. An understanding of organisational politics should be central to 
any approach that seeks to explain the process of managing transition, e.g. middle 
managers’ commitment toward the intended change cannot be taken for granted 
(Porter, Crampon and Smith, 1976). Variations in commitment can significantly 
influence the success of the change process (Guth and McMillan, 1989), particularly 
in cases where differing vested interests between management levels and functions do 
not align with strategic objectives (Wilkinson, 1983). Following Child (1972), it is
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possible to view these strategic choices as being modified and challenged collectively 
by the workforce or by individual and groups o f managers who are responsible for 
implementing a strategy.
Using the processual framework, this study specifically explores the process of 
introducing CE in Indaco. The important o f the processual framework with its context 
and politic determinants, particularly in analysing technological changes is 
emphasised by Thomas (1994). In power process perspective, Thomas (1994) sees 
technological change as a process and the relationship between technology and 
organisation is dynamic which only visible by extending the temporal and 
organisational context and assessing the role o f power and politics.
However, in this study the organisation is not viewed as the substance of change as in 
the Pettigrew’s (1973) and Dawson’s (1994) studies. Rather, based on research 
objectives outlined in the previous section, this study takes the initiation to establish 
CE as the substance o f change that undergoes the shaping and forming processes 
while being implemented in different organisational contexts. Such a framework is 
expected to provide the process dynamics o f such undertaking that are often ignored 
as most case studies focus on a discrete process o f change.
CE initiatives introduced in Indaco appeared in the form of a vague and general 
concept with a set o f broad generic features. Typically, the translation and adoption of 
such a general concept depends on the contextual factors and the means used to 
introduce it including the implementation process employed (Leonard-Barton, 1995; 
Rogers, 1995; Badham (ed.), 1993). This translation and adoption process results in a 
specific model. Thus, this study explores how a ‘Western’ model o f CE was 
introduced to the company and was gradually shaped and transformed into a specific
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‘Indaco’ model by its contextual factors and the organisational power and politics.
The context o f change is represented by the internal and external environment o f the 
company. In this study, the context o f change is o f particular interest because it 
involves transferring the substance of change (the CE approach) into a context that is 
significantly different from its origins, namely Indaco organisational within the 
Indonesia’s national context, apart from operate in the same industry. This has 
implication for the implementation process. Adopting Schneider and Barsoux (1997) 
this study frames the environment as sets o f contextual factors consisting o f society, 
industry, organisation, and function/department that capture both soft and hard 
aspects o f the environment. These contextual factors not only influence and affect the 
change process but also interact with one another.
The politics o f change is represented by activities carried out by individuals involved 
in the attempt to bring CE into the organisation. By using their power and by 
engaging in organisational politics, these individuals continuously affect the change 
process, influence the outcome of the process and determine the dominant spheres at 
any points in the process. In this framework, organisational power and politics act 
either as the catalyst mediating the effect o f the contextual factors in the process.
Arranging all these three determinants o f processual framework, the general approach 
taken in this study is illustrated as Figure 1-1.
1.5 Research Strategy
Adopting the processual approach and the argument that theory and methodology are 
interdependent (Pettigrew, 1973), this study is designed as a qualitative, longitudinal
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in-depth, single case study. Using three generic and interrelated features of CE 
(Zanko, et al, 1998) as the basis o f its CE literature review, this study identifies CE 
initiatives as consisting of five generic elements: (1) organisational integration, (2) 
communication and decision-making mechanism, (3) enabling technology, (4) 
external integration, and (5) human resource.
External Context
X_____________________ y
Internal Context
Organisational Power and Politics
Figure 1-1: General Conceptual Framework: Processual Approach
Using this set o f initiatives as a reference point, this study investigates the CE 
introduction by focusing on two of the five categories: (1) organisational integration 
and (2) communication and decision-making mechanism. CE initiatives in these two 
categories include cross-functional teams, heavyweight management, formal 
communication, collaboration, inter-team communication, and decision-making 
mechanism. These initiatives are investigated thoroughly. CE initiatives in other 
categories, e.g. enabling technology, external integration and human resources, are 
also discussed and their interrelations with the focus initiatives are also investigated
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but not in such depth. Internal and external contextual factors as well as the 
organisational power and politics o f this transformation process are identified. 
Focusing on the internal context and micro-politics in the organisation, influences of 
these factors on the process are investigated. External contexts, e.g. societal and 
industrial contexts, are broadly discussed.
To obtain a rich and in-depth case study that allows such processual analysis, within 
almost four years research period a significant amount o f time was allocated to two 
field studies, each of duration of 5 to 6 months. Normally, the development process of 
a new product platform in the aircraft industry is 7 to 9 years, which made it 
impossible, in term of resource and time available, for this research to investigate the 
overall process. The field study, therefore, used two main strategies to fulfil its 
objectives:
1) Observing the process as it happened through participant observation, interviews 
and documentary review during the field study periods.
2) Reconstructing the relevant significant events through a combination of 
interviews, documentary review, and the experience o f the researcher as an 
‘insider’ in the organisation.
The insider position of the researcher provides immense advantage in carrying out the 
research. The researcher’s past experience in the company, before the research began 
in June 1996, enabled her to reveal the detail o f the complex change process and 
provided understanding to the context as well as access to the data and people 
relevant to the process. However, it also had disadvantages. This involves cross­
cultural and language problems as the researcher and most o f respondents and 
materials are Indonesian and use Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian’s national
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language. The researcher as an engineer had to deal with theory of management as 
part of the research for such a domain. As an insider, the researcher acknowledges 
potential biases due to 13 years o f personal involvement in the company, such as the 
opinions of the fairness of some company’s policies and the character o f some 
respondents. To minimise the effect o f these biases, the researcher intentionally put 
her personal knowledge of such issues as a background information that needs further 
data collection and vigorous verification through cross-checking and triangulation.
1.6 Case Study
The case study focused on the introduction of CE in the development o f a new 100- 
passenger aircraft program (pseudonym as the PLI Program) of Indaco. The 100- 
passenger jet PLI was the third aircraft designed by Indaco after the 35-passenger 
commuter PLC (co-designed with a European company) and the 50-passenger 
commuter PLP. The PLI Program started at the end of 1993. Its completion was 
scheduled for 2004 but the program, due to the Indonesian financial crisis, was 
prematurely terminated in 1999.
The introduction of CE, modelled on that o f Westaco, started in 1995. A thorough 
investigation and analysis o f the case study revealed that the CE implementation in 
this program was a complex transformation process. The study found four stages that 
reflect this complex multidimensional process. Each stage was characterised by a 
distinct program organisation. The focal CE initiatives (i.e. cross-functional team, 
heavyweight management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team 
communication, and decision-making mechanism) in each stage also differed. At each 
stage, there was a degree of increase in some initiatives, others became weaker or
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remained less strong. In general, it tended to deviate from the intended Westaco 
model.
Analysis of the context and politics o f change reveals the underlying factors affecting 
this complex transformation. The analysis of the CE initiatives showed that the lack 
of competence and systematic protocols significantly influenced the character o f each 
stage o f the transformation. The strong technology sub-culture in the company was an 
important factor that led to the formation of two parallel design and production teams 
in the PLI Program rather than a single integrated one. This was also' the factor 
underlying the rivalry between the PLI Program and the functional design units that 
led to the lack of competency in the ‘program team’. In addition, Indonesian’s cultural 
tendencies also influenced the communication and decision-making mechanisms.
Other external contexts played a more remote but nevertheless vital role. The industry 
was the most significant factor in the push to introduce CE, while the contemporary 
crises in Indonesia led to the termination of the Program and CE experiment. The 
analysis o f the politics o f change revealed a complex and messy intertwining o f the 
contexts, the power sources as well as the skill and will o f key personnel who were 
responsible for various actions and non actions instrumental in the process.
1.7 Contribution of the Thesis
The thesis provides significant conceptual and theoretical contributions to CE 
literature. It provides a rich and detailed empirical account on dynamic reality o f  
introducing CE by using the processual framework that takes into account the 
contextual factors and organisational power and politics surrounding the change
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process. In doing so, this thesis offers an operationalisation o f CE through classifying 
CE initiatives into several groups, defining the dimensions o f each initiative, and 
defining the possible range of each dimension that could be developed further for 
measurement o f the level to which CE is applied. In addition, by taking a company 
from a developing country as the object o f the case study, this thesis also provides 
insights o f the probable underlying causes o f introduction other than commercial 
benefits.
This thesis also offers practical benefits for companies that attempt to introduce CE. 
By thoroughly investigating the introduction process of CE, this thesis provides useful 
insights in increasing the readiness for technological, organisational and cultural 
changes that are inherent in introducing CE. It also increases the awareness of the 
messiness of such process by outlining the roles and the dynamics of the 
organisational context and politics in such a change. For practitioners from 
developing countries that have a context different from which CE was originated, the 
case study provides useful insights in implementing and adjusting CE.
1.8 Thesis Structure
The thesis is arranged in the following structure:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Concurrent Engineering and Conceptual Framework
Chapter 3: Context and Politics o f Change and Conceptual Framework
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
Chapter 5: Indaco: the Company and Its External Context
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Chapter 6: 
Chapter 7: 
Chapter 8: 
Chapter 9: 
Chapter 10:
The Substance of Change: CE Implementation 
Contextual Explanation o f Change 
Politics o f Change
Dynamics of Change: Summary Discussion 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapters 2 to 4 provide reviews of the relevant literature that leading to the 
refinement of the general conceptual framework adopted from the processual 
approach and the methodology employed in undertaking the research. Chapter 2 
provides conceptualisation and operationalisation o f introducing CE as a process. 
Chapter 3 reviews the organisational context and politics and conceptualises and 
operationalises them as the explanation of the change process. Chapter 4 describes the 
appropriate methodology employed in this study.
Chapters 5 to 8 present the case study. Chapter 5 describes the company and its 
industrial and national contexts and provides a bird eye view of CE introduction 
process. Chapter 6 describes the complex process of introducing CE, focusing on 
organisational integration and the communication and decision-making mechanism 
aspects. Chapters 7 and 8 offer some explanation of the change process. Chapter 7 
discusses the contribution of other CE initiatives, i.e. the inner context, as well as the 
wider organisational context in shaping the transformation process of CE initiatives. 
Chapter 8 discusses the influence o f organisational power and politics.
Chapters 9 and 10 are the concluding chapters. Chapter 9 provides a summary of 
research findings and discusses the correlation between these findings and the 
relevant research literature. Chapter 10 outlines conclusions, conceptual and practical 
implications, and recommendations for future research in CE.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
This study explores the process o f introducing concurrent engineering (CE) as a 
distinctive approach to new product development approach. In this chapter, CE 
approach and various literatures associated with it are discussed to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical basis for investigating such process. CE is conceptualised 
as an approach to product development, which seeks to achieve simultaneous rather 
than sequential processes. It is defined as a systematic multi-disciplinary approach to 
product development that focuses on integrating all product life cycle considerations 
at the outset o f the process to achieve customer expectations with maximum quality, 
and reduced lead-time and cost.
Guided by the processual approach, the introduction o f CE is viewed as a change 
process in which the concept o f CE was adapted and continuously shaped. Using the 
identified generic features o f CE (Zanko et al, 1998) as a framework in reviewing the 
CE-related literature, namely: holistic design, organisational integration and 
concurrence, CE is conceptualised as a set o f initiatives under several categories, i.e.
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organisational integration, communication and decision-making mechanisms, 
enabling technology, external integration, and human resources. This set of CE 
initiatives is conceptualised as the substance o f change in the processual analysis.
This study focuses on initiatives within the organisational integration and the 
communication and decision-making mechanisms, which include the cross-functional 
team, heavyweight management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team 
communication, and decision-making mechanism. Each initiative is reviewed and 
operationalised into dimensions and sub-dimensions. Drawing from the 
interdependent nature of the generic features (Zanko et al., 1998), initiatives in the 
other three categories are also reviewed and conceptualised as influential to the 
longitudinal process o f implementation of the focus initiatives.
The chapter begins with an overview of CE within the product development 
management literature. It is followed by a review of CE features and initiatives. This 
review focuses on the organisational integration and the communication and decision­
making mechanisms. Initiatives in these aspects are included as the substance of 
change in the processual analysis adopted in this study and operationalised into 
dimensions and sub-dimensions. This leads to a refinement of the general framework 
incorporating CE initiatives in those categories as the substance o f change that are 
interrelated and interdependent o f each other.
2.2 Concurrent Engineering and New Product Development 
Management
In an ever increasing competitive and globalised environment, high-tech companies in
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particular, are striving to improve their new product development performance. Some 
researchers have argued that improving this area is the only way to survive in such 
competition (Trygg, 1993; Wheelwright and Clark, 1993), which means a need for the 
ability to bring higher quality new products to market faster and cheaper. 
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) argue that this ability involves solving problems 
quickly and integrating insight and understanding from the engineering perspectives 
with critical knowledge from the manufacturing area which are critical in achieving 
cost reduction in its final product.
Concurrent engineering (CE), which emerged from Western high-tech industries in 
the late 1980s, has been represented as an approach to acquire these capabilities (e.g. 
Braham, 1992; Nevins and Whittney 1989). This approach calls for a change from a 
sequential to a simultaneous process in product development. In particular, CE has 
been seen as an approach that can help Western companies to acquire the ability to 
carry out faster and integrated product development that is responsive to market 
expectancy (Evans, 1990; Gordon and Isenhour, 1990; Syan, 1994). Cleland (1991) 
argues that the success of Japanese manufacturing industries, one of the stimuli to the 
formulation of the CE approach, was derived from characteristics of their product 
development, such as problem sharing and mutual respect between design and 
manufacturing, close relationship with suppliers, attention to reliability and quality, 
and cross-functional involvement at each stage. Japanese companies have followed 
approaches similar to CE long before the CE became popular in the West (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Bowonder and Miyake, 1992).
Developments in many large Western corporations in the post-war period, notably in 
the aerospace, automotive and electronics industries, showed the following tendencies
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(e.g. Iansiti, 1995; Cleland, 1991):
1) increasing specialisation due to increasing complexity o f the product,
2) compartmentalisation o f functions that lead to ‘stove-piping’ and ‘silo-ing’, and
3) linear sequential process for efficiency purposes, such as to ease the co-ordination 
and control of tasks.
These led to compartmentalisation with specialists looking inward within their own 
speciality (Clausing, 1994).
This compartmentalisation is characterised by the traditional ‘relay race’ in which the 
tasks of development are ‘thrown over the wall’ from an upstream function to the 
downstream function in the development process (Cleland, 1991). In design and 
production activities, for example, the sequential approach means that the product is 
designed as completely as possible before being handed over to production (Riedel 
and Pawar, 1991). The apparent benefits o f the sequential approach as a means of 
managing complexity include the formation of simple managerial tasks, escaping 
early investment for down-stream activities, relatively safe and risk free, simple 
communication channels, less frequent interaction, the insulation o f the design team 
from marketing and production pressures.
The sequential approach, however, causes many problems associated with the cost 
and schedule, which, in part, reflect conflicts among functions due to differences in 
attitudes and values. This lead to communication difficulties that hamper integration 
(Cleland, 1991). The approach is inherently problematic in upstream-downstream 
interaction (e.g. communication, co-operation, co-ordination, and goal displacement). 
These disadvantages include (Riedel and Pawar, 1991):
1) it increases the possibility o f longer lead-times for product introduction;
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2) it is less flexible and less innovative;
3) passing the tasks from one group to the other is often accompanied by crucial 
problems at the interface that cause a hiccough-like process with stops and starts;
4) bottle-necks demotivate specialists and may lead to interpersonal and inter­
departmental conflicts;
5) the isolation o f specialists may cause technology mismatch to both the supplier’s 
and customer’s expectations as well as the competitor development; and
6) the risk of design modification at the production stage that increases both the lead- 
times and cost of development.
A number o f authors have argued that the ‘time to market’ for new products has 
become central to competitiveness in 1990s (i.e. Adachi, Shih and Enkawa, 1994; 
Cleland, 1991; and Trygg, 1993). Faster lead-time means getting ahead o f  
competition and possibly lower development cost which can lead to winning in the 
market (Cleland, 1991). Using their simple formula, Carter and Baker (1992) show 
that a 2-month launching delay for a product with 12-month market window leads to 
24% loss in total lifetime revenue. For manufacturing companies, a 6-month late will 
result in a 34% reduction of potential profit over the life of the product, while a 20% 
cost over run will result in just 8% reduced of potential profit (Harrel, Emanuel and 
Kroll, 1995). Other advantages of being earlier include the ability to charge the 
premium price, to incorporate more up to date technology, and to response faster to 
changing market needs and taste (Trygg, 1993).
Companies strive to make a shift toward faster product development process. Yet, as 
Trygg (1993) has noted, product development has also become increasingly complex 
with longer development time, increasing cost, increasing product complexity,
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decreasing life cycle time, more frequent new technology, more rapid change 
demand, and increasing competition and glamorisation. Within this context, CE, 
characterised with simultaneous activities, has been prescribed by its advocates as a 
major solution to deal with the problems of product development and the need to stay 
competitive in 1990s (Clausing, 1994, Trygg, 1993). Braham (1992) even coined CE 
as a condition o f survival for manufacturing companies.
2.2.1 Concurrent Engineering History
CE is not an entirely new concept (Smith, 1997); it has antecedents, e.g. design for 
manufacturing and assembly (DFM/A) and simultaneous engineering (SE). The 
formal history o f CE started when the U.S.’s Department o f Defense (DoD) asked the 
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to investigate CE and its possible application to 
weapon system acquisition in the 1987. This project aimed at improving concurrency 
in product development programs (de Graaf, 1996). Prior to this project, the Defence 
Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) had undertaken a study o f the emerging 
new product development approach in 13 U.S. major weapon system suppliers 
(Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). The IDA reviewed those various initiatives on the 
DARPA Concurrent Engineering Workshop in December 1987. After the workshop, 
the IDA study group continued the investigation, contacted many experts, sponsored 
several workshops, and visited companies involved in the initiatives (Winner et al., 
1988).
It was understood that to achieve concurrency, U.S. companies had used various 
similar approaches for decades as an inherent part o f their development process 
(Owen, 1992). This U.S. Government initiative, however, focused its attention on
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large high-tech companies engaged with the government’s defence contracts such as 
General Electric (GE) and Boeing (de Graaf, 1996). The Concurrent Engineering 
Research Center (CERC) was founded in West Virginia University to support the 
initiative with the enabling tools (de Graaf, 1996). Although the formalisation of the 
concept occurred in the U.S. as a result o f the DoD initiative, within a few years CE 
had become more widely adopted within various industries across geographic 
boundaries (Ashley, 1990).
2.2.2 Concurrent Engineering Definition
CE was initially proposed as a means to minimise product development time. 
However, its focus and scope has been progressively elaborated in successive 
publications (Prasad. 1996). A tendency toward a wider scope o f CE can be traced 
from the evolution of its definitions. The first formal definition of CE, also the most 
widely cited, is provided in the EDA report R338 by Winner et al. (1988) as the 
following:
A systematic approach to the integrated, concurrent design of products and their related 
processes, including manufacture and support. This approach is intended to cause developers, 
from the outset, to consider all elements of product life cycle from conception through 
disposal, including quality, cost, schedule and user requirements (Winner et al., 1988, p. v ).
Built on the earlier definition, another widely cited definition of CE is offered by 
CERC (Cleetus, 1992; 1993):
CE is a systematic approach to integrate product development that emphasis response to 
customer expectations and embodies team values of co-operation, trust and sharing in such a 
manner that decision making proceeds with large interval of parallel working by all life 
cycle perspectives early in the process, synchronised by comparatively brief exchanges to 
produce consensus (Cleetus. 1993. p. 43. bold original).
The broadest definition is offered by the Computer Acquisition and Logistic Support
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(CALS) Office, which emphases the logistic support aspect after the product 
delivered to the customer as part of the design consideration in the product 
development process:
CE is a systematic approach to creating a product design that considers all elements of product 
life cycle from conception through disposal ... CE defines simultaneously the product, its 
manufacturing process, and all other required life cycle processes such as logistic support. CE 
is not the arbitrary elimination of a phase of the existing, sequential, feed forward engineering 
process, but rather the co-design of all downstream processes toward a more all- 
encompassing, cost-effective optimum... CE is an integrated design approach that takes into 
account all desired downstream characteristics during upstream phases to produce a more 
robust design that is tolerant of manufacturing and use variation at less cost than sequential 
design. (CALS Office, 1991, p. iv)
Other definitions of CE vary in their scope and emphasis. They range from a narrow 
scope considering only simultaneous design of product and its tooling (Weill, 1992) 
to very broad with an emphasis on multi-disciplinary (Clausing, 1993; Liu and 
Fisscher, 1993), involving design, manufacturing and maintenance (Vos, 1993) 
marketing, quality control, purchasing (Slade, 1993) and even disposal activities (Wu 
and Choong, 1993). The emphasis in these definitions ranges from organisational 
issues, such as establishing multifunctional teams (Clausing, 1993, Slade, 1993) and 
achieving earliest possible integration of resources and experience (Wu and Choong, 
1993), to technical issues, such as co-ordination methodology (Liu and Fisscher, 
1993) and iteration procedures to solve a multi-criterion optimisation problem 
(Olhoff, Lund and Rasmussen, 1993).
In short, CE can be viewed from the narrow focus of integrating product and process 
engineering (product design and production process design) into a wider scope of 
integrating the whole product life cycle. The narrow focus of integrating design and 
production is o f particular interest to many researchers (e.g. Anderson, 1993; Riedel 
and Pawar, 1991; Krishnan, 1996), while the wider scope is less extensively 
explored.This reflects the engineering focus of much o f the CE literature on those
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themes that have been discussed since the early 20th century (Smith, 1997). In fact, 
there are two distinct research traditions in CE: system engineering oriented 
manufacturing automation approach and management o f innovation and technology 
approach (Moffat and Gerwin, 1994).
Focusing on the design and production interface, Riedel and Pawar (1991) describe 
CE as a means to prepare for production while the design process is still in progress. 
They argue that CE involves two risks: locking in investment in manufacturing 
facilities early in the design stage and the possible modification of facilities as the 
process unfolds. These risks are traded-off with the gains: being early to market, 
minimal modification due to manufacturing difficulties, maximum compatibility with 
manufacturing facility, and more efficient production. They further argue that the 
choice between sequential and concurrent processes has a strategic impact. Its 
adoption should consider three strategic issues: time benefit versus cost o f the risk, 
the firm ability to lay initial investment early, and the availability o f competent 
engineers and managers (Riedel and Pawar, 1991). In short, they see CE as a strategic 
approach to improve new product development performance, and therefore to 
organisational survival, by delivering products to the market, faster, with higher 
quality and lower cost. However, Riedel and Pawar also illustrated that this strategic 
approach is not suitable for every context and type of product development project.
Many concerns and issues in CE have been addressed in other knowledge domains 
such as product innovation, organisational design, design management and project 
management. In these areas CE appears to ‘ re-disco ver’ and integrate concepts that 
have previously been addressed elsewhere. Smith (1997) has argued that CE is a 
summary of best practices in product development rather than the adoption of a
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radically new set of ideas. In 1986, for example, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986), have 
argued that design and manufacturing overlap enhances shared responsibility and co­
operation, stimulates involvement and commitment, sharpens problem solving focus, 
encourages initiative taking, develops diversified skills, and heightens sensitivity 
toward market conditions. They also observed that this overlap creates more tension 
and conflict and requires extensive interaction among team members and with 
suppliers. Similarly, the issues surrounding integration and differentiation have been 
addressed for quite some time in organisational design literature (e.g. Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Burns and Stalker, 1961)
In general, CE remains a fuzzy term. CE means different things to different people. 
People look at CE with different emphases that lead to different definitions and 
different names. Other concepts have also been proposed to refer to similar 
approaches, e.g. synchronised engineering, simultaneous engineering, collaborative 
engineering, design for excellence, design for manufacturing, process driven design, 
integrated product development, parallel product development, team approach, life 
cycle engineering, black-box engineering, early manufacturing involvement, and 
integrated design and engineering (Trygg, 1993). Most descriptions in the literature 
present CE as an unstructured set o f concepts and tools (Blackburn, Hoedemaker, and 
Wassenhove, 1996).
CE is variably presented as a set of methods, a methodology, an environment, a 
technique, a systematic approach, or a strategy. This variation o f opinion makes what 
is the essential o f CE difficult to grasp (Vasilash, 1990; Trygg, 1993). Blackburn et al. 
(1996) admit the lack of a clearly defined template for CE may become an obstacle to 
its implementation. CE has all the hallmarks o f what Abrahamson (1996) called a
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management fad’ (Abrahamson, 1996). Despite this fuzziness, however, there are 
common elements in the various approaches. There is, for example, a widespread 
agreement on the main objectives of CE in developing products that satisfy customer, 
faster and with less cost (Prasad, 1996; Wu and Choong, 1993; Sharon, 1992).
To reduce terminology confusion, This study takes operational definition o f CE as a 
strategic approach to the organisation and management o f design and development 
programs that systematically relies on a cross-functional approach to integrate all 
product life cycle considerations at the outset of a program, to maximise overlap and 
parallel activities, and to minimise changes in later stages o f development processes 
so as to meet customer expectations, provide maximum product quality, and reduce 
development lead-time and cost. This working definition is intentionally broad and 
built upon various CE definitions to enable the viewing of CE comprehensively. It 
implies the wider scope of consideration in the development process than the design- 
production interface. However, it does not embrace the new product strategy or the 
marketing aspect of new products.
This working definition is operationalised into three interrelated features: holistic 
design (design integration), organisational integration, and concurrence (Zanko et al., 
1998). Holistic design refers to the extent that life cycle considerations are taken into 
account up front in order to reduce down stream cost. Organisational integration 
refers to the extent that the process taken breaks down ‘functional silos’. Concurrence 
refers to the extent that it minimises the relay races in the development process. These 
features are generic and reflect the underlying concept of CE. The use of these 
features as the basis o f operationalisation provides a clearer picture of CE and escapes 
the trap to viewing it in terms of specific tools such as computer integration and
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analytical tools (Trygg, 1993) which are often associated with CE. Rather, these 
features emphasise what such tools actually represent.
2.2.3 Achieving Concurrent Engineering
As an approach, CE is realised through the introduction of various types of 
organisational arrangement, system and procedures, and supporting tools. There is a 
tendency in CE literature towards universalism. Many researchers have attempted to 
study and define its generic elements (e.g. Trygg, 1993; Haddad, 1996). After 
reviewing successful CE practices, Trygg (1993) concluded that the generic elements 
of CE success cases are the cross-functional teams, computer integration and 
analytical methods and tools. In the cross-functional team, representatives from 
involved functions, sometimes including suppliers, collaborate to ensure that the 
design reflects both customer needs and downstream function restrictions. Computer 
integration, particularly in the form of computer-aided design and computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAD/CAM), aims to support the design and manufacturing parallel 
work. Analytical tools, such as the design for manufacturing and assembly (DFM/A) 
and the quality function deployment (QFD) seek to ensure that information needed is 
available as early as possible to reduce slack time, unnecessary re-work and the 
earliest start.
Apart from cross-functional teams, other elements remain inconsistently associated 
with CE. Evans (1990), for example, argues that computer integration is not 
absolutely necessary, and uses Japan as an illustration where, while integration is 
common, the use o f an advanced computer system is less so. The use o f computer 
integration relates to the team interaction and is more likely to be used when face to
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face interaction is not possible due to the size of the task or diverse locations. 
Computerisation eases both the technical tasks and the management of large programs 
(Evans, 1990). The tools and methods for producibility and manufacturability cannot 
be standardised, but rather they are dependent on the type of tasks and therefore cause 
variation on the way these aspects are taken into account during design decision 
process. Although computer integration and analytical tools are apparently not the 
most important elements of CE, research on CE has mainly focused on these enablers 
(e.g. Blackburn et al, 1996; Hauptman and Hirji, 1996; de Graaf, 1996; Syan and 
Menon, 1994). It seems that literature in the manufacturing automation approach is 
ahead in detailing the operationalisation on the CE concept.
Although it is widely acknowledged that introducing CE involves organisational 
change, the change processes associated with it have not been given adequate 
attention. Much research in CE implementation has focused on the result, i.e. 
comparing the previous old, traditional and typically functional-based development 
process with the cross functional based CE process, rather than on the change process 
per se. Haddad’s (1996) study is an example o f this. Although it covers a reasonably 
long period of time, from 1991 to 1994, this study did not capture the longitudinal and 
contextual aspects in the implementation process. The CE literature tends to be 
general and conceptual, with a strong tendency towards ungrounded prescriptions 
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996), and does not address the problematic nature of its 
implementation that involves organisational and cultural change. This may contribute 
to the growing rhetoric of the excellence o f CE that neglects the detail transitional 
aspects o f its introduction and put CE in the danger o f becoming an Abrahamson’s 
(1996) ‘management fashion’. Zbaracki (1998), in his evolutionary model of rhetoric 
and reality, shows a similar pattern in which the rhetoric aspect o f Total Quality
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Management (TQM) has driven out its technical aspect which in turn had led to 
decreasing popularity o f TQM.
Detailed empirical studies of CE only started to appear in mid-1990s (Gerwin and 
Susman, 1996). In her study in the U.S. automotive industry, Haddad (1996) presents 
the CE implementation model (CEIM) for operationalising CE. This model argues 
that the central mechanism of CE is the establishment of product-focused, cross­
functional teams to foster functional integration, information sharing and 
collaborative problem solving. These teams are supported by organisational and 
technological enablers. Organisational enablers involve changes in organisational 
structure and practice such as cross-group communication, decentralisation and 
participative decision-making and human resource practices that breaking down 
traditional knowledge boundaries and control. Technological enablers are structural 
artefacts, equipment, systems and physical design to support the teams such as 
building design, computer aided design and computer networking. Other empirical 
studies into CE, albeit at a simple team level o f analysis, can also be seen in Harrel et 
al. (1995), and Klein and Maurer (1995).
2.3 Generic Features of Concurrent Engineering
This study uses three inter-related generic features of CE: holistic, integration and 
concurrence, as proposed by Zanko et al. (1998). These features address particular 
problems experienced in the product development process and what CE seeks to 
achieve as well as the means that can be used. In this review, the initiatives associated 
with the means to achieve each feature (i.e. organisational arrangement, system and 
procedure, and supporting tools) are laid out and become the basis o f CE initiatives as
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the operationalisation of a CE approach in the next section.
2.3.1 Design Integration
One o f the main objectives of CE is reducing lead-time. Design changes disrupt 
product development process, delay it, and increase its cost. Changes in later stages 
disrupt more. However, changes are inherent in the development process (Stoll, 
1990). A particular problem associated with the linear-sequential process in product 
development is that it leads to an increased number of design changes throughout the 
development process, especially at the interfaces due to the practice in which one 
group of specialists do the work, make decisions, and ‘throw them over the wall’ to 
the next group. Such practice can create problems o f wasted time, weak 
understanding, and inadequate commitment to earlier decisions (Clausing, 1994).
Clausing (1994) suggests a problem prevention approach in product development 
through a more holistic development taking into account all the product life cycle 
considerations up-front. The ideal process, therefore, is to have an activity that 
addresses all parameters in the system and eliminates all kinds of partitioning. This 
activity should be executed as early as possible and, therefore, causes a shift of 
activities to the earlier stage of the process (Clausing, 1994). This is addressed 
through re-integration of the design process using various concepts and 
methodologies, such as quality function deployment (QFD), design for manufacturing 
(DFM), design for assembly (DFA), design for services (DFS), design for testing 
(DFT) and, design for product life cycle (DFPLC). To embrace all the above 
concepts, the term ‘design for X-ilities’ (DFX) is often used (Trygg, 1993; Clausing, 
1994). Some of those concepts have been developed as computer-based tools to help
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the designer in a concurrent engineering environment to work faster (Clausing, 1994). 
In a CE that focuses on coupling between engineering and production, this concern is 
reflected in the manufacturability and producibility o f the product.
2.3.2 Organisational Integration
Another major problem in the development process is functional specialisation that 
leads to ‘silo-ing’ in which specialists look inwardly toward the optimisation of their 
own specialisation rather than toward the optimisation of the whole product. In the 
1960s, this problem was addressed in the organisational design literature (e.g. 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 1968; Burns and Stalker, 1961) and more recently in the 
product innovation literature (e.g. Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; 1993). The 
organisational integration feature of CE specifically seeks to address this issue.
To achieve a holistic design, development is conducted through integrating all 
involved functions and specialisation that contribute to the process. Reviewing design 
and manufacturing relationship, Adler (1995) argues for the use of team integration 
together with the use of standardisation, schedule and multiple adjustment. Adler 
further argues for the contextual mode of integration reasoning that the most efficient 
interdepartmental co-ordination mechanism is the one that is able to deal with the 
uncertainty o f product and process fit at the least cost. Wheelwright and Clark (1993) 
argue that cross-functional integration, which may go beyond the organisational 
boundary, is essential for a superior program in its cost, time, and quality. They 
further argue that this integration may be achieved by fostering intensive 
communication, information sharing, and collaboration between involved functions.
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Kahn (1996) proposes that integration is a multidimensional process that subsumes 
formal interaction and collaboration. Formal interaction refers to the structured and 
formal nature o f co-ordination activities between involved functions including routine 
meetings, memos, and other regulated communication. It is characterised by 
transaction relationships and a competitive environment between relatively 
independent functions. Collaboration refers to the unstructured, affective nature of 
interdepartmental relationship emphasises on strategy alignment through a shared 
vision, collective goals, joint rewards through an informal structure. It is characterised 
by a continuous informal relationship, interdependent, and co-operative environment. 
He concludes that formal interaction may be necessary but is not sufficient; 
collaboration makes the difference between success and failure in product 
development. Similarly, Schrage (1995) argues that the ultimate aim o f any 
interaction media such as meetings or teams is actually collaboration, which requires 
a shared space where each collaborator can add value to the task in hand. The shared 
space can be as simple as white board or as sophisticated as stereo-lithography rapid 
prototyping.
There are different approaches to integration. Many researchers suggest the use of the 
cross-functional team as the organisational means to achieve integration (e.g. Trygg, 
1993; Clausing, 1994). Wheelwright and Clark (1993) add the necessity of 
heavyweight feature in such teams in which the team leader had full authorities to 
manage the process. They further suggest the use o f integrated problem solving as an 
interaction mode in which downstream functions participate in the preliminary stage 
through an ongoing dialogue with the upstream functions to obtain early information 
to enable a ‘flying start’ on their own work. To foster interaction, the team members 
are collocated in one location. Another strong trend, particularly in the engineering
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literature, is the use o f computers as an integrating mechanism (e.g. Norman, 1990; 
Volk, 1992; Fan, 1995). The development of computer-based information system, 
CAD/CAM, and rapid prototyping provides a significant contribution in providing 
easy and faster communication and collaboration media (Schrage, 1995).
2.3.3 Concurrent Process
A key issue in reducing development lead-time is how to achieve as much 
concurrency, simultaneity and overlapping activities as possible. The design 
integration and organisational integration features facilitate opportunities to reduce 
lead-time by shortening, simplifying, or overlapping the activities at all stages without 
sacrificing cost and quality (Fujimoto, 1997).
Hauptman and Hirji (1996) argue that at the macro level, a high level o f concurrency 
is fostered by effective two-way communication, overlapping problem solving, and 
willingness to release uncertain and ambiguous information. But, the use of such 
information should be limited for collaboration before the decision is made rather 
than for decision-making. Krishnan (1996) introduced a model based on upstream 
information evolution and downstream sensitivity to obtain effective overlapping of 
activities. He concludes that the best opportunity for overlapping is achieved by 
preliminary product information exchange when the sensitivity o f downstream 
activities is low and by early finalisation of product information when the upstream 
information evolution is fast.
Blackburn et al. (1996) argue that the process o f design concurrency takes two 
different forms: concurrency in activities and concurrency in information. Activity
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concurrency refers to the tasks and design activities that are performed simultaneously 
by different people or groups (i.e. within-stage, across-stage, and across-platform 
overlaps). Information concurrency refers to the integrated development (team 
approach) in which all the concerns o f the different functions are addressed through a 
flow of shared information. They suggest two enablers linking both types of  
concurrency: architectural modularity that divides design problems into modules with 
well-defined functionality and interfaces, and synchronicity that co-ordinates parallel 
activities, which is prime responsibility o f the program leader.
Clausing (1994) argues that in a concurrent process frequent information exchanges 
occur at the level o f the small unit design tasks. At the micro level o f the detail task, 
the tasks may remain sequential, but the overall effect in the higher level perspective 
is concurrence. It can be achieved through different means, such as partitioning, 
overlapping, compressing, switching, deiterating, and front loading (Fujimoto, 1997). 
The CE engineering automation domain shows that computer-based technology has 
also been used in this area, particularly for “front loading” information through 
computer-aided engineering (CAE) simulation software (e.g. 3-D CAD/CAM) and 
virtual prototyping (e.g. stereo-lithography) (Fujimoto, 1997).
2.4 Concurrent Engineering Initiatives
This section categorises initiatives associated with the means o f achieving CE in order 
to operationalise the CE concept. This operationalisation is used as the basis for 
analysing the case study. Based on the previous discussion of its generic features, 
initiatives to realise a CE approach can be applied in three main areas:
1) in the organisation and management o f a new product development (NPD)
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program with the establishment o f heavyweight cross-functional team(s) and 
encouraging interaction/communication;
2) in enabling technology with the establishment facility and technological support 
for new product activities; and
3) in human resources with the establishment o f supportive human resource 
management (HRM) policies.
However, apart from the cross-functional team that seems to be accepted in most of 
the literature, other generic elements are still largely indeterminate. Research on CE 
has focused mainly on the organisational and technological enablers and overlooked 
the reason for investing in those enablers: to achieve effective and efficient team 
processes and attitudes (Hauptman and Hirji, 1996). This leads to another area of 
initiatives in achieving CE: the HRM supports to ensure those involved have the 
appropriate skills, knowledge, motivation and behaviour for engaging in CE. CE 
introduction may require changes in those areas. This is the gap in the CE literature 
that has only recently begun to receive attention with a growing literature in ‘softer’ 
CE within the management of innovation and technology domain.
This study focuses on initiatives in organisational integration because this integration 
is considered as a most important feature of CE. Organisational integration is the 
primary means for achieving the other two features of CE: design integration and 
concurrence. Without organisational integration, a truly holistic design cannot be 
achieved which, in turn, will inhibit the effort to increase concurrency of the process. 
However, the study is not only interested in the structural issue of integration, i.e. 
vertical and horizontal integration, as reflected by the cross-functional team and 
heavyweight management initiatives but also in the processual issues of integration.
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This brings the initiatives in communication and decision-making mechanisms as the 
other focus o f the study. The reason behind this research decision is that the structural 
issues, more often than not, do not reflect the real process in the organisation.
In order to provide adequate emphasis on the focus of this study, the initiatives in 
organisation and management of product development program are classified into two 
categories: the organisational integration and the communication and decision-making 
mechanisms. Further, external integration categories are also added to reflect the 
expansion o f functional integration involving institutions outside organisational 
boundary. As the result, efforts and initiatives in achieving CE in this study are 
categorised as follows:
1) Organisational integration: cross-functional team and heavyweight management.
2) Communication and decision-making mechanisms: formal communication, 
collaboration, inter-team communication, and decision-making mechanism.
3) Enabler technology: computer-based technology, collocation, CE methods and 
systematic process protocols.
4) External integration: supplier involvement and customer involvement.
5) Human resources: competency, CE-related training and human resource policies.
These five categories are used as the CE framework of this study. By specifically 
including the communication and decision-making mechanisms and human resources, 
this study attempts to fill in the gap in the CE literature relating to these issues. The 
first two categories are the focus of the longitudinal processual study and are 
discussed and analysed further in their dimensions and sub-dimensions in the 
following sections. The summary of this discussion is provided in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1: Operationalisation of Initiatives within Organisational Integration and 
Communication and Decision-making Mechanisms Categories
C a te g o r y C E  In it ia t iv e D im e n s io n S u b d im e n s io n R a n g e
C r o s s S iz e  a n d  a r c h ite c tu r e N u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s m a ll  to  la r g e
F u n c t io n a l N u m b e r  o f  ( s u b ) te a m s in g le  to  m u lt ip le
T e a m N u m b e r  o f  la y e r  o f  t e a m s s in g le  to  m u lt ip le
D iv is io n  o f  te a m fu n c t io n a l-b a s e d  o r  p r o d u c t -b a s e d
S c o p e N u m b e r  o f  fu n c tio n  in v o lv e d d u a l fu n c tio n  c o u p lin g  to  c o m p a n y -w id e
L e v e l o f  fu n c tio n a l r e p r e s e n ta t io n fo c a l p o in t, r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o r  fu ll m e m b e rs h ip
R o le  o f  fu n c tio n s m a in  o r  s u p p o r t in g  ro le s
M e m b e r s h ip  p a t te rn P o s it io n  a t  fu n c t io n a l u n it lo w  (e g . s ta f f )  to  h ig h  (e g . s e n io r  m a n a g e r )
N a tu r e  o f  m e m b e r  a c t iv ity o p e r a t io n a l,  m a n a g e r ia l ,  o r  lia is o n  ta s k
d
O L e v e l o f  d e d ic a t io n p a r t ia l d e d ic a t io n  to  fu ll d e d ic a t io n
O )0 ) T e m p o r a l c h a r a c te r is t ic te m p o r a r y  to  p e r m a n e n t
CO M u lt ip le  m e m b e r s h ip s in g le  to  m u lt ip le
g H ig h e r  te a m  c o m p o s it io n in c lu s io n  to  e x c lu s io n  o f  lo w e r  te a m
CO
'cCO H e a v y w e ig h t H ie ra rc h ic a l p o s it io n F o r m a l s tr u c tu r e lo w e r , e q u a l o r  h ig h e r  th a n  o f  th e  fu n c tio n sCD
Ö M a n a g e m e n t A u th o r ity  o f  th e  p r o g r a m  le a d e rs lim ite d  (e .g .  d e s ig n  o n ly )  to  e x te n s iv e
N a tu r e  o f  d e le g a t io n D e le g a t io n  f ro m  p ro g ra m  m a n a g e r n o n e  to  e x t e n s iv e
D e le g a t io n  fro m  fu n c tio n s n o n e  to  e x t e n s iv e
S e n io r ity  o f  le a d e r T e n u r e s h o rt  to  lo n g  te n u r e
A g e y o u n g , e g . u n d e r  3 5 ,  to  m a tu re
E d u c a t io n lo w  to  h ig h
F o m a l C o m m u n ic a t io n  m o d e R ic h n e s s  o f  m e d ia s p a r s e  (e g . n o te s )  to  ric h  (e g . f a c e  to  fa c e )
C o m m u n ic a t io n F r e q u e n c y b a tc h  ty p e  to  in te n s iv e , o n - lin e  ty p e
D ir e c t io n o n e -w a y  m o n o lo g u e  to  tw o -w a y  d is c u s s io n
CO
‘c T im in g e a r ly  (a t  in it ia t io n )  to  la te  (a t  c o m p le tio n )
-£ZoCD T y p e  o f  d a ta  c o n v e y e d T y p e  o f  d a ta  r e le a s e d a m b ig u o u s  to  c e r ta in
c p T y p e  o f  d a ta  u s e d a m b ig u o u s  to  c e r ta in
25CO C o lla b o ra t io n In te ra c tio n a l re la t io n s h ip  p a t te rn c lo s e  &  fr ie n d ly  to  d is ta n t  &  c o m p e t it iv e
CZo C o n flic t  &  n e g o tia t io n  p ro c e s s c o n fro n ta tio n  w in - lo s e  to  d ia lo g u e  w in -w in
CO
oCD P r e s e n c e  o f  c o lle c t iv e  g o a l in d e p e n d e n c e  to  in te r d e p e n d e n c eQ
" Oc P r e s e n c e  o f  s h a r e d  v is io n
p ro g ra m  o r fu n c tio n a l s e l f  a s s o c ia t io n
CO
co In te r - te a m F o rm a l c o m m u n ic a t io n ( s e e  fo rm a l c o m m u n ic a t io n )
Tog C o m m u n ic a t io n C o lla b o ra t io n ( s e e  c o lla b o ra t io n )
Z5
E D e c is io n -M a k in g A u th o r ity  o f  te a m s n o n e  to  fu ll a u th o r ity
Eo
O M e c h a n is m R e s p e c t  to  lo w e r  te a m  d e c is io n re s p e c te d  to  ig n o re d
P o w e r  d if fe re n t ia l p e rc e p t io n  in lo w e r  a n d  h ig h e r  t e a m s lo w  to  h ig h
Initiatives from the other three categories are also discussed. The summary is 
provided in Table 2-2. The conceptualisation and the operationalisation of all 
initiatives are used in investigating the CE introduction in the case study. The 
interrelation and interdependence between them are used to explain the 
transformation of the primary focus initiatives.
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Table 2-2: Operationalisation o f Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External 
Integration and Human Resource Categories
Category CE Initiative Dimension
Enabling
Technology
Computer-based Technology Supporting individual design task 
Integrating across function 
Assisting information management 
Supporting collaboration work
Collocation Collocation area 
Space layout
Formal CE Methods Direct utilisation 
Utilisation of informal methods
Systematic Protocols Formal description of CE-in-practice 
Implementation strategy and planning
External
Integration
Supplier Involvement Number of supplier 
Position in the team 
Temporal characteristic
Customer Involvement Number of customer 
Position in the team 
Temporal characteristic
Human
Resources
Competency Educational background
Experience
Multiskilling
Knowledge and skill parity
CE-Related Training Team -related training
Training on CE concept and initiatives
Human Resource Policies Recruiting
Career development and training 
Performance measurement 
Reward system
2.4.1 Organisational Integration Initiatives
This section reviews two important initiatives in achieving organisational integration: 
the formation of the cross-functional team and the heavyweight management.
2.4.1.1 Cross-Functional Team: Horizontal Integration
A cross-functional team is often formed when a form of co-ordination mechanism is 
needed to integrate several functions (Adler, 1995). In cross-functional teams of
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product development programs, representatives from involved functions collaborate 
to ensure that the design incorporates the customer’s needs as well as restrictions and 
possibilities in downstream functions (Trygg, 1993). This collaboration may go 
beyond the organisation’s boundary to involve suppliers and customers in the team 
(Adachi et al., 1994; Wheelwright and Clark, 1993; Cleland, 1991).
In the CE approach to product development, the cross-functional team is the only 
indisputable generic element (Trygg, 1993). A cross-functional team is a means for 
achieving integration (Clausing, 1994). A similar argument also appears in the 
product innovation literature. Wheelwright and Clark (1993), for example, argue that 
cross-functional effort is essential for the superior development program in industries 
with dynamic markets and technologies, and where time is a critical element. Some 
studies and some companies (e.g. Boeing, Xerox) interchange the term ‘CE’ with 
‘integrated product development team’ which reflect the importance o f the cross­
functional team in such an approach (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Klein and Maurer, 1995; 
Stantham and Kleiner, 1996). Other elements of organisational change in CE are 
basically derived from the existence of such teams in CE implementation.
Henke, Krachenberg and Lyons (1993) found that firms realised four primary benefits 
of cross-functional teams in a product development: overcoming the shortcoming of  
hierarchical structure by its ability to cut across vertical authority, decentralising 
decision-making, reducing information overload at a higher level, and providing 
higher quality decisions. However, establishing a cross-functional team is a 
challenging task. From the engineering management domain, Thamhain and Wilemon 
(1987) have argued that team building involves taking a collection of individuals with 
different needs, background and expertise and transforming them into an integrated,
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effective work unit. They argue that team ‘output’ is not only task-related outcomes 
(e.g. technical success, on-time and on-budget performances) but also involves 
people-related outcomes, such as communication effectiveness, interface 
effectiveness, team spirit and mutual trust.
For larger development programs, the team may comprise o f a ‘team of teams’ 
(Clausing, 1994). Depending on its complexity, a product can have numerous teams 
and each team may have several sub-teams. They are integrated or co-ordinated by a 
product management team. The product management team itself is a cross-functional 
team at a higher level (Henke et al., 1993). According to Clausing (1994), the team 
leader (e.g. program manager) and the managers who directly report to him/her 
constitute one team, often referred as the ‘core team’. Typically, the core team is 
responsible for everything related to the program. The membership o f a core team 
may include sub-team leaders. Clausing (1994) considers such formation of an 
interlocking structure of teams as a key factor for success.
Many studies focus on the structural characteristics o f the team (Page, 1993; Henke et 
al., 1993; Adachi et al., 1993). In his study of multi-disciplinary teams in new product 
development, Page (1993) uses three dimensions o f team structure: the type of 
organisation, the level o f functional involvement, and the role of product champion. 
Henke et al. (1993) describe the team structure in terms o f functional representation, 
hierarchical and lateral relationship within and among teams, and supplier 
involvement. Adachi et al. (1994) identify the structural dimensions of a cross­
functional team to include its size, location, and composition. Team’s composition is 
defined by the authority of its leader, membership pattern, level o f specialisation, and 
internal and external integration. Similar dimensions are also identified in the
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literature on team and teamwork (e.g. Ellis and Fisher, 1994). For example, 
Katzenbach and Smith (1993) include small size and having adequate complementary 
skills, meaningful purpose, clear working approach, mutual accountability, and 
members who enjoy being part o f the team, as the characteristic of an effective team.
Thus, the structural dimensions of a cross-functional team include: the team size and 
architecture; membership pattern; internal and external scope of integration; 
leadership pattern; communication pattern; and location. This section only focused on 
3 structural dimensions: (1) team size and architecture, (2) scope of internal 
integration, and (3) membership pattern. Other structural dimensions are discussed 
later to provide a thorough discussion of each dimension.
• Team Size and Architecture:
The size of a cross-functional team relates to the scale o f development program and 
the level o f specialisation. Some researchers argue that the team size is crucial for 
team effectiveness as the larger size hampers communication (Katzenbach and Smith, 
1993). To remain effective, a large team is normally divided into a core team and 
several layers o f sub-teams (Adachi et al., 1994; Ellis and Fisher, 1994), and is often 
supported by a computerised information support system. As can be seen later in the 
intended model o f CE in Chapter 6, the division o f development team can either 
primarily be functional-based (e.g. production groups and design groups) or product- 
based (e.g. wing group and cockpit group). The dimension of the team size and 
architecture varies in the following four sub-dimensions:
1) The number of member involved in the program team: small to large number.
2) The number of sub-team within the program team: single to multiple teams.
3) The number o f layer of teams within the program team: single to multiple layers.
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4) The division o f team: functional based or product based
In a case study, it is possible that the Teams’ are defined and constructed on the basis 
of the role o f  a group of people as observed by the researcher, rather than on the basis 
of a formal organisation o f people by the organisation under study. The existence of 
the core team, for example, may be a researcher’s construct to simplify the 
organisation mechanism observed in the study.
• Scope of Integration:
This dimension refers to the range o f functions involved, represented, and co­
ordinated within a cross-functional team to achieve integration (Adachi et al. 1994). 
This dimension varies from dual function involvement (coupling) such as a design- 
production team to a full organisational-wide involvement, in which all organisational 
functions are represented in the team. Slade (1993) and Adler (1995), for example, 
focus on product design and manufacturing process; Clausing (1994) includes design, 
production, logistic and field support; while Pawar (1994) goes further and includes 
product design, process, engineering, marketing, service, purchasing, and selected 
suppliers. This dimension seems contextual dependent; functions represented in the 
team vary according to industry and market. In part, this variation in the scope of the 
cross-functional team contributes to many definitions o f CE as discussed previously.
The matrix arrangement identified in the heavyweight management (Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1993; 1992) implies functional representation in the product development 
teams. Along the continuum o f this representation, the functional involvement can be 
distinguished into three following levels:
1) full-membership, in which functional experts are part o f the program and report 
only to the program leaders;
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2) representative, in which functional experts are partly part o f the program and 
report to both program and functional leaders; and
3) focal point, in which functional experts are not part o f the program and report only 
to the functional leaders. Typically, the focal points are specifically assigned by 
functional units to internally co-ordinate support for the program.
Cross-functional teams, however, are vulnerable to problems associated with its 
temporary nature and diverse backgrounds and perspectives that lead to conflicting 
goals, weak desire to co-operate, and weak allegiance (Pinto and Pinto, 1991). This 
different perspective between functions can be derived from differences in orientation 
toward particular goals, time orientation, interpersonal orientation, and formality of  
structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). These differences exist between engineering 
specialisation, which coined as the ‘object world’ by Bucciarelli (1994). He notes that 
the object world o f a mechanical engineer and an electronic engineer, for example, 
can be quite different in seeing a technological problem. In a product development 
program, this diversity often leads to the relative role of each function in the 
development activities. In Haddad’s (1996) case study of automobile industry, for 
example, the main development activities (i.e. design) were carried out by product- 
based teams that consisted entirely of engineers from the design function while 
representatives from other functions (e.g. marketing, manufacturing, finance, 
purchasing) provided support for those teams.
Based on this discussion, the scope of team cross-functionality can be divided into 
three sub-dimensions:
1) The number o f function involved: ranges from dual function coupling to 
company-wide functional involvement.
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2) The level o f functional representation in the program: ranges from focal point, 
representative and full membership.
3) The role of each of those functions in the program: ranges from playing main role 
to playing supporting role.
• Membership Pattern:
This dimension is concerned with the members’ positions in the team vis-a-vis their 
position in their functional area, whether the members are partially or completely 
withdrawn from their functional area, and whether the members are fully dedicated or 
not to the program. Page (1993) observed that the membership pattern of a cross­
functional team involves who, when and how far they are involved. In Haddad’s 
(1996) case study, for example, representatives from non-design functions were 
involved in the core team and provided liaison with their respective functions while 
engineers were full-dedicatedly involved at the operational level in product-based 
design teams.
Further, Henke et al. (1993) argue that multiple membership, horizontally within 
product-based development team, may facilitate information flow. Closely related to 
the team size and architecture is the formation of the interlocking structure (Clausing, 
1994) represented by the nature of the relationship and interface arrangement between 
layers o f core team and sub-teams (Ellis and Fisher, 1994). This can be reflected 
through the composition of the core team and higher-level sub-teams, for example, 
whether the leaders of sub-teams become members o f the next higher level teams.
Based on the above discussion, the membership pattern varies in the following six 
sub-dimensions:
1) The hierarchical position of members in their respected functional unit: ranges
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from operational level engineer to top level manager.
2) The nature o f members activities: ranges from working on operational, 
managerial or liaison tasks.
3) The level o f member’s dedication: ranges from all partly dedicated to fully 
dedicated and completely withdrawn from their functional area.
4) The temporal aspect o f their involvement: ranges from the whole lifetime of the 
product development phase to only a temporary one in a single phase.
5) The extent o f multiple membership within a single program (i.e. a member being 
part o f two or more sub-teams): ranges from single to multiple membership.
6) The composition o f the higher level teams: ranges from the absence to the 
existence o f lower level team representatives.
2.4.1.2 Heavyweight Management: Vertical Integration
The heavyweight management initiative refers to the organisational arrangement that 
provides team leaders at every level with more power than their functional 
counterparts in program-related matters. In particular, the heavyweight management 
refers to the presence and authority of team leaders in relation to the seniority, rank 
and position o f the leaders in the company and authority assigned to them (Adachi et 
al., 1994). Heavyweight management initiative is concerned with the co-ordination 
mechanism o f the inherent interdepartmental interdependence o f product development 
process (Adler, 1995). Wheelwright and Clark (1992; 1993) used the term 
heavyweight program team to describe the ideal type of organisational structure and 
leadership for the managing a new product development program, yet it is rarely 
presented in the product development practice.
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Along the continuum of the matrix of function-division structure, Wheelwright and 
Clark (1993) distinguish four types of development team: functional, heavyweight, 
lightweight and autonomous, as diagrammatically shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1: Types of Development Team (Source: Wheelwright and Clark, 1993, p. 524)
Functional teams reflect the traditional sequential process o f product development. 
Heavyweight program managers are senior managers who have the primary influence 
over those involved in the program and supervise their work directly through key 
functional people on the collocated core team. In contrast to the heavyweight team, 
the lightweight program managers, typically junior managers with little status or 
influence, lack of the power to directly execute and control the process which in to 
large part remains under the control of various functional managers. In the
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autonomous team, on the other hand, individuals from functional units are assigned 
and totally removed, at least temporarily, physically and administratively from their 
functions and totally dedicated to the team.
In a heavyweight program team, the program leader is responsible to ensure the 
achievement o f product development’s objectives in its phases (Gordon and Isenhour, 
1990). To do so, the leader should have direct access to and responsibility for the 
entire work of all functional representatives involved in the development program. 
Heavyweight management provides a powerful team leader without losing the 
opportunity to benefit from the accumulated expertise in functional units. This leads 
to the first dimension of the heavyweight management initiative: the program position 
within the organisational hierarchy. This position is reflected in the formal structural 
position o f the program manager relative to functional managers and the extent of the 
authority assigned to the program manager and other program leaders.
The engineering culture, in which the main part o f development process takes place, 
has been characterised as a culture fostering competition, high individualism, and 
aversion to co-operation (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). In addition, the matrix 
arrangement that is embedded in a cross-functional team adds other challenges in 
terms o f horizontal and vertical communication, resource sharing among programs, 
multiple reporting relationship, and dual accountabilities (Pinto and Pinto, 1991; 
Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). Facing the above challenges, the leadership becomes 
a crucial factor (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987).
A cross-functional team works at the operational level (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1993). Therefore, the extent o f the program manager authority is delegated to the 
lower-level program leaders and the extent o f the functional authority is delegated to
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functional representatives working in the team become crucial for effective 
functioning o f the team. This leads to the second dimension, namely the nature of  
delegation, which involves the authority delegation from the program manager and 
from the functional leaders.
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) further suggest that the senior heavyweight managers 
not only have expertise but also have significant ‘organisational clout’. They have full 
control over resources contributed by the different functional groups and become the 
evaluators of the contribution made by individual team members. McDonough (1993) 
argues that the characteristics o f the team leader include tenure for understanding 
internal functioning of the company, position tenure for understanding the necessary 
knowledge and procedures, age for accumulating experience, and education for 
understanding technical issues. This leads to the third dimension of heavyweight 
management: the seniority of the program leaders.
Based on the above discussion, heavyweight management is operationalised into the 
following dimensions:
• Program hierarchical position:
1) Formal structural position ranges from lower, equal or higher than of the 
functional positions.
2) The authority o f the program leaders ranges from limited (i.e. design aspect 
only) to extensive (i.e. overall aspects).
• The nature of delegation:
1) Delegation of program manager’s authority ranges from none to extensive.
2) Delegation of functional authority ranges from none to extensive
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• Seniority of program team leaders:
1) Tenure ranges from short to long.
2) Age ranges from young (i.e. under 35 years o f age) to mature.
3) Education ranges from low to high level.
2.4.2 Communication and Decision-making Mechanisms
Initiatives within this category deal with the processual aspect o f organisational 
integration (Kahn, 1996). These initiatives are critical for integrating design and 
development activities. Closely related to the task dimension, these initiatives can be 
seen as both part o f CE initiatives and as the result o f them. Cross-functional 
integration can only be achieved by fostering intensive communication, information 
sharing and collaboration between involved functions (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993). 
Trygg (1993) argues that team and other aspects such as job rotation, regular meeting, 
social interaction and physical proximity aim for fostering interdepartmental 
communication. Schrage (1995) even sees that the ultimate aim o f all organisational 
initiatives is achieving better interaction and collaboration to ensure effectiveness.
The importance o f the communication and decision-making mechanisms in CE has 
been noted by many researchers (e.g. Kahn, 1996; Blackburn et al., 1996). Blackburn 
et al. (1996) suggest its importance by arguing that concurrent activities performed by 
various individuals and groups require a flow of shared information in which all the 
concerns o f different functions are addressed. As mentioned, Kahn (1996) argues that 
integration process include formal interaction and collaboration. Formal 
communication and collaboration patterns exist simultaneously in a cross-functional 
team(s) albeit in different degree across teams. Formal communication is dominant
52
Chapter 2: Concurrent Engineering and Conceptual Framework
when the network is characterised by ‘wheel-and-hub’ pattern (Ellis and Fischer, 
1994) with the leader in hub position. In contrast, collaboration is dominant when the 
communication network is characterised by an ‘all channel’ network (Ellis and Fisher, 
1994) with the leader as catalyst to foster dense and frequent collaboration.
W heelwright and Clark (1993, p. 147) identify four dimensions that jointly determine 
the quality and effectiveness of communication: the richness of its media, its 
frequency, its direction, and its timing. Based on these dimensions, they identify four 
modes o f upstream-downstream interaction: serial/batch, early start in the dark, early 
involvement and integrated problem solving, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2 Four Modes of Upstream-Downstream Interaction 
(Source: Wheelwright and Clark 1993, p.475)
Integrated problem solving is a particular mode of interaction for effective cross­
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functional team characterised by intensive, rich, face-to-face dialogue between 
upstream and downstream participants early in the beginning of the process with more 
comprehensive problem solving style. In this mode of interaction, downstream 
participants are involved in early activities and in an ongoing dialogue with the 
upstream counterparts in the preliminary stage and use that information and insight to 
get a flying start on their own work (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993).
In studying the effect of communication and the level o f concurrence between 
upstream and downstream activities, Hauptman and Hirji (1996) conclude that high 
degree of two-way communication, overlapping problem solving, and the release of 
uncertain and ambiguous information lead to more favourable outcomes in terms of  
product cost, schedule and quality as well as in team satisfaction; while the use of 
uncertain and ambiguous information leads to negative outcomes. These contradictory 
findings on the release and the use o f uncertain/ambiguous information suggest that 
such information should be used for further collaboration between upstream and 
downstream participants rather than for the downstream’s decision-making. This 
finding refines the Wheelwright and Clark (1993) suggestion in the way of 
downstream participants use the information from the upstream participant.
This study follows Kahn (1996) and divides initiatives in this category into formal 
communication and collaboration. In addition, inter-team communication is also 
discussed considering the existence o f several layers o f sub-teams in large-scale 
development programs. This initiative focuses on the interaction between members 
from different teams within a product development program. With this addition, the 
previous two initiatives are dedicated to the intra-team communication and 
collaboration. The decision-making mechanism is further added in respect to how the
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information, gathered through communication initiatives, is used to make decision.
2.4.2.1 Formal Communication
This initiative refers to the establishment o f structured, formal and intentional 
communication media that facilitate interaction between functions, including routine 
meetings, memoranda, forms, reports, faxes and any kind o f regulated interaction 
among functions (Kahn, 1996). Such media are characterised by a formal transaction 
relationship among independent functions within an environment in which they may 
have different and conflicting interests.
Following Hauptman and Hirji (1996) and Wheelwright and Clark (1993), formal 
communication is operationalised into two dimensions: the mode of communication 
and the nature o f data conveyed. Using communication dimensions identified by 
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) and the conclusion of the Hauptman and Hirji study 
(1996), these dimensions are further operationalised as follows:
• The communication mode: refers to how information is released by the upstream 
counterpart and how this information is used in the process.
1) Richness o f media ranges from sparse, e.g. the use of document and computer 
network, to rich, e.g. face to face communication.
2) Frequency: ranges from low, e.g. one-shot, batch type, to high, e.g. piece by 
piece, on line, intensive.
3) Direction: ranges from one-way, e.g. monologue, to two-way, e.g. dialogue.
4) Timing: ranges from late, e.g. completed work, at the end of the process, to 
early, e.g. preliminary, at the beginning of the process.
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• The nature of data conveyed:
1) The nature data released: ranges from ambiguous to certain.
2) The nature o f data used in the decision: ranges from ambiguous to certain.
2.4.2.2 Collaboration
As mentioned previously, according to Kahn (1996) collaboration refers to the 
informal, unstructured and affective nature o f inter-functional relationships that 
emphases strategy alignment among collaborators through a shared vision, collective 
goals and joint rewards. The suggestion that cross-functional integration “rests on a 
foundation of tight linkages in time and in communication between individuals and 
groups working on closely related problems” (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, p. 175) is 
closely related to the notion of collaboration. This involves a shared act of purposive 
relationship, mediated by shared space (Schrage, 1995), in a problem solving process 
through which different aspects of a problem are constructively explored and goes 
beyond the limitation of individuals (Gray, 1989).
Many authors argue that collaboration is the ultimate form o f relationship sought in 
teams (e.g. Trygg, 1993; Schrage, 1995; Kahn, 1996). Kahn (1996) views 
collaboration as being characterised by a continuous relationship, informal media, 
relatively interdependent and co-operative environment, shared vision and collective 
goals. Collaboration can occur simultaneously with co-ordination (e.g. means used to 
ensure that separate activities from different people can fit together), while not every 
co-ordination results in collaboration. Levine (1994), using Senge’s (1990) and 
Bohm’s (1990) notion o f dialogue versus discussion, takes the importance of this 
continuous relationship even further by arguing that the vehicle o f dialogue is selfless
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listening that creates a common vessel o f collective spirits. In contrast with discussion 
in which choices are made and held, dialogue is a conversation between individuals 
that are examining possibilities together and are willing to suspend and alter their 
positions (Levine, 1994). This, in effect, is similar to collaboration.
Collaboration distinguishes teamwork from team work (Donellon, 1993; 1996). In her 
study on interaction between individuals in the cross-functional teams in four large 
US companies, Donellon (1993; 1996) assessed team interaction using six 
dimensions: dependencies, identification, conflict management tactics, negotiation 
processes, power differentiation, and social distance. Combining these dimensions 
with Kahn’s (1996) collaboration characteristics, the dependency dimension relates to 
the presence o f a collective goal; the identification relates to the presence o f a shared 
vision; the conflict management and negotiation process relates to the presence of  
shared media; while power differentiation and social distance relate to the interaction 
pattern.
Based on the above discussion, collaboration can be seen as a form of informal 
interaction characterised by a communication pattern that is intensive face-to-face 
dialogue since the beginning of the process and supported with the shared-space 
media among those who share collective visions and goals. This study, therefore, uses 
the following four dimensions to operationalise collaboration:
1) The relationship pattern between people involved ranges from a close and friendly 
to a distant and competitive relationship.
2) Conflict and negotiation process ranges from a confrontation process toward win- 
lose situation or a dialogue process in order to reach win-win situation.
3) The presence o f collective goals ranges from independence goals (e.g. achieving
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individual goals) to interdependence goals (e.g. achieving collective goals).
4) The presence o f shared vision ranges from personal identification (i.e. no shared 
vision) to group association, either toward the program or toward the function (i.e. 
shared vision presence).
2.4.2.3 Inter-team Communication
This initiative specifically relates to the relationship patterns both vertically between 
the core team and sub-teams and horizontally between sub-teams in term of  
channelling and sharing information. The interlocking structure between layers of 
development teams, co-ordination mechanism between them, and multiple 
membership across teams are important in the effective development process 
(Clausing, 1994). Although many development teams, particularly in high-tech 
manufacturing industries, are made up of core team and sub-teams due to the team 
size constraint and the complexity o f the product (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Fan, 1994; 
Haddad, 1996), there has been very little research in this aspect o f teamwork.
Most inter-team relationship involves higher level issues rather than operational tasks. 
This leads to the extent of the formal communication and collaboration presence 
although in this process both formal communication and collaboration patterns exist 
together. The communication may rely less on informal and personal face to face 
media and more on formal and impersonal media, such as budget and schedule 
documents, regular meetings, and technical reports. This initiative, therefore, is 
operationalised as follows:
1) The presence o f formal communication (see formal communication in 2.4.2.1).
2) The presence o f collaboration (see collaboration in 2.4.2.2).
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2.4.2.4 Decision-making Mechanism
This initiative is concerned with how the team uses the information gathered througho  o
the communication media in various teams and sub-teams in decision-making 
mechanism. Decision-making mechanism relates closely to the authority and 
responsibility relationship among teams and among individuals. In an interlocking 
structure, co-ordination mechanism is represented by an authority relationship 
between core teams and sub-teams, which reflects on the extent to which the sub-team 
decision is respected and not being ignored by the higher level team (Clausing, 1994). 
Henke et al. (1993) argue that authority and responsibility relationship among teams 
depends on the extent of authority possessed by sub-teams vis-a-vis to the authority of 
the core team or higher level teams.
The composition o f the higher level teams, i.e. whether sub-team leaders become 
members o f higher-level teams (Clausing, 1994), is closely related to the perception 
of relative power between team leader and sub-team leaders and between sub-team 
leaders and sub-team members which, in turn, influences the effectiveness o f the 
overall process. Sub-team leaders who are part o f the core team may be perceived as 
having greater proximity and less status differential with the program leader than the 
leaders who are not parts o f the core team. They may also perceive themselves as 
having a higher level o f status differential with members o f the team than leaders that 
are not part o f the core team.
Therefore, the decision-making mechanism is operationalised through the following 
three dimensions:
1) Authority o f  the program teams: ranges from none to full authority.
2) Respect over the lower level teams’ decisions: ranges from respected to ignored •
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3) Power differential perception: ranges from low to high.
2.4.3 Enabling Technology
Enabling technology refers to initiatives that utilise various physical tools and 
structured methodologies that have been promoted as means o f realising a CE 
approach. They include computer-based enabling technology, collocation, formal CE 
methodologies, and systematic protocols. While collocation initiative is often 
regarded as part of organisational integration category, in this study it is classified as 
one o f the enabling technology initiatives based on the fact that it refers to physical 
means (e.g. building and space layout), as oppose to organisational means. Some have 
argued that part o f its functions can be substituted by computer-based technology (e g. 
virtual collocation) (Adachi et al., 1994; Fan, 1995). Although effectiveness and 
applicability in supporting CE objectives are still in doubt, their contribution in 
supporting CE in large-scale development program is largely acknowledged. CE 
application in aircraft and auto industries, for example, are supported by these 
enablers (Fan, 1995; Haddad, 1996).
2.4.3.1 Computer-Based Technology
Computer-based technology initiative refers to the utilisation o f both hardware and 
software o f computer technology in the application o f CE. This initiative is widely 
advocated, particularly in the engineering literature, as a means o f achieving and 
supporting integration (e.g. Volk, 1992; Syan and Menon, 1994; de Graaf, 1996). The
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utilisation o f computer-based technology includes the following areas:
1) Supporting the individual engineering tasks e.g. CAM, CAE (Fujimoto, 1997).
2) Supporting cross-functional integration, e.g. CAD/CAM, CATIA (Trygg, 1993).
3) Assisting information management, e.g. enterprise resource planning (ERP), 
intranet and internet (Hameri and Nihtila, 1995).
4) Supporting collaborative work, e.g. rapid prototyping, computer-supported co­
operative works (CSCW) (Fan, 1995; Fujimoto, 1997).
Although its position in CE can be argued about (Evans, 1990), the computer does 
make communication easier especially for large development tasks due to the large 
amount o f information involved and their complex interdependency (Clausing, 1994; 
Schrage, 1995; Fujimoto, 1997). There is a relationship between the mode of 
interaction and the use o f the computer technology. When the more intensive face to 
face interaction is not possible either due to the task’s size or location, it is substituted 
by computer integration (Adachi et al, 1994; Hameri and Nihtila, 1995).
Recent developments in computer technology, such as computer networking, 
integrated CAD/CAM system, and rapid prototyping system, provide significant 
contribution in providing and easier and faster communication (Schrage, 1995). It 
support collaboration. It can also support concurrence work, particularly for a front 
loading strategy, in terms o f simulations such as 3-D CAD-CAE, CAE simulation, 
and stereo-lithography (Fujimoto, 1997). However, King and Majchrzak (1996) argue 
that the assumptions made by developers o f such CE tools are likely to inhibit the 
tools for successfully enabling CE because they are often inconsistent with 
documented behaviours o f people using similar technologies.
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2.4.3.2 Collocation
The term collocation is used to describe the intentional physical proximity o f  people 
involved in the development process, e.g. a group is collocated into a single area. It 
relates to the physical location in which team members reside. The team’s location 
may be scattered in the case when members are located all over the organisation’s 
buildings and only meet from time to time in designated spaces or they are collocated 
at the same place. Allen (1977) argues that increased physical distance exponentially 
reduces the probability o f communication between counterparts (i.e. ‘communication 
distance curve). However, this negative impact o f physical distance on 
communication appears to be less evident with computer and electronic 
communication (Hameri and Nihtila, 1995). In this sense, location becomes one of  
the determining factors for the selection and design o f an information support system 
(Adachi et al., 1994).
Collocation is widely cited as conducive to achieve cross functional interaction and 
integration (Trygg, 1993; Pelled and Adler, 1994; Pawar, 1994; Jurgen, 1997). Pelled 
and Adler (1994) argue that physical proximity plays a role in influencing the 
outcomes o f a task conflict, whether it enhances effectiveness and leads to functional 
outcomes or it becomes an emotional conflict that reduces effectiveness and leads to 
dysfunctional outcomes. This argument underscores the importance o f collocation in 
understanding others’ perspectives through free interaction and socialisation. 
Similarly, Pawar (1994) argues that collocation helps informal consultation and 
improves relationships leading to faster problem resolution.
Pawar (1994), however, admits that loyalty to the functional unit for some members 
may prevent them from talking to members from other functions. It seems that the
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way they arrange the layout o f the allocated space is influential in reducing the effect 
o f functional loyalty. Another issue is concerned with which functions are collocated. 
In many large programs, often only engineering related functions are collocated (e.g. 
Haddad, 1996, for automotive development programs) which is understandable 
considering the size of the team.
2.4.3.3 Formal CE Methods
Formal CE methods refer to the use o f various formal analytical methods frequently 
associated with the CE approach in the product development process. Most of these 
systematic methodologies are developed within the discipline o f engineering design 
‘pre-CE’ as part o f the rationalisation o f the design process (Smith, 1997). However, 
they are regarded as important elements o f CE (Trygg, 1993; Hales, 1994). Clausing 
(1994) argues that the movement toward a more holistic way o f development has led 
to several concepts and methodologies, while Hales (1994) argues that without tools 
the CE approach is only a ‘catch phrase’. The focus of these methodologies is to 
ensure that the information needed is available as early as possible to reduce slack 
time and unnecessary rework (Trygg, 1993).
These methods include DFM, DFA, QFD, Taguchi methods, DFS, DFT and 
ultimately DFPLC or DFX (Trygg, 1993; Clausing, 1994). The use o f some of these 
tools and methods as other names o f CE (Trygg, 1993) marks the importance of their 
contribution in the conceptualisation o f CE. The most frequently cited and used tools 
are DFM, DFA, and QFD (Syan and Menon, 1994; Waterbury, 1986; Stoll, 1990). 
DFM and DFA take the issues that the cost o f production is mainly determined in the 
design phase. They are systematic methodologies o f designing the product in such a
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way as to minimise the total cost o f manufacturing and assembly. In more general 
terms, they are conceived as manufacturability and producibility evaluation.
The objective o f DFM is to obtain a product concept that is inherently easy to 
manufacture by focussing on design for the ease o f manufacture and integrating the 
manufacturing process and product design for the best matching o f need and 
requirement (Stoll, 1990). DFM guidelines consist o f all encompassing rules for best 
practice for economic manufacture, such as minimising the number o f parts, 
developing modular designs, minimising part variations, and minimising handling 
(Syan and Swift, 1994a). The objective o f DFA is to obtain product concepts that are 
inherently easy to assemble. DFA consists o f rules and techniques specific to 
assembly which can be applied methodically for assembly rationalisation, and design 
of components for ease of handling and assembly (Syan and Swift, 1994b). Some of 
DFA techniques include Corbett’s checklist for DFA, Hitachi’s assemblability 
evaluation method, the Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc.’s DFA procedure, and the Lucas 
DFA Technique (Syan and Swift, 1994b, Waterbury, 1986).
Quality function deployment (QFD) originated in 1972 at Mitsubishi’s Kobe shipyard 
(Hauser and Clausing 1993; Prasad 1996). The objective o f QFD is to incorporate the 
voice o f customers into all phases o f the product development cycle in order to 
effectively match product concept and performance specification to market needs 
(Slade, 1993; Hales, 1994; Prasad, 1996). QFD involves tiered matrices o f ‘what’ and 
‘how’ from customer requirements down to the production control (Hauser and 
Clausing, 1993; Prasad, 1996). QFD basic matrix is the house of quality (HoQ), 
which translates the voice o f the customer into the engineering, design process, and 
production stages (Prasad, 1996). The translation process involves sequentially
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constructing several matrices o f customer requirement versus design requirement, 
design requirement versus engineering design, engineering design versus product 
characteristics, and so on (Menon, O’Grady, Gu and Young, 1994).
As with computer technology, there is criticism over the effective use o f CE 
methodologies (e.g. Evans, 1990; King and Majchrzak, 1996). The main point in the 
criticism is that such methods cannot be standardised but rather depend on the type of  
task as long as these aspects are taken into account during design decision process 
(Evans, 1990). Considering this issue, this study considers both formal and informal 
utilisation o f these methods. The more informal methodologies include all efforts that 
are effectively utilised to ensure producibility and manufacturability o f  the design.
2.4.3.4 Systematic Protocols
This initiative refers to the effort to establish a set o f systematic guidelines that assists 
the organisation in maintaining commitment to the CE approach. Protocols 
encapsulate the key element o f how the approach is realised in a particular context. 
Procedure manuals are common in engineering functions to help them deal with the 
complexity o f their task. CE methodologies such as DFA and DFM, for example, are 
derived from such a custom (Syan and Menon, 1994a; 1994b).
Introducing CE implies a large-scale transition from the sequential approach. CE also 
involves more intense and demanding activities and interaction than the sequential 
approach, and creates more tension and conflict within the program team (Riedel and 
Pawar, 1991). Pinto and Pinto (1991) note that the team’s rules and procedures are 
significant predictors o f the success o f a cross-functional co-operation. Unfortunately,
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only a few studies have examined the importance o f such protocols in implementing 
CE. This issue is another gap in the CE literature. Cleland (1991) is among the few 
researchers who underline the importance o f protocols in the implementation process. 
He argues that several important strategies have to be laid out at the start including the 
descriptions o f the cross-functional team, how it influence the overall process, team 
charter, system support committed and resource allocation planning.
The necessity o f systematic protocols in CE implementation involves two issues:
1) What CE initiatives are carried out, which is represented by operating manuals 
consisting o f an applied set of CE initiatives (i.e. CE-related manuals);
2) How CE is implemented in the organisation, which is represented by a structured 
and systematic approach to its implementation (e.g. CE charter and plan).
2.4.4 External Integration
Cross-functional integration may go beyond the organisational boundary and involve 
both suppliers and actual or potential customers in the process. Many researchers and 
practitioners have suggested such an involvement, particularly in high-tech industries, 
such as aerospace and aircraft (i.e. Fan, 1995; Slade, 1993; Henke et al., 1993; 
McDonough and Griffin, 1997). This category covers such initiatives and can be seen 
as an extension o f  the scope o f a cross-functional team. Therefore, the membership 
pattern o f the cross-functional team is also applied in the dimension of this category, 
which include the following:
1) the number o f supplier/customer involved,
2) the relative position o f external counterparts in the team (e.g. whether they work 
in the operational level, or mainly as the representatives in the higher-level team),
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3) the stage o f the process they are involved (e.g. whether only sporadic in a 
particular stage or throughout the whole process).
2.4.4.1 Supplier Involvement
The involvement o f supplier representatives as part o f a cross-functional team is often 
cited as an important element of CE and o f successful new product development (e.g. 
Fujimoto, 1997; Slade, 1993; Jurgen, 1997). Slade (1993) argues that the relationship 
with suppliers is often complex and problematic, and therefore requires supplier 
integration, in which suppliers’ engineers work together with design and 
manufacturing engineers in the design teams, early in the design cycle and continues 
throughout the product cycle. The involvement o f key suppliers provides the 
opportunity to rationalise and harmonise operating system interfaces, i.e. quality 
standards, production and paperwork process, and delivery schedule (Henke et al., 
1993). Supplier involvement is more apparent in large development programs with 
long development cycle (e.g. 5-9 years), such as aircraft development. Fan’s (1995) 
study of extended enterprise in CE, draws the experience of many aircraft 
manufacturers that involved key suppliers in their cross-functional teams and were 
engaged with some them in a risk and cost sharing partnership.
2.4.4.2 Customer Involvement
The involvement o f key or potential customers in the cross-functional team is a 
significant initiative in CE, particularly in the industrial and contract-based customers 
(McDonough and Griffin, 1997). In the aircraft industry, for example, the
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development o f  a new platform involves a long period o f time (i.e. 7 to 9 years). Any 
customer s doubt about the design (e.g. product safety) will greatly affect the sales 
and bring about changes to the design in later stages to incorporate such concerns. In 
a long development cycle program, it will greatly affect delivery to market, which in 
turn will affect sales more adversely.
2.4.5 Human Resource Management (HRM) Policy and Capability
Katzenbach and Smith (1993) argue that to be effective and successful the team 
should have adequate complementary skills: technical, problem solving and 
interpersonal. This argument implies that HRM issues should be included to facilitate 
required changes and to develop necessary competencies in establishing a cross­
functional team. This aspect relates to the competencies necessary for establishing a 
CE approach and organisational policies that develop and foster such competencies 
within the organisation. However, HRM issues are largely ignored in CE literature.
2.4.5.1 Competency
This element refers to the building o f key competencies required in new product 
development, which are acquired through HRM policies and practices. Nakayama 
(1997) argues that innovative product development is knowledge creation, which 
requires interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge held by involved people. 
Explicit knowledge is derived from the organisation’s knowledge represented by 
specification, calculation, or blue prints, which later materialised into the product. 
Explicit knowledge is tangible and transferable from one person to another
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(Nakayama, 1997). Tacit knowledge is derived from the organisation’s knowledge 
that is kept and internalised by each member o f the organisation. It is intangible and, 
therefore, the transfer is difficult (Nakayama, 1997).
At the group level, knowledge creation activity evolves through interaction, which 
leads to the sharing o f tacit and explicit knowledge and results in the 
conceptualisation process (Nakayama, 1997). Development technology refers to the 
tacit knowledge internalised in each engineer o f the development teams and brought 
to the next development effort (Nakayama, 1997). It comprises the field work 
knowledge (e.g. intuition, experience and analogy), which provides the insight 
necessary for understanding overall circumstances and actively re-framing or 
integrating various technologies to fit the needs o f a product development program.
Klein and Maurer (1995) argue that an integrated product development team needs 
technical experts who possess integrative knowledge across multiple functions. These 
integrators are needed because an effective group process relies on the ability to 
communicate and synergistically integrate its combined skills and knowledge 
throughout the development process. An integrator bridges functional knowledge 
bases. To be an integrator requires deep knowledge o f and experience in one field 
plus basic understanding of several adjacent fields (Iansiti, 1993; Klein 1994).
Crucial to this integration is a set up of overlapping knowledge or multi-skilling. 
Klein and Maurer (1995) further argue that overlap between individual members in 
many areas is not necessarily duplication o f knowledge but often varying degrees of  
expertise or different types of knowledge. The areas o f overlap are essential for the 
team to function. If only one member possesses the overlapping knowledge (even 
peripheral in some instances) he or she would become the de facto team leader.
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Similarly, Volk (1992) argues that multidisciplinary education is required to balance 
the requirements o f more specialisation. Furthermore, professional equality and trust 
among members seems to be a determinant in interaction. The higher the professional 
trust and equality among members, the stronger their tendency is toward 
collaboration. Indeed, Reidel and Pawar (1991) argue that competency of engineers 
and managers o f the company should become one o f the basic considerations in the 
decision to implement a CE approach.
Based on the above discussion, the dimensions o f required competency for this study 
include: educational background to capture the explicit knowledge; experience in 
previous programs to capture the tacit knowledge o f development; multi-skilling or 
overlapping expertise to become effective integrators; and the knowledge disparity 
level to ensure professional trust and equality.
2.4.5.2 CE-Related Training
This initiative refers to the availability o f specific training courses in supporting the 
application CE. Gordon and Isenhour (1990) suggest that members in integrating 
teams be trained in team building and problem solving skills. The adoption of a cross­
functional team implies a break from a traditional hierarchical and isolated functional 
work environment (Donellon, 1993) toward specialists working closely together with 
other specialists from different functional areas. This experience can cause a cultural 
shock (Anderson, 1993). Specific team-related training courses, such as team building 
and interpersonal skills, are important in breaking down people’s barriers to effective 
functioning o f the team (Donellon, 1993; Anderson, 1993). In addition, the applied 
CE concepts and guidelines need to be introduced to the entire functional units, and in
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particular to direct participants.
Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) view team building as a process of taking a collection 
of individuals with different needs, background and expertise and transforming them 
into an integrated, effective working unit. Another team related skill needed is 
collective listening that is necessary in reaping the benefit o f ‘teamness’ (Levine, 
1994). However, Henke et al. (1993) found that more effort has been invested in the 
structure than in the preparation of team members to ensure them to function 
effectively through such training courses.
2.4.5.3 Human Resource Policies
Human resource management (HRM) issues play important role in product innovation 
for manufacturing success. HRM policies had to be congruent with new product 
development practices; otherwise the expected result can not be achieved (Zanko et 
al., 1998). Breaking the silos that hinder the integrated process raises a concern for 
the long-term maintenance of strategic competencies. To retain critical functional 
knowledge and skills, an organisation needs an HRM system with an appropriate 
balance between short-term product related needs and long term strategic business 
and employee development goals (Klein and Maurer 1995).
HRM policies that are considered important for CE are recruitment, training and 
career development, performance measurement and reward system (Jurgen, 1997). 
Klein and Maurer (1995) report a case in which these issues were handled through a 
set o f policies starting with skill registration or skill inventory to list the core and 
other expertise available in the organisation and the knowledge map that reflect the
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knowledge required for the product development. The selection system reflects the 
matching o f  the individual with the knowledge map. Training needs are identified 
through the gap between the skill register and the knowledge map. Career 
development is handled considering the continuity o f knowledge. This includes job 
rotation to facilitate overlap knowledge. Performance is measured through team based 
peer appraisal rather than individual appraisal. Reward systems include team based 
pay plans and skill based pay systems. However, Zanko et al. (1998) suspect that in 
much CE implementation HRM has been addressed more as ad-hoc issues rather than 
as a systematic whole and, these issues are undertaken mostly by the involved line 
managers which put the HRM function in a reactive and clerical mode.
2.5 Conclusion
CE conceptualisation and operationalisation reveal that introducing CE is not as 
simple as its concept would indicate. It involves the selection o f a combination of  
these initiatives as well as the types most appropriate to be applied in a particular 
context. Therefore, it covers a wide range o f CE models.
Throughout the introduction process these initiatives may change and be shaped by 
the context and politics surrounding the process and may take different forms to that 
they initially intended. Each initiative may go through different paths and be 
influenced by the context and politics in different ways. The interrelation and 
interdependence o f  the identified generic features (Zanko et al., 1998) imply that all 
these initiatives are also interrelated and interdependent. The substance o f change, 
therefore, consists o f  several interrelated sub-processes as illustrated in Figure 2-3.
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This study focuses on initiatives in organisational integration and communication and 
decision-making mechanisms, which include: cross-functional team, heavyweight 
management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team communication, and 
decision-making mechanism. Focusing on these initiatives, this study analyses the 
longitudinal development o f each sub-process o f these initiatives through their 
dimensions and sub-dimensions.
Initiatives from other categories are also discussed. Drawing on the interrelationship 
between initiative sub-processes, these initiatives are used as part the explanation of 
what happened in the focus initiatives, which are central to the study and used to 
characterise the shape and the transformation development o f the CE in the case 
study. This discussion on CE leads to a refinement o f the general processual 
framework developed in Chapter 1. This refinement is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The
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operationalisation of focus initiatives into dimensions and sub-dimensions is provided 
in Table 2-1 (p. 40). The operationalisation o f other initiatives into their dimensions is 
provided in Table 2-2 (p. 41). The internal and external contexts as well as 
organisational power and politics surrounding the implementation process are 
discussed in the following chapter.
Figure 2-4: Conceptual Framework Refined based on CE Initiatives
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CHAPTER 3
CONTEXT AND POLITICS OF CHANGE AND 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Introducing CE into an Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company means bringing 
CE to a context that is different from its origins, and involves a significant change 
from the previous approach adopted by the company. The choice and process o f  
change are influenced by the organisational structure and context, as well as the 
political manoeuvring o f those who have access to the development process, 
particularly when such change is viewed as an opportunity to alter the structure and to 
express their worldviews (Thomas, 1994).
Guided by the processual approach to organisational change (Dawson 1994; 
Pettigrew, 1990), this study aims to explore through longitudinal research how a 
model o f  CE was over time shaped and formed by the contextual factors and the 
organisational power and politics surrounding its introduction to an organisation. 
Furthermore, following Thomas (1994) argument in his power process perspective, 
this study expands the organisational and temporal context in analysing the process o f  
change in order to see the dynamics and interactive nature o f such a process.
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In order to define a conceptual framework for such exploration on the context, this 
chapter reviews research literature on contextual factors and organisational power and 
politics, particularly ones that surrounding the implementation of a new approach or 
strategy in an organisation. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is 
devoted to the review of contextual factors that comprise the context o f change and 
the incorporation of these factors into the research framework. Pettigrew (1997, 1990) 
and Dawson (1994) suggest that context o f change includes both external and 
organisational environment within which the process takes place such as the particular 
circumstances within the organisation and its functional units, industry and society. In 
this study, the analysis of the context is focused on the organisational context and 
considering not only its structural but also its processual and cultural dimensions. The 
external context will only be reviewed in a broad sense.
The second part reviews the literature associated with organisational power and 
politics. Although often ignored, organisational politics play a central role in process 
innovation, either in the decision to adopt an approach or in the implementation of the 
adopted approach (Thomas, 1994). Politics can be viewed as the practical domain of 
power in action (Buchanan and Badham, 1999), which may go beyond the traditional 
authority in directing activity o f others (Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, and Mayes, 
1980). The discussion is arranged based on tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1995): power sources; context and structure; and will and skill. This review 
is used to conceptualise the role o f organisational politics in this change process of 
introducing CE to complete the elements o f a processual analysis. The final 
conceptual framework incorporating the above analysis o f context, power, and 
politics is presented at the end of this chapter.
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3.2 The Context of Change
In processual analysis, the context o f change refers to the past, present and future 
projection o f internal and external operating environment (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson 
1994). The internal or organisational context is represented by contextual factors 
inside the organisation. The external context covers competitor strategy, international 
competition, government legislation, changing social expectation, technological 
innovation, and changes in business activities (Dawson, 1994). The external factors 
can be grouped into the industry and the society in which the organisation operates. 
Typically, the management o f an organisation has more control and influence over 
internal context, but less or no such control or influence over the external context.
Thomas (1994) argues that in order to attain deeper understanding on the dynamics of 
the change process, it is necessary to expand the organisational and temporal context 
in which the process occurs. However, to make the research tasks ‘manageable’, this 
study focuses on the organisational context. To satisfy the necessity o f expanding the 
organisational context, the literature on the external contexts, namely the industry and 
the society is reviewed broadly, with a particular purpose to provide guidance in 
describing the organisation and its environment rather than to intentionally seek 
explanation from it. Using this review, the overview of the industry and society in 
which the subject o f case study operated, namely the aircraft industry and Indonesia, 
are provided in Chapter 5 which introduces the company and its environment.
The reason to choose the organisational context as the focus o f the study is two-fold. 
Firstly, organisational context, at least partly, represents the intersection o f the 
industry context and the society contexts (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). 
Organisational context is both moderating and affected by the conflicting aspects of
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the industry and society. Hawkins (1999), for example, notes the complex criss­
crossing o f national, professional, and departmental cultures as well as the cultures o f  
different clients while working in an international company. In this line, Hosffcede 
(1991) outlines the relationship between the organisational culture and mechanism 
and the societal culture o f its members. From the contingency theory proponents, 
Thompson (1967) suggests the technology employed by an industry determines the 
degree o f complexity, uncertainty and interdependence within an organisation 
operates in that industry. Secondly, since the external context is in the outer layer of  
the process, the direct influence o f its factors is expected to be more remote than the 
influence o f the inner context.
3.2.1 Organisational Context
As discussed in Chapter 2, many researchers acknowledge that moving from 
sequential to integrated process involves not only technological change but also 
substantial organisational and cultural changes and hence emphasise the 
organisational aspects o f CE initiatives (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Adler 1995; Klein dan 
Maurer, 1995). Central mechanism of CE is supported by both technical and 
organisational enablers (Haddad, 1995). These organisational enablers involve 
changes in organisational structure and practices. More specifically, Zanko et al. 
(1998) argue that organisation integration is one o f the distinct features o f CE, which 
calls for an organisational arrangement designed differently to the traditional 
functional silos (Zanko et al., 1998). The fit between organisational context and CE 
approach being introduced greatly affects the implementation of CE in a company. 
Therefore, organisational context is an important issue in the discussion of successful
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CE implementation.
Basically, an organisation is the grouping o f individuals into one or more groups in 
order to accomplish a given task (Ensign, 1998). Organisational context covers hard, 
formal structure and mechanism o f the organisation as well as its soft, behavioural, 
attitudinal, and cultural aspects o f people within the organisation. According to 
Dawson (1994), five main factors in the internal organisational context are human 
resources, administrative structures, technology, product, and history and culture.
Contingency theory argues that there is no best way o f organising (Galbraith, 1973; 
Child, 1984). Galbraith (1973: p. 2) states “there is no single best way to design the 
structure o f an organisation” and “any way o f organising is not equally effective”. 
One of these contingency factors is the size o f organisation (Child, 1984; Handy, 
1985; and Wong and Birmbaum-More , 1994). Other contingency factors that are 
considered as determinants o f organisational structure are market environment (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961), production technology (Woodward, 1965), industry characteristics 
and its technology (Handy, 1985; Chapman and Jehn, 1994), strategy (Chandler, 
1962; Child 1972), type o f work and environmental demands (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Lorsch and Allen, 1973); objectives, history and ownership o f the organisation 
(Handy, 1985), product characteristics, administrative heritage, and the organisational 
stage o f development (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Child (1984) further argues that contingencies are themselves interrelated. He 
emphasises the important of choice in defining organisation o f the firm by arguing 
that it is not simply a technical matter but also reflects the preference embodied the 
dominant culture o f the organisation. This confirms Buchanan and Boddy’s (1983) 
argument o f interrelationship between the organisational structure and organisational
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culture in their analysis o f  technical change. In fact, many researchers argue that 
organisational culture is reflected by organisational structure (Harrison, 1972; Handy, 
1985; Hofstede, 1991; Pheysey, 1993).
Furthermore, many o f  these contingencies, such as market, type o f work and 
technology, relate to the external context, namely the industry in which the 
organisation operate, indicating contribution o f the industry context in defining the 
organisation structure (Woodward, 1965; Thompson, 1967). Thompson (1967), for 
example, argues that greater technical complexity o f  the industry results in increased 
structural differentiation. In a sense, this technology deterministic argument 
contradicts the above argument o f strategic choice put forward by Child (1972, 1984). 
In this respect, Thomas’s (1994) argues that in addition o f the ‘invisible hand’ of  
exogenous technological deterministic and the ‘visible hand’ o f strategic choice, 
change may occur as a result o f the ‘political hand’: initiated in response to existing 
structure by means o f  technology. This Thomas’s power process perspective sees 
relationship between technology and organisation as dynamic and interactive rather 
than static and unilateral.
Meanwhile, Hofstede (1991) argues two dimensions o f societal culture (i.e. power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance) influence the structural aspect of the organisation. 
He argues that power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of societal 
culture are represented by the centralisation and formalisation dimensions of  
organisational structure (1991). He also made comparison between his quadrants and 
Mintzberg (1979) organisation typology indicating interrelation between the 
organisation context and the national/societal context.
In summary, the organisational context in this study is represented by the
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organisational structure and stage o f development o f the organisation, organisational 
culture, and functional culture. This is taken considering the contingency theory’s 
(Galbraith, 1973) argument for the interrelation between structure and the contigency 
factors, Schein’s relationship o f organisational history and culture (1985), and 
Lawrence and Lorsch’s functional orientation (1967).
3.2.1.1 Organisational Structure and Stage of Development
This section discusses the organisational structure and its co-ordination mechanism 
and the organisation’s stage o f development. The stage o f development o f a company 
is included here because it affects some structural contingencies, such as the size, 
administrative heritage, goals and objectives and particular strategy employed by the 
organisation (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Organisational structure is a major factor within the organisational context. In 
simplest term, it is the way in which organisation divides its people into distinct tasks 
and achieves co-ordination among them (Mintzberg, 1979). Child (1984) and Handy 
(1985) refers to organisation structure as a means for allocating formal responsibility 
that provide a framework for operation and co-ordination mechanism within the 
organisation. Similarly, Scott (1992) argues that a formal structure defines the formal 
roles and relationship among people, and thus creating a certain authority pattern. 
According to Child (1984), organisational structure has three main aspects:
1) The basic structure: a formal allocation and co-ordination mechanism o f people 
and resources. This includes organisation charts, job descriptions, and the 
constitution o f boards, committees, and teams.
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2) Operating mechanism: a set o f devices that govern what is expected from the 
people. This includes operating procedure; standard performance, rewards and 
appraisal systems; and planning, scheduling and communication systems.
3) Decision-making mechanism: mechanisms to attain decision and its associated 
information, such as environmental scanning and information systems.
Matteson and Ivancevich (1990) use three dimensions o f formalisation, centralisation 
and complexity (differentiation/specialisation) in analysing organisational structure. 
Formalisation refers to “the extent to which rules, procedures, and other guides to 
action are written and enforced” (p. 653). Centralisation refers to “the extent to which 
authority to make decisions in retained in top management” (p. 651). Complexity 
(differentiation/specialisation) refers to “the number o f different jobs and/or different 
units within an organisation” (p.652).
In line with his three aspects of organisational structure, Child (1984) argues that 
organisation structure has six major dimensions: design of jobs (specialisation), 
design o f formal relationship, hierarchy and span o f control (the shape), the grouping 
(fimctional/divisional), integration, delegation o f authority, and performance appraisal 
and rewards system. This list seems to accord with the above Matteson and 
Ivancevich’s (1990) three dimensions of organisational structure.
Similarly, Scott (1992) describes the structural features that integrating an 
organisation include formalisation, hierarchy, centralisation, and various way of  
facilitating the lateral flow of information. Hierarchy is associated with the way 
people are linked into a single pyramidal structure o f control relation, while 
centralisation is a structural mechanism that defines who participates in decision 
making (Ensign, 1998). These descriptions o f ‘centralisation’ and ‘hierarchy’ are
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similar in their essence to the definition o f ‘centralisation’ in Matteson and 
Ivancevich’s (1990) dimensions o f organisation structure.
On the basis o f key dominant parts o f the organisation, Mintzberg (1979) developed a 
typology o f the organisation structure, each with different co-ordination mechanism:
1) simple structure o f the strategic apex with direct supervision,
2) machine bureaucracy of the techno-structure with standardisation o f work process,
3) professional bureaucracy o f the operating core with standardisation o f skill,
4) divisionalised form o f the middle management with standardisation of output, and
5) adocracy o f the support staff with the use o f mutual adjustment.
This typology can also be described in term o f formalisation, centralisation and 
differentiation with adocracy represents the low end o f formalisation, centralisation 
and differentiation dimensions while full bureaucracy represents the high end of  
formalisation, centralisation and differentiation dimensions.
Based on the above discussion, it seems that the Matteson and Ivancevich’s (1990) 
dimensions o f organisation structure covers all aspects o f the organisation structure 
more comprehensively. Therefore, following Matteson and Ivancevich’s (1990), this 
study operasionalises organisational structure and co-ordination mechanism through 
three dimensions o f centralisation, formalisation, and specialisation.
The operationalisation o f the organisation’s stage o f development is sought in various 
organisation models within the strategy imperative framework, i.e. whenever strategy 
change the organisation must change (Galbraith, 1991; Mintzberg, 1991; Chandler, 
1962). This framework indicates that organisation is more than just structure. The 
elements o f both strategy and organisation should be combined to suit a particular 
context (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991). Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) relate their
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context with the stage o f development o f the organisation: entrepreneurial context o f  
the start up companies, mature context o f the large business organisations, and 
diversified context o f the conglomeration. Start up organisation is typically used a 
simple structure to deal with the entrepreneurial context, while the large business 
organisations and conglomeration use machine bureaucracy and divisional structures 
respectively.
The above discussion shows that the stage o f development o f an organisation is 
closely related to the age of the company and its business maturity relative to other 
players in the industry. Considering that this study is concerned with new product 
development process, knowledge and technology accumulation also become highly 
relevant. In this aspect, Riedel and Pawar (1991) warn that the adoption o f CE should 
also consider the issue o f availability o f competent engineers and managers other than 
the time-cost trade off and the ability to lay substantial capital investment at the 
outset. Their case study emphasises the importance o f the technological and 
managerial competency. Therefore, the stage of development is operationalised 
through the following three aspects:
1) the age o f the company relative to other players in the industry,
2) the business maturity, and
3) the technological competence maturity.
3.2.1.2 Organisational Culture
The term organisational culture is used to reflect a wide range o f the organisational 
dynamics from behavioural attitudes and values. There is a wide body of literature on 
this subject, but there is disagreement on its definition; to some extent it is still a
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polemical concept. For example, Bloor and Dawson (1994) emphasise its features on 
facilitating sense making and guiding working behaviour, and therefore, see 
organisational culture as patterned systems o f perception among people that share 
common experiences. Schein (1985), on the other hand, has deliberately excluded 
overt behavioural patterns from his widely cited definition. He further argues that 
organisational culture provides consensus on organisational mission, goals, means, 
measurement criteria, and repair strategies in dealing with survival and external 
adaptation issue. It provides common language and consensus over group boundaries.
Organisational culture consists o f the core values that maintain an organisation as a 
bounded unit and provide it with a distinct identity (Chatman and Jehn, 1994). In its 
essence, these core values also play a role as a normative control that continuously 
forces members o f the organisation to behave in accord with the organisation’s 
objectives (Kunda, 1992). Schein (1985) suggests the dominant influence o f the 
founders and strong leaders, the dominant groups, and the unique history of 
organisation in shaping the core values o f organisational culture. Kunda’s empirical 
study on ‘engineered engineering culture’ (1992) in a high-tech company is also 
underscore the strong influence o f the founder and senior management members in 
defining and shaping the intended organisational culture.
Organisational culture is not static but develops over time in a complex interplay with 
the external environment (Schein, 1985). Using Hofstede’s (1991) model, Pheysey 
(1993) suggests that the organisational culture is the golden means o f achieving the 
organisational mission. This means an organisation evolves from one culture to the 
other whichever best fits the organisational context. Similarly, Charles Hampden- 
Turner (1994) sees organisational culture as the way the organisation deals with the
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dilemma o f contradictory choices that may create either a vicious cycle that goes from 
one extreme to the other, or a virtuous cycle that creates solution to achieve harmony.
In conceptualising organisational culture, Roger Harrison (1972) and Charles Handy 
(1985; 1987) develop similar quadrants with four types o f culture and coined with 
different names. Their quadrants are derived from a similar formalisation and 
centralisation dimensions and represent co-ordination mechanism and organisational 
structure. Interestingly, these typologies closely resemble Hofstede’s (1991) 
organisational culture quadrant and Mintzberg’s (1979) organisational typology 
mentioned in the previous section. These interrelationship between organisational 
culture and organisational structure is illustrated in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Organisational Structure and Organisational Culture Interrelationship 
(Adapted and Extended from Hofstede, 1991)
These typologies highlight the interrelation between structural and cultural aspects of 
the organisation context as well as the interrelation between the organisation context 
and the external contexts. Furthermore, the use o f key part o f the organisation as the
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basis o f Mintzberg’s (1979) typology leads to the notion of the existence o f different 
parts and functions in organisation. This implies the relationship o f the structure and 
the nature o f various functions in organisation, which leads to the functional culture.
Meanwhile, Martin (1992) views organisational culture from three different 
perspectives: integration, differentiation and fragmentation. The integration 
perspective views organisational culture as a set o f shared-values, often espoused by 
the organisational management as bringing organisational members together. The 
differentiation perspective takes the view that the espoused organisational culture 
sometimes conflicts with organisational sub-cultures that exist in the organisation. 
The fragmentation perspective views that several, and sometimes conflicting, sub­
cultures exist in an organisation and their interplay shapes the organisational 
dynamics. This three-perspective o f organisational culture is strongly supported by 
the empirical result o f Kunda’s ethnographic study in a high-tech company. Kunda 
(1992) found that the engineered ‘tech-culture’ was intensively brought forward by 
the management while other members reacted to it quite differently, either embracing 
or distancing, according to the his/her particular circumstance at a particular time.
Within this framework, the above discussion on organisational culture represents the 
integration perspective o f culture characterised with the notion of espoused, united 
and shared culture. Two other perspectives imply the importance o f sub-cultures (i.e. 
various functional cultures) that coexist in the organisational context and the way of  
individuals within the organisation deal with the espoused and intended culture. This 
is supported by one dimension o f organisational culture suggested by Schein (1985) 
and by the result o f Kunda’s (1992) study, namely the dominant group within the 
organisation, which implicitly recognised the distinct identities o f various groups
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within the organisation. This organisational sub-culture (i.e. functional cultures) is 
discussed further in the next section.
Based on the above discussion, this study follows Schein (1985) and Kunda (1992) 
and assesses the organisational culture through the dimensions o f founder and strong 
leaders and the unique organisation history. These two dimensions are the major 
contributors that define a set o f distinctive common cultural attributes that are shared 
by the entire organisation and often intentionally espoused.
3.2.1.3 Functional and Professional Culture
Professionals acquire judgement through intensive training, supervision and 
socialisation. Different professions differ in their values and beliefs, and what is 
considered as appropriate behaviour. These differences may reflect differences in 
mission, method, and concerns (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). However, some 
professions are often blurred with the occupation. Engineers, for example, while 
coming from the same profession, are more likely addressed according their 
functional occupations (e.g. production engineers, designers). Hansen (1995) notes 
that while being part o f the same profession, hardware and software development 
departments have different cultures. In this study, this sphere is not taken into 
consideration. The influence o f particular professions, if relevant, will be included as 
part o f this discussion on functional culture.
Following Martin’s three perspectives (1992), this study acknowledges the potential 
coexistence o f a united organisational culture that is shared across functional 
departments and various differentiated and fragmented sub-cultures (i.e. functional
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cultures) with conflicting interests within an organisational context. Schein (1993) 
argues that sub-units of an organisation are likely to develop their own subcultures 
because they share core technologies and learning experiences. These subcultures 
imply differences in languages, assumptions about reality, and mental models.
Similarly, Kunda (1992) found significant differences in the ownership o f an intended 
culture among three different categories o f  employees in his case study o f high-tech 
culture. This case study shows that design engineers became the centre o f the culture 
and the effort to inseminate that intended culture. Design engineers was clearly the 
first class employees and the main target o f the intended culture put forward by the 
senior management members. Other groups, including production engineers, are less 
important. This empirical result is in line with Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argument 
for the degree o f domination o f a particular function as one dimension in describing 
industry environment.
Schein (1993) suggests that subcultures tend to form around any stable social unit. 
This stability is a function of relative stability o f membership, the duration of the 
founders leading the group, the potency o f leadership, the number and intensity o f  
common coping experiences, the life time o f the group, and the “smallness” of the 
group to foster mutual acquaintance and trust. Program teams, functional groups, 
geographical units, or hierarchical strata, each inevitably creates a common frame of 
reference, a common language, and a common assumptions-forming sub-culture due 
to their differences within the organisation (Schein, 1995). Bloor and Dawson’s 
(1994) definition o f culture emphasises patterned systems o f perception that facilitate 
sense making and guide behaviour at work, suits the concept o f functional culture as a 
group level phenomena linked by the ‘sharedness’. Each function (e.g. marketing,
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R&D, production) has its own particular culture.
The reasons for these differences are related to the nature o f the task and what is 
considered to be the best way to achieve success (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) identify specific differences in the way of thinking and 
working o f three functional units: sales and marketing, production, and research, 
which are rooted in cognitive and emotional orientations as follows:
1) orientation towards the goals o f their particular units,
2) time orientation: short term versus long term o f sales and research,
3) interpersonal orientation: task versus people orientations o f production and sales,
4) formality o f structure: formal-hierarchical versus flat-less precise control o f  
production and research.
The effect o f functional cultures on the CE implementation process is apparent. 
Schein (1993) argues that, although it is often overlooked, understanding differences 
in functional cultures is important when cross-functional teams are created to develop 
new products, design new policies or explore new market. The domination of one 
function over others may affect the structural hierarchy and mechanism within the 
cross-functional team. In such teams, particular attention should be paid to the design 
and production functions that normally become the main players in CE product 
development process. In this respect, Thomas’s (1994) and Kunda (1992) accounts 
from their case studies provide useful information about these two main functions of  
high-tech companies.
Design function is typically a dominant function (Thomas, 1994, Kunda, 1992). As 
the heart o f product development process, this function is considered worthy to 
become the focus o f attention in insemination engineered culture (Kunda, 1992). The
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hegemony and substantial power o f this function come from its unique skill to 
confront complexities in designing parts and integrating them into a coherent system 
(Thomas, 1994). Thomas (1994) further argues that this hegemony itself is the 
product o f core assumptions about the nature o f product and the organisation 
necessary to produce it.
On the other hand, production functions and engineers in production area are 
accorded to a lower status and less critical than the design function (Thomas, 1994). 
In contrast with the organic organisation o f design function, production function tends 
to be mechanical in nature with traditional functional units, standardisations, 
documentation, and bureaucratic organisation (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Its activities 
continue to be perceived as secondary, e.g. responding order, executing design, and 
devoting energies to diminish variation rather than creating it). Consequently, it is 
granted less control over resources, and considered substitutable (Thomas, 1994). 
This inequality may trigger political actions to assert a worldview and interpretation 
either to reinforce or to alter the existing structure and power relation which discusses 
further in the next section.
In summary, functional cultures are represented by differences in language and 
assumptions about reality and mental model (Schein, 1993). These differences are 
rooted in four orientation differentials (e.g. goals orientation, time orientation, 
interpersonal orientation, and structural formality) between various functions within 
the organisation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, these four orientation 
differentials and the degree o f domination of a particular function are used in this 
study to assess the existence o f various functional cultures in the organisation and 
their effect to the introduction o f CE.
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3.2.2 External Context
3.2.2.1 Industry Context
Industry context refers to both structural and processual aspects that are specific to the 
industry and distinguishes one industry from others. A solid description o f industry 
context is important as part of extending the organisational context to provide better 
understanding o f the change process (Thomas, 1994).
In their analysis on organisational environment, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) use 
three dimensions to describe industry environment: the degree o f risk, the speed of 
feedback, and the degree of domination of a particular function. The degree of risk 
indicates the degree of certainty in various aspects (e.g. market and technology) in a 
particular industry. The speed of feedback indicates the time needed to obtain 
feedback about a decision taken. Based on these dimensions, they suggest that 
industries differ along the continuum from the most stable to the highly dynamic. The 
aircraft industry, for example, was classified as a dynamic industry because it deals 
with high uncertainty (i.e. high degree o f risk) in its technological aspect and needs a 
long time before the technology is confirmed (i.e. low speed of feedback).
Porter’s (1985) competitive advantage model o f industry structure provides further 
useful insight on underlying factors that define the structural characteristics of a 
particular industry. He suggests five structural forces that determine the level of 
competition within an industry: rivalry, threat o f substitute products and new entrants, 
and bargaining power of suppliers and buyers. He further argues that the strength of 
each factor is a function o f the underlying economic and technical characteristics of 
an industry.
Chatman and Jehn (1994) also suggest that technology is one o f the most salient
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similarities among firms in the same industry. They suggest that technology 
differences create most organisational variance since technology constrains the 
variation in how things are done by defining what is being done. Within contingency 
theory framework, Thompson (1967) argues that the technical core of an organisation 
determine the degree of complexity (diversity), uncertainty (unpredictability), and 
interdependence. Greater technical complexity results in increased structural 
differentiation; greater technical uncertainty results in less formalisation and 
centralisation o f structure; and greater technical interdependence requires greater co­
ordination.
In assessing industry culture which reflects processual aspects specific to an industry, 
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) identify five reasons for differences across industry: 
(1) the nature o f decision-making, (2) the nature o f products or services, (3) the rate of 
technology change, (4) the degree o f state intervention, and (5) market characteristics. 
There is a relationship between the structural and processual aspects of an industry. 
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) argue that nature o f decision-making is determined by 
the degree of risk involved and the amount o f time required to know the consequence 
of a decision, and suggesting the use o f cultural quadrant developed by Deal and 
Kennedy (1982). This quadrant uses the Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) speed of 
feedback and degree o f risk dimensions. The nature o f product/services, the rate of 
technological change, and the degree o f state intervention are closely related to the 
technological core of the industry, while the market characteristic relates to the 
market and economic core of the industry.
In summary, factors associated with industry characteristics developed by Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) and Schneider and Barsoux (1997) are interrelated and closely
93
Chapter 3 : Context and Politics of Change and Conceptual Framework
related to the underlying factors o f an industry, namely the technology and economic 
characteristics. These overlapping dimensions provide a guide in describing the 
industry context relevant to this study, namely the global aircraft industry.
The effect o f this industry context on CE is obvious. CE approach was originated, 
developed and then diffused within and across industries to balance the inherent 
technical complexity and uncertainty with the need for integration in order to achieve 
better products with faster and cheaper development process (e.g. Winner et al., 
1988). However, CE is o f greater relevance to some industries than to the others. 
Aircraft and other high-tech and complex manufacturing industries seem to be the 
ones that benefit most from CE in their product development, as reflected by their 
domination in the IDA report (Winner et al., 1988). As noted in the previous 
discussions, the underlying aspects o f an industry (i.e. technology and market) also 
influence the process indirectly through their effect in organisational structure and 
culture. For example, the more complex industry leads to high differentiation and 
specialisation, and therefore needs more sophisticated integration mechanism.
3.2.2.2 National Context
As with the industry context, the description of national context is important as part of  
extending the organisational context to provide better understanding of the change 
process (Thomas, 1994). National context consists of two interrelated aspects: 
societal institutions and societal culture. Societal institutions are represented by a set 
of systems o f  governance (i.e. law, economics and political system) applied in a 
politically bounded society (i.e. nation state), which lead to the contemporary political 
and economical circumstances o f a particular nation. This, in turn, affects the
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organisation that operates within an nation state, its mission, and its governance 
system and practices.
Schneider and Barsoux (1997), for example, argue that government regulations 
influence the degree to which technologies are developed and protected and signal 
which industries are more valued and perceived as crucial to national security or 
economic sovereignty. The effect o f national context in the introduction of CE, either 
directly or indirectly, is mainly rooted in this issue. In a developing country, state- 
owned companies typically have not only economical objectives (i.e. profit making) 
but also political objectives o f the government. A state-owned company is often seen 
as a vehicle for technology transformation o f the country to become part of 
industrialised world. These objectives often cause the company to become vulnerable 
of government’s intervention. The economic and political systems of governance 
influence the degree of this intervention.
Culture is originally an anthropological term used to describe different behavioural 
patterns between geographically divided societies (Kluckhohn, 1962). Societal culture 
is represented by layers of cultural artefact; values, norms, and believes; and 
underlying assumptions held by the members o f a society (Hofstede, 1984, Schein 
1985, Trompenaar, 1994). Some researchers argue that social institution is part of the 
artefact, the observable part o f culture (Wilkinson, 1996; Ralston et al., 1995). There 
is reciprocal relationship which reflects the interrelated layers o f culture: culture 
shapes social institution, and in turn, social institution and their reproductions shape 
culture (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Societal culture has been related to many organisational issues including: 
organisational structure, leadership style, interaction and group dynamics,
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organisational system and processes, human resource management, organisational 
culture, and international business (e.g. Hall, 1960; Hofstede, 1984; 1991; Lane and 
DiStefano, 1988; Trompenaars, 1994; Adler, 1991; Jackson, 1993; Mead, 1994; 
Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). This wide range o f issues can be summarised into two 
main aspects o f organisation and management practices: the institutional (e.g. 
structures, policies, systems and procedures), and processual and behavioural (e.g. 
leadership and interaction).
A widely cited and tested framework in analysing societal culture is Hofstede’s 
(1984) study (e.g. Lane and DiStefano, 1988; Adler, 1991; Jackson, 1993; Pheysey, 
1993). Defining culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members o f one group category o f people from another” (Hofstede, 
1991, p.5), Hofstede constructs four dimensions o f culture (Hofstede, 1984):
1) Power distance: the level o f the less powerful members o f a society expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally.
2) Individualism/Collectivism: the level o f individual ties in a social relationship.
3) Masculinity/Femininity: the level o f distinction o f gender role in social 
relationship.
4) Uncertainty Avoidance, the level o f the society feels threatened by uncertain 
situations.
While widely cited, Hofstede’s study is also the subject o f criticism. The main 
objection is the use o f quantitative approach in assessing culture. Critics consider that 
culture must be assessed using a more qualitative approach (see for example Schein, 
1984; Pettigrew, 1973). Mead (1994) lists five criticism over Hofstede’s framework: 
assuming homogeneity within national territory, conceptual and methodological
96
Chapter 3: Context and Politics of Change and Conceptual Framework
problems, the research is in itself culture-bound, some findings are out o f date, and 
concentrate on single industry and single multinational.
There are only a few studies that link the product innovation with societal culture. 
Among these, Jurgen (1997) contributes an empirical study on variation in product 
development restructuring from four countries: Japan, US, Italy and Germany. In 
assessing the effect o f culture in organisation, Hofstede (1991) further suggests that 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions are related to the institutional 
aspect, while individualism and masculinity dimensions are related to the processual 
and behavioural aspect. Likewise, societal culture is likely to affect CE introductory 
process, either directly or indirectly in both structural and behavioural aspects. Power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions are likely to influence organisational 
integration, e.g. how the cross-functional team is structured and managed, while the 
individualism and masculinity dimensions are likely to influence team’s interaction.
In summary, national context can be described into two aspects, the national system 
of governance and the societal culture within the nation. The system of governance 
leads to the contemporary situation that influences the organisational context, 
particularly for the state-owned company in a developing country. The societal 
culture affects the process, either directly or indirectly, in both structural and 
behavioural aspects. The use o f Hofstede’s framework (J984) is common in such 
analysis. However, aware o f criticisms o f this framework as pointed out by Mead 
(1994), this study not only relies on Hofstede’s framework but also on anthropology 
and other social science literature which provide richer descriptions o f the culture and 
with more appropriate qualitative methodology (e.g. Geertz, 1960; Hill, 1994).
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3.2.3 Conceptual Framework Refinement Based on Contextual Variables
Based on the above discussion, the conceptual framework is refined to incorporate the 
operationalisation of contextual variables. This framework is illustrated in Figure 3-2.
3.3 Organisational Power and Politics
As mentioned previously, introducing CE involves a process of change. In such a 
process, organisational politics is influential and may become a dominant contributor 
of the result attained (Thomas, 1994). Commitments from various functions and
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individuals cannot be taken for granted, particularly due to competing interests across 
functions and levels within an organisation (Guth and Me Millan, 1989; Wilkinson, 
1983; Porter, Crampon and Smith, 1976). However, Thomas (1994) notes that 
researchers tend to treat the role o f politics and political action lightly in the process 
innovation. The reasons include: innovation is considered as in accord with a broader 
organisational objectives; consensus is assumed as essential while conflict is 
considered dysfunctional and indication o f ineffectiveness; and politics and conflict 
are sensitive issue involve questioning rationality o f management action.
Using his power-process perspective in studying technological change process, 
Thomas (1994) argues that politics is far more central to the process than has been 
recognised. Innovation and change in technology and organisation may be as much 
products o f internal political action as they are products o f exogenous forces, 
conscious design of top leaders, or efforts o f units formally sanctioned to it. In this 
respect, Thomas (1994) views politics not only influential in the process of 
implementing change but also in the decisions over the choice o f what need to be 
changed prior to the implementation process. Such a choice involves three screens: 
technical, economic, and political or interest. Apart from its technological and 
economical advantages, this choice also represents a vehicle to express and enact 
worldviews for individuals or groups o f individuals (e.g. functional units) that may 
embody both self-interest and genuine collective interests. Desire for status, 
recognition, and balanced inequities, can trigger functional groups to enact their views 
(Thomas, 1994).
From this perspective, it can be argued that the process o f introducing CE is 
immensely influenced by political maneuvering o f key individuals and groups
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involved in the process, particularly considering the unbalanced domination o f  one 
functional group (i.e design engineering) over others (i.e. production and production 
engineering). In fact, Thomas (1994) notes that approaches, such as CE or 
simultaneous engineering, are beneficial in balancing the power between functional 
groups, but their prescriptions miss the opportunity for changing the perceived 
relationship between those functions.
In broader management literature, many authors acknowledge the importance o f  
politics in organisation (e.g Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995; Buhler, 1994; Mintzberg, 1991). Buhler (1994), for example, views 
organisational politics as one mechanism that enables managers to get things done 
through people. He argues that politics is unavoidable, but the degree to which 
politics is used, discussed and even encouraged varies across organisations. In his 
study o f decision-making, Pettigrew (1973) views an organisation as an open political 
system in which its sub-units are interdependent and have different interests, which is 
likely lead to conflict. He views political behaviour as behaviour of individuals and 
sub-units in making a claim against the resource sharing system of the organisation.
Many other studies relate political behaviour to organisational decision-making 
(Drory, 1993; Kozlowski and Doherty, 1989; Allen and Porter, 1983; Garguilo, 
1993). However, Egan (1993) argues that the politics of the workplace often takes 
place out o f sight. This shadowy side consists o f all those things that substantially and 
consistently affect the productivity and quality o f the working life but which are not 
found on organisational charts, in company manuals, or in formal meetings. In this 
respect, Thomas notices that “political actions might be a vital though not necessarily 
a comfortable part...” (1994, p. 230)
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Much research takes a negative view of organisational politics (Ferris and Kacmar, 
1992). Matteson and Ivancevich (1990) identify politics as a potential source o f stress. 
Drory (1993) suggests that organisational politics have a potentially damaging effect 
(i.e. negative attitudes) on lower status employees. Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn and 
Harrell-Cook (1996) view political behaviour as self-serving behaviour that is not 
sanctioned by the organisation and potentially has negative consequences including 
conflict and disharmony at both individual and organisational levels. Individuals 
and/or groups are pitted against each other, or against the organisation itself. This, in 
turn, results in negative outcomes such as poor job performance, negative attitudes, 
and employee withdrawal from the hostile and political environment.
Scholars have recently focused on neutral and even positive perspectives of 
organisational politics (Gilmore et al, 1996). According to Mintzberg (1991), 
organisations function on the basis o f system of influence: authority, ideology, 
expertise and politics. The first three are considered as legitimate in some sense, while 
politics is necessary to correct deficiencies in legitimate systems of influence and to 
provide some sense o f flexibility discouraged by other systems. Buchanan and 
Badham (1999) view power and political behaviour as significant to the effectiveness 
of the organisation and the individual, but can also be individually self-serving and 
organisationally damaging. According to Buchanan and Badham (1999, p. 11), 
“political behaviour is the practical domain o f power in action, worked out through 
the use o f techniques o f influence and other (more or less extreme) tactics”. Power 
can be seen in three perspectives: a property o f individuals, a property of  
relationships, or a property o f social and organisational structures and procedures.
In line with Buchanan and Badham’s three perspectives, Pettigrew and McNulty
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(1995) have used a “tripartite analysis” o f power and influence as the framework for 
studying the power o f the board o f directors in several UK companies. This 
fram ework views ‘power sources’ and the individual's ‘skill and w ill’ in using such 
sources are located within broad features o f ‘context and structure’ that have both 
constraining and enabling characteristics. This framework can be seen in Figure 3-3.
Context and 
Structure
A
Power V—1---------- Skill and
Sources Will
Figure 3-3: Tripartite Analysis o f Power and Influence 
(Based on Pettigrew and McNulty (1995))
This framework is used to conceptualise the organisational politics in this study 
particularly because it reflects a dynamic quality o f power and politics. As Pettigrew 
and M cNulty (1995) argue, skilful mobilisation o f power sources may change the 
rules o f the political game and provides a new context for subsequent influence 
attempts. The crisis, the history of effective or ineffective users o f power, and the 
violation o f trust or codes of conduct may destabilise and change the power 
relationship. This framework, for example, is useful in explaining why managers 
often perceive political activity as an influence attempt outside the traditional use of 
authority (i.e. traditionally defined limits o f legitimate power) and attribute political 
activities to those in positions of high legitimate power (Madison, Allen, Porter, 
Renwick, and Mayes, 1980). It also useful to explain why managers tend to be more
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tolerant toward organisational politics and consider it as less immoral compared with 
non-supervisory employees (Drory and Romm, 1988).
3.3.1 Power Sources
In line with the view of power and power source as a property o f individuals or 
groups o f individuals, Lukes (1974) suggests three ways o f viewing power. Firstly, 
the one-dimensional, traditional, pluralistic view that suggests power is distributed 
pluralistically (e.g. Dahl, 1957). This view involves a focus on behaviour in the 
making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict o f interests, 
as expressed in policy preferences, revealed by political participation. Secondly, the 
two-dimensional view that suggests the pluralistic view was inadequate (e.g. 
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) because some issues are intentionally brought into the 
organisational agenda politics while others are deliberately discarded from the 
agenda. This view involves an examination both decision-making and non-decision­
making. Non-decision-making is a means by which demands for change are killed 
before gaining access to the decision-making arena.
Third, the three-dimensional view that criticises the first two views as too 
individualistic (e.g. Lukes, 1974). Lukes (1974) argues that there are ways to keep 
potential issues out o f politics, whether through social forces, institutional practices or 
individual’s decisions. They occur in the absence o f actual, observable conflict, which 
may have been successfully averted although the issue remains an implicit reference 
to potential conflict. The three-dimensional view incorporates this latent conflict, 
which consists in a contradiction between the interests o f those exercising power and 
the real interests o f those they exclude.
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In line with this three-dimensional view, Thomas (1994) argues that such power 
relation relates to the domination o f one worldview over the others. Therefore, such 
decisions as introducing a technological change or process innovation may be 
influenced by both effort to alter structure and effort to reinforce or reproduce existing 
relation (Thomas, 1994). In this sense, Thomas (1994) criticises the strategic choice 
perspective (Child, 1972: Buchanan and Boddy, 1983) that only limited their analysis 
of technological change process to the behaviour o f the leaders. Both those exercising 
power and those they exclude may use one or more o f Mintzberg’s (1991) systems o f  
influence (i.e. authority, ideology, expertise, and politics) to enact their interpretation.
3.3.2 Skill and Will
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) argue that power is a relational phenomenon. It is 
generated, maintained and lost in the context o f relationship with others. The will and 
skill relates to this relational aspect o f power. The relational aspect of power, defined 
as influence, explore personal and group’s ‘will and skill’ in creating and using the 
power sources potentially available. Power involves the ability to produce intended 
effect in line with one’s perceived interests (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Power 
and influence inherently have highly situational character (Knoke, 1990; Pettigrew 
and McNulty, 1995). Most influences are limited to certain domains and occasions 
and may not transferable to other setting (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Therefore, 
power and influence are dynamic and potentially unstable (Knoke, 1990).
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) also argue that individuals differ in ability, skill and 
willingness to mobilise and use the features o f context and the variety o f power 
source available or created. The perception that political activities occur outside
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traditional use o f authority (Madison et al., 1980) reflects the importance o f the skill 
and will in the organisational politics. Further, skilful political activities may be 
required to overcome a lack o f power sources or a less valued set o f power sources 
available (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Thomas’s (1994) case studies show that 
resource constraint, lack o f influence, and status inequality may increase the will o f a 
group o f individuals to take political actions in order to initiate or support changes 
that conform with its view of the way things should work and, hence, to shape the 
context by their perceptions and interests.
Within this perspective, many researchers argue that organisational politics closely 
relates to uncertainty. Tushman (1977) found organisational politics becomes more 
intensive within uncertain circumstances. Hickson, Hinnings, Lee, Schneck and 
Pennings (1971) stress that the real basis o f power is the ability to cope with the 
uncertainty and not the presence o f the uncertainty alone. Political activity intensifies 
prior to decisions concerning resource distribution (Frost and Hayes 1979), and when 
the interdependence among units and individuals on important resources is relatively 
high (Pfeifer, 1981). Madison et al. (1980) suggests three conditions that relate to 
high level o f  perceived political activity : uncertainty, the importance of the situation, 
and the salience o f issue. This makes organisational politics crucially important in the 
product development process. Pettigrew (1993), for example, argues that political 
behaviour is likely to be especially pronoun in an uncertain task environment 
surrounding an innovative decision.
Implementation o f new approaches such as CE implies a significant change in the 
way product development is undertaken and managed, and consequently increases 
uncertainty in the already uncertain nature o f development process. The effect of
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organisational power and politics in such circumstances is likely to be highly 
significant as indicated by Pettigrew (1973). In addition, the inequality between two 
functional groups closely involves in the process (i.e. design and production groups) 
that commonly exists in high-tech companies (Kunda, 1992; Thomas, 1994) is likely 
to enhance political manoeuvring and its effect to the process. In his case studies, 
Thomas (1994) notices that political manoeuvring involves various tactics, such as 
being quiet and discreet, being vague On discussion with other groups, going outside 
for technical help, and forming internal coalition. However, these issues have been 
largely ignored and have not been adequately dealt with in CE literature and even 
within the broader product innovation literature.
3.3.3 Structure and Context
Power is not just about interpersonal dynamics; it has a macro or structural aspect and 
a micro or relational aspect. The structural analysis of power deals with the 
possession and control of power sources, such as position, rewards, and sanction and 
information. Giddens (1979) argues that structure and context are not just barriers to 
action but are essentially involved in its production. Following Giddens’ structuration 
theory, Brass and Burkhardt (1993) argue that structural and behavioural treatments 
of power should be regarded as simultaneous and complementary: “The structure 
provides the contexts within which actors operate to acquire and exercise power. 
Structure arises from the action o f people, and these actions are shaped by structure” 
(p.443). Features o f structure and context enable rather than simply determine the 
actions (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Madison et al. (1980), for example, note the 
attribution o f political activities to those in managerial position and that such
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activities may result in even higher positions o f authority. Thomas (1994) notes that 
features in structure and context often influenced the range o f technological change or 
process innovation considered. The hegemony o f  design engineering function in the 
complex aircraft manufacturing company illustrates how structure and context play 
important role in determining and enabling organisational politics.
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) further suggest that power should also be understood 
in its historical context. The outcomes o f earlier events may change individual’s 
power sources and alter key features o f context such as rules, roles, and individual 
interpretations o f the world around them. The outcome of historical exchanges feeds 
the current dynamic and shapes the emerging context for power and influence. In this 
respect, Thomas (1994) criticises previous research on technological change that 
narrowed the temporal context to the final moments o f change and often ignored the 
process dynamics altogether. He argues that the analysis must include a full range of 
activities including the identification o f  problems, the selection among alternative 
technology and its configuration, and the implementation of chosen technology. 
Thomas further argues that the process occurs within social and historical contexts 
embedded with interests and ideologies influenced by the structure, 
professional/occupational values, and social status. All o f these become apparent 
when focusing on the dynamics o f the process in its extended historical and 
organisational context.
3.3.4 The Final Conceptual Framework
Based on the above discussion, this study takes Thomas’s (1994) power-process 
perspective that organisational politics play a central role in the technological change
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or process innovation. To review organisational politics on such process, this study 
takes Buchanan and Badham’s (1999) neutral perspective that political behaviour 
represents both an ugly and deplorable face as well as a positive and beneficial one. 
Political behaviour is the practical domain o f  power in action, worked out through the 
use o f  techniques o f influence and other tactics o f power play. Following Pettigrew 
and McNulty (1995), this study conceptualises power using the tripartite analysis 
framework involves power sources, skill and will, and structure and context to 
acknowledge the relational and structural aspects o f power.
Following Lukes (1974), this study conceptualises power to encompass all overt and 
covert, decision and non-decision, and micro and macro aspects. Therefore, 
organisational politics is operationalised through the actions taken by several key 
persons and their associated groups in the process. These actions (and in some cases, 
non-actions) are an illustration o f political behaviour o f organisational members that 
reflect micro and macro aspects as well as decision and non-decision aspects of 
organisational power and politics. By focusing on the key individuals and their groups 
and investigating their power sources and relational background, the assessment of 
their actions also infers the skill and will as well as the structural aspect of power 
relations.
Incorporating organisational power and politics into the previous framework, the final 
conceptual framework o f this research is developed through the addition o f two 
dimensions o f organisational politics: power source and skill and will, as can be seen 
in Figure 3-4. The third dimension is already embedded in the dimensions of internal 
context that have been developed in the previous discussion on organisational context. 
These dimensions are used in assessing the element o f change process represented by
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the actions (or in-actions) o f key groups and individuals, which have affecting the 
process across the contextual barriers.
3.4 Conclusion
Guided by the processual approach, this research views the implementation of CE in 
the case study as a change process. During the process, the concept of CE is
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continuously being shaped to fit with the contextual environment. The context of  
change is captured as a set o f cultural spheres that capture both the soft and hard 
aspects o f the environment. The internal context is represented by the organisational 
context including the organisational stage o f development, organisational structure, 
organisational culture, and functional culture. The external environment is represented 
by industry and national contexts. The politics o f change is operationalised through 
the actions taken by several key persons or groups in the process. These actions (and 
in some cases, non-actions) reflect micro and macro aspects as well as decision and 
non-decision aspects o f organisational power and politics.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes research methodology employed in this study as well as the 
reasons and appropriateness in employing such a methodology. This description 
includes the research design and strategy, data collection methods, data analysis, and 
report writing. The description also outlines the advantages and disadvantages o f the 
methodology and efforts taken to deal with their limitation to ensure the reliability 
and validity o f  the research and its findings.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 discusses research design and strategy 
adopted for this study. Section 4.3 describes research methods employed, including 
field research, data collection, data analysis, and report writing. Section 4.4 discusses 
validity, reliability, and generalisability issues. Section 4.5 provides a summary.
4.2 Research Strategy
Following the argument that theory and method are necessarily interdependent and 
that it is most appropriate to explore an organisation as an ongoing system with a past, 
present and future (Pettigrew, 1973), the research strategy here is to be a single
111
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
longitudinal case study. This longitudinal design is adopted because the study 
attempts to understand a real process o f CE introduction with all its attendant 
messiness. Such a processual analysis cannot rely on time-series snapshots (Pettigrew, 
1990). The processual research studies a certain phenomenon over time within its 
context (Johnson, 1987). It observes how the process unfolds and how it is shaped by 
various factors, actions and politics within the context (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990).
The objective o f  this study is to explore how the CE approach is shaped within a 
particular context. The study involves a case study (Yin, 1989; 1993) o f introducing 
the CE approach to the organisation and management o f a product development 
program. The case study is an exploratory one and focuses on what the company 
intended to do and what actually happened. The present case study is an intrinsic and 
instrumental single case study according to Stake’s (1994) case study classification. 
The case study aims to provide a better understanding o f a particular phenomenon 
(i.e. the introduction of CE approach) as well as insights on more general issues. The 
decision to use a case study approach also provides the opportunity for longitudinal 
research design that suits the processual analysis intended in the study while the 
processual aspect o f the study enables the researcher to further investigate why 
particular actions or decisions were taken.
The research framework conceptualised in the previous chapter is similar to 
Pettigrew’s approach in his study o f politics in decision-making (1973) in 
emphasising the effect o f the past events on the present and focusing on the influence 
of the organisational context and politics and how they continuously influenced and 
shaped organisational practices over time. This framework also enables to observe 
aspects o f the broader context o f the change process that might provide a more
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complex picture o f the process and a better understanding of the relationship o f the 
technical and social systems. This present study resembles the processual approach of 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) and Dawson (1994). However, it attempts to achieve a 
more detailed account, i.e. the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), than those studies by 
using more in-depth ethnographic research methods. This effort brings the study to 
more closely resemble Thomas’s (1994) case studies.
The research strategy adopted in this study has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The main advantage is its ability to provide the opportunity to investigate the process 
of an organisational change in its real context and in ‘real-time’, and to discover 
issues which had previously remained hidden and hence, broaden the understanding 
of the object being studied (Dawson, 1997). Such a research framework enables the 
researcher to present something unique about the case (Stake, 1994). This uniqueness 
includes the nature o f the case, its historical background, its physical and societal 
settings, and its other contexts, such as the economic and political situations.
The disadvantages and limitations include:
1) It is messy. It may prohibit the researcher from seeing the ‘big picture’ o f the 
change process as the researcher struggles to obtain and later is drown under the 
huge amount o f detail and rich data. For this reason, the processual approach 
remains contentious among social science researchers.
2) Since the political issues are not immediately evident in public, the researcher 
must seek out and then carefully weight the competing worldviews and 
rationalities that exist in the process (Thomas, 1994).
3) A single case study as a study o f the particular, raises issues of generalisability 
(Stake, 1994).
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However, this research does not focus on ‘working the data’ to strengthen the 
generalisability o f  the findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), but rather to provide a 
narrative accounts o f complex organisational dynamics that develop continuously 
(Dawson, 1994).
The researcher believes that given the above advantages and limitations this research 
design provides a valuable contribution to the CE literature on the detailed and 
problematic nature o f introducing CE. Like Stake (1994), the researcher also believes 
that readers with an intrinsic interest in the case learn more about it from its 
description, and particularly from what Geertz (1973) calls ‘thick description’.
4.3 Research Methods
The single longitudinal case study design and the intention to provide a ‘thick 
description’ o f the change process has led to the use o f a qualitative research 
methodology. This type o f study is designed to observe how a process unfolds over 
time and how various contextual factors, actions and politics influence such a process 
(Van de Ven and Huber, 1990, Thomas, 1994). Such a research design typically 
requires (although it is not restricted to) qualitative research.
Qualitative research refers to multi-method research involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Silverman, 1993, Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994).This means researchers study things in their natural setting, attempting to make 
sense of, and interpreting the meaning o f their phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). Similarly, Silverman (1993) argues that qualitative research traditions share a 
commitment to the assumption that systematic social inquiry should be conducted in a
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natural setting rather than an artificially constrained one such as experiment.
Considering the above arguments, the researcher adopted qualitative research as the 
most appropriate methodology for the study. This approach has been widely 
employed in other studies with a similar conceptual framework (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973, 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993, and Dawson, 1994). Another significant reason to use 
qualitative research methodology in this study is that the research involves assessment 
of the soft aspect o f cultural spheres, e g. national, organisational, and functional 
cultures. The researcher agrees with the argument that culture must be assessed using 
a more qualitative approach (Schein, 1984; Pettigrew, 1973).
The process o f qualitative research usually begins with a framework that specifies a 
set o f questions that are then examined in a specific way and result in empirical 
material to be analysed and written about (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In doing so, 
Janesick (1994) argues that at various stages in the process, the researchers are 
situating and recontextualising the research within the shared experience o f the 
researchers and the research participants. Typically, qualitative researchers start with 
tentative questions o f what they want to know, then select appropriate methods 
considering the social setting of the subject to be studied and with an intention of 
living in that setting over time.
This technique bears a ‘double-faced ghost5 (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Firstly, it is 
assumed that competent researchers can report their observations o f the social world 
with considerable objectivity, clarity and precision. Secondly, it relies on the subject 
(e.g. interview respondents) to report their experiences as true accounts. The main 
cause o f these problems is that there is no objective observation. Observation is 
always socially situated in the world o f researchers and respondents and has filters
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such as language, social class, and ethnicity (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).
Qualitative research is not restricted to a single method. Many methods including 
interviews, participant observation, and visual methods can be categorised as part o f  
this methodology (Silverman, 1993; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The aim is to make 
the case study more understandable and to secure as rich and in-depth data as 
possible, although objective reality might never be captured (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). The most common methods include interview, participant observation, 
documentary analysis, or a combination o f them (Pettigrew, 1990).
Following the argument that the best way to understand a process is to become part of 
it (Pettigrew, 1973), participant observation was chosen as the principle method of 
investigation. Fieldwork data collection and data analysis tasks were, following Yin 
(1993), undertaken interactively toward the final definition o f the study questions. 
This means the analysis of the earlier data was used to refine the research questions 
that would be used in the later stages o f the fieldwork.
4 .3 .1  S e le c tio n  o f  th e  C ase S tu d y
This case study was selected because o f the accessibility o f the site and its 
involvement with the introduction of CE. Its familiarity, the result o f the researcher’s 
working experience in the company since 1983, was the trigger for the decision to 
undertake the research. Silverman (1993) considers most case studies are selected 
based on the accessibility. Detailed studies o f CE implementation especially outside 
Western countries and Japan are extremely rare, while such diffusion has raised many 
issues about the concept and difficulties in achieving substantial organisational
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change. Direct access to such a research site, therefore, provided a unique opportunity 
to explore those issues.
The selected case study was defined as a recent attempt (i.e. 1995 -  1999) to 
introduce CE into a new product development program in a state-owned aircraft 
manufacturing company in Indonesia. It involved a series o f inter-related change 
initiatives aimed at making the development program run likes those at a Western 
aircraft manufacturing company. Initially, the case covered two parallel development 
programs that were carried out by the company. One was the new platform 100- 
passenger jet aircraft (pseudonym PLI) and the other was a derivative o f the 35- 
passenger commuter airplane (Pseudonym DRI). During the study, the derivative DRI 
Program was terminated. Hence, the final report o f this case study only covers the PLI 
Program although data were drawn from both programs.
4 .3 .2  D a ta  C o llec tio n
Considering the research strategy, research questions, the context and researcher’s 
capacity to obtain the data in such a setting (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), this study 
employed a combination o f various data collection methods including participant 
observation, in-depth interviews, and the review o f documents. Participant 
observation was the main method and, in turn, required the researcher to spend a 
significant amount o f time at the field study site. Through participant observation the 
researcher observed the development o f current situation by being present and in 
close contact with the program teams and by attending various program-related 
meetings. Through a combination o f interviews and a review of secondary data 
sources, significant events in the past were identified to gain a historical perspective
117
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
o f the case study. Given the scale o f the development program and the intention o f  the 
research, it was necessary to focus on a particular area o f the development process in 
order to gain a sufficient depth o f data. The field study, therefore, focused on one 
element o f  the overall development process (i.e. the design o f the body component).
4.3.2.1 Field R esearch
The main body o f fieldwork was carried out in two stages. The first was from October 
1997 to April 1998, and the second, from October 1998 to March 1999. In addition, 
there were also four informal field-site visits during July 1998. Correspondence with 
participants and other employees o f  the company via E-mail enabled the researcher to 
monitor the development o f the program and the company while not at the field-site.
During the first field study, the researcher observed both the PLI and the DRI 
programs that were currently undertaken by the company. The PLI and DRI programs 
were in two different stages o f their development process. The DRI was in the detail 
design phase and the PLI was in the preliminary design phase. Observing both 
programs enabled the researcher to gain a more comprehensive picture o f the overall 
development process. At the time o f the second field study, however, only one, the 
PLI, survived Indonesia’s economic crises and could be studied. The summary of 
field research conducted for this study can be seen in Table 4-1.
During the field study, the researcher spent an average o f 4 days a week, 4 to 8 hours 
a day, at the field site. Because the researcher was also an employee o f the company, 
the researcher was based at the company’s management centre building. However, in 
order to obtain rich and in-depth data, the researcher always attempted to spend as
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much time as possible near the engineers involved in the programs. In the first field 
study, the researcher spent most o f the time at the PLI Program’s various locations as 
well as in the headquarter o f the DRI to observe, talk and discuss with engineers and 
managers involved in the programs. During the second field study, the researcher was 
located in the collocation area, at the Operation Centre quarter o f the PLI Program.
Table 4-1: Field Study Summary
First Field Study Informal Visitation Second Field Study
Time October 1997-April 1998 July 1998 October 1998- March 1999
Program Studied DRI DRI PLI
PLI PLI
Data Collection Participant Observation Interview Participant observation
Interview & Conversation Conversation Interview & Conversation
Documentary Review Documentary Review
As a long serving employee, the researcher was also able to draw on her first hand
experience o f  the company’s history and culture. This provided advantages as follow:
1) It minimised the accessibility issues to the selected field study site.
2) It facilitated access to information particularly at the operational level, the level 
addressed in this study. Since the beginning o f the field study the researcher had a 
general idea about where the information lay and who was to be approached to 
acquire that information.
3) It eliminated the usual familiarisation phase to the research site that normally 
takes a significant amount o f field study time (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973).
4) It ensured full co-operation o f the respondents. The researcher never experienced 
rejection for interviews or discussions because the respondents or respondent’s 
superiors were her acquaintances. The respondents often relaxed considering they
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were talking with an insider’ and in most cases, someone they knew.
5) It helped in the interpretation o f the collected data. Pettigrew (1973) argues that a 
researcher is in a stronger position to interpret historical material if  his/her data 
collection and analysis are undertaken after he has acquired a thorough knowledge 
of the present day culture o f the society he/she is studying.
6) It enabled the researcher to speak, read, and write in the same language with most 
respondents (i.e. Bahasa Indonesia) and understand its nuisance subtleties.
On the other hand, such a position also raised problems, such as possible bias and 
ethical issues. It is important, however, to recognise that the researcher does not 
claim that she is unbiased. Having worked for the company for almost 15 years, the 
researcher s opinions would always contain biases based on her personal experience 
throughout those years. These biases could not be eliminated. The researcher, for 
example, shared the opinion o f most members o f non-design functions that the value 
of the additional reward system was unfairly favourable to the members o f design- 
related functions. Given the understanding o f these biases, the researcher took an 
extra care with the data collection not to pass judgement on information gathered 
based on her personal knowledge. Steps taken to minimise the personal bias involved 
vigorous verification through cross checking and triangulation. For example, when 
the researcher suspected an information was untrue, such information was not 
immediately regarded as untrue, but the researcher rather waited until it revealed itself 
through findings gathered from other respondents or through other methods.
The ethical dilemma faced by the researcher was derived from two facets: the 
company’s commercial confidentiality and the interviewers’ personal confidentiality. 
The issue o f commercial confidentiality was associated with the problems o f
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accessing and reporting on commercially sensitive data. The researcher prior and 
during the study had known o f confidential materials considered relevant to the study. 
The Program Manager only imposed a loose confidentiality guidance, which the study 
should not jeopardise the intellectual property o f the PLI Program, and relied on the 
researcher s own judgement in deciding which issues should be considered as 
confidential. While this guidance provided immense opportunity and generated 
flexibility in data gathering, it also created a burden in the sense that the researcher 
continuously applied self-censorship and had to deal with the ever present doubt 
whether or not the writing went too far and, hence, violated the Program Manager’s 
trust. The solutions to address these concerns included disguising the company name 
and designating the thesis as a non-public domain.
Another source o f ethical dilemma concerned personal confidentiality. Some 
respondents had long been in close working relationship with the researcher. In some 
cases, the relationship could be traced back as far as university undergraduate days. 
While such relationships provided advantages in terms of accessibility and frankness, 
it could also affect the researcher’s judgement in establishing the character o f key 
persons involved in the case study and therefore contributing to the researcher’s 
personal bias described above. The concern involved the issue as to how far the 
person could be characterised without revealing private knowledge based on personal 
relationship. On this issue, the researcher took precautions not to include the 
researcher’s personal view. After each characterisation (see especially in Chapter 8), a 
careful review was taken to ensure that it was based on the research findings and 
respondents’ opinions.
The frankness, particularly in data gathered from casual conversation, also created a
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moral dilemma in that the researcher continuously self-questioned how far the 
personal relationship contributed to this frankness and hence how far it could be used 
as part o f the research writing. This anxiety reduced immensely for the data gathered 
in the interview because o f the respondents’ knowledge on the nature o f the 
conversation. The researcher handled this issue by using such data as background 
information and only used them in direct quote after personal permission from the 
respondents involved.
On the other hand, a respondent’s frankness, particularly over sensitive issues, might 
jeopardise his/her career and position in the company as well as relationships with 
other people involved. To deal with this issue, the researcher decided to disguise the 
name o f all respondents. Company-wise, however, it would be obvious who some of 
respondents were because their particular positions were revealed in the case study. 
This issue was solved by restricting the thesis to the non-public domain.
4.3.2.2 Participant Observation
The aim o f observation in qualitative research is to gather information about a process 
in a naturally occurring context (Silverman, 1993). This method enables a direct 
observation o f processes, facilitates interview opportunity with key players, and 
allows first hand experience on the organisational context. Pettigrew (1973) argues 
that the method is not atheoretical and participant observation was considered as most 
appropriate in qualitative longitudinal research. Following this argument, this study 
used the participant observation as the main data collection method, which involved 
sharing the respondents’ lives in an attempt to understand their world (Denzin, 1970). 
The rationale in this research decision was the Olesen and Whittaker (1968) argument
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that the best way to understand a process is to become part o f it and observe how the 
practices, processes, and interactions among involved people are really carried out 
rather than formally espoused.
Beside its relation to the theoretical conception, the participant observation method 
gives several other advantages as the result o f a close relationship with the 
respondents. It enables to correctly evaluate impute motives, avoid pointless and 
abrasive questioning, and get best-informed respondents (Dalton, 1964). It also allows 
the researcher to build rapport before asking disturbing questions and to gain access to 
sensitive material. Its flexibility enables the researcher to ‘wait and see’ what the 
critical research questions are (Pettigrew, 1973). However, this method also has some 
disadvantages. Silverman's (1993) list o f its disadvantages include:
1) it may blind the researcher o f important events occurred before his entrance;
2) respondents may be entirely unrepresentative o f the less open participants;
3) researchers may change the situation just by their presence;
4) researchers may ‘go native’ forgetting the principles underlying the study.
The researcher acted as a participant observer in two development programs in the 
first field study. In the derivative DRI Program, the researcher established a full 
participant role as part o f the program management team and was involved in the 
daily operation o f the team. The main tasks o f the researcher in the team were to 
ensure the integration and compatibility between the ‘engineering release date’ from 
the design engineering and the ‘number-one flow’ schedule from the production and 
to improve the effectiveness o f the interaction between the design and production 
functions. In fulfilling these tasks, the researcher was involved in various schedule 
reviews. The data collected from the DRI Program included minutes o f various
123
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
meetings, excerpts o f conversation in selected meetings, and the researcher’s personal 
observations that were recorded in the field journal. This participant observation 
provided an understanding o f the nature o f the relationship among various functions 
within design and production areas and between design and production functions. Due 
to the national economic crisis, the DRI Program was later terminated.
Throughout both field studies, the researcher also participated in the PLI Program as a 
non-official member o f the computer support group of the Program. The researcher’s 
task was to improve the effectiveness o f the approach taken by this group in dealing 
with both the program’s design team (i.e. Design Centre) and its production 
engineering team (i.e. Operation Centre). However, the interaction between the 
researcher and the members o f the Program was not limited to this participation, 
rather the researcher moved quite freely across various groups within and outside the 
Program. The researcher was involved in various discussions and meetings at the 
middle and operational levels within the Operation Centre and the Design Centre. The 
researcher also attended several program reviews that involved the Program Manager. 
The relevant information from those meetings was later documented in the field study 
journal. When available, the minutes o f those meetings were kept. A list of formal 
meetings and discussion attended can be seen in Appendix-A.
The time spent with the engineers in both the Design Centre and the Operation Centre 
also allowed the researcher to observe how they interacted with each other and to see 
how their superiors and others, such as technical advisers, interacted with them. It 
also revealed how they dealt with technical and non-technical problems. All 
observational information was kept in the field study journal.
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4.3 .2 .3  Interview s
From the perspective o f a symbolic interactionist, interviews are social events and, 
consequently, the social context o f the interview is intrinsic to understanding any data 
obtained (Silverman, 1993). It is argued that open-ended questions are the most 
effective way to gain authentic understanding o f people, but its flexibility frequently 
results in a lack o f comparability o f one interview with another and raises problems of 
reliability in data collection (Silverman, 1993). Furthermore, Denzin (1970) notes that 
interviewees’ responses are influenced by several issues, such as the different 
interactional roles and relative status between interviewers and interviewees; the 
context o f the interview; the self presentation o f interviewees, especially in early 
stage; the short-term relationships that cause little commitment and tale fabrication; 
and the difficulty o f penetrating private experience.
In this study, open-ended questions were used for the interview. The possible 
distortions were minimised by researcher’s familiarity to the site and some of  
interviewees. The main objectives o f the interview were:
1) to understand how different actors contributed to and interpreted the change 
process,
2) to gain their interpretations o f CE, and
3) to gain an understanding o f past events within the company and their context..
During the field study, the researcher carried out formal interviews with 36 managers 
and employees. 25 out o f 36 interviewees worked in the PLI Program and comprised 
25% o f the total full-time members o f the program. Other interviewees were not part 
of the program although some were closely involved with the development process of 
the program. The characteristic o f interviewees can be seen in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2: Characteristics o f  Respondents
Number of Interviewees
Program Member
Program Manager 1
Middle Manager 10
Other 14
Total 25
Non Program Member
Top Management Member 4
Middle Manager 4
Other 3
Total ^ r r ~
Total Respondent 36
Most interview sessions were conducted privately in the interviewees’ office. 
Typically, each interview took around 1 hour, but some expanded up to 2 hours. Some 
interviewees, particularly the key persons within the Program or the company 
management were interviewed several times in order to follow up the progress o f the 
program or the development of the company overall situation. Some interviews were 
carried out as group interview. The researcher also carried out a series o f discussion 
sessions with a focus group of 5 to 7 engineers. The sessions involved 7 one-hour- 
meetings in 3 weeks of the first field study and were held in a meeting room at 
lunchtime. In addition, the researcher was also engaged in many informal discussions 
and casual conversations related to the study with a wide range o f people in the 
company. The interview methods used in this research are summarised in Table 4-3.
Most interviewees were selected due to their involvement in the PLI Program. Only 4 
interviewees were chosen for their involvement o f the DRI Program, which was later 
eliminated by the company. However, the interview data from the DRI Program was
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kept due to its high relevance with the case and used as part o f the case study data. 
The approach to the interviewees varied with the extent o f their familiarity with the 
researcher as well as their position in the organisation. The interview with the PLI 
Program Manager that was carried out very early in the beginning o f the study, i.e. 
June 1996, enabled the researcher to identify the key persons in the Program as well 
as gaining permission to interview them. Discussions with these key persons, who 
were middle managers o f the Program, opened up the opportunity to be introduced to 
and subsequently, discuss with and interview the supervisory and operational-level 
staff involved in the Program.
Table 4-3: Interview Methods
Interview Method Number of Interviewee Number of Interview
Single Private Interview 17 17
Multiple Private Interview 7 18
Single Group Interview 5 2
Multiple Group Discussion 7 7
Casual Conversation 39 39
Total 75 83
Interviewees from outside the PLI Program were selected based on their close relation 
with the Program as observed through meetings or revealed from the interviews and 
casual conversation. They were personally approached and asked to be part o f the 
study as interviewees. Beside the Program Manager, three other senior managers were 
also interviewed. They were chosen because o f their accessibility and their roles in 
the early period o f  the program or previous programs.
Typically, the researcher prepared a set o f open-ended questions based on the 
operationalisation o f the research framework prior to the interview sessions. These
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questions varied according to the position o f  the respondents in the Program or in the 
company. However, these open-ended questions were used in a flexible way. The 
researcher added or eliminated questions during the interview sessions according to 
the situation and interviewee’s response. The open-ended questions were used only as 
guidance. Except for the discussion sessions and the interviews involving expatriates, 
Bahasa Indonesia (the first language o f both the interviewee and the researcher) was 
used. In the interviews with expatriates, English (the second language o f all) was 
used. In the discussion sessions, English was used based on the preference o f the 
interviewees although it was the second language for them and the researcher.
At the beginning o f all interview sessions, the researcher explained the nature o f the 
research and that the research had no relation with the company management. She 
also ensured them that the confidentiality would be protected. She requested their 
frankness, and their permission to use a tape recorder to record the conversation. 
Except for 9 interview sessions, the researcher was granted permission to use the tape 
recorder. The conversations were taped and transcribed. For non-taped sessions, the 
researcher took notes and then rewrote them after each interview session.
Informal discussions and casual conversations were held with a wide-range of people 
from various functional organisations. The discussion sessions held in the first field 
study significantly helped in bringing those respondents and some of their colleagues 
closer to the researcher and obtaining their trust. At a later stage o f the field study, 
they often engaged in casual conversations with the researcher and gave their frank 
opinions on various issues related to the Program and the company. The participant 
observation method employed in the field study provided the opportunity to engage in 
many such conversations. Some casual conversations involved people who were not
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part o f the Program. Some of them indirectly related to the Program and some others 
had no involvement in the Program at all. These people provided the other side o f the 
story and balanced the information gathered by the researcher. The casual 
conversations were not taped but the relevant issues were recorded in the field study 
journal immediately after each occasion.
To reduce biases and errors in data collected from the interviews and casual 
conversations, the following precautions were taken:
1) data were collected from primary sources only (i.e. direct witnesses); second-hand 
accounts (hearsay) were not drawn in;
2) data were checked against documentary material;
3) interviewees’ statements were internally checked for contradictions, and 
externally checked against the information obtained from other sources.
4.3.2.4 Secondary Data Sources: Documentary Review
Documents are used both to check verbal statements and to find out whether 
positional bias occurred in the other methods o f data collection (Pettigrew, 1973). 
The documentary review in this study can be divided into two categories based on the 
nature o f the document being reviewed. The first category was the ad-hoc 
documentary review. This category involved a documentary review conducted in-line 
with other data collection methods to provide hard evidence from accounts gathered 
from other methods. It included various documents shown during or after discussions, 
interviews or conversations that were used to emphasise or clarify issues raised on 
such occasions. It also included a documentary review on documents searched by the 
researcher for similar purposes, such as organisational structures, company policy, the
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company’s short and long term planning, and the company’s systems and procedures.
The researcher’s long term service in the company provided knowledge on where to 
search for such documents. Some o f these documents were classified as confidential 
or could be considered as confidential. Due to the loose restrictions applied to the 
researcher on the issue o f confidentiality, the researcher used her own judgement 
which documents should be considered as confidential and should not be used for the 
research purpose as discussed in the previous section.
The second category was the pre-selected documentary review. This category 
involved the files and documents that were deliberately chosen by the researcher to be 
reviewed in order to gain comprehensive understanding o f the process. After 
accustomed with several key persons in the Program, their work, and their interaction 
patterns, the researcher decided to review the inward and outward files o f both the 
Chief Engineer (Head o f the Program’s Design Centre) and the Chief o f Operation 
(Head of the Program’s Operation Centre). These files contained various types of 
documents such as memos, reports and draft reports, proposals and draft proposals, 
and minutes o f various meetings.
Administratively, these files covered most o f the development-related correspondence 
because o f the Chiefs’ central positions as the administrative gatekeepers of the 
Centres. Formally, all outward correspondence on behalf o f the centres came from 
and were signed by those Chiefs. When a supervisor needed materials, for example, 
he/she would draft a memo to be signed by the Chief and sent to the Procurement 
Department. When a supervisor composed and signed a letter, he would ensure that 
his/her Chief received the copy. Likewise for inward correspondence, most letters 
that requested attention from anybody within the centres were usually directed to the
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Chiefs who then allocated the tasks to supervisors or other members. When the 
correspondence was directed directly to persons within the Centres, the Chiefs also 
usually received a copy. Further, these files contained some relevant correspondence 
from the higher management level, as the Program Manager usually distributed copies 
of relevant materials from his own correspondence to the Chiefs. This tactic to pre­
select the ‘gatekeeper files’ was proven to be very beneficial in understanding the 
whole complex process as could be seen in Pettigrew study (1973).
However, since both Design Centre and Operation Centre were only established in 
1997, these files did not capture much of the early stages o f the program. There was 
not enough data to establish the overall evidence before the establishment o f the 
Centres. To fill in this gap, the inward and outward files o f one supervisor in the 
Operation Centre, who had been involved in the Program since 1995 was reviewed. 
Likewise, some old files frorma manager who had been involved in the engineering 
aspects since 1995 were also reviewed.
To capture a high level information on the program, the relevant folder, from one of  
senior managers involved in pursuing support for the Program from outside the 
company was also reviewed. This folder contained memos, reports, and proposals that 
ranged from the early initiation o f the program in 1993. Putting them together, all 
these files provided information that covered the beginning of the program in 1993 to 
the end o f  the field research in early 1999. They also contained information across the 
organisational hierarchy, from the top management level to the operational level. All 
information gathered from this method were summarised and kept in separate files. 
List o f documents reviewed during the field study is provided in Appendix-B.
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4 .3 .3  D a ta  A n a ly s is
Data collection is followed by data analysis and evaluation in an iterative process. 
With a massive amount of field data, this stage is a difficult task. The strength o f a 
qualitative research in refocusing as new data become available in the subsequent 
iteration can easily be spoiled due to disorganised field data (Silverman, 1993). The 
interpretation o f data and its relevancy to the case study can be obtained through data 
categorisation after considerable familiarisation with the process and linking these 
data categories to one another (Silverman, 1993). These classifying and recombining 
data, coined as decoupling process, enable researchers to develop, redefine, create, 
and present new authentic accounts (Dawson, 1997). Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1983) suggest using broad descriptive categories, e.g. types o f people, activities, 
topics, periods, etc, in which one item may be assigned to more than one category.
As the result o f rigorous data collection methods and the intention to collect ‘rich 
data’ from the field, this study dealt with a large and diverse body o f data from both 
primary (i.e. participant observation and interview) and secondary (documentary 
review) sources. Interpreting this huge amount o f field data involved categorising data 
in two different ways to fulfil both longitudinal and contextual elements of the 
processual study. Firstly, data were categorised and arranged in a time-line that spans 
from the initiation o f the Program to its termination in order to review the order of 
past and present events and their relation to internal and external contexts. Data 
collected from the documentary review formed the backbone of this process, with 
refinements from data collected through interview and participant observation. By 
establishing three levels o f time-line, i.e. top management, middle management, and 
operational levels, those events could be presented in a way that enabled the
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researcher to relate them to their respective context for further analysis. These Event 
Time-Lines can be seen in Appendix-C.
Secondly, field data were codified into accounts and categorised into several 
theoretically driven categories. These categories were developed based on the 
conceptual framework and its operationalisation developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
j . After being codified, each account was designated into a tree-diagram filing 
system. Data from interviews provided the backbone o f  this coding. By combining 
both analyses in time-line and theoretically driven categories, the researcher was able 
to interpret data in both longitudinal and contextual accounts that, in turn, became the 
body o f research report.
The analysis stage commenced in the middle o f the first field study. Therefore, the 
researcher had the opportunity to construct an early version o f the study report and 
then brought it back to the multiple interview sessions and continually refined the 
construct based on the later interviews. This iterative process o f field research and 
data analysis stages was maintained for the whole period o f the field study. By doing 
so, the researcher was not only able to refine the construct as new data become 
available (Silverman, 1993) but also to ensure its validity through respondent 
validation as suggested by Denzin (1970). This respondent validation involves the 
researcher asking respondents' feedback from a tentative result and refining it in line 
with their response (Reason and Rowan, 1981).
Another important activity during the data analysis stage was triangulation to ensure 
validity o f  accounts. Triangulation is a process o f using several accounts from 
different sources to clarify meaning and verify an observation or interpretation (Stake, 
1994). The process involved comparing data from different data collection methods to
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see whether they corroborated with one another and presented a complete picture 
(Denzin, 1970). Denzin (1970) has suggested this technique as a solution to minimise 
three possible flaws in field research: negligence toward important past events, 
unrepresentative informants, and the change o f situation due to researcher present.
In this study, each interview transcript was internally checked for consistency. Then, 
the interview transcripts were cross-checked against one another. The transcripts were 
also triangulated with data from the documentary review method and with data from 
participant observation. Likewise, data collected from the documentary review and 
participant observation were treated in the same manner. Several unclear issues found 
in the interview transcripts, documents or observations were brought back to some of 
key interviewees as part o f open-ended questions in subsequent interview sessions or 
as part o f casual conversation with some respondents. Another validation technique 
offered by Denzin (1970) is respondent validation discussed above.
4 .3 .4  R e p o r t W ritin g
This stage involved bringing a large amount o f information across a language barrier. 
Most data collected were in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language o f the country of 
the field study, while the report was written in English. The researcher, an Indonesian, 
relied on her own bilingual ability to translate all material for the final report.
Specific for direct quotations, an Indonesian colleague from the company with a 
degree in English was asked to translate them. For each quote, the researcher’s 
translation was compared with his translation. The differences were worked out to 
achieve a final translation. The option o f using an in-house translator was taken after
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considering that the in-house colleagues would have a better understanding o f  the 
company s overall process as well as over the terms, jargons, and other specific 
language used in the company. This decision, however, had a communication 
disadvantage as the researcher and the translator could not have face to face 
discussions. Most o f  the discussions over the translation were carried out through e­
mail correspondence. To ensure confidentiality, the quotations were sent to the 
translator without any real name attached to them and the translator was asked not to 
reveal any quotation material.
4.4 Validity, Reliability and Generalisability
The most important issue in a social science research is how it can be both 
intellectually challenging and rigorous (Silverman, 1993). Validity, reliability and 
generalisability are central concepts here although there is considerable controversy 
about how they might be applied to the social sciences. Arguments on validity, 
reliability and generalisability are often used as a criticism against qualitative research 
methodology. For this study, the steps taken during field research preparation, data 
collection, data analysis and report writing stages had ensured the validity and 
reliability o f the research result as well as its generalisability to the theoretical 
propositions as suggested by Yin (1993).
Validity refers to the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley, 1992). In qualitative research, the 
opinions about validity claims vary. Some argue it is unnecessary, while others argue 
it should be addressed. Agar (1980) argues that systematic hypotheses is inappropriate 
and rejects this traditional scientific control in favour o f an intensive personal
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involvement seeking to fit the current situation and ability to learn from mistakes as 
the way to ensure validity. Hammersley (1990, 1992) argues that validity can be 
claimed with confidence in the knowledge. He, therefore, suggests three steps on 
judging the validity o f  claims: first, plausibility o f  claim given our existing 
knowledge, second, credibility o f claim given research phenomena and the 
characteristic o f researcher; and third, when in doubt convince the plausibility and 
credibility o f  evidence (1990, p.61). Silverman (1993) relies only the plausibility and 
credibility o f evidence arguing Hammersley’s first two steps are problematic.
Standard criteria o f validity involves assessing the impact o f the researcher in the 
setting (i.e. halo effect, the values o f the researcher and the genuineness o f the 
respondent's account) and two forms o f validation most widely used: triangulation 
and respondent validation (Denzin, 1970, Silverman, 1993). Both triangulation and 
respondent validation were employed in this study. However, there are some 
criticisms over triangulation and respondent validation techniques. Triangulation is 
criticised as ignoring the context from which each account was gathered (Silverman, 
1993). Respondent validation has weaknesses as the respondent may not be interested 
(Bloor, 1978) and overt validation may only be given if the result is compatible with 
their self-image (Abrams, 1984). Therefore, this study also follows Silverman (1993) 
suggestion to rely on plausibility and credibility o f evidence, and presents some tables 
with simple data collection statistics to provide a sense o f flavour o f the data.
The impact o f the researcher’s presence was considered as minimal. The researcher 
was officially an employee o f the company and, therefore, was often considered by 
respondents as an inclusive part o f them (i.e. regarded as one o f them). The 
researcher’s constant presence around them helped relaxing some interviewees who
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were new to the researcher. Although the researcher does not claim that the study is 
bias free, the effect o f possible bias due to values and perspectives held by the 
researcher was minimised. Careful steps were taken to ensure that the study only 
considered issues raised by interviewees and not researcher’s own account. The 
genuineness o f interviewees’ accounts was validated by both triangulation and 
respondent validation.
The reliability refers to the degree o f consistency with which data were collected by 
different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Hammersley, 
1992). This issue derived from reliability o f  scientific measuring instrument and 
replicability o f  scientific experiment. Kirk and Miller (1986) suggest three kinds of 
reliability: consistency within a single method, consistency over time, consistency 
over various methods at the same period. Reliability is addressed by using 
standardised methods to write field note and prepare transcript (Silverman, 1993) and 
providing information on how field data were acquired as well as the detail o f its 
relevant context (Bryman, 1988, Kirk and Miller, 1986).
To ensure the reliability o f this study, field notes and transcriptions were taken using 
the accepted techniques, such as tape recording, transcribing, summarising, and field 
journals. The field research and data collection processes previously describe have 
adequately ensured the reliability o f  this study. However, it is important to note that 
not every researcher who comes to this same field and researches the same issues 
would come to the same conclusions. The difference would be the researcher’s 
knowledge that has been accumulated during 15 years experience with the company.
Dawson (1994) has argued that processual research such as this study deliberately 
confines itself to one or a small number o f organisations. It does not focus on working
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the data to strengthen the generalisability o f the findings, but rather to provide 
understanding o f  the complex dynamic o f the organisation. This argument can be seen 
as a severe weakness as some researchers doubt the generalisability o f  the data. The 
issue becomes more severe in a single case study approach.
The researcher, following Bryman (1988, 1990) and Yin (1989), argues that 
generalisability o f cases should be to the theoretical propositions rather than to the 
population or universe. The aim is not to ensure statistical generalisation but to 
expand and generalise a theory (analytic generalisation) or inductive reasoning (Yin, 
1989). The case study derives its validity not from the representativeness o f its 
samples but from the thoroughness o f its analysis (Bryman, 1990). This study, 
therefore, aims for detailed understanding of a single case (selected with no sampling 
logic and without the intention of generalising to a population) to provide detailed 
empirical accounts and generate several propositions based on those accounts.
4.5 Summary
Considering the research objectives and conceptual framework developed in the 
previous chapters, this study designed as a single longitudinal case study. This 
research design and the intention to obtain a ‘thick description’ led to the adoption of  
a qualitative research using a combination o f participant observation, interviews, and 
documentary review as data collection methods during the extended time spent in the 
research site. During data analysis and report writing, several actions have been taken 
to ensure the validity and reliability o f research findings and interpretations, which 
include triangulation and respondent validation.
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CHAPTER 5
INDACO: THE COMPANY AND ITS CONTEXTS
5.1 Introduction
The case study o f introducing CE took place in Indaco, an Indonesian company 
operated in the aircraft industry. This chapter provides an overview of the 
organisation and its industrial and national contexts. The aim is to provide a general 
understanding on the contexts o f the change process, the opportunities, challenges and 
impediments surrounded the process that contributed to the shape o f CE introduction 
process as it took form in the case study. This description o f the organisational 
context provides the background of the attempt to introduce CE as well as the basis 
for contextual explanation discussed in detail in Chapter 7. This chapter is intended to 
provide a general understanding on the overall process and its background prior to the 
detailed description and complex explanation o f the process in the next chapters.
In general, the organisation o f Indaco reflected the influence o f both industrial and 
national contexts. Indaco organisation could be characterised as ‘centralistic- 
bureaucratic’ with a strong technology orientation. The need for differentiation of the 
aircraft industry led to high compartmentalisation o f various specialisations into 
functional units. The industry was also responsible for the high formalisation and
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standardisation o f various organisational processes. These, in turn, fabricated a high 
level bureaucratisation. On the other hand, the establishment o f Indaco as an 
inseparable part o f  national pursuit on technological and industrial development 
created a strong technology orientation with little concerns for the market, while the 
Indonesian’s cultural tendency o f  high power distance (Hofstede, 1984) contributed to 
the severely centralised organisational structure and mechanism.
As the overview involves extended industrial context from which CE was adopted as 
well as the national context in which the economic crisis led to the termination o f CE 
introductory process, this chapter also provides the ‘bird eye’ view of CE 
introduction, from its beginning to its end. In particular, this overview discusses the 
contribution o f  the industrial context in the decision to introduce a selected CE 
configuration as well as in shaping the Indaco organisation in general. This overview 
also discusses the role o f national context in the existence o f Indaco in general and in 
the effect o f the economic crisis in the termination o f Indaco’s CE. Overall, the 
effects o f these extended contexts were more remote but nevertheless crucial and vital 
to the existence o f CE in Indaco. As the outer layer o f contextual factors, the 
contribution o f  these contexts might be more remote and indirect than the contribution 
of the other contextual factors.
In order to fulfil the above objectives, this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 5.2 
describes Indaco, the Indonesian state-owned aircraft manufacturing company in 
which the case study took place. This description is the basis o f contextual 
explanation (discussed in Chapter 7) o f the detailed change process (discussed in the 
next Chapter 6). Section 5.3 describes the global aircraft industry and its relation to 
the CE introduction in Indaco. In focuses on the typical aircraft development process
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and the common relationship among aircraft companies that led to CE adoption by 
Indaco. Section 5.4 describes the Indonesia national context and its relation to Indaco 
organisation as a vehicle for national development as well as the contemporary 
Indonesian economic and political crises that led to CE termination. Section 5.5 
provides a summary and brief discussion on interrelationship between organisational, 
industrial and national context.
5.2 Overview of Indaco: The Organisational Context
5.2 .1  O rg a n isa tio n a l M iss io n
Indaco was established in 1976. As a state-owned company, it has a mission to act as 
a vehicle for Indonesian industrial transformation by becoming a centre o f excellence 
in the aircraft and aerospace industries. This mission was carried out through four 
consecutive and overlapping phases o f technology acquisition1:
1) F am iliarisation  o f the aircraft technology phase. This phase started in 1976 and 
was undertaken via various licenses and subcontract programs to expose the 
company to process and manufacturing technology in the industry.
2) Integration  o f  the existing technology phase. This phase started in 1978 and 
took the form o f  a joint development program with another company to gain 
access to technologies available in the industry and integrate them in the product. 
The joint development o f a 35-passenger commuter airplane, the PLC, was part o f  
this phase. In this program, Indaco was responsible for the design and 
manufacturing the fuselage o f the aircraft.
1 Item (36) Appendix-B
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3) Integration of new technology phase. This phase was carried out through the 
application o f acquired technology for local design. The development o f the PLP,
a new platform 50-passenger aircraft, started in 1989, was a major part o f this 
phase.
4) Implementation of R&D for future technology phase. The applied R&D 
activities were undertaken in 1990 and their results were implemented in the PLI, 
a new product platform for a 100-passenger jet airplane.
In 1976, Indaco employed 500 staff with 17 engineers and 2 small hangars o f  11,000 
square metres. These facilities were inherited from a small research department o f the 
Indonesian Air Force. Subsequently, the Government provided US$ 170 million for 
production facilities and allocated on average o f USS 100 million per annum working 
capital for several years (Todd and Simpson, 1986). The Government also secured the 
company’s domestic market with a decree in 1980 that forbade all domestic airlines to 
import products that could be provided by Indaco. By 1997, Indaco employed 15,000 
people including more than 3000 engineers. Its production facilities included various 
conventional and computerised machine tools, autoclaves and other heat and surface 
treatment facilities, and assembly lines for various airplanes and helicopters. All 
facilities were centralised in its 75-hectare site. The total assets o f Indaco were valued 
at US S 1 billion at the end of 1996.
5 .2 .2  P ro d u c ts  a n d  P ro d u c t D e v e lo p m e n t P ro g ra m s
During the time o f case study, Indaco involved in various business activities 
commercialising their product lines as well as developing new aircraft platform or
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derivative products. During the case study, there were five main category aircraft 
programs:
1) Under licence programs from various aircraft and helicopter manufacturers that 
produced and sold 15-passenger turboprop airplane, as well as light, medium and 
heavy helicopters.
2) PLC, the joint development of 35-passenger airplane and its derivatives. This 
aircraft had been in the product line since 1985 with various derivatives to suit its 
customers.
3) PLP, the development program o f the first indigenous 50-passenger airplane, 
which was undergoing certification program during the time o f  the case study.
4) PLI, the development program o f the 100-passenger jet airplane, which was the 
subject o f the case study, and
5) Subcontract programs from various global primes, including Westaco from which 
CE was adopted.
Other than the above aircraft development and production programs, the company 
was also engaged in aircraft services particularly for Indaco’s products, defence 
system, and satellite businesses to fulfil the need o f Indonesian Government.
5 .2 .3  O rg a n isa tio n a l S tru c tu re
The complexity o f the aircraft industry (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) was reflected in 
Indaco’s complex organisational structure. Before June 1997, Indaco used a 
functional structure where activities were centralised in functional units. Matrix 
mechanisms (Davis and Lawrence, 1977) had been adopted since 1984 to bridge and 
co-ordinate functional supports to each program. A program was defined as any 
product line in the form o f either a serial line, a new platform, or a product derivative
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undertaken by the company. A program manager was responsible for managing a 
particular program and co-ordinating resources from various functions to support the 
program.
Prior to the PLI development program, program managers were perceived as having a 
lower status than a head o f functional units, mainly because they did not have 
resources directly allocated to them. The role o f those program managers was 
‘lightweight’ (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993): monitoring the progress and negotiating 
support from various functions. They were often sandwiched between conflicting 
interests o f various functional units. Over time, however, the program management 
moved toward the ‘project team’ (Pawar, 1986) in which a program manager had 
more discretion in allocating resources and greater influence over team members. 
Nevertheless, except for their significant roles on functional budget allocation that 
required their approval for outflows budgeted to support the Programs, the influence 
of program managers over design and manufacturing processes remained limited.
In 1989, functional units were organised into eight main divisions: Technology, 
Production, Fabrication, Purchasing, Commerce, Finance, Program Co-ordination, 
and General Affairs as can be seen in Figure 5-1. Production Division was divided 
further into Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing, Defence Systems, Industrial Engineering, 
Production Engineering, and Manufacturing Development divisions. Technology was 
divided into Aircraft Technology, Aircraft Design, Aircraft Engineering, Aircraft 
Interior, Satellite, Electronic Measurement, and Flight Test divisions. The Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and heads o f main divisions formed the 
Executive Management Council.
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Figure 5-1: Indaco’s Organisational Structure Prior to 1997
In order to improve the company’s performance, in June 1997 Indaco was 
restructured into a more product-based organisation, shown in Figure 5-2 (Bold box 
indicated member o f Executive Management Council).
President Director
Expert Staff - -
-  Quality Assurance
-  Certification & Airworthiness
-  Information technology
-  Universal Maintenance
Internal Auditor
Security
Technology
-  A/C Development
-  A/C Construction
-  A/C System & Eng.
A/C Interior
-  Electronic & Meas't
-  Flightiest
L  Research & Devt
-  Fabrication
Corporate Secretary
Airplane
CN235
N250
N2130
-  After Sales
L  Commerce
RW, Defence & Aerospace
-  Helicopter
-  Defence System
-  Aerospace
L  Commerce
Procurement
Human Resource & Adm
Subcontract
Planning
Finance
L  International Business
Figure 5-2: Indaco’s Organisational Structure After 1997
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5.3 Aircraft Industry and Its Relation to Indaco and CE Adoption
5 .3 .1  O v e rv ie w  o f  th e  G lo b a l A irc ra f t In d u s try
According to Todd and Simpson (1986), the global aircraft industry can be divided 
into three tiers. Firstly, the tier-1 companies or the primes which are the airframe 
producers, i.e. companies that design and assemble the whole aircraft or aero-engine 
and install the power plants and other components and systems manufactured 
elsewhere to the airframe and wing. Secondly, the tier-2 companies, which are 
airframe component manufacturers that make the required components for the primes. 
Thirdly, the tier-3 companies, which are companies deal with aircraft maintenance, 
repair and overhaul services.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) regard the aircraft industry as industry that operates in a 
complex, diverse and dynamic environment. Working in such an environment, the 
global aircraft industry has developed the following characteristics:
1) T echnology intensive. The aircraft industry is characterised by invention, 
innovation and development o f new and complex materials and products. 
Research and development play a fundamental role (BIE, 1993) and make the 
industry very sensitive to technical changes. Todd and Simpson (1986) argue that 
the relationship between customer demand and technical progress in aircraft 
industry is interactive; innovation probably owes as much to customer stimulus as 
customer enthusiasm responds to technical performance. Its evolution is 
contributed by ‘a combination of technology-push and demand-puli’ innovations.
2) L ong developm ent time. Developing an aircraft involves a very complicated 
process from concept definition, preliminary design and analysis, detail design to
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testing, and certifying the product before it is ready for the customer. Typically, 
the development time for a new aircraft platform takes seven to nine years.
3) C apital intensive. The aircraft industry normally requires state-of-the-art 
manufacturing facilities and modern design tools and with high development cost. 
The gap between initiating a new design and full-scale production due to long 
development time must also be covered by sufficient working capital.
4) L abour intensive. The industry requires a large quantity o f highly skilled labour. 
The industry is regarded as a high value-added sector, in which high level o f  
productivity is expected (BEE, 1993). Since educating such skilled labour takes a 
long time, there is a preference toward employment stability and a desire to retain 
skilled labour despite fluctuations o f business (Todd & Simpson 1986; BIE, 
1993). Only recently this preference is lessening due to more business pressure.
5) A relatively sm all num ber but dem anding custom ers. The aircraft market can 
be divided into civil and military market. The market o f military aircraft is 
determined by the size o f national defence budgets (Todd and Simpson, 1986), 
while the civil market is basically determined by the growth of air traffic. The 
military demand for new features often results in significant innovation, which 
typically supported by the government. In the U.S., this takes form in research and 
initiatives within National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
Institute o f  Defense Analyses (IDA). International marketing strategy in both 
civil and military markets usually involves customer financing, offset programs 
(i.e. some portions o f the contract packages are carried out in the customers’ 
countries), and counter trade. This marketing package puts an additional burden 
on the financial aspect o f the industry.
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6) Demanding regulatory environment. Each military customer normally has its 
own safety standards. In global civil market, there are two most respected 
authorities to which most countries referring to: the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the European Joint Aviation Authority (JAA). 
Manufacturer has to comply with any standard required by its customer. These 
standards have tended to increase not only in regard o f the safety o f  the product 
but also the safety o f the product to the environment.
7) C lose relationsh ip  w ith  suppliers. This industry requires materials and 
components made to specific standards. The suppliers are normally short-listed to 
a list o f approved suppliers in which the manufactures periodically audit their 
compliance to specific standards o f production process. Aluminium and forging 
material, for example, are supplied by two or three specialists for the whole 
industry. Bought-out components like engines, landing gears, avionics, electronics 
and hydraulics systems require close contact with the suppliers from the early 
stages o f development.
8) Extensive government involvement. The basis o f government involvement in 
nurturing a domestic aircraft industry comes from a perception that this industry is 
a national asset. It is important in major industrial economies and has a strategic 
importance for national sovereignty due to o f its military function. It also has the 
ability to generate multiplier effects and sizeable balance o f payment gain (Todd 
and Simpson, 1986). Government involvement takes various forms such as 
providing direct investment; facilitating R&D; being a customer; creating 
government financing scheme; and providing protection through tariff, regulation 
and other barriers (Todd & Simpson, 1986). This involvement has put the industry
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in the position o f ‘permanent receivership’ (Lowi, 1975), as companies in the 
aircraft industry are the recipients o f state attention in order to guarantee their 
continued stability and success.
With these characteristics, the aircraft industry is often regarded as a ‘high-tech’ 
industry dominated by engineering and technological orientations. The industry 
evolves around the uncertainty in all aspects o f its environment (i.e. market, science 
and socio-techmcal) and continuous venture to new frontiers o f technology. In its core 
is technological imperatives with a belief that the product will sell itself at its own 
price (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). However, the combination of immense 
uncertainty, long feedback time, and heavy investment makes the aircraft industry 
become more conservative than other high-tech industries, particularly ones with 
speedier feedback (e.g. computer and electronics industries) that are typically risk- 
taker (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). The decision-making process is typically 
conservative and involves careful assessment o f all risks. This leads to heavy reliance 
on standard manuals, standard operating procedures, detail implementation plan, 
protocols, and prudent technical documentation.
These characteristics o f the aircraft industry result in various common practices. 
Internally, their managers have to deal with the inherent paradoxical issues of 
differentiation and integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). According to Thomas 
(1994), aircraft companies are companies in contrasts, risk-taking and risk-aversing at 
once: flexible and organic in design and development functions while rigid and 
mechanical in production functions. Eventually, this industry becomes one o f the 
incubators o f management concepts that try to find solution in dealing with 
specialisation and integration, such as matrix organisation and concurrent engineering
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(e.g. Davis and Lawrence, 1977, Winner, et al., 1988, Fan, 1995). This is reflected in 
Indaco through highly compartmentalised structure in combination with matrix 
mechanism between program and functional organisation, highly formalised 
procedures, and strong technology orientation and the domination o f design and 
technology functions as described in the previous section and elaborated in detail in 
Chapter 7.
Externally, the companies' managers have to deal with various demanding 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, government, and regulation bodies. With 
heavy investments at stake, companies in this industry typically maintain a close 
inter-organisational relationship within the industry and with their constituents. 
Launch customers (i.e. customers who are the first in a product’s booking order) are 
important part in the ‘go-ahead’ decision o f a development program and, typically, 
enjoy many financial and technical benefits. Some key suppliers become risk and 
cost-sharing partners (Fan, 1995). Subcontracting and manufacturing under-license 
are common production practices. Many companies are involved in joint design 
development, technological research and human resource development. These inter 
organisational practices and its contribution to Indaco’s decision to adopt CE is 
discussed further in Section 5.3.3.
5 .3 .2  N e w  P ro d u c t D e v e lo p m e n t in  A ir c r a f t  In d u s try  a n d  th e  N e e d  f o r  C E
Aircraft development is a risky initiative that involves various disciplines to find a 
small optimum ‘envelope o f solutions’. The stakes are high due to high investment 
cost, long development time, high standard regulation, and increased competition, 
particularly in the low-end and smaller products. Due to its high technological
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complexity, the aircraft development process typically involves considerations over a 
w ide-range o f aspects in its design decisions, such as technological, operational, 
financial, commercial and environmental, as illustrated in Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-3: Aspects o f Aircraft Development Process (Source: Internal Course, 1998)
The overall aircraft development process can be illustrated in a sequential diagram as 
in Figure 5-4.
Given the nature of highly differentiated specialisation, an aircraft development 
program normally struggles to integrate and harmonise various and often conflicting 
specialisation perspectives in order to achieve a commercially and technologically 
viable design. Often, a specialist seeks optimisation only in terms of his own ‘object- 
w orld’ (Bucciarelli, 1994). This situation o f competing interests o f specialisation in 
the aircraft development process can be illustrated as Figure 5-5.
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Figure 5-4: Aircraft Development Process (Adapted from Internal Course, 1998)
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aircraft industry had directly played a significant role in bringing the CE approach to 
Indaco which triggered the Indaco’s management decision to apply it in the PLI 
Program, and influenced the introduction process o f CE in Indaco:
1) Licensing, subcontracting and co-development relationship. These business 
relationships were common within the industry. Beside their business prospect, 
new entrants often saw these relationships as a means o f technology transfer.
2) Technical and managerial consultation relationship. The large primes (i.e. 
companies that design and assembly the aircraft) often had a management service 
division that offered technical and managerial consulting services for smaller 
manufacturers world-wide, particularly in the area o f design and production 
process. Many new and smaller manufacturers acquired this service as part o f  
their effort to comply with the standards set by the large primes, which in turn 
would create opportunity to become subcontractors. Compliance with these 
standards was also seen as a means o f achieving compliance with the standards of 
the internationally respected regulatory bodies.
3) Internship program. The less developed and smaller manufacturers engaged in 
internship program with larger primes in which they temporarily released their 
engineers to work with the primes for 1-2 years. During this period, those 
engineers were typically treated as primes’ employees. Sometimes, the internship 
program was tied to an international purchase contract, as part o f an offset 
agreement. But, often it was a voluntary co-operation between the two companies 
in which the larger primes fulfilled their short-term shortage o f engineers while 
the smaller manufacturers gained the opportunity to upgrade the skills and 
knowledge o f their own engineers.
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Since its establishment, Indaco has had business relationships with other companies in 
the global aircraft industry through licensing, subcontracting and joint development 
programs. Westaco was one o f the companies with whom Indaco engaged with in the 
above three types o f  relationship. Indaco had been a Westaco subcontractor since the 
late 1980’s and this subcontract program had forced Indaco to standardise its 
production system prior to signing a contract agreement. As part o f the strategy to win 
this contract, Indaco had engaged in various agreements with Westaco since 1984, in 
which Westaco agreed to provide some managerial and technological supports and 
consulting services.
As part o f  these services, Westaco sent its people as technical assistants, up to 20 
people at a time, in Indaco to help establishing adequate working systems and 
practices in various areas. Some o f these technical assistants even spent more than 
five years in the company. Several worked as functional specialists in the design 
process. Some assisted functional units (e.g. Production, Quality Assurance, 
Engineering, etc.) to improve Indaco’s design and production systems in order to 
comply with internationally recognised regulatory standards, (e.g. FAA and JAA), so 
that the company could market its products world-wide. These systems included 
configuration management and control, quality systems, product specification 
systems, and computational and information systems. Some others worked in the 
program divisions (i.e. PLC, PLP, and PLI programs) to establish program 
management systems and assisted in running the programs.
Indaco had started the internship program in 1990 by sending Indaco’s 4-5 engineers 
annually to work for 1-2 years in Westaco. This internship covered various areas, 
such as aircraft design, production, customer support, and system administration.
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These engineers brought back the experience o f implementing the ‘Westaco Way’ as 
it was documented in various Westaco procedure manuals. The most prominent ex­
intern was the PLI Program Manager. Several other ex-interns also directly or 
indirectly supported the PLI Program.
These contracts for support and consulting services between Indaco and Westaco 
were terminated later due to the Indaco’s financial crisis. However, as the result of 
these various engagements with Westaco, some understanding towards those systems 
and various W estaco’s protocols, standard manuals, and operating procedures started 
to accumulate in Indaco. Many Westaco’s manuals and protocols were adopted as part 
of Indaco’s standard manuals and system procedures. Various CE protocols from 
W estaco’s development programs were available in Indaco through a similar pattern. 
These protocols were, partially, used as references in establishing the mechanism 
applied to Indaco’s development programs.
The previous PLP development program, for example, adopted the Design Production 
Team which actually w?as a part o f CE initiatives in one o f Westaco’s development 
programs (see Chapter 6), albeit with some fundamental deviations. In Westaco, this 
initiative is involving production-related engineers in the early stage o f the 
development process in order to incorporate production considerations early in the 
design process. In the PLP Program, however, the Design Production Team was 
established late in the detail design phase. Therefore, its purpose reduced only to filter 
the design drawings prior to the engineering release in order to reduce the number of 
engineering changes and to discuss producibility and manufacturability o f those 
design drawings. It was too late to talk about the optimum process or ease of  
production. One o f the engineers from production recalled:
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Figure 5-5: A Dream for a Specialisation, a Nightmare for Others 
(Adapted from McMasters, 1993)
The pursuit to obtain optimal solution for such competing interests and objectives 
with immense risk at stake and long feedback time that triggered various initiatives in 
the aircraft companies to find a better concept and approach in their product 
development program. It is unsurprising that some aircraft companies is among the 
first that came up with and implement the concurrent engineering approach (albeit 
often with different names) as indicated in W inner et al. (1988).
5.3.3 Inter-Firm Relationship within the Aircraft Industry and CE Adoption
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, the characteristics o f aircraft industry lead to close 
interrelationship among companies that constitute the industry. In turn, this inter 
organisational relationship permits the spread o f various management and 
technological concepts and approaches such as matrix management and concurrent 
engineering through out the industry. In particular, three common practices within
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[In the PLP Program,] we were involved at the detail design [phase]. The design had been 
completed. So. we only assessed whether this part [design] could be fabricated. If we 
suggested a new idea, it would take a long time and many steps [back to the design process]. 
... It was only 'could we do it’ question. If we could, [the design] was released. If not, we sent 
it back to the designer. ... Since the design loop had been completed even a small change 
would go back to the design cycle, analysis and verification, which took months (Kevin, 
Tooling Engineering, January 1999).
Not surprisingly the Design Production team was eventually abandoned. Another 
issue that surfaced from this experiment was concerning the competency o f personnel 
in both Design and Production Divisions, which led to many disappointments in the 
PLP development process. One o f senior manager from production function recalled:
People assigned to [the Design Production Team] often did not have the necessary
qualification as there were to many teams to be fulfilled........  We worked with for
information only' drawings with an assurance [from Designers] that they would not be 
changed. But, when the drawings were formally released, they had been changed. Designers 
[apparently] went through the weight and balance analysis and several other calculations, 
found several mistakes and modified the drawings. It happened many times ... There were 
[also] a lot of parts that were compliance with design drawings but when assembled together, 
they did not fit. The design must be changed... (Steve, Fabrication Division, July 1998).
Unfortunately, these issues were not taken into full consideration when the CE 
implementation in the PLI Program began, despite the concerns expressed by many, 
including the engineer who was the Project engineer o f both PLP and PLI programs. 
Nevertheless, this experience enhanced some team members’ understanding o f CE 
and became part o f the lessons learned as they went through the PLI Program:
Based on our experience [in the PLP program] we try to provide input to design people while 
they are carrying out early aircraft planning. (Peter, Operation Centre, November 1997)
The introduction o f the CE approach in the PLI Program started when the PLI 
Program Manager, who had two years internship experience in Westaco, early after 
his assignment announced that he would apply the CE modelled on Westaco’s. This 
move was intended to take benefit o f his own and other ex-interns hands-on 
experience, the availability o f  various Westaco’s CE protocols, and the previous 
experience in the PLP Program.
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However, it was clear that computer-based technologies as CE enablers were the 
focus o f attention. Later in the interview in 1996, the Program Manager stated:
[Westaco] termed it as enabling technology. With this enabling technology, [engineers] can 
work optimal. [Westaco] uses 100% digital [design]. So is our [PLI], no compromise. We will 
define the product with 100% digital CAT1A and we will utilise the digital mock up in which 
engineers can compare and find the areas that require changes due to design faulty or part 
interference.... For [PLI], we will use that. [Westaco] has used that... (Clive, Program 
Manager, June 1996)
There was a less serious effort in adopting other aspects o f W estaco’s CE practices, 
which in turn, led to difficulty in realising other aspects o f CE, such as cross­
functional teams and sufficient communication mechanism as can be seen later in 
Chapter 6.
5.4 National Context and Its Relation to Indaco and CE Termination
National context played a vital role in the existence o f Indaco and its organisational 
mechanisms. The very existence o f the company, for example, could not be separated 
from Indonesia’s pursuit for industrial development, while its cultural tendencies 
played a role in shaping the organisation’s structure and practices. In particular, this 
section discusses the following three aspects o f national context that significantly 
contributed to Indaco and its CE:
1) Indonesia’s national development plan that led to the existence o f Indaco and its 
PLI Program.
2) Cultural Tendencies o f the society, particularly the high power distance and 
collectivism, that led to centralised structure and its social-professional leakage 
was contributed to the acceptance o f CE adoption.
3) The contemporary Indonesia’s economic crisis that led to the termination o f the
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PLI Program and its CE.
5.4.1 Indonesia’s Development Plan and Its Relation to Indaco and PLI Program
The establishment o f aircraft industry was an integral part o f Indonesia’s national 
development program (Todd and Simpson, 1986). Economically, it was part of 
industrialisation plan to promote economic growth and development in order to 
become one o f the new industrialised countries. Rich in natural resources, Indonesia’s 
domestic revenue in the 1970s was heavily relied on such resources, oil tax in 
particular which accounted for more than 50% (Tanter, 1990). In comparison, 
manufacturing sector was accounted only for 2% of national export (Todd and 
Simpson, 1986).
Indaco, established as a state-owned company operating in aircraft manufacturing 
industry in 1976, was seen as the vehicle toward industrialisation. It was intended to 
diversify the composition o f national export, facilitate import substitution and at the 
same time fulfil the country’s high-tech industry ambition. This labour intensive 
industry was also beneficial in creating and tending new highly skilled jobs for 
Indonesia which its growing workforce became a major challenge for the government 
(Edwards, MacIntyre, and Asra, 1994). Politically, the national aircraft industry was 
also seen as a strategic factor for promoting further integration throughout Indonesia 
by enabling to develop air transportation suitable in connecting and bridging the 
archipelago. These broader objectives were clearly reflected in Indaco’s 
organisational mission that emphasising technology transfer as well as its strong 
orientation toward technology advancement and less attention toward marketing and 
financial aspects o f the business. Eventually, the company had accumulated a
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significant loss and later faced financial difficulties in the time of national economic 
crisis during which the government’s aid stopped flowing.
During the 1990s, the government viewed that the global economic competitiveness 
could only be captured through high-level o f  scientific and technological capability 
(Hill, Marsh, Merson, and Siregar, 1994). This view was reflected in the objectives o f  
the Government’s Sixth Five Year Plan (REPELITA VI) that covered the period of  
1994-1999. This plan included establishing industry as the economic motor and 
primary absorbent o f the labour forces and increasing industrial productivity and 
efficiency through the enhancement o f the quality o f human resources and 
improvement in skills, creativity, discipline, technological mastery and managerial 
skills (Nomura Research Institute, 1993).
The combination o f these government’s objectives and Indaco’s success in the first 
flight o f the first indigenous design o f PLP in 1995 provided the opportunity for 
Indaco to propose another aircraft development program, the jet engine PLI. Due to 
its limited available fund for such undertaking, the Government fostered the 
establishment o f a private company as a financial scheme to accumulate public 
funding for the PLI Program.
5 .4 .2  C u ltu ra l T en d en cy  a n d  I ts  E ffe c ts  in  I n d a c o 's  O rg an isa tion
Indonesia has great ethnic diversity with hundreds o f ethnic groups each with their 
own cultural and social heritage (Prijadi and Rachmawati, 1998). Among these, 
Javanese is the biggest ethnic group, accounted for one-third o f the population and 
widely dispersed throughout the country. The unifying forces o f this diversity were
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accounted in national language, artistic expression, tradition, history o f their struggle 
against Dutch colonialism, as well as in the national ideology, ‘Pancasila’ (the Five 
Pillars: belief in one God, just and civilised humanitarianism, a united Indonesia, 
democracy guided by wisdom through consultation and representation, and social 
justice for all Indonesian people) (Vatikiotis, 1993). Lubis (1990) argues close 
relationships and inter connections within those ethnic groups went far back into the 
pre-colonialisation era.
In assessing Indonesian cultural tendencies, this study uses Hofstede’s (1984, 1991) 
framework as a starting point. Aware of the limitation o f Hofstede’s study, further 
confirmation is sought in more qualitative studies from anthropology literature and 
contemporary reports on politic and sociology, such as Geertz (1960), Vatikiotis 
(1993), and Guinnes (1994). According to Hofstede (1991), Indonesia is a country 
with a tendency towards high power distance, high collectivism, low masculinity, and 
low in uncertainty avoidance. This classification implies that people are likely to 
prefer to work in a group, be less competitive, and prefer co-operation and group 
harmony. Relationships are personal and activities are oriented toward the group 
interests. The organisation is likely a centralised structure that relies more on the 
individual who has the power rather than on the system (Hofstede, 1984).
This implication is broadly confirmed by anthropological work of Geertz (1960) on 
the Javanese culture, which is argued as the primary source o f the contemporary 
Indonesian culture and social practices (Vatikiotis, 1993; Guinnes, 1994). Focusing 
on the Javanese culture, Geertz (1960) has classified the Javanese into three vertical 
sub-cultures: the ‘abangan’ culture o f village peasants and urbanised working class, 
the ‘santri’ culture o f the market traders, and the ‘priyayi’ culture o f aristocrats and
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government bureaucrats. These sub-cultures share many common values, such as 
value for harmony and against overt aggressive behaviour, value for proper behaviour 
according to status, disregard for open expressions o f  opposition, and the value of 
politeness and polite suppression o f feelings.
These cultural tendencies were clearly reflected in Indaco’s organisation. The 
tendency o f  high power distance was reflected by high level o f  centralisation o f the 
organisational structure, in which the ‘man at the top’ had an enormously wide span 
o f control, much wider than most top management in Western countries. His direct 
control by-passed the control o f his direct subordinates as all heads o f the divisions 
had also a reporting line directly to him, beside the reporting line to their respective 
directors. Managers, even the senior ones, often hesitated to make decisions, and 
sought direction from the top. Influenced by the tendency o f high collectivism, the 
decision-making process was slow and dominated by several consultation meetings 
among the executives prior to bringing the issue to the top, even for insignificant 
issues. The consultation process among those executives was slow as they avoided 
direct confrontation and sought for the necessary ‘face saving’. This slow process was 
regarded by the impatient middle managers as the ‘bolt-and-nut executive meeting’.
5 .4 .3  C o n te m p o ra ry  In d o n e s ia ’s  E c o n o m ic  C risis a n d  C E  T erm in a tion
The financial crisis that devastated South East Asia since in the middle o f 1997 has 
had a great impact on Indonesia’s economy and politics. The Indonesian currency, 
Rupiah , had fallen by more than 60% against US dollar, the stock market index had 
dropped by more than 30% and inflation raised rapidly to more than 80% by early 
1998 (Prijadi and Rakhmawati, 1998). The financial crisis led to economic and social
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problems. Unemployment rapidly increased; manufacturing and construction workers 
were affected most. This situation eventually led to civil unrest that led to political 
crisis. The pressure for reform brought about by student and general demand, 
ultimately toppled the more than 30 years old regime on May 21 1998. Reformation 
in political, economics and social institutions as well as law reinforcement was 
highlighted as urgent in the new administration. However, social, political and 
economic situations remained uncertain.
Unlike other parts o f Indaco that were affected since the end of 1997, the financial 
impact o f the economic crisis only started to seriously affect the PLI Program in late 
1998. This one-year lag was instrumental in allowing the PLI Program to complete its 
preliminary design phase. However, when the crisis was eventually felt, it totally 
eliminated the program’s source o f finance. There had been indications o f financial 
difficulties since the mid 1998 when the Program Manager issued a directive stated 
that the main objective of the Program was reduced to the completion o f the 
preliminary design phase by the middle o f 1999. At the end of 1998, the private 
company set up to finance the Program, decided to liquidate itself for various political 
and economic reasons. This development erased a hope o f the PLI Program 
continuing the development process in the near future. With the termination o f the 
PLI Program, the implementation process o f CE initiatives was also ended.
5.5 Summary
Indaco was a fully state-owned Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company. Its 
establishment in 1976 was linked to the Indonesia’s national pursuit of economic 
growth and development toward industrialisation. The industry was intentionally set
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up in the perception that it could fulfil the economical mission for export 
diversification and import substitution while fulfil the nation ambition o f high-tech 
industry. Although it also had commercial missions, the engineering and 
technological orientation was enormous. This company operated in the industry 
through various way, including under license production, new aircraft developments, 
subcontract services for other primes, and aircraft maintenance services. Influenced 
by both national and industrial contexts, Indaco, had an elaborated organisational 
structure with highly differentiation, highly centralisation, and highly formalisation. 
The characteristics o f aircraft industry contributed to high level o f differentiation and 
formalisation, the cultural tendency associated with high power distance led to high 
centralisation, while the collectivism tendency led to slow decision making process.
Extending the organisational contexts towards the external environment o f the 
company, also provided the bird-eye view o f CE adoption: the background o f its 
initiation and the reason of its termination. The effect o f external context on CE 
implementation was more remote but nevertheless crucial to its existence. Industry 
common practices (e.g. subcontracting, technical and managerial consulting services 
and internship program) had exposed CE to Indaco and triggered the decision for 
adoption. However, as Indaco was one symbol o f national technology development, 
this adoption was not solely triggered by the market and competition in the industry 
but also, and more intensely, by high-tech ambition which led to strong attention 
toward the enabling technology o f this approach, namely the computerised support 
system. The Indonesian economic and political crisis that started in 1997 had forced 
Indaco to terminate the PLI Program due to the ending o f the program’s source of 
finance. This termination also ended the CE introduction process in Indaco.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SUBSTANCE OF CHANGE: CE IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 2, CE is conceptualised as an approach to new product 
development process that focuses on integrating all product life cycle considerations at 
the outset o f the process to achieve customer expectations with maximum quality, and 
reduced lead-time and cost. This approach is operationalised through several sets of 
initiatives. This study focuses on two o f these sets, namely initiatives on organisational 
integration and communication and decision making mechanisms. The organisational 
integration has horizontal and vertical dimensions. The degree o f cross functionality in a 
team represents the degree o f horizontal integration, while the degree of heavyweight 
management represents the degree o f vertical integration. Communication and decision­
making mechanisms represent the processual dimension o f such integration.
In analysing the introduction process o f CE approach, this chapter looks at the changing 
shape o f  CE initiatives throughout the introduction of CE into the Indaco’s PL1 Program - 
from its initial adoption and adjustment to the current approach used at that time to its
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final result. During this process, the model was adjusted, shaped, adapted to the specific 
organisational and temporal context. The changing nature o f CE in this introduction 
process is assessed through operationalised dimensions o f the above two initiatives.
In the organisational integration initiatives, the changing nature o f the cross-functionality 
is assessed through the size and architecture, the scope, and the membership pattern of  
the program teams. The changing nature o f heavyweightness is assessed through the 
structural position, the degree o f assigned delegation, and the seniority o f the leaders o f  
the program teams. The initiatives on communication and decision making mechanisms 
are assessed through the degree o f which formal communication, collaboration, inter­
team communication, and involvement o f lower level teams in the decision making 
process. The assessment in this chapter involved all levels o f program teams (i.e. core, 
middle-level, and operational teams) that existed throughout the introduction process. 
The dimensions assessed are summarised in Table 6-1.
In this assessment, the intended CE model is represented by the Westaco model. This 
model was drawn from initiatives related to the CE approaches undertaken by Westaco, 
in particular CE approaches from its two recent product development programs. The 
assessment reveals that this intended model had a high degree of organisational 
integration. Its cross-functional teams had a wide-ranging and in-depth involvement of  
various relevant functions. It also had a heavyweight management at all levels of the 
development team, which composed of senior and high position leaders with extensive 
authority in controlling the development process. Communication and decision making 
mechanisms in this intended model was characterised by a systematic communication 
system with a high degree o f both formal and informal communication within and across
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all levels o f the development teams as well as a significant involvement o f lower level 
teams in the decision making process. This communication system was supported by an 
advanced computer system.
Table 6-1 Dimensions o f CE Assessed in the Case Study
C atego ry CE In itia tive D im ension
Organisational Integration Cross-functional
Team
Size and architecture 
Scope
Membership pattern
Heavyweight
Managem ent
Hierarchical Position 
Nature of delegation 
Seniority
Communication and 
Decision Making Mechanisms
Fomal
Communication
Communication mode 
Type of data conveyed
Collaboration Interactional relationship pattern 
Conflict & negotiation process 
Presence of collective goal 
Presence of shared vision
Inter-team
Communication
Formal communication 
Collaboration
Decision-Making
Mechanism
Authority of teams
Respect to lower teams' decision
Power differential
The assessment o f  CE introduction in the Indaco’s PLI Program is intentionally detailed 
to see the dynamics o f its changing shape and nature throughout the process. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, many studies o f CE only provide a superficial understanding of 
the complex organisational arrangements involved in multi-teams product development 
projects. Their models, analyses, and prescriptions appear too simplistic. The assessment 
of Indaco’s PLI Program in this thesis reveals four stages o f the Program in relation to 
CE. The first stage represented the traditional approach, while other stages represented 
the CE introduction process to a new product development program. Each stage had a 
different characteristics o f  organisational integration and communication and decision
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making mechanisms. Further more, this longitudinal analysis reveals no consistent path 
of this variation toward the intended model. Rather, this variation seems to be ad-hoc and 
strongly influenced by the temporal and organisational contexts. This variation is the 
subject o f the explanatory assessment in the next chapter.
The sections o f this chapter are arranged as follows. It begins with an overview o f the 
Indaco’s PLI Program. Then, CE initiatives at Westaco as the model o f CE being 
introduced to Indaco are described. This is followed by a detailed discussion on CE 
implementation in Indaco throughout the phases o f the PLI’s development process. Four 
stages o f change process were identified, characterised by differences in organisational 
integration and communication and decision-making mechanisms. This is followed by a 
discussion on the extent o f variation between the intended Westaco model and what was 
emerging as the Indaco model and its changing nature throughout the process.
6.2 Overview of Indaco’s PLI Program
The PLI was conceived as a new generation of regional jets for the 21st century. Indaco 
forecasted that there would be an increasing demand for regional aircraft in order to fill 
an increasing gap between the supply o f jumbo jets and regional airplanes that usually 
serve as the jumbo jet’s feeders. The PLI was intended meet that demand (Indaco, 1997). 
Company-wise, the PLI was regarded as a major vehicle to bring Indaco to the fourth 
phase o f  its planned strategic development, i.e. the implementation o f R&D in future 
technology. The PLI was the third new aircraft platform development undertaken by 
Induce after the co-development o f the 35-passenger commuter PLC and the development
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o f the first indigenous 50-passenger commuter PLP. The objective o f the PLI program 
was to develop, build and, certify prototypes o f a new platform 100-passenger jet airplane 
that could fulfil the world market by 2004. At the outset, the estimated development cost 
was USS 2 billion. The general features o f this new aircraft are provided in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: General Features o f the PLI (Source: Indaco ])
Dimension PLI-100 PLI-200Basic
Gross Weight
Increased 
Gross Weight
Basic
Gross Weight
Incerased 
Gross WeiehtWing: 
Gross Area (m2) 107.4 107.4 107.4 107.4Span (m) 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
Aspect Ratio 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
Sweepback (0.25c) (degree) 25 25 25 25
Overall Length (m) 31.25 31.25 33.86 33.86
Fuselage Diameter (m) 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95
Weight
Max. Take Oft'Weight (kg) 49550 51500 56600 58700
Max. Landing Weight (kg) 44600 46350 50950 52850
Max. Payload (kg) 11400 11400 13200 13200
Engine Thrust (KN) 2x83 2x86 2x94 2x98
Passenger Capacity
All tourist Class (pax) 114 114 132 132
Mixed Class (pax) 104 104 122 122
The lifetime o f the PLI Program ran from November 1993 to June 1999 when it was 
terminated due to the ongoing economy crisis within the country. The initial engineering 
study o f  PLI development was begun in November 1993 by the New Product 
Development (NPD) Department, a department within the Technology Division. The PLI 
Program was officially launched in March 1994 and initially led by the Head of NPD 
Department as the Chief Engineer. In August 1995, a program manager was assigned to
1 Item (83) Appendix-B
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manage the PLI Program. The Program Manager, who recently completed his internship 
in Westaco, decided to introduce CE using the Westaco initiatives as the model. At the 
time o f the field study from October 1997 to March 1999, there were more than 130 
people from various specialisations fully dedicated to this Program, while a significant 
number o f others were supporting the Program through their work in functional areas.
6.2 .1  P r o g r a m  P h a s e s
The PLI Program established a typical five-phase aircraft development process:
1) conceptual design phase,
2) preliminary design phase,
3) detail design phase,
4) prototype production (fabrication and assembly) phase, and
5) flight test and certification phase.
This, however, was not so much a linear sequential process, rather a process o f  
continuous iterative and overlapping development. Despite the decision to use CE, the 
program schedule showed no significant expectation o f a faster development time. 
Rather, the schedule can be seen as ‘moderate’ for such a development program. It was 
slightly longer than the schedule o f the previous PLP Program reflecting that the PLI was 
larger and more complex than PLP. The Program’s Master Phasing Plan can be seen in 
Appendix D. The activities planned in each o f  the development phases are given in Table 
6-3, while the simplified version o f  its major milestones can be seen in Figure 6-1.
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Table 6-3: Development Activities in Each Development Phase (Source: Indaco2)
P h a s e A c tiv itie s
C onceptual Definition of D esign  R equirem ent and O bjectives (D R & O )
D evelop m ent o f basic  configuration (cabin sp ace, m axim um  take  off w eight (M T O W ), wing size , eng ine s ize) 
Definition o f baseline  configuration options( 8 0 ,1 0 0  and 1 3 0  passenger)
P relim inary a s s es s m e n t of aircraft system s (hydraulics, electrics, avionics)
W ind -tunnel da ta b a s e  for design
N um erica l m odels fo r com putational fluid dynam ic (C F D ) and finite e lem ent analysis (FE A )
Specification of s ta tem ent of works (S O W s ), program  planning, and financial planning
P relim inary
D esign
C onfiguration optim isation and trade-o ff analysis  
P relim inary perform ance and econom ic analysis of the aircraft 
W in d  tunnel test for configuration optim isation  
M anufacturability  and producibility analysis  
Fixed configuration decision
D etail
D esign
A nalysis  of local strength and functional requirem ent o f com ponent/part 
D esign refinem ent based on test and analysis  results
D etail design of structures, system s, m echanism s, joints, fittings, and attachm ents  
D etail eng ineering  docum ents
Fabrication
A ssem bly
M anufacturing engineering, m anufacturing planning and N C -program m ing
Tooling engineering and m anufacturing
Q uality  eng ineering  and quality planning
D etail part m anufacturing
C om ponent assem b ly  and final assem bly
S ystem  installation and functional tests
F lightTest and  
Certification
D ocum entation  and analysis  to com ply with airw orthiness reg u la tion^) 
Flight test to validate airw orthiness com pliance
1995 19% 19 9 7 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4
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Figure 6-1: Simplified Milestones o f the PLI Program (Source: Indaco ) 23
2 Extracted from items (9), (10), (13), and (16) of Appendix-B
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The program had completed its conceptual phase and delivered the design requirement 
and objectives (DR&O) at the beginning o f  1997. The airplane-level DR&O o f the PLI 
Program can be seen in Table 6-4. The DR&O was continually refined and detailed 
during the next preliminary design phase.
Table 6-4: PLTs Airplane Level DR&O (Source: Indaco4)
Feature Description
Payload 114 passengers all tourist class 32" seat pitch (baseline)
132 passengers all tourist class 32" seat pitch (stretched version)
Design Range 2963 km (1600 nm)
Long Range Cruise Speed 0.8mach
Take-off Field Length 1750 m (5742 ft) (MTOW, ISA+18, sea level)
Landing Field Length 1750 m (5742 ft) (MLW. ISA+18, sea level, wet runway)
Sendee Ceiling 11890 km (39000 ft)
At the time o f  the field study from October 1997 to March 1999, the Program was 
undertaking the preliminary design phase with some parallel activities covering the detail 
design and certification process. By the end o f 1998, due to Indonesian economic 
difficulty, Indaco decided to temporarily terminate the Program on the completion o f this 
preliminary design phase scheduled on June 1999. The aim was to make the design 
concept ready for potential investors.
6 .2 .2  P ro g ra m  U n iq u en ess
Compared to Indaco’s other programs, the PLI Program had two distinctive features: a
4 Item (83) Appendix-B
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unique financial arrangement and the deliberate attempt to use CE as its approach to the 
organisation and management o f  the development process. These features affected the
whole process o f  development within the Program and the relationship between the 
Program and the rest o f the company.
1) F inancial arrangem ent:
Officially, the PLI Program was undertaken by Indaco through a contract with the 
owner , a private company (pseudonym: Prico), specifically formed to acquire funding 
for the PLI development. The contract between Indaco and Prico, signed in August 
1996^, made in effect that Indaco acted as a sole contractor to Prico. However, as the idea 
of the program was proposed by Indaco, it effectively acted as the virtual owner o f the 
Program, particularly in defining the airline features and program schedule. Prico was 
typically seen as part o f a scheme to ensure financial support for the Program.
Prico reserved the right to audit cost disbursement o f the PLI Program. To simplify the 
audit procedure and to limit exposure o f the company’s financial affairs to outsiders, the 
Program’s financial management was set up separately from Indaco’s. By this 
arrangement, the PLI Program was authorised to manage its own financial affairs using 
the statement o f work authorisation. The statement o f work was used both to authorise 
the execution o f  tasks and to control the process. Periodically, the Program submitted a 
work plan to Prico in the form o f a statement o f  work draft, which included targets on 
deliverables, schedules and man-hours required. Prico then authorised this statement o f  
work and provided money to the Program based on the agreed man-hours required. A
5 Item (35) in Appendix-B
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similar procedure was also in place (or at least attempted) for the functional units within 
the company that provided services to the Program.
This specific financial arrangement allowed the Program to have flexibility in allocating 
its financial resources and relative freedom from the myriad o f Indaco’s slow corporate 
procedures. It increased the ‘heavyweightness’ o f the Program organisation and 
influenced the decision to become an autonomous program. This arrangement created 
more flexibility for the Program than any other divisions, including the ability to bring 
functional expertise from outside Indaco rather than rely on the internal support. 
However, this arrangement also created inconsistency in the overall company policies. It 
was perceived by others as an indication o f the Program’s exclusiveness and created 
displeasure among other senior managers and jealousy among other employees. This, in 
turn, affected the interaction between the Program and other divisions.
2) C oncurrent engineering approach:
When he was appointed in 1995, the Program Manager, an engineer in a functional 
design unit (i.e. Technology Division), had just returned from an internship in Westaco. 
His announcement to implement CE in the PLI Program was seen as an opportunity to 
improve the product development process, particularly by people from production-related 
functions who were concerned with the problems they had encountered in the previous 
PLP Program. Basically, the PLI Program attempted to implement an approach that was 
modelled closely on Westaco’s DRX Program. The Program manager stressed in the 
interview:
In my opinion, [the DRX] Program was more concurrent because it was truly product oriented. ...
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For [the PLI], we will use that. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)
A wide range o f  W estaco’s manuals were available to Indaco and often used as 
references to support CE implementation. The Program Manager established a group to 
develop the ‘Sidina’ system as CE enabling technology for this Program. This group, co­
ordinated outside the Program team by the Head o f CADCAM Division, aimed to 
prepare, develop and set up the necessary enabling technology to support CE 
implementation. The Sidina group ran two pilot projects: one dealt with the idea o f using 
a cross-functional team in the application o f digital product development process, and the 
other attempted to develop a system based on knowledge-based engineering. Further 
analysis o f  enabling technology provided by Sidina group is discussed in Chapter 7.
Apart from the Sidina projects and the availability o f  W estaco’s manuals, there was no 
deliberate attempt to introduce and socialise CE, neither within the PLI Program team nor 
in the rest o f  the company. Within the PLI Program, CE was interpreted variously and 
given different meanings by different people and groups. Since this issue was never 
brought into a formal cross-functional discussion at any level, there was no single 
agreement on what a CE approach meant to the Program. As a result, despite the Program 
Manager’s intention to follow Westaco’s approach, the implementation process revealed 
that the realisation o f CE in Indaco’s PLI Program varied over time and did not follow 
the intended model. Detailed assessment o f this variation is provided in the next sections.
In addition, most senior managers within Indaco were not well informed about the 
consequences o f implementing CE. There was no deliberate link between the Program’s 
CE initiatives and the company-wide organisation and human resource policies. The
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objectives and consequences o f introducing such an approach were only casually 
addressed in the Executive Management Council meetings. This lack o f communication 
raised conflicts during the development process between the Program and the involved 
functional units. These conflicts mostly appeared in functional units’ hesitation to 
provide the human resources demanded by the Program which, in turn, was perceived by 
the Program as a resistance toward the CE approach.
6.3 CE Initiatives at Westaco: The Model of CE for the PLI Program
In this case study, CE initiatives in product development applied by Westaco, a major 
player in the aircraft industry, are taken to represent the intended model that was 
introduced into Indaco for the following reasons:
1) The Westaco model o f CE was an explicit basis for the introduction of CE in Indaco. 
At the beginning of the program, the Program Manager o f the PLI continuously 
expressed his intention to implement CE and to bring a particular set o f initiatives and 
concepts from Westaco to be implemented in the PLI Program. These concepts were 
learned either indirectly through the availability o f  manuals and protocols concerning 
those concepts at Indaco, or through hands-on experience by Indaco’s engineers in an 
internship program at Westaco.
2) Westaco is one o f the most respected companies in the global aircraft industry and its 
• model was a representative o f CE application in the industry. CE initiatives from
Westaco have been widely researched and reported on in various books, journals and
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magazines, and regarded as ‘one o f the best practices’ in the aircraft industry.
For the purpose o f  this thesis, the key characteristics o f the Westaco model were those 
elements communicated to and within Indaco rather than the complex and most probably 
involved reality o f  Westaco’s longer-term implementation o f CE. CE initiatives at 
Westaco were identified indirectly through the following sources:
1) Published materials, including CE books, journal and magazines.
2) Unpublished materials, particularly in the form o f Westaco’s procedures and 
protocols that were widely available in Indaco.
3) Accounts from primary sources, i.e. ex-interns, who experienced and witnessed 
Westaco’s development processes.
According to these sources, Westaco’s CE approach was applied through various sets of  
initiatives. These varied from one program to another. Typically, initiatives applied in the 
later development programs were more advanced than in the earlier programs. In part, 
this variation reflected the cumulative experience that Westaco has gained through its 
previous programs. It also reflected the development o f both the CE concept and 
computer technology as its enabling technology since Westaco’s major CE initiatives 
involved advanced computer support systems.
Two sets W estaco’s CE initiatives were particularly influential in the Indaco’s CE: CE 
initiatives for a new platform program (pseudonym: PLX) established in 1991 and CE 
initiatives for a major derivative program (pseudonym: DRX) established in 1994. 
Although the Program Manager o f the PLI Program often expressed his preference to use 
the DRX model o f  CE, the PLX model was also significantly influential in the PLI
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Program. There were two major reasons o f  this. Firstly, the protocols o f  the PLX model 
are more widely available in Indaco than the protocols o f  the DRX model. Technical 
assistants hired from Westaco even long before the PLI Program had started brought 
these protocols. Secondly, most ex-interns who brought hands-on experience o f CE from 
Westaco were involved in the PLX program rather than in the DRX Program. Therefore, 
these two sets o f  Westaco CE initiatives are included in this review and regarded as the 
Westaco Model’ as intended to be introduced in Indaco. Table 6-5 provides a summary 
of this review, which is discussed in more detail in the remainder o f this section.
In general, CE initiatives in the PLX and DRX Programs were similar. Despite the 
obvious difference o f  the size and the nature o f these programs (i.e. new platform versus 
derivative development), they both had a sizeable team divided into several layers o f a 
core team and sub-teams. They had a wide ranging cross-functionality and a heavyweight 
program management with similar communication and decision-making mechanisms. A 
detailed analysis on organisational integration and communication and decision making 
process revealed their differences in the nature o f how their sub-teams were divided, the 
role o f the functions involved, and the pattern o f team membership as follows.
1) Organisational Integration 
C ro ss -F u n c tio n a lity :
Both programs involved company-wide full members and functional representatives 
representing both engineering and non engineering functions, such as airframe structure, 
aerodynamic, system, stress analysis, weight analysis, manufacturing planning, NC- 
programming, tooling engineering, design to cost analyst, customer service,
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manufacturing, quality control, purchasing, business, training, computer services, and 
scheduling. They also involved external organisations, such as main manufacturing 
contractors, suppliers and potential customers.
Table 6-5: Summary o f  the Westaco Model o f CE
CE Initiative and Dimension Westaco
PLX DRX
C r o s s S i z e  a n d  A r c h it e c tu r e L a r g e  w ith  c o r e  t e a m  a n d  s e v e r a l  le v e ls  o f  s u b - te a m s
F u n c t io n a l
P n m a r i ly  b a s e d  o n P r im a r i ly  b a s e d  o n  in te g r a te d
s p e c ia l is a t io n e n d  p r o d u c t
T e a m S c o p e R o le D e s ig n  fu n c t io n s  in  th e D e s ig n  a n d  o t h e r  fu n c t io n s  h a d
m a in  r o le ,  o th e r s  in e q u a l  ro le s  in  d e s ig n  te a m s
L e v e l
s u p p o n m g  r o ie  -------------------------------------------------
F u l l  m e m b e r s h ip / r e p r e s e n t a t iv e
In v o lv e d  fu n c t io n s
W id e  r a n g e :  c o m p a n y - w id e  fu n c t io n s  a n d  in c lu d e
c u s to m e r s  a n d  s u p p lie r s
M e m b e r s h ip P o s it io n S t a f f  a n d  m id d le  m a n a g e r ia l  le v e l
P a t t e r n M e m b e r 's  a c t iv i ty O p e r a t io n a l  a n d  l ia is o n O p e r a t io n a l
D e d ic a t io n F u l ly  d e d ic a t e d
T e m p o r a l P e r m a n e n t
c M u lt ip le  m e m b e r s h ip S o m e  m e m b e r s  w e r e  p a r t  o f  m o r e  th a n  o n e  te a m
2 H ig h e r  t e a m ’s  c o m p o s it io n L o w e r  t e a m  le a d e r s  w e r e  p a r t  o f  h ig h e r  t e a m sCD3c. H e a v y w e ig h t H ie r a r c h ic a l F o r m a l E q u a l  to  f u n c t io n a l d iv is io n E q u a l  to  fu n c t io n a l s u b d iv is io n
1 5c M a n a g e m e n t P o s it io n A u th o r i ty E x t e n s iv e  a u th o r i ty  a n d  c o n tro l
COin D e le g a t io n P r o g r a m E x t e n s iv e
cCOCD F u n c t io n a l E x t e n s iv e  to  a ll m e m b e r s
o S e n io r i ty T e n u r e S e n io r  le a d e r s
A g e S e n io r  e n g in e e r s
E d u c a t io n H ig h ly  e d u c a t e d
F o r m a l C o m m u n ic a t io R ic h n e s s S e v e r a l  le v e ls  o f  s y s t e m a t ic a l ly  a r r a n g e d  r e g u la r  m e e t in g
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In the PLX Program, the team was primarily based on the design specialisation (e.g. 
structure, system) and then divided further into several layers based on product division 
(e.g. wing structure, aileron structure). Design engineers comprised and played the main 
role in the sub-teams. Members from other functions played supporting roles as 
functional representatives outside the operational design teams. In contrast, the DRX  
Program team was primarily divided based on fully integrated end product incorporating 
various design specialisations (e.g. wing, aileron). Design engineers and members from 
other functions comprised the operational sub-teams and played equal roles.
Overall, the team architecture, scope o f integration, and membership pattern o f the PLX’s 
cross-functional team resembled the findings o f CE teams on the U.S. automobile 
industry (Haddad, 1996). The overall cross-functional team covered a wide range o f  
functions and specialisation through permanent and fully dedicated representation, but 
the operational design teams were dominated by engineers. In a sense, the horizontal 
integration o f the DRX Program was a refinement from the PLX Program. It refined the 
interlocking structure o f the core team and sub-teams o f the PLX program through 
specific membership pattern o f the high-level teams. It pushed the involvement o f various 
engineering and non-engineering functions into the operational levels and freed those 
levels from the confusion of a matrix mechanism. By integrating all specialisations to 
work together in an operational team, its architecture also provided a truly product- 
focused team structure.
Heavyweightness:
At Westaco, the program managers had the highest authority in the development process,
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while the functional units served as ‘support pools’ to provide the required skill 
competencies and to ensure the compliance with any relevant regulations. The Program 
Manager was responsible and accountable for the product’s features and performance, as 
well as for the program’s management including planning, budgeting, allocating 
resources and controlling the progress. To provide the program with sufficient power, 
Westaco had established program teams with heavyweight management.
Structurally, the management o f both programs had formal hierarchical positions equal 
with the functional heads at their levels. The difference in the nature o f the program (i.e. 
platform versus derivative) caused the difference in the hierarchical position o f the 
program managers o f these two programs. The program manager o f the new platform 
PLX program was a vice president reported to the president director o f the group. The 
program manager o f the derivative DRX program was a subdivision head and reported to 
a vice president. However, both program managers had extensive authority and access to 
control the overall development processes. They and other team leaders at all levels were 
typically senior members o f the company in terms o f age, tenure and experience with a 
sufficient degree o f education. These program leaders had extensive delegation from both 
the programs and functional units to make and execute decisions throughout the 
development process. 2
2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanism
Both W estaco’s programs had the same pattern of communication and decision making 
mechanisms. At the operational development process, technical information was shared 
and channelled across the teams through the on-line computer system, but updated
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authorisation remained with the originators. The whole program teams were also linked 
by four levels o f  systematically arranged regular meetings. This also reflected the 
decision-makmg mechanism o f  the programs that had a low degree o f power differential 
and respect the authority o f low-level teams.
• Operational meeting: Each development team had its twice-a-week meeting chaired 
by its leader and attended by all engineers and representatives worked for that team. 
The agenda o f this meeting typically included discussion o f new design issues, and 
closing issues that involved team decisions signed by every member including 
finalising drawings so that they could be passed on to manufacturing. Minutes of 
meetings were distributed to all attendants after each meeting
• Progress Review Meeting: This was a weekly co-ordination meeting at the middle 
management level for clearing up issues and problems from the above operational 
meetings. The meeting was conducted with a formal time-controlled agenda and a 
circulation o f  minutes o f meeting afterward. Typically, the agenda involved reports 
from Chief Engineers, representatives, lead engineers, and key engineers, each of 
which was followed by a discussion. The decisions were made in the meeting.
• Design Review Meetings: The development process was divided into several design 
reviews. Typically, the design review meetings were conducted every two months. 
The aims o f  these meetings were to review the overall development process and to 
straighten out any engineering problems. Prior to each o f these meetings, the design 
process was frozen, and the administration services distributed the list o f design 
interferences (i.e. the mismatch between one part or aspect o f the design and other
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parts or aspects) to be resolved at the meeting. As most interferences involved more 
than one operational team, these meetings represented the formal communication 
across teams to resolve issues in the first and second meetings. Therefore, these three 
program meetings systematically interlocked across all layers o f teams.
• Program Management Meetings: These meetings represented the communication 
and decision-making mechanisms in the program top management. The meeting 
covered a wide range o f issues encountered by the program, such as training, major 
purchasing, interactions with the authority, and changes o f important material.
Formal communication at various levels was accompanied with more informal 
collaborative modes that ranging from on the spot discussion, e-mail, and telephone 
conversation. Within the operational development teams, this intensive collaboration was 
fostered by collocation and the ‘indoctrination process’ o f a program familiarisation 
course through which any new member was introduced to the programs’ overall plans 
and protocols at the very beginning o f his/her involvement in the programs.
Informal collaboration across operational teams also occurred, typically triggered by the 
preparation for design review meetings. As engineers from various teams had to establish 
their joint course o f actions to resolve the interference problems prior to these meetings, 
informal interactions even with unfamiliar colleagues were intensified. Any problem 
resolution as a result o f  these interactions within and across teams was respected. Only 
issues that could not be resolved through interaction at the lower level were brought to 
higher level meeting for decision.
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6.4 CE Approach in Indaco’s PLI Program
This section captures the process o f introducing CE in the Indaco’s PLI Program. During 
the PLI Program’s lifetime (1993-1999), four different structures in organising its 
development teams were identified in regard to organisational integration aspect o f CE. 
This led to four different stages o f CE implementation as follow:
1) The Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 -  August 1995).
This stage corresponded with the beginning o f the conceptual phase o f the PLI 
Program. In general, this was a pre-CE stage. At this stage, there was no intention to 
implement CE. Instead the task was carried out by the New Product Development 
(NPD) Department with the team exclusively made up o f design engineers.
2) The Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 -  October 1996).
The commencement o f this stage marked by public launching o f the PLI development 
program in August 1995. The Program Manager, officially appointed by the Indaco’s 
President Director in this event, established a program structure that primarily 
consisted o f  matrix between the Program’s component-based design teams and 
engineering specialists groups supported by functional design units.
3) The Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 -  June 1997).
This stage was marked by the launching o f  a new program structure that internalised 
engineering specialists and functional representatives within the Program 
organisation. The internalisation involved merging the component-based design 
teams and engineering specialists into the Program’s Design Integration teams, and 
addition o f five functional representatives as part o f the Program team, including the
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Operation Co-ordinator representing production-related functions.
4) The Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 -  June 1999).
In this stage the PLI Program restructured its organisation to become an autonomous 
division internalising all functions necessary to develop and build the aircraft as parts 
o f the Program. The main feature o f the Program was the Design Centre and the 
(production) Operation Centre; each consisted o f parallel product-based teams.
In general, these various structures and stages can be seen as part of the effort to find an 
appropriate means o f implementing CE. The field study started in the beginning o f the 
design-production coupling stage. The overlapping between these stages, program 
development phases, and field study time can be seen in the Figure 6-2.
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Figure 6-2: Overlapping Timeframes between the Program Phases, CE Stages, and
Research Activities
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The review o f this section is constructed around the CE initiatives that are the focus o f  
this study (i.e. organisational integration and communication and decision making 
mechamsms). It starts with outlining the changing nature o f CE initiatives in 
organisational integration and communication and decision making mechanisms within 
the program teams throughout four identified stages. A longitudinal analysis o f each 
stage is provided afterward to clearly capture the dynamics o f the change process and the 
temporal and organisational contexts that might influence the process and the variations, 
either against one another or against the intended model, that were present throughout the 
process. Therefore, this analysis is intentionally detail, exploring the nature o f each team 
involved throughout four identified stages, from the core team to the operational teams.
6.4.1 Overview o f Indaco ’s CE
Throughout four identified stages, the changing nature and shape o f CE initiatives in the 
PLI Program can be summarised in Table 6-6. In general, both organisational integration 
and communication and decision making mechanism were undergone significant 
changes. The introduction o f CE started at the second stage, the engineering matrix 
stage, and was marked by the effort to establish a cross-functional team with a 
heavyweight management for the PLI Program and separate the Program team from the 
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) that traditionally housed such 
development activity. This was accompanied by another effort to establish an integrated 
computer system to support product development activities.
Throughout all stages, however, this effort took a different path from the intended
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Westaco model. By the end o f this introduction process, the Program abandoned the 
heavyweight matrix organisational arrangement to become an autonomous division that 
independent from the influence o f functional units. The process was dominated by the 
design-related functions. Consistent support came only from production-related 
functions. The computer-support system remained a stand-alone rather than an integrated 
system. Decision making process was dominated by high-level teams and individuals. 
Involved teams were not linked either by systematic formal meetings or by informal 
collaboration. The changing nature o f CE initiatives in each o f organisational integration 
aspect and in communication and decision making mechanism aspect is as follows:
Table 6-6: Summary o f the Changing Nature o f CE in Indaco
CE Initiative and Dimension CE Stage
Program Initiation Engmeenng Matrix Engneering Integration Design- Production Couping
Cross See and Smal Large wth core team and several levels of subteams
Functional Architecture Smote team Design team was divided pnmariiy based on Design Centre: product-based teams
Team integrated eno product Operation Ctr product-based + functional
Scope Wide range company-wide functions
Design engineering
Design function in the man role 
Weak support from ether functions.
incbdng production (focal pcxnts*)
Design function m the man role 
Support from other functions.
including production (representatives)
Design and production in the man role 
Internalisation of aft relevant functions
Membership Permanent and fully Mxed fulty/partly defeated members Mostly fully dedicated members of Permanent and fully dedicated
1 Pattern dedicated members of design teams wth overlapping and design teams with overlapping and members separated into Design Centre
Q©__ Overlapping riteriocktfig membership inîeriocktng membership and (Production) Operation Centre
m
s
membership
Focal poets’ cf other functions
Representatives and Focal points' of 
other functions
Intemaïsation of relevant functions
ms Heavyweight Organisations V Functiona! department Heav/ws art matrix Autonomous division
C Management Hierarchical Position Mddfe tevel High tevel auihoniy High level authority
Nature of Delegation Extensive Extensive to Program Manager, senior leaders, aid senior engineers Extensive
Seniority of leaders Sensor leader Mxed of junior and senior leaders in design teams Junior leaders/engneers in design teams
Junior engineers Junior engineers More senior in operation teams
coms*o Formal Gommmication
Routine meeting 
Early ntormation
Communication modes were ad hoc based on preference and situational context 
Computer-based meda were stand alone
*G Cotaborabon Extensive High level coSafcoration within the subteams but rarely extended across teams• È
i l Merteam Comnuucabon
Rich two-way 
com truncation
Formal and Less cofeboratives
Fated to maintain a rich two-way dialogue 
that ftounshed earlier this stage
S O
c E Smal "Semi autonomous' hierarchy of teams *Semi autonomous' hierarchy of Large autonomous design / production
Reason Malang Mechanism autonomous design strongly influenced by fractional teams less influenced by design units teams increasingly centralised in the core
8  1 team design units as sngneers were integrated team
T Focal Ports: fonctional expens assigned by functional mils to support a program
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1) Organisational Integration
CE initiatives in this aspect caused a significant change in Program organisation. Prior to 
CE introduction, PLI development activities were carried out as functional activities in 
the NPD Department o f Technology Division. At the engineering matrix stage, when CE 
was first introduced, the development activities were managed by a heavyweight program 
team involving all design-related functions through a matrix between the Program’s 
operational design teams and the engineering specialist groups backed by functional 
design units. In the next stage, (i.e. engineering integration stage) engineering specialists 
were integrated to the design teams but the PLI Program managed a matrix between the 
Program and other supporting functional units. In the last stage, rather than keeping the 
matrix arrangement as the intended Westaco model, the PLI Program became an 
autonomous division, mainly consisted o f design-related and production related 
functions. The heavyweightness o f the Program team was reflected by the structural 
position o f  the Program Manager who reported directly to the President Director 
throughout all stages. However, these efforts did not ensure that the Program achieved its 
intention in implementing CE to its development process.
Horizontal Integration: Cross Functional Team in the PLI Program 
Cross-functionality in the PLI Program evolved in line with the increasing complexity o f  
the development process and the growth o f the program team. Initially, the Program was 
carried out by a small team. Over time, the size had grown to become more than 130 
people by the last stage. Starting at the engineering matrix stage, the Program team was 
divided into a core managerial team and several levels o f  sub-teams. At the program 
initiation stage, the development team only covered the design-engineering
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specialisation. With the decision to introduce CE, the Program started to involve other 
functions in the engineering matrix stage. Unlike the cross-functionality in the DRX 
Program, however, functions other than design-related functions were only involved in 
supporting roles and were separated from the design teams. Only at the last stage did 
other functions (i.e. production-related functions) become involved in the main 
development activities through the formation o f  the Operation Centre along side the 
Design Centre.
In the program initiation stage, team members were permanent and fully dedicated 
engineers. In the engineering matrix stage, additional partly dedicated engineers from 
various design specialisations were brought to the design teams as part o f the matrix 
arrangement. In the engineering integration stage, most o f representatives became fully 
dedicated to the Program. In the last stage (i.e. design-production coupling stage), with a 
few exceptions all involved parties belonged to the Program and became permanent and 
dedicated members o f the Program.
Vertical Integration: Heavyweight Management in the PLI Program
From the beginning, the top management o f the PLI Program had enjoyed an equivalent 
position and authority to that o f the heads o f functional units on issues such as budget and 
resource allocation. However, the Program struggled to gain control over some 
development processes carried out by the functional design units (i.e. technical analyses 
that were central to making design decisions) particularly because the leaders o f the PLI 
Program were less senior in their age and less experienced than their counterparts in the 
functional design units. The complexity o f the relationship between the functional units
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and the PLI Program under a matrix arrangement in the second and third stages led to the 
creation o f  a stand-alone independent program in the fourth stage. In this stage, 
functional representatives became full members o f the Program team, and thereby gave 
up their positions in the functional units.
2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
In a development process o f the PLI’s scale, the release and use o f uncertain information 
by engineers were necessary in the initial stages to establish an ‘engineering solutions 
envelope’. This information was shared through the computer system and continuously 
updated when more refined data (e.g. analyses and test results) were available. The 
process in the core team and middle level teams was dominated by formal 
communication, such as meetings, reports and memoranda. Over time, these higher level 
teams increasingly ignored and disregarded decisions made by the lower level operational 
teams. There was evidence o f difficulties in maintaining interaction across teams both 
horizontally and vertically. However, the communication and decision-making 
mechanisms within the operational design and (later) production sub-teams were often 
dominated by collaboration based more on friendly and informal communication and 
dialogue to achieve mutual goals. Formal communication was typically used to formalise 
the result o f the collaboration process, rather than in the decision making itself.
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6.4.2 Longitudinal Analysis o f  CE Introduction Process in Indaco
6.4.2.1 Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 -  August 1995)
The PLI Program was first initiated in November 1993 when the President Director of 
Indaco asked the Head o f NPD Department to assess the possibility o f  developing a 
regional jet airplane. The preliminary design requirements and objectives (DR&O), a 
rough concept o f the PLT was completed in January 1994. A series o f  management kick­
off meetings was conducted during March -  July 1994. These meetings decided that the 
PLI would be a 100-passenger wing-mounted engine regional aircraft and outlined the 
program milestones with the first delivery targeted in 2006. By the end o f 1994, the PLI’s 
two-year plan o f  the conceptual design phase was completed. Following this, the 
President Director assigned the Head o f the NPD Department as the Project Engineer of 
the PLI Program. He was responsible for the overall product performance aspects as well 
as the progress o f  the development program. Consequently, most engineers worked at the 
NPD Departments worked for this Program. Detailed analyses o f organisational 
integration and communication and decision making mechanism in this stage are as 
follows:
1) Organisational Integration:
Cross Functionality:
In this stage, the size o f the team working for PLI was around 20 members. The team was 
divided into nine overlapped informal groups in which one member might belong to more 
than one group: Configuration, Flight Mechanic, Aerodynamics, Structure, Wing Design, 
System, Fly-by-Wire, Load Alleviation, and Propulsion. Each group had 3-6 members.
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Despite this sub-grouping, the whole team, due to its relatively small size, was able to 
perform as a single team without hierarchical division o f core team and sub-teams. As 
part o f the NPD Department, all members were representing design engineering. There 
was no representation o f other functions. All members worked at the operational level 
and were fully dedicated to the development o f PLI. Their involvement was permanent as 
part o f their task in the department.
Heavyweightness:
The Project Engineer was the Head o f NPD Department, a middle manager who reported 
to the Director o f Technology. As all team members were part o f his department, he had 
full authority and was able to directly control and supervise the process. Due to his 
involvement as the Project Engineer in the previous PLP Program, he often had direct 
access to the President Director and, therefore, influential in engineering-related issues. 
However, his discretion over budget and resource allocation was limited. His request for 
additional facilities, for example, had to proceed through the Director o f Technology.
The team members were mainly junior, 20 -  35 years old, engineers. Typically, this 
Program was their first involvement in product development process. Most co-ordinators 
of the sub-groups were equally juniors, typically appointed on the basis o f  either their 
qualifications or their experience. These co-ordinators had little delegated authority in 
design process or in controlling other members. Supervision and direction o f the process 
came directly from the Project Engineer.
2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
The PLI development team had a weekly meeting led by the Project Engineer that
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discussed and decided various interface issues between sub-groups. The release and use 
o f uncertain and ambiguous data were common. The design concept was continuously 
refined, as more valid data became available.
The interaction among members was highly collaborative. Inspired by the often quoted 
President Director’s vision “Mastering advanced technology is an effort to accelerate 
national development”6, team members were typically determined to prove that they were 
capable o f  making such a contribution to the company’s and the nation’s future. These 
shared vision and goals led to a relatively cohesive team. The cohesiveness among these 
particular members remained throughout all stages. The overlapping small-size groups 
made informal discussion within and between groups possible. Engineers who belonged 
to more than one sub-group acted as catalysts in inter-group communication. Although 
friendly, there was a significant power differential between the Project Engineer and 
team members. Most major decisions were made by the Project Engineer.
6.4.2.2 Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 -  October 1996)
In August 1995, the PLI Program was publicly launched and the President Director 
officially appointed its Program Manager. The Program Manager, who reported to the 
President Director, decided to introduce CE. This marked the commencement o f this 
stage. As part o f CE introduction, the Program Manager established a matrix arrangement 
involving the Program’s product-based teams and specialist groups from various
6 e.g. Item (36) Appendix-B
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engineering specialisations. Other functional units supported the Program through their 
focal points specifically assigned to provide functional supports for the Program. The 
Program organisation was structured as in Figure 6-3.
The main part o f this structure was the matrix between the product-based design teams 
called TOP (stands for Team optimisasi produk’: product optimisation team) and the 
engineering specialist groups. The TOP teams were responsible for the physical features 
and configuration o f the aircraft and aircraft components. There were four TOP teams: 
Fuselage, Wing, System and Propulsion, co-ordinated by the TOP-Airplane Manager. 
This manager reported to the Program Manager and was responsible for the whole 
aircraft configuration development. The typical work plan o f the TOP teams during this 
conceptual design phase included preliminary design concept definition; trade-off study 
on sizing and configuration; design concept validation and tool evaluation; and 
application for preliminary design.
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Engineering specialist groups were functional-based groups that responsible for the 
necessary non-physical products, such as analysis and calculation, to support the TOP 
team in the development process. There were four engineering specialist groups:
1) Aeromechanics, Aerodynamics and Aerolastics;
2) Aerophysics and Flight Mechanics;
3) Airframe Structure, Material and Processing; and
4) Aircraft System.
These groups were supported by functional design units. They consisted o f engineers and 
specialists who were assigned as representatives to the PLI Program by functional design 
units. These specialists worked in the TOP teams. Table 6-7 illustrates the typical task 
division between various engineering specialist groups in a component-based TOP team.
Engineering Specialist 
Groups
TOP-Wing Non-Physical
ProductAirfoil Family High-lift Devices Clean Wing Wing and Movable Surface
Aeromechanics Specify pressure distnbution 
Obtain geometry
Obtain optimum 
configuration
Obtain platform, bad 
distribution, isobars
Determine movable 
surfaces
Software
CFD/FEM
Aerophysics and Flight 
Mechanics
Define/check control 
power
Expenmental
d-base
Airframe Structure, Material 
and Processing
Define wingbox thickness Define space for 
fuel and system
Compute stress at 
critical bads
New material 
assessment
Aircraft System Define volume and space 
of system boxes
Define mechanism Devebp concept for gust/ 
maneuvre bad contra Her
Advancement of 
FBW concept
Physical Product Aerofoil Flap and Slat Clean Wing Wing and Surfaces
Table 6-7: Matrix between TOP Teams-Engineering Specialist Groups (Source: Indaco7)
The Program organisation also had a Deputy Program Manager, a Program Management 
Office (PMO) Manager, an Engineering Operation Manager, and Executive 
Representatives from Business and Finance Divisions. The Deputy Program Manager 
was assigned to the previous Project Engineer. He was responsible in managing the
' Item (11) Appendix-B
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technical aspects o f development process. In addition, the Program Manager also 
requested company-wide functional units to assign their focal points. Focal points were 
representative assigned by functional units to provide and co-ordinate functional support
for a particular program. These focal points were involved in various activities to support 
the Program.
The attempt to extend the scope o f CE was reflected in activities under the Engineering 
Operation Manager who was responsible for co-ordinating early involvement o f  
production-related functions in the Program and assessing enabling technologies 
necessary for CE implementation. This Manager established the design build process 
(DBP) team to co-ordinate production activities and the advanced system development 
(ASD) team to co-ordinate enabling technology assessment. The design build process 
team consisted o f focal points from production-related divisions, such as Fabrication, 
Fixed Wing, Production Engineering, Industrial Engineering, and Quality Assurance. 
This team aimed to make necessary preparation for the production phase and to provide 
insights to TOP teams on producibility and manufacturability issues o f their designs.
The advanced system development team consisted o f focal points from Information 
Technology, CADCAM, and Manufacturing Resource Planning Divisions. Its objective 
was to support CE implementation in the PLI Program. In April 1996, this team obtained 
management’s approval to develop a computer-based integrated digital system called 
‘Sidina’. Later, known as ‘Sidina’ group, this team was co-ordinated outside the program 
organisation by the Head o f CADCAM Division. Further analysis o f  ‘Sidina’ initiative is 
provided in Chapter 7.
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The PMO Manager was responsible for the program management, which involved 
planning, monitoring, and controlling the process. The PMO manager co-ordinated 
company-wide focal points to establish the program’s Master Phasing Plan (MPP). This 
activity involved a series o f weekly meetings. By the end o f this stage, the Master 
Phasing Plan was submitted to the Program Manager for approval. The Business and 
Finance Representatives were primarily involved in the establishment of the Preliminary 
Feasibility Study of the PLI Program. With this feasibility study, Indaco’s top 
management lobbied the Government officials for financial support. This resulted in the 
formation o f Prico to finance the development cost o f the Program in March 1996. 
Subsequently, the contract between Indaco and Prico was signed in August 1996. 
Detailed analyses on CE initiatives in organisational integration and communication and 
decision making mechanisms in this stage are as follows:
1) Organisational Integration
The characteristics organisational integration o f the PLI Program in the engineering 
matrix stage can be summarised in Table 6-8.
Cross-Functionality:
The size o f the Program team expanded to over 60 members, excluding the functional­
based focal points. The hierarchical division into three levels was evident on the basis of  
their regular meetings: the core team o f the Program Manager and its direct subordinates; 
a middle level team consisted o f the TOP-Airplane Manager and the leaders of design- 
related TOP teams; and operational level teams represented by the TOP teams. The scope 
o f the Program team expanded through the assignment o f focal points from all relevant
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functional units. However, functional focal points were typically involved in supporting 
roles. The main role laid in the functions that were involved in the core team and design- 
related TOP teams.
Table 6-8 : Organisational Integration Characteristics in Engineering Matrix Stage
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S ize  and Architecture: Large, over 60 people (excluding focal points)
Three layers: core team , middle m anagem ent team  and sub-team s
Scope:
- Role
- Level o f Involvem ent
-  Functions Involved
Core team T O P  team s M P P  team D B P  team A SD /S id ina team
M ain D eve lopm ent Role Support Roles
Full/representatives  
Design, Business, Finance
Full/representatives  
Design functions
Focal points 
com pany-wide
Focal points 
Production functions
Focal points 
IT -related functions
M em bership  Pattern:
- Position
- Activity
- Dedication
- Tem poral
- Multiple m em bership
- H igher team 's com position
High level 
Liaison/m anagerial 
Full/partly dedicated  
Perm anent
S taff & middle level 
O perational/m anagerial 
Full/partly dedicated  
Perm anent/tem porary  
Multiple within and across team s 
Include leaders of lower team s
Middle level 
Liaison
Partly dedicated  
Temporary
M iddle level 
Liaison
Full/partly dedicated  
Perm anent
M iddle level 
Liaison/operational 
Partly dedicated  
Perm anent
He
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Hierarchical Position:
- Structural
- Authority
- Access to Control
Equal to functional division 
Extensive authority 
Less access to control
Equal to functional departm ent 
M ixed  of little/extensive authority 
Little access to control
No hierarchical position 
Little authority and access
Program  delegation: Extensive for experienced leaders and less for inexperienced leaders
Functional delegation: Extensive Extensive for experienced ones 
Little for inexperienced ones
M oderate to extensive
Sen iority
-A g e
- Tenure & Experience
- Education
Young
inexperienced  
Highly educated
M ixed, increasingly young  
increasingly inexperienced  
Highly educated
M ainly M ature  
M ainly experienced  
M ixed of highly and less educated
The core team included representatives from design, business, and finance functions. Its 
members were considered as high and middle level managers. The Program Manager, the 
PMO Manager, and the Engineering Operation Manager were full members and fully 
dedicated to the managerial tasks o f the Program. Business and Finance representatives 
were partly dedicated to the Program and involved in liaison tasks linking the PLI 
Program with their functional units. The Project Engineer and the TOP-Airline Manager 
were representatives from Technology Divisions. They were partly dedicated to the 
Program and mainly handled engineering supervisory tasks.
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The component-based TOP teams (i.e. Fuselage, Wing, System and Propulsion) involved 
design-related functions only. To reduce task complexity, each TOP team was divided 
into sub-teams. The TOP-Wing, for example, was divided into Airfoil, High-Lift 
Devices, Clean Wing, and Movable Surfaces. The TOP teams consisted o f fully 
dedicated designers from the PLI Program (i.e. engineers from the previous New Product 
Development Department) and partly dedicated engineering specialists from various 
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). Some members were involved in 
more than one TOP team due to the limited number o f available engineers and created 
multiple membership among these teams. These teams carried out the operational tasks of 
the design process. TOP team leaders handled both operational and supervisory tasks. 
Most o f them were not fully dedicated and had other responsibilities from their functional 
design units. The inclusion of the TOP-Airplane Manager in the core team and the 
leaders o f  TOP teams in the middle level team provided interlocking structure in the 
program teams.
Other functions played supporting roles in the process as their focal points became parts 
o f three support teams: the master phasing plan team, the design build process team, and 
the advanced system development (later known as Sidina) team. Most o f focal points 
held middle managerial positions. Typically, they were partly dedicated and performed 
liaison tasks between the program and functional units. The master phasing plan team 
involved company-wide focal points. The design build process team involved production- 
related focal points and led by the focal point from Production Division. The growing 
activities in this team led some members to become representatives and fully dedicated to 
the PLI Program. The advanced system development/Sidina team involved focal points
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from divisions related to information technology. Some members o f  this team performed 
operational tasks, evaluating advanced technology possible to support CE 
implementation. These support teams had multiple membership as most focal points took 
part in the master phasing plan team and some o f  Sidina members were members o f the 
TOP teams and the design build process team.
Heavyweightness:
Structurally, the Program Manager’s position was at the same high level as the heads o f 
functional divisions as he reported directly to the President Director. At 30 years o f age, 
the Program Manager was a ‘junior’ in the company compared with his counterparts in 
functional units. But, his doctoral degree in Aeronautics and his intensive internships in 
various Western aircraft companies were considered as substitutes for this lack of tenure 
and experience.
The Program Manager had some authority over budget allocation but had problems in 
allocating and controlling the resources requested by functional units for PLI purposes. 
Although functional units were required to get approval from the PLI Program for any 
supporting facility funded by the Program, they afterwards retained full control over such 
resources. They were not required to report on the utilisation o f those facilities. The PLI 
Program often had problems in requesting functional units to share their facilities with 
other divisions or to use facilities acquired from other programs.
The Program Manager also had problems in gaining access to control the product 
development process. He had less authority than the heads o f functional design units over 
people who worked for the Program. Most members o f his core team were
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representatives with extensive delegation from functional units and were not fully 
dedicated to the Program. Officially, they were members o f functional units. Their salary 
and career path remained attached to those divisions. The Program Manager provided 
extensive delegation to members o f  this core team in performing their tasks.
Leaders o f the design-related TOP teams and sub-teams were a mixture o f inexperienced 
and experienced engineers but they were increasingly dominated by the young and 
inexperienced ones albeit with Master or Doctorate degrees. The experienced leaders had 
extensive delegation from both the Program and the functional design units they 
represented to perform and co-ordinate design tasks. The young and less experienced 
leaders had less delegation from the TOP-Airplane Manager. Inexperienced leaders and 
engineering specialists also had little delegation from their functions to perform the tasks 
and also had to report to their experienced functional leaders. Consequently, the 
inexperienced TOP team leaders had problems in controlling engineering specialists 
within their teams as these specialists were closely supervised by more experienced 
functional leaders. Furthermore, the engineering specialists reallocated some analytical 
tasks (e.g. the finite element analysis) to other specialists controlled entirely by functional 
design units. Such analysis became a ‘black box’ for the TOP team leaders. They did not 
know how it actually proceeded. This raised some design variation concerns that 
contributed to the internalisation o f engineering specialists in the next stage.
In supporting teams, the master phasing plan team was led by the PMO manager, a 
member o f the core team. The design build process team was led by the Production Focal 
Point, a young engineer who held a Master degree. He had been given an extensive 
delegation to co-ordinate focal points from production-related divisions, but neither had
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the authority nor direct access to control them as they were experienced focal points who 
also had extensive delegation from various functional units. As most o f the members o f  
this team were experienced engineers, he played a co-ordination role and maintained a 
collegial relationship. The advanced system development team was led by the 
experienced Head o f  CADCAM Division, who had extensive delegation from the 
Program Manager and significant influence over other members due to his seniority.
2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms:
The characteristics o f communication and decision-making mechanism in this stage is 
summarised in Table 6-9. Formal communication, such as formal meetings and written 
reports were often used to deal with both increasing complexity o f development process 
and increasing number o f team members. Typically, each team had a weekly meeting 
complemented with minutes of meeting. The minutes were circulated to other teams.
Table 6-9: Communication and Decision-Making Mechanisms in Engineering Matrix
Stage
Core Team TOP Teams Master Phasing Plan Team Design Build Process Team Sidina Team
- Weekly meeting - Mainly weekly meeting - Weekly meeting - Weekly meeting - Weekly meeting
c_o and some discussion and some discussion and some discussion and some discussion and some discussion
03_o - Minutes of meeting - Minutes of meeting - Minutes of meeting - Minutes of meeting - Minutes of meeting
3 - Reports and memos - Communication Memos
E - Mainly late, after all - Early and on- line - Late, in batch after each - Early and batch type, - Early and batch type,
O information gathered sharing of technical data function had a plan section by section section by section
E - Some release and use of
oLL ambiguous data
- Friendly and distant - Friendly and some close - Friendly and distant - Friendly and close - Friendly and some close
Co - A few dialogue - On the spot dialogue - A few dialogue - On the spot dialogue - On the spot dialogue
(0
o - Relatively independent - Interdependent - Relatively independent - Relatively independent - Relatively independent
J5 - Some identified with - Mainly identified with - Mainly identified with - Mainly identified with - Mainly identified with
oO the Program the Program functional divisions functional divisions functional divisions
- Formal Meetings with minutes of meeting
o - Formal written reports, memorandas, carbon copies of minutes of meeting and communication memos
I = - Online shared technical data, particularly within TOP teams and between ASD/Sidina and TOP teams1 i - Less collaborative except for within some TOP teamsin
S O - More distant, less dialogue, independent, and more functional or other identification rather than to Program
- Some design decisions were influenced by functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions)
c  E - Lower level teams (i.e. TOP teams) increasingly had less authority in making decision
- Decision made by lower level teams were mainly respected
^  -C  O  O  
0) 4> 
Q ^
- Increasingly high power differential perrception between low-level teams and high-level teams
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In the core team, formal communication was dominated by weekly meetings and written 
reports. The information was communicated after the completion o f tasks or decisions 
were made. Informal collaborative activities were less evident. Relationship among 
members was distant although friendly. Conflicts were not solved through dialogue. 
Resolution process typically depended on who had the most legitimate authority on the 
issue. Some members identified themselves with the Program but others, functional 
representatives in particular, remained loyal to functional units.
The middle level team and most o f design-related TOP teams held regular weekly 
meetings. Within these teams, technical data was intensively shared through the computer 
system. To increase design compatibility, they also used communication memos to 
circulate design decisions to all members. A communication memo was a written 
medium in which a team listed both their design decisions and design commitments with 
other teams or engineering specialists. The release and use o f uncertain technical data 
increasingly reduced. Engineers tended to consult their superiors before sharing the 
information with other members.
Within the TOP teams, the processes were dominated by informal collaboration. Lead 
Engineers typically worked together with other engineers. Engineers involved in the 
previous stage fostered friendly and close relationship among most members of the TOP 
teams. Conflicts were solved through dialogue and informal discussion. Collaboration 
across TOP teams was catalysed by engineers involved in more than one TOP team. 
Some members identified themselves to the Program but others remained identified to 
their functional design units.
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Formal communication in three supporting teams was dominated by regular weekly 
meetings. In the master phasing plan team, communication occurred late, after each 
functional unit had worked out its plan. Although friendly to one another, members did 
not have close relationship, and therefore informal dialogue rarely occurred. In the design 
build process team and the advanced system development team, communication occurred 
early and in batches, one section at a time. These two teams were also collaborative. 
Some members had friendly and close relationship fostering by similarity in their 
occupations. Conflicts were often solved through informal discussion. As focal points, 
members o f  all supporting teams were relatively independent o f each other and remained 
identified themselves to their functional units.
Inter-team communication was mainly characterised as formal. Co-ordination meetings 
and written reports were particularly used when involving the core team. The middle, 
operational and support teams mainly used meetings and the circulation o f  
communication memos and minutes o f meeting. The leaders o f supporting teams usually 
attended the meetings o f design-related TOP teams.
The matrix between TOP teams and engineering specialist groups allowed some analyses 
and design decisions to be outside the control of the Program teams and heavily 
influenced by the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). Low level teams 
(i.e. the TOP teams and their sub-teams) initially had extensive authority in decision 
making. This authority was later reduced as inexperienced engineers involved in those 
teams increased. Their decisions also became less respected. Power differential between 
high-level and low-level teams increased which led to more dependent low-level teams.
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6.4.2.3 Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 -  June 1997)
The engineering integration stage was marked by the new program structure (Figure 6-4) 
that internalised engineering specialists and functional representatives within the Program 
organisation. The internalisation involved merging the TOP teams and enmneerin0̂ 
specialists into the Program's design integration teams. This was expected to eliminate 
the anxiety over the development process experienced by the members of design teams 
due to a dual reporting relationship of the matrix. The Program also internalised the 
marketing and customer support functions by appointing a Manager for Marketing and 
Customer Support. The organisation involved Sales, Operation, R&D, Procurement and 
Finance Co-ordinators who were representatives from functional units. To maintain the 
relationship with Prico, the Program also appointed a Prico Co-ordinator.
P r o g r a m  M a n a g e r
Figure 6-4: PLI Program Structure in Engineering Integration Stage
This structure was adopted by the Program Manager for several reasons including: (1)
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dissatisfaction over the level o f  control gained by the PLI Program team for the tasks 
allocated to functional units, (2) the growing importance o f the above functions as the 
Program progressed, and (3) the increasing urgency o f  facility investment and 
procurement issues. With this new organisation, design engineers were ‘hired5 from 
functional design units and reported only to the leaders o f the PLFs design integration 
teams. To add design and technical expertise in the design teams, several technical 
advisers were contracted.
Similar to the TOP teams in the previous stage, the Airplane Integration Manager co­
ordinated four component-based design integration teams: Body Integration, Wing 
Integration, System Integration, and Propulsion Integration teams, and the Configuration 
Management and Certification Department. Each team had several sub-teams with the 
same grouping as the previous TOP teams. The Configuration Management and 
Certification Department was responsible for engineering documentation to ensure the 
compliance with the regulatory standards.
Although administratively remained as the members o f functional units, the Co­
ordinators were appointed by the Program Manager. They did not participate directly in 
the development process. Their roles were to provide advice and to ensure the Program 
gained the necessary supports from their functional units. Their tasks typically involved 
co-ordinating functional activities for the Program. The R&D Co-ordinator linked the 
PLI Program and the functional design units (i.e. Technology divisions). Previously, this 
link was maintained through the matrix between the TOP teams and engineering 
specialist groups. With this new arrangement, the necessary matrix mechanism was 
moved from the operational teams into the core team. The R&D Co-ordinator became the
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junction o f  the matrix between the Program and functional design units with espoused 
dual reporting relationship to the both o f them, but remained primarily report to his 
functional unit.
The addition o f the Operation Co-ordinator reflected the increasing activities in the 
production-related design build process team. Within this team, the Operation Co­
ordinator formed four component-based production-related teams called TIP (stands for 
‘tim integrasi produk’: product integration team): TIP Fuselage; TIP Wing; TIP 
Assembly and test; and TIP System. This Co-ordinator arranged a matrix between these 
TIP teams and production specialist groups, mirroring the matrix o f the TOP teams and 
engineering specialist groups in the previous stage. Production specialist groups were 
supported by their respective functions from functional production units (i.e. Production 
Divisions), such as tooling engineering, quality engineering, manufacturing engineering, 
industrial engineering, and material processes. Activities in these production-related 
teams were actively pursued by the Operation Co-ordinator. These increasing activities in 
the production related aspects contributed to the change o f the PLI program structure to 
balance the hierarchy and authority o f design-related and production related teams which 
led to the next stage o f the CE process in the PLI program.
Detailed analyses on CE initiatives from organisational integration aspect and 
communication and decision making mechanism aspect for this stage are as follows:
1) Organisational Integration:
The organisational integration initiatives in this stage is summarised in Table 6-10.
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Table 6-10. Organisational Integration Characteristics in Engineering Integration Stage
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Size and Architecture. Large, 100 people
______________________ Three layers: core team, middle manaoement team, and sub-teams
Scope:
- Role
- Level of Involvement
- Functions Involved
Core team Design Integration Tearns DBP and TIP teams
Main Development Role Support Role
Full membership/representatives 
Design. Production, Finance 
Procurement Sales
Full membership/representatives 
Design functions
Representatives 
Production functions
Membership Pattern
- Position
- Activity
- Dedication
- T emporal
- Multiple membership
- Higher team's composition
Middle level representation 
Liaison and managerial task 
Fully dedicated 
Permanent
Staff representation
Operational tasks
Mainly fully dedicated
PermanentAemporary
Multiple membership in/across TOPs
Include leaders of lower teams
Middle level representation 
Liaison/operational tasks 
Full and partly dedicated 
Permanent/temporary 
Multiple membership across TIPs 
Include leaders of lower teams
H
ea
vy
w
ei
gh
t 
M
an
ag
em
en
t Hierarchical Position:
- Structural
- Authority
- Access to Control
Equal to functional division 
Extensive authonty and mainly 
extensive access to control
Equal to functional department 
Mainly little authority 
Some access to control
No hierarchical position 
Little authority 
Some access to control
Program delegation Extensive for experienced and less for inexperienced leaders
Functional delegation Extensive Full delegation Extensive
Seniority:
-A g e
- Tenure & Experience
- Education
Young
inexperienced 
Highly educated
Mainly young 
Mainly inexperienced 
Highly educated
Mainly mature
Mainly experienced
Mixed of highly and less educated
Cross-Functionality:
The size o f the whole team expanded to over 100 people due to the inclusion of  
functional co-ordinators, internalisation engineering specialists, and expansion of the 
production-related design build team. Team’s architecture was similar to the previous 
stage: a core team o f  the Program Manager and its direct subordinates; a design related 
middle level team of the Airplane Integration Manager and the leaders of design 
integration teams; and the operational level teams represented by design integration 
teams and their sub-teams. The core team and the design integration teams played the 
main role in the development process.
The core team consisted o f 11 members covering design, production, finance, sales, 
marketing, customer support, R&D, and procurement functions. Co-ordinators
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representing these functions typically held middle managerial positions in their functional 
units and performed both liaison and managerial tasks in co-ordinating support for the 
Program. Unlike the previous stage, all core team’s members were assigned permanently,
fully dedicated to the Program and no longer had other responsibilities in their functional 
units.
In contrast with the previous stage, all leaders o f design integration teams were full-time 
members o f and fully dedicated to the Program. The internalisation o f engineering 
specialists into the design integration teams changed the nature o f membership o f these 
design teams. Most engineering specialists, who previously were functional 
representatives, became full members and were fully dedicated to the Program. However, 
it did not significantly change the size, the architecture, or the scope o f the design 
integration teams in comparison with the previous TOP teams.
The design build process team and its production-related TIP teams (i.e. Body, Wing, 
System, and Assembly and Test) were the only support teams that remained in the 
Program organisation. These teams involved 30 members, a significant increase from 14 
members in the previous stage. Each TIP team had around 10 members. Typically, they 
performed both liaison and operational tasks (e.g. carried out preliminary assessment on 
design concepts). All members were functional representatives. Although 
administratively they were members o f functional units, most were fully dedicated to the 
PLI Program. Their assignment was permanent and intended as a preparation for the 
production phase o f  the PLI. Production specialists often supported more than one TIP 
team, and therefore, created overlapping membership among these TIP teams.
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H e a v y w e ig h tn e ss :
The Program Manager had increasingly gained power and influence over the product 
development process and resource allocation issues. He gained more direct access to 
control the PLI s development process as all leaders o f design integration teams were 
administratively members o f the Program. The relative power o f the Program Manager 
over functional units was demonstrated by the fact that he, and not the respective 
functional heads, chose and appointed the functional co-ordinators although those co­
ordinators were administratively members o f  functional units. The PLI Program’s unique 
financial arrangement provided access to control and allocate program-funded facilities 
across functional units as only the Program reserved the right to assess and approve 
requests from functional units.
In the design integration teams, the hierarchical position and the seniority o f their leaders 
remained the same as that o f the leaders o f TOP teams in the previous stage. The 
internalisation o f  engineering specialists made the engineers o f the Program had full 
delegation to perform tasks that previously under the control o f functional design units. 
This provided more authority to the leaders o f design integration teams. However, some 
problems o f  controlling the development process remained for three reasons. Firstly, 
some members were not collocated due to the lack o f adequate office space. Secondly, 
functional design units released only ‘second-class’ engineers to the Program. Thirdly, 
some engineers remained functional representatives ‘hired’ by the Program, and 
therefore, performance evaluation of these engineers were administered by functional 
design units. Due to their limited competence, members o f design integration teams often 
turned back to their functional supervisors nearby for assistance in solving design
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problems. As the Chief Engineer and one o f the Design Centre members recalled:
[Technology Divisions] did not want to provide the best engineers and they did not like the idea of 
engineers being fully dedicated to and collocated in [the PLI Program], (Robert, Chief Engineer October 1997) ’
Everything is much easier now. The real challenge was during [the Engineering Matrix and 
Engineering Integration Stages]. We only had little authority and barely had facility ... We 
borrowed engineers [from Technology Divisions] but those engineers were not committed to the 
program. (Frank. Design Centre. November 1997)
In addition, most leaders o f design integration teams were less experienced than their 
counterparts in functional design units. As a result, most leaders o f design integration 
teams remained with less influential than their functional counterparts in the process 
carried out by engineering specialists.
In the design build team and production-related TIP teams, most leaders were middle 
managers in their functional units. Operation Co-ordinator had extensive delegation from 
the Program and his functional unit. The leaders o f  TIP teams had no hierarchical 
positions in the Program, and so has little authority to direct the process. Most were 
experienced engineers, some with a university degree. This seniority created some access 
to control the process through their influence. Similar to the previous stage, these leaders 
basically maintained collegial relationship and played co-ordinator roles.
2) Communication and Decision M aking mechanisms
In general, communication and decision-making mechanisms, particularly involving the 
core team and design integration teams, remained the same as at the end o f the previous 
stage. There was a significant change in the decision making process. Due to the 
internalisation o f engineering specialists into the Program teams, the Program teams had
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more control over development process and design decisions were less influenced by the 
functional design units. A few other changes included the increasing use o f written 
communication, more identification self with the Program in the TIP teams, and the 
increasing in the use and release o f  more certain information in both design integration 
teams and production-related TIP teams as the product development proceeded and the 
results o f analysis and engineering tests started to be made available.
6.4.2.4 Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 -  June 1999)
This stage corresponded with the beginning o f the Program’s preliminary design phase 
and its termination in mid 1999. In line with the Indaco’s restructuring program, the PLI 
Program restructured its organisation to become an autonomous division internalising all 
functions necessary to develop and build the aircraft as parts o f the Program. This 
program structure ’S provided in Figure 6-5.
P LI Division 
Program  M an ag er
C h ie f E ng ineer p  
C hief of O peration  p
Prico Coordination
1-------------------------------------------------------------  ■ ___________________1___________________ ___________________1-------------------------------
O peration  C e n tre  Business M an ag em en t F inance Design C entre
Facility P lann ing W o rk  M an ag em en t A cc. & M gm t. R eport Body Integration Design
Q ua lity  P lann ing T im e M an ag em en t Treasury W in g  Integration Design
Production P lann ing B udget M an ag em en t B udget and  Analysis Propulsion Integration Design
P rocurem ent M an ag em en t Verification & Control System  Integration Design
G enera l Affairs Configuration M an ag em ent
Figure 6-5: PLI Program Structure in Design-Production Coupling Stage
212
Chapter 6: The Substance of Change: CE Implementation
The Program Manager adopted this structure for two reasons: (1) the continuing 
dissatisfaction over the Program’s ability to directly control some engineering activities 
as discussed previously, and (2) the increasing contribution o f the production-related 
teams. The intention o f  this restructuring was to make the Program relatively independent 
from and did not rely on the support o f functional units. With this internalisation, the 
selection and deployment o f members, the evaluation o f their performance and rewards, 
and their career path planning were administered and managed by the Program.
The main parts o f  the structure were the Design Centre and the Operation Centre. The 
Design Centre was led by a manager who also functioned as the Chief Engineer. The 
Chief Engineer was responsible for the design aspect o f the Program. The Design Centre 
was the incarnation o f the Design Integration teams o f  the previous stage and had the 
same four component-based Design Integration teams (Body, Wing, System, and 
Propulsion) and a Configuration Management Department.
The production-related Operation Centre was led by a manager who also functioned as 
the Chief o f  Operation. He was responsible for co-ordinating the production aspects o f  
the Program. The Operation Centre can be considered as the incarnation o f the previous 
design build process team and production-related TIP teams since most members o f this 
Centre had been involved in those previous activities. The Operation Centre housed three 
functional departments: Production Planning, Facility Planning, and Quality Planning, 
and, as in the previous stage, four TIP teams: Body, Wing, Assembly and Test, and 
System and Propulsion. The Operation Centre focused its activities on the assembly o f  
aircraft and components, for two reasons. Firstly, assembly was seen, particularly by the 
Chief o f  Operation, as the Centre’s core activity, while detail part manufacturing and
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tooling activities might be ‘out-sourced’ either internally to Indaco’s Fabrication 
Division, or externally. This view was inspired by the global trend o f outsourcing within 
the aircraft industry. Secondly, manufacturing and tooling concepts were technically 
defined by the assembly concept. Defining assembly concepts, in effect, means also 
broadly defining manufacturing and tooling concepts without wasting their resources for 
that purpose.
The design integration team and the production-related TIP team responsible for the same 
component were expected to work concurrently and interact directly. The Body 
Integration team and its sub-teams from the Design Centre, for example, would work 
concurrently with the TIP Body team and its sub-teams from the Operation Centre. The 
operational level structure of the Design Centre and Operation Centre in which this 
working relationship was expected to occur is illustrated in Figure 6-6.
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However, the Program intention to be a truly autonomous division was not achieved. The 
engineers brought into the Design Centre were young and inexperienced, who typically 
either became dependent upon the expatriate technical advisers or would informally seek 
advice from experts in functional design units. On the operation side, the focus on 
assembly as the core activity had left the crucial tooling engineering and manufacturing 
functions outside the Operation Centre. These functions were vital in the development 
tasks currently undertaken by the Design Centre. In effect, the Design Centre often saw 
the Operation Centre as an unnecessary ‘bridge’ in interaction with those functions. This 
contributed to the increasing tension between the Design Centre and Operation Centre.
Furthermore, the rest o f Indaco’s top management was not well informed about CE, the 
comprehensive plan to implement it in the PLI Program and its implications for the 
overall organisational working system. This lack of information had caused conflicts 
between the Program and the functional design units involved in the development 
process, which at this stage felt ‘locked out’ by the intention o f the Program Manager for 
the PLI Program to become an autonomous division. This issue is discussed further in the 
next chapters.
The Indonesian economic crisis that started in July 1997 and peaked in early 1998 badly 
affected most Indonesian companies including both Indaco and Prico. In February 1998, 
the Program Manager released a directive that the Program would progress only until the 
completion o f the preliminary design phase due to financial problems faced by Prico. In 
mid-December 1998, Prico’s shareholders decided to liquidate Prico. With this 
development, any prospect o f continuing the PLI development program disappeared, at 
least until Indaco could find another source o f finance. Consequently, the experience with
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CE was also cut short.
Detailed analysis on each CE initiatives o f organisational integration aspect and 
communication and decision making mechanism in this stage is as follows:
1) Organisational Integration:
The change in the Program structure had caused several changes in the characteristics o f  
organisational integration as summarised in Table 6-11.
Table 6-11: Organisational Integration in Design-Production Coupling Stage
Size and Architecture: Large, over 130 people
Three layers: core team , middle m anagem ent team s, and sub-teams
Scope:
-  Role
- Level of Involvement
- Functions Involved
Core team Design Centre and Design Integration team s Operation Centre and T IP  Team s
Main Development Role
Full membership
Design, Production, Finance, Business
M ainly full membership 
Design functions
Full membership 
Production functions
Membership Pattern:
- Position
- Activity
- Dedication
- T  emporal
-  Multiple membership
-  Higher team s’s composition
High and middle level 
Managenal tasks 
Fully dedicated 
Perm anent
A few functional staff representatives 
Operational and managerial tasks 
Fully dedicated 
Perm anent
Multiple membership within Integration teams 
Include leaders of lower team s
Operational and managerial tasks
Fully dedicated
Permanent
Multiple membership in/across TIPs  
Include leaders of lower team s
H
ea
vy
w
ei
g
h
t 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
H ierarchical Position:
-  Structural
- Authority
- A ccess to Control
Equal to functional division 
Extensive authority 
Extensive access to control
Equal to functional department 
Mainly little authority 
Extensive access to control
Equal to functional department 
Extensive authority in the Centre but 
Little access to production activities
Program delegation Extensive delegation Little delegation Extensive delegation
Functional delegation Full delegation Full delegation Full delegation
Seniority:
-A g e
-  Tenure & Experience
-  Education
Young
Inexperienced  
Highly educated
M ainly young 
M ainly inexperienced 
Highly educated
Mainly mature
Mainly experienced
Mixed of highly and less educated
Cross-Functionality:
The whole team expanded to more than 130 full-time members. It consisted o f the core 
team, two middle level teams o f the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, and 
operational level teams in both Centres (i.e. Design Integration teams and TIP teams).
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The production-related Operation Centre had equal positions to the Design Centre as the 
main player in the development process. In the core team, the size was reduced to six 
members covering design, production, finance, and business functions. All members 
were full-members permanently assigned by the Program Manager and were fully 
dedicated to the PLI Program. Administratively, they belonged to the PLI Program.
The Design Centre had over 60 members covering design-related functions, such as 
configuration management, aerodynamics, load analysis, stress and fatigue analysis, 
structural design, system analysis, and system design. It had four design integration teams 
(i.e. Body, Wing, System, and Propulsion), each led by a supervisor. The Chief Engineer, 
Technical Adviser, and all supervisors o f design integration teams comprised the middle 
level team o f the Design Centre. This level mainly performed managerial tasks.
Each design integration team had around 15 members, and as in the previous stages, was 
divided into several sub-teams of 4-6 engineers, each led by a lead engineer. The Body 
Integration Team, for example, had four sub-teams: Nose Section, Mid-Section, 
Empennage, and Payload System. Initially, each design integration team covered all 
design-related functions. Later in 1998, the Chief Engineer moved all aerodynamic 
specialists from these teams to a separate group under his supervision in order to reduce 
aerodynamic inconsistency at the airplane level. Chief Engineer argued these specialists’ 
involvement in design teams had exposed them to too many design constraints that led to 
aerodynamic inconsistency. This removal reduced the scope o f design integration teams.
Most members o f the Design Centre belonged and were fully dedicated to the Program 
except some system engineers who remained as functional representatives. Lead
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engineers had operational responsibilities and worked at the operational level together 
with other members. The multiple membership occurred within a design integration team 
(i.e. across sub-teams in a design integration team) but not across teams. The 
involvement o f supervisors o f the design integration teams in the middle-level team 
created the interlocking structure between the high and low level teams.
The Operation Centre had over 35 members, covering most o f production-related 
functions, such as production planning, industrial management, material and process 
development, facility planning and maintenance, quality engineering, and quality control. 
All members belonged and were fully dedicated to the Program. This centre consisted o f  
three functional-based departments that housed the above specialist groups, and four 
product-based TIP teams (i.e. Body, Wing, System, Assembly and Test) each lead by a 
TIP co-ordinator. The Chief o f Operation, supervisors o f functional departments, and TIP 
co-ordinators comprised the middle level team o f  the Operation Centre.
The TIP teams performed and co-ordinated operational tasks related to their components. 
Initially, TIP co-ordinators reported to the Production Planning Supervisor, but later this 
reporting line was upgraded to the Chief o f Operation. Each TIP team had around 10 
members and was divided to sub-teams, each led by a lead engineer. Multiple 
membership was present within and across TIP teams as production specialists typically 
supported more than one team. Interlocking mechanism between the low and high level 
teams was provided by the involvement o f TIP co-ordinators in the middle level team.
Heavyweigh tn ess:
Overall the seniority o f  the program leaders remained the same as in the previous stage,
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but some significant changes occurred in the hierarchical position and delegation 
dimensions. As the PLI Program became an autonomous division, the program 
management had full authority to perform and control tasks that previously, at least 
partly, under the control o f  functional units. The appointment o f the Program Manager to 
also be the Director o f the Airplane Group made him a member o f the Executive 
Management Council. This significantly increased his ‘influence5. Fabrication and 
assembly divisions that involved in the Program were part of this Airplane Group and, 
therefore, under his control. Furthermore, as an autonomous division, the Program had 
full discretion on functional issues.
In the Design Centre, the leaders o f the design integration teams had equal supervisory 
positions as the department heads in functional design units. However, experienced 
leaders continued to leave the Program for two reasons: Firstly, they had already held 
managerial positions in functional design units and opted to remain there when the 
Program became an autonomous division. Secondly, they had conflict with the 
domineering Technical Adviser. This left an increasing number o f inexperienced team 
leaders with little authority over technical decisions. Their authority was often overridden 
by the Technical Adviser in particular who made most decisions for them.
In the Operation Centre, the leaders o f component-based TIP teams initially reported to 
the Supervisor o f  Production Planning Department. This provided them with less 
legitimate power than their TOP team counterparts from the Design Centre. Their source 
of influence was the ‘residual5 reputations from the previous occupation in functional 
units. Later, the position o f TIP leaders was upgraded to become the staff o f the Chief of  
Operation. However, they did not have the authority to control the work packages
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authorised to and carried out by a functional unit.
2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
Characteristics o f  formal communication, collaboration, inter-team communication and 
decision-making mechanisms in this stage are summarised in Table 6-12.
Table 6-12: Communication and Decision-Making Mechanisms in Design-Production
Coupling Stage
Core T earn Design Centre Operation Centre
co Weekly formal meeting A few formal meetings Weekly formal meeting
"rao Minutes of meeting Minutes of meeting Minutes of meeting
c3 Report documents, memoranda Communication Memos Communication Memos
II Mainly late, after all data gathered Early and Online shared technical data Early and batch type, by sections
h. a Some released and used of ambiguous data Some released and used of ambiguous data
Co Friendly and distant Friendly and some close Friendly and close
CO
O A few dialogue On the spot dialogue On the spot dialogue
m Relatively independent Interdependent Relatively independent
O Self indentification with the program Mainly indentification with program teams Indentification with programcoTO Formal Meetings Formal meeting with minutes of meeting
E E Written reports, memos. Written reports, routing of minutes and communication memos (COMs)
S  E
i  E
routing of COM and minutes Online shared technical information
£  o -S O Few collaboration, mainly one-way communication Some collaboration in the beginning but reduced toward the end
Eu) Authority of making individual decision Lower teams rarely made decision Lower teams made decisions2 o) ro (/) E _cÜ ^  Ü Individual decisions were respected Decisions they made often ignored Their Decisions were respecteda  co a>O 2  5 High power differential High power differential Low power differential
In the core team, formal communication was the same as in the previous stage: weekly 
meetings, and written reports. The two-way informal dialogue that characterised 
collaboration was rarely evident. Open conflicts were avoided rather than solved through 
dialogue. Conflicting perceptions about CE, the dissatisfaction over Sidina support, and 
the uncomfortable situation due to the domineering role o f the Technical Adviser, for 
examples, although privately complained were never be discussed until the process had 
greatly deteriorated. Decisions individually made by members o f the core team were 
respected as Program decisions. Due to the high power differential between the Program 
Manager and the rest o f the core team, however, many o f these decisions were referred to
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the Program Manager for his approval.
Inter-team communication involving the core team was mainly formal: meetings, reports, 
minutes o f  meeting, and communication memos. Collaboration was non-existent. In 
particular, the Core team had a monthly review with the Design Centre, a monthly review 
with the Operation Centre, and a configuration review involving company-wide design 
functions. The objectives o f these reviews were to evaluate the progress of design 
development and production preparation. Each meeting had on average 50 people in 
attendance. Meetings were characterised by one-way communication, either reports from 
supervisors to the Program Manager or directives from the Program Manager, without 
adequate open discussion on the issues presented. These meetings tended to be ‘courtesy’ 
meetings as a way o f the Program Manager to show appreciation and to motivate his 
team members. Similarly, feedback from functional design units (i.e. Technology 
Divisions) in the configuration review was not documented and followed up.
Within the Design Centre, formal meetings were increasingly discouraged and regarded 
as ‘a waste o f time’ by both Chief Engineer and Technical Adviser. Instead, on-the spot 
discussion was encouraged and fostered by the collocation, online information system, 
and the ‘management by walking around’ approach o f the Chief Engineer. This 
discussion sometimes involved engineers from more than one design integration team. 
The results were formalised in communication memos and routed to other design 
integration teams and to the respective production-related TIP teams.
The members o f  a design integration team worked interdependently and most had 
identified themselves with their team. However, this collaboration was not extended
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across other design integration teams despite the proximity o f their workplace. Instead, 
written communications were often used. Sensitive conflicting issues, such as over 
human resource allocation and task division, were resolved through the Chief Engineer. 
Most design integration teams had little authority and were often intervened by the 
Technical Adviser. Technical decisions or commitments made with their counterparts 
(e.g. production-related TIP teams) were often ignored or disregarded. Power differential 
between the Technical Adviser and the leaders o f these design integration teams was 
strikingly high due to the Technical Adviser’s experience level (i.e. more than 40 years in 
aircraft industry) and the Program Manager’s reliance on him. On most occasions the 
decision making was characterised by ‘do as you are told’ situation.
Within the Operation Centre and its TIP teams, the characteristics o f formal 
communication and collaboration mainly remained the same as in the previous stage. As 
all members belonged to the Program, they identified themselves with the Program. Inter­
team communication across TIP teams mainly flowed through regular meetings chaired 
by Chief o f Operation. Written reports were complemented with informal collaboration 
fostered by multiple membership and collocation. However, informal collaboration 
between Supervisors and the leaders o f TIP teams was limited. They relied more on 
formal communication. The overlapping of tasks between the TIP teams and functional 
groups tended to create conflicts over accountability o f those tasks. However, considered 
as sensitive, this issue was never brought into an open discussion.
Communication between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre was mainly formal: 
on-line information, reports, minutes o f meeting, and communication memos. Initially, 
both Chief Engineer and Chief o f Operation encouraged their members to collaborate.
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Informal discussions between these two centres flourished. They had a weekly meeting 
chaired by the Chief o f Operation, which involved tooling engineering, manufacturing 
planning and process development functions from the Fabrication Division. This, 
however, was reversed later in mid 1998 when the influential Technical Adviser urged 
the design engineers to concentrate on design tasks and regarded such interaction as 
ineffective and wasting designer’s precious time. The Design Centre, therefore, reduced 
the level o f  its direct communication with the Operation Centre. It also started to directly 
communicate with the Fabrication Division arguing that the Operation Centre was 
ineffective. The Operation Centre was forced to communicate their manufacturability and 
producibility assessments to the Design Centre through written reports. The setback to 
this was that there was no channel for direct feedback from the Design Centre.
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In respect to the implementation o f CE approach, four stages o f the PLI Program were 
identified: the program initiation, engineering matrix, engineering integration, and 
design-production coupling stages. The first program initiation stage represented the 
traditional sequential approach in which the development task was first assigned to a 
functional design unit (i.e. the New Product Development Department, Technology 
Division). The next stages reflected the progressive efforts to introduce CE into the 
Program modelling the CE initiatives from Westaco. Overall, despite the Program 
Manager’s overt decision and encouragement to use the Westaco model, the CE 
initiatives that took form during each stage were often not consistent with the intended
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Manager’s overt decision and encouragement to use the Westaco model, the CE 
initiatives that took form during each stage were often not consistent with the intended 
model. In some cases, they moved further away as discussed later in this section. 
Reviewing how the process unfolded over time, an additional finding could also be 
inferred, the CE structures were partially implemented and continuously modified to 
address the problems that arose throughout these stages. Variation between the intended 
Westaco model and what was emergent as the Indaco model is outlined in Table 6-13.
Table 6-13: Variation between the Intended Model and the Emergent Indaco Model
C E In itia tiv e  and D im e n s io n W esta co Indaco
PLX D R X PLI
Cross Size and Architecture Large with core team  and several levels of sub-team s Increasingly large with core team and several levels of sub-teams
Functional
Primarily based on F’rm arily  based on integrated Design team s based on integrated produd . Production fundions
specialisation end product becam e increasingly part of the program team
Team Scope Role Design functions in the Design and other fundions had Design functions in the main role, others in supportina role
main role, others in equal roles n  design team s Produdion had equal role as design in last stage
Level F u l mem berstup/representative Changing from representatives to full mem ber
Involved functions W ide range company-wide functions, customers and Increasingly wide range but not include customers and suppliers
Membership Position Staff and middle m anagenal level Staff and Middle m anagenal level
Pattern Mem ber's activity Operational and liaison Operational Changing from liaison to operational
Dedication F u ly  dedicated Changing from mainly partly dedicated to fully dedicated
Tem poral Perm anent Increasingly permanent
Multiple m em bershp Some m em bers were part of more than one team Som e m em bers were parts of more than one team
Higher team 's composition Lower team leaders w ere part of higher team s Lower team leaders were part of higher team s
Heavyweight Hierarchical Formal Equal to functional division [Equal to functional subdivision Equal to functional divisions
Managem ent Position Authonty Extensive authonty and control Extensive authority but limited control until the last stage
Delegation Program Extensive Extensive only to senior/expenenced m em bers
Functional Extensive to all m em bers Extensive to experienced m em bers To all mem bers in last stage
Sem onty T enure Senior leaders Increasingly junior leaders
Age Senior engneers Increasingly junior leaders and engineers
Education Highly educated Highly educated in design teams, mixed in operation teams
Formal Comm unicatio Richness Several levels of systematically arranged regular meeting Mainly weekly meeting, reports, and mem os
Communication Modes Frequency with ritensive discussion and minutes of meeting based on preference of team sleaders
Direction Integrated com puter-based m edia for sharing technical data Adhoc and unintegrated computer based media
T m in g Early at the beginning of the process Variable
Type of data Released Ambiguous data released and used Ambiguous data released and used
Used but b ec^ n e  more certain during the process but becam e more certain during the process
Collaboration Interaction Collaborative at all levels characterised by Increasingly less collaborative although the degree
Conflict M anagem ent dose and friendly interaction to achieve program's goal. of dose and friendly interaction varied between team
Collective goals dialogue to solve problems in interdependent work
Shared vision fostered by indoctrination process and social activities
Inter-team Foim al Communication Formal and informal Mainly used formal communication
Comm unication Collaboration Intensive, triggered by formal and informal communication Ion-in tensive but variable degree of collaboration
Decision M aking
Authority
-‘rogram - Function Sem i autonomous m atnx strudure
Autonomous design team through stages of semi autonomous to 
autonomous design-production teams
-ligh level - Low Level _ower team s had extensive authonty .ower team s increasingly had less authonty
Respect to lower team s .ow er team s' dedsions were resp eded  by higher team s .ower team decisions were ncreasingly being ignored
M echanism s ^ower differential _ow power differential between higher and lower team s
High power differential between higher and lower level teams
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6.5.1 Or g anisational Integration
In general, total organisational integration was never achieved in the PLI Program. CE 
initiatives in organisational integration evolved to become two parallel design and 
production ‘teams’ under the single integrated umbrella of the ‘program team’:
1) The formation o f the design-related TOP teams in the engineering matrix stage, led to 
the establishment o f design integration teams in the engineering integration stage, and 
later the Design Centre in the design production coupling stage.
2) The formation o f  the production-related design build process team in the engineering 
matrix stage led to the appointment o f the Production Co-ordinators to co-ordinate 
design build process team and its production-related, component-based TIP teams 
activities in engineering integration stage, and later the creation o f an Operation 
Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
While the design-related teams had played the main role in the product development 
process since the beginning, the production-related teams started as supporting 
participants and gradually established themselves as more central participants alongside 
the design teams.
This arrangement o f two sets o f parallel design and production teams was different from 
Westaco’s DRX model that integrated both production and design engineering into 
integrated development teams from the outset. However, considering that both design and 
production functions consisted o f various sub-functions which previously worked within 
a rigid sequential process, even this movement toward two functional-related teams was a 
significant change in Indaco and raised major organisational and managerial issues,
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particularly in terms o f  co-ordination and interaction with supporting functional units. 
The abandonment o f the matrix structures o f the engineering matrix and engineering 
integration stages in favour o f more autonomous program teams in the design-production 
coupling stage can be seen as an effort to reduce those problems.
This decision to eliminate matrix arrangement was inconsistent and, even, moved away 
from the Westaco model. While having a large degree o f independence and authority 
over the product performance and program management, Westaco’s development teams 
always maintained their relationship with functional units through various forms of  
matrix mechanism. This relationship was very important, particularly in providing a 
technological competitive edge for the product. Giving the nature o f technological 
uncertainty within the industry, the technological core competency was too complex to be 
maintained entirely by the management o f a development program. At Indaco, the pitfalls 
of abandoning the matrix mechanism were apparent. The Program teams struggled with 
design, manufacturing and communication problems throughout the later stages. Most o f  
this was due to the lack o f  competency o f the team members.
1) Cross-Functional Team
Following the Westaco model, from the engineering matrix stage the PLI Program was 
divided into several horizontal sub-groupings accompanied by the hierarchical 
arrangement o f a core team and two levels o f product-based teams: middle management 
and operational teams. In this stage, the main part o f the PLI Program only involved 
design-engineering functions. This arrangement resembled more closely the PLX rather 
than the DRX model, but had much weaker support from other functional units in forms
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functional focal points rather than functional representatives. In the engineering 
integration stage, support from some non-design functions (i.e. Production, Procurement, 
Sales, and Finance) became more adequate as their representatives became part of the 
program s core team as functional Co-ordinators (e.g. Production Co-ordinator). At the 
design-production coupling stage, the whole production-related functions, not only the 
Co-ordinator, became the main part o f the PLI Program. However, instead of forming an 
integrated development team as in the DRX Program, the PLI Program established two 
separate groupings primarily based on functional specialisation (i.e. design and 
production functions).
Unlike the Westaco model, most additional members brought into the PLI Program at the 
engineering matrix and engineering integration stages were temporary and not fully 
dedicated to the Program. In contrast, members became permanent and fully dedicated to 
the Program in the design-production coupling stage. However, with the total 
abandonment o f matrix arrangement they were also totally independent from the 
functional units. Following the Westaco models, the interlocking mechanism of the PLI 
teams was created by incorporating leaders and key members o f the design and 
production teams to the higher level teams. At Indaco, however, this arrangement was not 
fully supported by complementary initiatives in the communication and decision-making 
mechanisms.
2) Heavyweight Management
Similar to the Westaco model, the PLI Program Manager enjoyed a high level position, at 
least equivalent with his counterparts in functional units. However, unlike Westaco’s
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Program Managers, his seniority in terms o f experience and tenure were less than the 
heads o f  functional units. A similar situation also occurred at the lower level teams. Most 
supervisors and lead engineers were significantly more junior than their counterparts in 
functional units. The situation was worsened by the elimination o f the matrix mechanism 
between the Program and functional units in engineering integration and design- 
production coupling stages. Many senior engineers, particularly from design-related 
functions, opted to leave their positions in the Program and stay in their functional units. 
They were substituted by more junior members. This was contradictory to the Westaco 
model, which, according to one ex-intern, selected only experienced engineers for the 
team.
Like the Westaco model, since the adoption o f  CE (i.e. engineering matrix stage) the 
PLTs Program Manager had extensive authority to perform and control the development 
tasks. He also had significant authority over the budget and resource allocation. However, 
unlike the Westaco model, this authority was not delegated further down to the lower 
level teams. Instead, most leaders o f the operational teams (i.e. design integration teams) 
often had difficulties in asserting design decisions on their respective components. All 
budget and resource allocation issues had to be channelled back to the core team for 
decisions.
On the other hand, inexperienced engineers and representatives from functional units had 
little delegation from their units and had to refer their analyses and decisions back to their 
respective functional managers for further direction. As the result, the relatively 
inexperienced leaders o f  the Program teams encountered difficulty in directing and 
controlling the activities o f these members. These difficulties were partly reduced by
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abandoning the matrix o f  TOP -  engineering specialist groups and instead internalising 
engineering specialists as part o f the Program teams in the engineering integration stage.
In the design-production coupling stage, as an autonomous division the Program had full 
delegation from functional units. However, the number o f inexperienced lead engineers 
and supervisors increased. They had little delegation from the Program’s core team and 
had to refer most o f  technical decisions to members of higher level teams (i.e. Technical 
Adviser or Chief Engineer) for validation.
6 .5 .2  C o m m u n ic a tio n  a n d  D e c is io n -M a k in g  M ec h a n ism s
1) F orm al C om m unication
Like the Westaco model, the PLI Program used a combination o f formal meetings, 
written documents and a computer-based system for technical information. However, 
unlike Westaco model that set up communication media to bridge various levels o f  
Program teams, various communication media in the PLI Program were not so well 
integrated. Rather, they were ad-hoc and based on preferences within various teams. The 
Design Centre, for example, preferred a more informal medium (e.g. ‘on the spot 
discussion’, ‘management by walking around’) while the Operation Centre opted for 
communication by a more formal one (e.g. meetings, written reports). Most o f the time, 
therefore, these various formal, informal and computer-based communications worked 
separately as a stand-alone medium and their integration were ad-hoc.
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2) Collaboration
Similar to the Westaco model, informal collaboration within each o f the operational 
design integration teams was relatively high, particularly within the ‘backbone’ engineers 
who had worked on the PLI since the beginning. The collaboration within each of the 
production teams was also relatively high. However, unlike the Westaco model, such 
collaboration was less evident within the higher level teams.
3) In ter-T eam  C om m unication
Unlike the Westaco model, inter-team collaboration remained less evident, despite all 
efforts and mechanisms (e.g. collocation, computer system) to enhance across-team 
integration. Conflicts between design integration teams in the Design Centre, for 
example, tended to be handed to the Chief Engineer for resolution. Since the beginning, 
the relationship between design-related and production-related teams had also been 
distant and sporadic. Even though there were times during which these two separate 
functional teams enjoyed a fairly good relationship and collaboration started to develop, 
particularly at the beginning o f design-production coupling stage, a later development 
showed that they drifted apart due to the influence o f the Technical Adviser.
Unlike the Westaco model that, as suggested by some published reports8, had vertical 
dialogue in their meetings, which often extended into collaboration outside the meeting, 
vertical communication in the PLI Program tended to be formal and characterised by one­
way communication. Often, the meetings were used as a reporting medium that could
8 Due to confidentiality concerns, these reports cannot be revealed in the references
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easily and more effectively have been carried out using written communication.
4) D ecision -M ak in g M echanism
Unlike the Westaco model that respected decisions made by low-level teams, in the PLI 
Program most o f  the design decisions were made at the higher level (e.g. by members o f  
the core team). This was partly due to the relatively junior status o f the Program members 
and lead engineers. At the program initiation stage this was considered as appropriate as 
the engineers saw the task as an ‘exercise’. At the engineering matrix and engineering 
integration stages, decisions o f a few experienced lead engineers were highly respected 
by the higher level teams. However, at the design-production coupling stage most design 
integration teams had experienced their decisions, often made with collaboration with 
other teams, being disregarded and ignored.
6 .5 .3  S tr u c tu r e  L a g g in g  b e h in d  th e  P ro c e ss
Unlike the Westaco model that systematically set up all the structures and protocols from 
the outset, the PLI Program followed a more ad-hoc emergent process. The program 
structure was incrementally adjusted based on current activities. The findings showed 
that the organisational structures set for the Program throughout the stages were 
continuously lagging behind the process they supposedly supported. This lagging 
phenomenon can be seen in all three structures applied after introducing CE in the 
Program and was seemingly part o f  the reason to change from one structure to another.
In the engineering matrix stage, the structure was adopted from the concept established in
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the program initiation stage in which the Program was part o f the Technology Division. 
The matrix arrangement, therefore, involved only various design-engineering functions 
and did not include other functions required for several tasks during this stage. 
Marketing, Sales and Finance functions required for carrying out cost estimation and 
feasibility study, for example, were not included in the program structure. The PLI 
Program, therefore, became dependent on those ‘externaT functions.
As the co-ordination tasks with those functions became more demanding, the Program 
moved to an integration structure that involved Sales, Finance, Production and 
Procurement Co-ordinators within the program structure, and hence moved to the 
engineering integration stage. However, the issues around the feasibility study and 
financial scheme soon decreased after the establishment o f Prico. The Program started to 
face design and production interface issues. In this stage, these issues were tackled by the 
production-related teams (i.e. the design build process team and the production-related 
TIP teams) and initially channelled through the Production Co-ordinator. As the 
relevance o f  these issues increased due to the development progress, the Program 
Manager emphasised the need to bring the production to the same status as design 
functions. This led to the design-production coupling stage in which the Program 
established two centres: the Design Centre and the (Production) Operation Centre.
In this latest stage, Chiefs o f both Centres continuously stressed that the two centres 
should be regarded as one in the development process. However, there was no sense o f  
clear direction on how to achieve it in a systematic way. Some engineers, particularly 
from the Operation Centre, expressed concerns over the lack o f a common systematic
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protocol o f  CE implementation through all development phases to ensure synchronised 
activities and they urged a more serious and substantial discussion over the issue. The 
Program never did tackle this issue.
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6 .5 .4  C o n c lu s io n
The framework used in this study places the CE approach introduced to an organisation 
as the substance o f  change that underwent a change process through which it was shaped 
and adapted by the contextual and political factors o f the organisation. The longitudinal 
case study o f  introducing CE in the Indaco’s PLI Progam indicates that despite the 
intention to apply a particular model o f CE, the change process had caused different 
models to emerge during the process and these did not necessarily comply nor show a 
clear direction toward the intended model.
Furthermore, the analysis o f CE initiatives in both Westaco, from which the intended CE 
was adopted, and Indaco, to which CE was introduced, showed that there was no single 
model o f  CE. Rather, there is a wide range variation o f CE implementation. It varies in 
to which initiatives being applied and focused. The application o f  any initiative also 
varies in the characteristics of its dimensions and sub-dimensions. The characteristics o f  
one CE initiative may inter-relate with or constrain the characteristics o f the other. This 
set o f initiatives and their characteristics defines a particular CE in a particular product 
development program.
Although Indaco had established a ‘CE-like’ structure (i.e. cross-functional team
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complemented with heavyweight management) similar to the intended model since the 
beginning o f the CE introduction, the organisational structure, team’s architecture, scope 
and level o f  functional involvement, team membership pattern, as well as the nature o f  
delegation and authority o f team leaders were all changed over time to fit in with one 
another and with their surrounding circumstances. This ‘CE-like’ structure and the 
availability o f computer support system did not necessarily lead to the ‘CE-like’ 
communication and decision making process. Ironically, the communication and decision 
making mechanism prior to CE introduction (i.e. program initiation stage) showed more 
resemblance to the intended model than such mechanisms in other stages.
As we shall see in the next chapter, a number o f factors were influential in creating these 
changing characteristics across the stages. Detailed analysis o f each stage in this chapter 
has revealed that the most significant factors were the shortage o f competent engineers, 
the absence o f clear direction on the approach to be applied, the strong and dominant 
design engineering culture, the rigidity o f functional compartmentalisation, and the 
cultural tendencies associated with personal and group interaction. These factors were 
affected by the context and politics of the organisation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATION OF CHANGE
7.1 Introduction
The previous Chapter 6 discusses the change process o f how CE in the PLI Program 
developed over time, through which CE continuously changed and transformed. This 
transformation tended to deviate from the intended CE modelled after the Westaco’s 
CE. This transformation process started from a relatively traditional program 
initiation stage, followed by the injection o f a Westaco model for CE, and three 
subsequent stages o f engineering matrix, engineering integration, and design- 
production coupling, each more or less extensive introducing elements o f the Westaco 
model.
The analysis o f the substance o f change in this CE case reveals the complex 
multidimensional characters of organisational integration and communication and 
decision-making mechanisms. At each stage, the degree o f integration increased in 
some ways but was weakened or remained less strong in other ways. The scope of 
functions represented in various teams of the Program, the vertical control of those 
who comprised the teams, their degree of expertise, and teams’ authority varied in 
these stages.
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This study aims to provide some explanation of these complex changes. The main 
factors considered are:
1) the ‘inner’ contextual factors within the substance o f change;
2) the ‘outer’ contextual factors in the wider organisational context; and
3) the organisational politics surrounding their implementation.
This chapter focuses on contextual factors both within the substance o f change and in 
the wider organisational context. The organisational politics is discussed in Chapter 8.
As outlined in Chapter 2, the overall substance o f change consists o f several 
interrelated sub-processes that undergo a process of change. Due to their 
interrelationship, any.one sub-process has the other sub-processes as a ‘context’. The 
holistic feature o f processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997) implies that it may not be 
possible to establish a single direct cause for a change, rather it provides a holistic 
analysis across several levels o f context about what might be the factors and how they 
contribute to the change. Hence, one contextual factor might influence changes in 
several sub-processes and a contextual factor from the outer level might influence 
different level o f the inner layers.
In this case study, the focus is on CE initiatives in (internal) organisational integration 
and communication and decision-making mechanism sub-process. Consequently, 
other CE initiatives in enabling technology, external integration, and human resources 
are seen as ‘contextual factors’ that influencing those main focal initiatives. These 
factors are referred as ‘the contextual factors within the substance o f change’ or ‘the 
inner contextual factors’. The wider organisational context in this study refers to other 
internal factors that influenced and were, in turn, influenced by the CE initiatives. 
These factors include the company’s organisational structure and co-ordination
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mechanism, organisational culture and sub-culture, and stage o f development. 
Because they are not the target o f the change initiative, these factors are more stable 
than factors in the inner context.
The first part o f this chapter analyses thé contribution of each of ‘inner contextual 
factors’ (i.e. CE initiatives in enabling technology, external integration and human 
resources) on the changing shape o f internal integration and communication and 
decision-making mechanisms. The analysis o f the change process has revealed the 
most significant inner contextual factors were the lack o f competent human resources 
available for assignment to the PLI Program and the lack o f systematic protocols 
which could guide the Program in implementing CE.
The second part discusses the contribution of each factor in the organisational context 
(i.e. organisational structure, culture, sub-cultures, and stage o f development) at 
Indaco’s CE initiatives in the PLI Program. This analysis reveals the role o f the nature 
of Indaco’s organisational structure and mechanism in the continuous problems in 
carrying out heavyweight matrix program organisation that led to the formation of an 
autonomous program division. The analysis also shows that difficulty in 
organisational integration and communication initiatives, particularly between the 
important production and design functions, was stemmed from the history o f Indaco 
that had created a culture that emphasised design engineering.
This chapter is arranged as follows: Section 7.2 provides a brief description o f CE 
initiatives in enabling technology (i.e. computer-based technology, CE tools and 
methods, and collocation), external integration (i.e. supplier and customer 
involvement), and human resources (i.e. CE-related training and human resource 
policies) in Indaco and their intended model from Westaco. The effect of these
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initiatives on the internal organisational integration and communication and decision­
making mechanisms are also briefly discussed. As the analysis o f  the case study has 
revealed the importance of initiatives in systematic protocols and human resource 
competency, Sections 7.3 and 7.4 are dedicated to these two initiatives. Section 7.3 
discusses the contribution of the lack of competent human resource in the change 
process. Chapter 7.4 discusses the contribution of the lack of systematic protocols. 
Section 7.5 discusses the contribution of the wider organisational context in the 
Indaco’s CE. Section 7.6 provides a summary.
7.2 CE Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External Integration and 
Human Resources
By focusing on the organisational integration and communication and decision­
making mechanisms, the nature of initiatives in enabling technology, external 
integration and human resources become the changing contextual factors within the 
substance of change that affect the change. This section discusses the nature of these 
initiatives in Indaco, compares them with those in Westaco, and outlines their 
contribution on the complex transformation. The summary of these discussions is 
outlined in Table 7-1.
7.2.1 E n a b lin g  T ech n ology
This section briefly discusses three CE initiatives in enabling technology: computer- 
based technology, CE tools and methods, and collocation. The other initiative, namely 
systematic protocols, is discussed in detail in Section 7.4.
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Table 7-1: Contribution of Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External Integration,
and Human Resources
C E In itia tiv e O rg a n isa tio n a l In te g ra tio n C o m m u n ic a tio n  and  
D e c is io n  M ak in g  M ec h a n is m s
O th e r E ffec ts
C o m p u te r-b a s e d  T e c h n o lo g y
- poorly integrated system
- inadequate capacity
- technical & compatibility problems
- little involvem ent of program  
m em bers in the pilot project
- not conducive for effective  
cross-functional team  in later stages
- limited on-line shared data throughout 
stages mainly within design functions
- less efficient comm unication across 
team  in later stages
- limited communication 
between developers and users 
led to less user-friendly 
application, conflict and distrust
C E T o o ls  an d  M eth o d s
- em bedded in the system
- manufacturability/producibility
- Increasing role of production-related 
functions throughout stages
- foster early design/production 
comm unication in Engineering M atrix stage
C o llo c a tio n
- full collocation at Initiation stage
- partial collocation at the engineering 
matrix and engineering integration stage
- train wagon and exclusion 
som e functions at the last stage
- from mixed part/full dedicated mem bers  
in engineering matrix stage to mainly 
dedicated in last 2 stages
- from little access to control to extensive 
access in last 2 stages
- high collaboration within team s across 
stages
- low collaboration across team s
- increasingly self association to the 
program
S y stem atic  P ro toco ls*
- absence protocols and 
implementation plan
- under developed standard 
manuals
- under developed operating 
procedures
- absence of clear exit criteria 
and deliverables
- partly contnbute to changing structure 
and arrangement throughout stages
- changing scope and mem bership pattern 
of design team s in the last two stages
- increasing lack authority lower team s 
in the last two stages
- slide back to traditional/functional 
arrangement in the Design C entre in 
the Design-Production Coupling stage
- ineffective utilisation of support system
- no trust for collaboration across team
- reduced communication across team
- chaotic communication modes
- more dependent lower team
- expectation mism atch, 
disappointments and conflicts 
between the program and 
functional units
- anxiety, chaos, distrust 
within and between Design  
and Operation Centres
- imposed non-CE approach
- lack of CE-related training
E xte rn a l In te g ra tio n
- mainly absence of customer 
and supplier involvement
- no significant effect during the phase  
in d e r study
- no significant effect during the phase 
under study
C o m p eten ce*
- increasingly lack of competence  
particularly in design-related 
mem bers
- mainly young, educated but 
inexperienced design-related 
m em bers
- mainly mature, experienced  
producbon-related members
- mainly young team  leaders
- changing structure and arrangement 
throughout stages
- changing the membership pattern of cross 
functional teams throughout stages
• changing the nature of delegation to 
mem bers and lower level team s
- changing the seniority level of m em bers
- hamper total integration betw een design 
and production related functions
- poor communication between the program  
and functional units
- increasing high power differential between  
lower and higher team s in three last stages
- reduced communication and collaboration 
between Design and Operation Centres 
in the Design-Production Coupling stage
- lower team s rarely m ade decisions and 
w ere often ignored and intervened
- on going conflict and 
tension between the 
Program and functional design 
units at the last three stages
- suspicion and distrust 
between Design and 
Operation Centre at the 
last stage
C E -R e la ted  T ra in in g
- almost absence, pilot project
- pilot projects involved a few members
• slideback to traditional/functional 
arrangement in the last stage
- hamper inter-team communication
- not conducive for collaboration
H u m a n  R eso u rce  P o lic ies  
• functional based reward system  
- individual-based performance 
evaluation
- little access to control representatives  
during the Engineering M atrix and 
and Engineering Integration stages
- identification with the functional units prior 
to the Design-Production Coupling stage
* Discussed further in the next sections
7.2.1.1 Computer-Based Technology
Modelled the Westaco’s CE, Indaco relied heavily on advanced computer-based 
technology as the enabler for CE implementation. Initiatives in enabling technology 
were directed toward a paperless design that relied heavily on the availability o f state- 
of-the-art computer technology. However, the development of a computer support
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system for the PLI Program was not well integrated into the design and development 
process and dissatisfied most of the leaders o f the program teams.
The computer technology that supports design integration, such as CAD/CAM, 3-D 
CAD, and CATIA, had been available in Indaco for several years. In addition, the PLI 
Program Manager, together with the CADCAM Division, established the Sidina 
. group to develop an integrated computer system to support CE in the Program. The 
main features o f the Sidina system were an integrated database, on-line data sharing, 
an integrated application system, and a digitally controlled product configuration. 
This included the following initiatives:
1) Fully digital product definition in three-dimensional using CATIA system.
2) Digital mock-up, including digital pre-assembly that electronically simulated 
assembly o f all parts/tools to check the possible fit and interference, and a digital 
assembly sequence that electronically simulated the assembly o f components to 
optimise the assembly sequence.
3) A product data management system that stored and maintained all product 
definition data in a single electronic database throughout all phases o f the design- 
build-support process.
4) A distributed computing system that distributed computer power and data to work 
areas through networked workstations to provide higher performance and 
availability as well as independency and flexibility.
In preparation to implement this enabling technology, the Sidina group ran two pilot 
projects: a CE simulation with the application o f digital product development and 
cross-functional team; and a knowledge-based engineering system application to 
accelerate design process for the PLI Program. These pilot projects paid great
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attention to the infrastructure o f the support system but mainly ignored organisational 
and human resource issues. At the time o f the field study, i.e. October 1997, the CE 
pilot project, using the redesign of PLP’s door as the case study, was just finished.
Sidina initiatives, to a large extent, mimicked the enabling technology in Westaco. 
However, according to an ex-intern that had experience at Westaco, the memory 
capacity o f the computer system was far less than the capacity available in Westaco. 
This caused prolonged processing time and continuous technical problems. Further, 
unlike Westaco’s support system that was mainly developed in-house combining the 
development of the computer technology with Westaco’s cumulative experience and 
facilities, the Indaco support system relied entirely on what was available and offered 
by its computer and system development suppliers.
Overall, the computer-based technology in Indaco was not as developed as in 
Westaco. There were problems partly brought about by the lack of technological 
capacity and the lack of integration between the technical group developing the 
support system and the members o f the PLI Program. Since the Program was still in 
its preliminary phase, it was hard to see the impact o f the state o f these initiatives to 
the overall performance o f the PLI Program. To date, nevertheless, it contributed to 
less efficient communication particularly for non-design functions since the on-line 
data were only shared between the design-related functions. Tooling engineering, for 
example, had difficulties to fully utilise the on-line data from the computer system. 
This contributed to a lack of support for effective cross-functional integration and to a 
lesser degree of internal organisational integration.
The use of a non-PLI component as the object of the CE pilot project meant only a 
few members of the PLI Program were involved. Hence, the CE pilot project did not
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provide the hands-on cross-functional team experience as intended for most members 
of the Program team. Interaction between the system developer (i.e. the Sidina group) 
and its users (i.e. the Design and Operation Centres) which necessary to ensure a user- 
friendly system application, also limited. As the result, engineers from both Centres 
often complained that the Sidina did not provide adequate support1.
7.2.1.2 Collocation
As in Westaco, physical collocation was also used to support CE in Indaco. Indaco 
and Westaco both started with partial collocation involving only design-related 
functions and then extended to other functions. In Indaco, collocation was a matter of 
gradual introduction and retained some elements of traditional office division. 
However, collocation itself did not lead to total integration. Despite the ‘open plan 
working space system’ adopted in the collocation area, there was a clear separation 
between one team to another.
At the Initiation stage, all team members worked in one location as part o f the New 
Product Development (NPD) Department. A need for collocation was suggested by 
the Program Manager in the engineering matrix stage. But, new members that joined 
the program remained in their original functional locations. As the number of 
involved members extended from 23 to more than 100 people in the beginning of 
design-production coupling stage and the single collocation area was not yet 
available, the relative number of collocated members reduced from 100% in the 
initiation stage to about 25%. The partial collocation of ex-NPD group which 
remained mostly intact throughout all stages had contributed to the high level of
1 for example in the Coordination Fomin between the Design and Operation Centres
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collaboration within some of design teams, but this was not enough to foster 
collaboration across teams when the number grew.
At the beginning of the design-production coupling stage (June, 1997), most members 
of the Design Centre were collocated in one area in the Technology Centre Building. 
Each design integration team was clustered in an ‘open-plan’ office. Except for the 
Chief Engineer and a meeting room, there were no real barrier between groups other 
than desks, filing cabinets, and drawing boards. Later, the Chief Engineer separated 
the aerodynamic specialists from the design integration teams and located them in a 
different room. Members of the Operation Centre occupied several rooms on different 
floor. They clustered according to their positions in the Program’s hierarchy. 
Supervisors occupied one room, TIP Leaders and other members occupied another 
bigger room. The Chief of Operation had his own room separated from these two. 
Functional representatives from tooling engineering, manufacturing development and 
manufacturing planning were in their functional offices. The Program Manager and 
other members were in the Management Centre Building. These office locations of  
various program members are illustrated in Figure 7-1.
In May 1998, both the Design Centre and Operation Centre moved into another 
location, i.e. Training Centre Building, with a larger space that had been prepared 
specifically for collocation. The office layout of the new collocation area, which some 
members coined as ‘the wagon train’ for the obvious reason, is in Figure 7-2. Besides 
the convenience that they were on the same floor with adequate computer facilities, 
the layout mirrored their previous space allocation. Walls bordered the Design Centre 
and the Operation Centre and between groups in the Design Centre. Tooling and 
manufacturing engineers were excluded and remained in their functional locations.
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This situation played a role in changing the status o f some o f them from fully- 
dedicated to partly dedicated to the program.
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Figure 7-1: Locations of the PLI Team Members in the Company Site at the 
beginning of Design-Production Coupling Stage
The partial collocation was partly caused by hesitancy of the functional design units 
(i.e. Technology Divisions) to collocate their assigned members due to the limited 
number of their competent specialists. The above computerised enabling technology 
initiative was often used by functional units as an excuse for not collocating design 
representatives as they could have shared the information online through ‘virtual
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Figure 7.2: Layout o f the Collocation Area in May 1998
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collocation’. This hesitation added to the tension between the PLI Program and the 
functional design units over human resource issues. It also contributed to the failure to 
achieve organisational integration through the matrix mechanism during the 
engineering matrix stage. This led to changes in the Program’s organisational 
structure.
The single collocation area for both the Design Centre and the Operation Centre in the 
design-production coupling stage did not significantly increase the degree of inter­
team communication within and across the two Centres. The nature o f layout and 
cluster (i.e. train wagon, functional-based clusters) seemingly contributed to this 
modest effect of the collocation initiative in organisational integration and 
communication and decision-making mechanism.
7.2.1.3 Formal CE Methods
Both Westaco and Indaco did not include any formal CE methods in their initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the purpose o f these methods, to some extent, was embedded in their 
design process and computer support system. In Westaco, CE tools and methods were 
well captured, either in the design process standard manuals/procedures or in their 
computer-based technology enablers, and integrated with their CE applications. The 
digital pre-assembly application, for example, focused on easy fabrication and 
assembly as suggested by DFA/DFMA methods. Another example was the addition 
of manufacturing engineers in the approval process prior to the formal release of 
drawing. Previously, the approval process only listed design, stress analysis, and 
material technology engineers. *
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Formal methods as described in CE literature, such as DFM/A and QFD were not 
evident in the Indaco’s PLI Program, but similar to the Westaco, the aim o f such tools 
was attempted to be incorporated in the design process and computer support systems. 
The Sidina support system included, for example, the digital pre-assembly application 
as part of its integration system although had not been fully applied. The 
consideration over manufacturability and producibility issues led to the establishment 
of the Design Build Process team to foster early communication between design and 
production functions early in the engineering matrix stage. This had extended and led 
to the formation of the Operation Centre in the design-production coupling stage. 
Despite the absence of the formal CE tools, the objective of such tools remained parts 
of the consideration and contributed to the change in internal organisational 
integration initiatives.
7.2 .2  E x te rn a l In teg ra tio n
Westaco was also at a considerably advanced stage in integrating its customers and 
suppliers into its development programs. By contrast, external integration in Indaco 
was clearly far less than it was in Westaco and very limited in terms of CE ideas. 
However, during the period of the case study, at least, these differences did not have 
any significant effect on the CE initiatives in the focal sub-processes.
7.2.2.1 Supplier Involvement
The aircraft industry is normally characterised bv a relatively higher degree of 
supplier involvement due to the complexity o f its technology. In Westaco, suppliers
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were closely involved early in the development process, either as representatives in a 
product development team or as a whole sub-team within the program teams . The 
equipment suppliers were typically involved as representatives and manufacturing 
subcontractors as sub-teams. These supplier involvement arrangements became part 
of contractual issues between Westaco and its suppliers and subcontractors.
In Indaco, by contrast, supplier involvement did not go further than a business 
relationship between the customer and its suppliers. Although some suppliers had 
their representatives visiting and talking with Indaco’s engineers to clarify the 
material/component specifications, none were involved as part o f the PLI cross­
functional teams in the development process. Supplier representatives, mainly sales 
engineers, were typically engaged in lengthy discussion sessions with the team 
members to clarify the material/component specifications. Some suppliers agreed to 
the risk sharing clauses in which they would provide the initial investment for making 
the components specifically met the PLI’s requirements, although never be put into 
practice due to the PLI termination. This contractual clause merely reflected the 
widespread business trend in the aircraft industry to lock-in suppliers and minimise 
the investment risk rather than as part o f an intention to engage in a cross-functional 
development team.
7.2.2.2 Customer Involvement
In the Westaco’s programs, customers and potential customers were typically 
involved in two different phases o f the development process. Firstly, in the conceptual 
phase, the programs tapped into customer requirements first-hand by establishing a
:A published report that due to confidentiality reason cannot be referred
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series o f discussion sessions with potential customers, following up their suggestions 
and, at the end, presenting back the aircraft concept. Secondly, in the design phase, 
customer representatives became part o f the product development teams. Some 
Westaco’s engineers reported the advantages o f having these representatives as they 
were typically airlines’ maintenance engineers who understood aircraft operation and, 
therefore, were able to provide simple suggestions that often turned out to be critical3.
In Indaco, customer involvement was limited to the airline visitation and the 
formation of the airline-working group that met annually, during the engineering 
integration stage, the Program Manager and his staff contacted and visited local and 
international airlines in order to capture the customers’ views o f airliner requirements. 
Then, the PLI Program established the airline-working group to maintain the 
relationship with potential customers and organised an annual meeting to obtain 
updates on the latest developments in customer needs. Other than this annual 
gathering, there was no direct contact between the programs’ engineers with the 
airlines’ representatives.
7.2.3 H u m a n  R eso u rce  P o licy  a n d  C a p a b ility
This section briefly discusses two CE initiatives in human resource policy and 
capability, which are CE-related training and pilot projects and human resource 
policies. Another CE initiative in this aspect, namely competency, is discussed in 
Section 7.3. These discussions on human resource aspect o f CE are focused on the 
‘local’ policies and initiatives in the PLI Program. However, as we shall see the 
analysis moves to the broader organisational context as the current state and policies
y A published report that due to confidentiality reason cannot be referred
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in human resources in this inner context were contributed by and, in turn affected the 
broader organisational context.
7.2.3.1 CE-Related Training and Pilot Projects
In Westaco, CE-related training was provided at the outset o f the programs. 
According to both ex-intems and engineers from a Westaco’s subcontractor, the 
launch of a new product development program typically started with the 
familiarisation session for all people involved in the programs. This familiarisation 
process included the training on the programs’ charter and protocols and all related 
manuals and procedures. These sessions involved members from inside as well as 
outside the company. Some outsiders coined this kind o f sessions as the indoctrination 
to the ‘ Westaco’s way’4.
At Indaco, acknowledging that the new approach required familiarity with features o f  
the computer-based tools, the Sidina group offered regular training courses to prepare 
engineers for using the advanced computer technology. The Sidina pilot projects 
offered the potential for providing know-how and hands-on experience in cross­
functional teamwork. However, since this pilot project used a component from other 
program as its case study, the members o f the PLI Program were not deeply involved. 
Only a few engineers were involved, which was ironic given the pilot project’s main 
objective was to support the PLI Program. Furthermore, although the pilot project 
intended to simulate CE implementation, it focused more on the infrastructure of the 
support system than on organisational and human resources. Therefore, even though 
the effects of team members’ competence were noticed in a Sidina pilot project
J Personal interview with engineers in die subcontractor sue
Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change
report5, no further action was taken.
In contrast with the availability o f  various training courses in computer-based tools, 
there was no CE familiarisation and team-related training available for the Program 
team during all stages o f the development process. A few members from the 
Operation Centre showed some know-how on team-related issues and admitted that 
they had acquired this through training course in Total Quality Management in their 
previous functional units. This lack o f CE-related training was attributed to the lack of 
systematic protocols discussed in previous section, and, this also contributed to the 
state o f internal organisational integration and communication and decision-making 
mechanism in the PLI Program in the same way as the lack o f systematic protocols.
1 .2 .3 .2  Human Resource Policies
In Indaco, except for administrative purposes, the involvement o f the Human 
Resource Department in the selection, training, career development, and performance 
measurement o f the employees was insignificant. Decisions over these issues rested 
almost solely in the hands of line managers of the functional and program units. Thus, 
CE-related human resource management issues were generally at thes-.' units’ 
discretion. Unfortunately, due to limited sources and failure to obtain access to 
Westaco, this study does not have sufficient data from Westaco on this issue.
1) Selection:
Almost all team members were drawn from various parts o f Indaco. Only a few were 
newly hired. Members from the Design Centre joined the PLI Program through four
? Item (45) Appendix-B
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different paths: 1) early involvement in the program initiation stage as a member of 
NPD Department; 2) assignment as representatives from functional units; 3) voluntary 
application to move from a functional unit and join the Program; and 4) new 
recruitment. Members from the Operation Centre joined the PL1 Program through 
four different paths: 1) involvement as focal points; 2) being approached and asked by 
one of Program leaders; 3) voluntary application; and 4) functional assignment. 
Managers and supervisors were selected by their respective superiors. This selection 
were based on: 1) involvement in previous stages; 2) experience and specialisation; 
and 3) previous activities as focal points.
As mentioned in the previous section, internal recruitment typically added tension 
between the Program and the functional units due to scarcity o f competent engineers, 
particularly in the design area. This issue also contributed to the state o f competency 
of the Program members which is discussed further in the Section 7.3.
2) Training and career development:
The career development issue was one major cause o f a tension between the PLI 
Program and functional design units. Collocation and full dedication demands from 
the Program, which had been aired since the beginning of engineering matrix stage, 
were seen as reducing the role of functional units to merely a ‘human resource pool’ 
that supplied engineers to the program, particularly at the design production coupling 
stage in which the Program intended to become an autonomous division. This pool­
user relationship raised issues of who would control the specialists and who was 
responsible over their performance evaluation.
Functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions), in particular, resisted the notion
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that they served only as a pool o f expertise for the Program. This ‘pool’ role was in 
stark contrast with their roles in the previous PLP Program in which they had had 
significant influence in the development process. Furthermore, functional design units 
viewed that product development competence involved cumulative learning o f both 
tacit and explicit knowledge, and hence assignments on a particular program should 
ensure fitness with longer-term career development in the company and 
organisational knowledge rather than being solely based on the short team specific 
interest o f the program. They believed that it was part of their responsibility to get 
involved in systematically assigning and routing engineers to various stages o f the 
development process in various programs in order to ensure the program assignments 
matched the overall career development system and organisational knowledge.
This conflicting view was never properly addressed. The PLI Program only provided 
to the functional design units the opportunity to suggest a list o f engineers for 
functional representatives to be selected by the Program, which obviously dissatisfied 
those units. Although it could be considered as a major strategic issue, it was never 
put in the agenda of Indaco’s top management council. Overall, this issue contributed 
to various forms of tensions, conflicts, suspicions and distrust between the PLI 
Program and the functional design units as mentioned in the discussion of 
competency, which affected the state o f organisational integration and communication 
and decision-making mechanisms as discussed later in this chapter.
3) Performance measurement and reward system:
In Indaco, the link between the company-wide performance evaluation and the reward 
system was indirect and not always clear. The company-wide performance evaluation 
was based on individual contributions administered twice a year. The company
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reward system basically consisted o f a base salary and an incentive system for 
individual contribution. The base salary system was developed on the basis o f  the 
education level with a gradual annual increase given for the appropriate level o f  
performance. The incentive was discreetly granted on the basis o f the Heads o f the 
Divisions subjective evaluation o f the individuals’ achievement. It was widely 
believed that a great disparity o f the incentive level existed. Design engineers were 
believed to receive much higher incentive compared with other employees at equal 
positions. Since the nominal amount o f the incentive was significant to the total pay­
cheque (i.e. it could be much higher than the base salary for the engineers), this 
system was widely regarded as unjust and needed a major overhaul. Efforts to 
improve this salary system had taken place in the company since mid-1980s but no 
significant improvement had been achieved.
During the design production coupling stage, in addition to the company-wide 
performance evaluation and reward system, the PLI Program initiated an additional 
reward system based on individual performance on program’s tasks exclusive to the 
people involved in the Program. Since this program-specific reward system directly 
linked to the performance, it was seen as an improvement to the company system. 
Similar to the company-wide appraisal system, it involved superiors filling in 
individual-based evaluation forms about their subordinates. However, this reward 
system was cancelled after its first application due to objections from many other top 
managers who considered this as unfair to other employees who were not involved in 
the Program. Given its financial situation, Indaco was unable to afford a similar 
additional system to the entire company.
In the PLI Program, awareness o f strong attachment between representative engineers
and their functional superiors (i.e. a large portion o f their income attributed to the 
subjective valuation from those superiors) contributed to the continuing anxiety over 
the loyalty o f functional representatives. This, in turn, contributed to several structural 
changes in the pursuit to achieve effective integration. Within this perspective, the 
attempt to have an exclusive performance and reward system could be seen as a ‘lure3 
to buy loyalty from members and functional representatives. However, it had a 
contrary effect as it added more tension to the already tense relationship between the 
Program and functional design units.
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7.3 Competency and the Effects of the Lack of Competent Human 
Resources
7.3.1 L e v e l o f  C om p eten cy  in th e  P L I  P ro g ra m
Overall, most design-related members o f the Indaco’s PLI Program were 
inexperienced but highly educated engineers. Only a few managerial positions were 
occupied by senior persons. The production-related engineers and team leaders were 
typically more experienced but with less formal education. This situation was 
different from Westaco’s programs that mainly consisted of senior experienced 
engineers and managers.
Most members o f the PLI’s design integration teams were young engineers, between 
25 to 35 years o f age. Some of them held doctoral and master degrees in engineering 
from various universities world-wide. For most o f them, the Program was their first 
practical design experience at a development program. Despite their education, they 
were considered by managers from functional design units as not mature enough to be
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independently involved in such a big project. On the other hand, most members and 
leaders o f the Operation Centre were experienced engineers who had been with the 
company for more than 10 years. They had mostly been involved in the production 
phase of the previous development programs. Most o f them held engineering degrees 
from local universities. A few had Masters degrees. Some members started their 
careers as mechanics or support staff and completed their degree in engineering by 
taking part-time study. All supervisors and leaders o f the production-related TIP 
teams were engineers.
In the program initiation stage, the lack of competency o f design engineers was 
compensated for by the experienced team leader (i.e. the Project Engineer) who was 
considered to be one of most respected engineers in Indaco. The scheme to have 
experienced engineers leading a largely inexperienced design team was attempted in 
the next two stages. Initially, most leaders in the design related TOP teams during the 
engineering matrix stage were experienced engineers with recognised reputations in 
their specialisation. However, the Program Manager’s policy requesting full- 
dedication assignments to the PLI Program had made functional design units pulling 
out their experienced engineers from the Program during the engineering integration 
stage because these engineers were also needed to support other programs. In the 
design-production coupling stage, only a few lead engineers and supervisors in the 
Design Centre were sufficiently competent for independent design work. This created 
the opportunity for the Technical Adviser, who was initially assigned to assist the 
Program in technical issues, to impose his design approach and play a more dominant 
role.
The main reason for this situation was the limited number of 'competent engineer’
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available as the functional design units struggled to support all programs with 
competing schedules. In the view of these functional units, assigning competent 
specialists only to one program could jeopardise other programs. Furthermore, these 
competent specialists most likely were managers or supervisors in their respective 
functional units. A compromise scheme to resolve this issue was proposed and 
discussed between the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) and the 
Design Centre at the beginning of the design-production coupling stage. The scheme 
involved the Design Centre working together with Technology Divisions to define the 
PLI design concept during the preliminary design phase. This design concept would 
be dispatched in work packages and allocated to various Technology Divisions for 
detail design. The deliverables (i.e. detail drawings and specifications) would be 
handed back to the Design Centre for sign-off. However, this scheme was never put 
into practice.
In a later development, there was a mutually agreed scheme to use the statement of 
work for acquiring personnel support from functional units. The Design Centre had 
full responsibility for product performance and full control over the personnel 
assigned to the Program. The Design Centre was also able to reject assigned engineers 
based on their qualification. Technology Divisions could provide suggestions over 
technical issues, but the technical decisions’ sign-off was in the Design Centre. 
During the case study, however, this scheme was only partly implemented for aircraft 
system specialisation. These ineffective schemes to overcome shortages in competent 
design engineers resulted in conflicts and tensions not only between the Program and 
Technology Divisions but also between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre 
within the Program. •
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The increasing conflicts and tensions between the PL1 Program and functional design 
units (i.e. Technology Divisions) attributed to four factors:
1) the Program’s demand for fully dedicated engineers;
2) the scarcity of competent engineers in the Technology Divisions in relation to the 
demand from all programs;
3) the strong commitment of the Technology Divisions to other programs, especially 
the PLP Program; and
4) the expectation of the Technology Divisions that they would be given autonomous 
PLTs work packages.
Initially, Technology Divisions committed more senior people to support the PLI 
Program according to their perception and expectation. However, as they did not 
devote enough resources to fulfil the Program Manager’s demand, the Program 
Manager tried to get engineers to be integrated into the Program and under his 
managerial control that led to several changes in program structures. In response to 
this action, the Technology Divisions pulled out their more experienced engineers and 
gave only junior ones to the Program. This meant that expert dependence continued 
on the functional design units, and on going conflict was the norm.
The relationship between the Design Centre and the Operation Centres was also 
affected. The Design Centre had less senior people than the Operation Centre. Both 
Centres could not have the full sign-off authority because the need to check design 
adequacy and tooling requirement with functions outside the Program due to the 
intentional exclusion of those functions from the Operation Centre. This situation 
displeased the Design Centre. The result was suspicion and distrust in various forms.
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7.3 .2 E ffec ts  o f  th e  L a c k  o f  C o m p e ten t H u m a n  R eso u rce
Although sometimes mentioned in the CE literature as part o f a CE requirement that 
could be an impediment in its implementation (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997, Statham and 
Kleiner, 1996), the importance o f competency was rarely emphasised in supporting 
CE. It seems that much CE discussion has an embedded assumption that the engineers 
have had adequate design (both tacit and explicit) competence. The case study 
findings showed how the lack o f competency shaped CE practices in the PLI 
Program. The precondition of skill necessary to apply CE was not available and this 
caused several adjustments in CE initiatives that led to the deviation from the 
intended approach.
Ln Indaco, several senior managers in both design and production units were 
convinced that the company-wide lack of competent personnel was a major obstacle 
in applying CE. One top management member support this view:
The mam obstacle for CE is that our people are not qualified enough. ... Although we have 
enough in number [of engineers], engineers that could be given fully delegation are not many. 
(Steve. Top Management Member. April. 1998)
The Ex Project Engineer expressed his concerns in applying CE in Indaco because of 
this competency issue, particularly regarding the engineers’ level o f experience:
At [the PLI]... it is not CE.......  For me. the ability of [Indaco’s] designers is not mature
enough: the svstem could not compete with the accumulation of experience. That should be 
handled first. It should be based on discipline...then we have to increase communication, 
interaction, and dialogue. But they should be in the strict specialisation because they haven't 
got enough experience to provide judgement.... Otherwise, the quality will be deteriorated ... 
We are not read's' for CE vet.... CE is not only a tool.... CE is a culture.... It cannot be planted 
right away (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)
In a later interview with the Chief Engineer, he admitted that members of his team, 
including him, were far from adequate for the job to develop a new aircraft and that 
they were ‘learning by doing" as he stated:
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There are two types of design people, designers and analysts. ... An analyst is a deeper 
specialist such as structural analyst or stress analyst. ... A designer needs to know analysis 
issue and design issues that relate to producibility. ... Designers are the ones who shape the 
product. ... It is hard to find people who know the knowledge deeply. All [engineers in 
Design Centre] are far from it, no experience. I myself still need a lot of learning. I started 
with aerodynamics, although I got structure at school, it does not detail enough. I could not 
argue on a detail issue... (Robert. Chief Engineer, February' 1999)
However, rather than the explicit competence such as the level o f education in 
relevant disciplines, the case study findings emphasised the importance of the more 
intangible aspect of design competence that related to tacit knowledge, which could 
only be acquired through the accumulation of experience and involvement in product 
development programs. While the level o f explicit knowledge was rarely mentioned 
as a problem, the level o f experience was found to be very important. Almost all o f  
the competency concerns were attributed to the limited experience. One engineer 
involved in the Design Centre expressed his concern in these words:
We made mistake in [the PLI Program], We have established an unbalanced team: too many 
youngsters. The youngsters are good because they are dynamic, but if too many we cannot 
bring with us previous experiences. ... We intend to create a multi-functional to be an integral 
one. To understand die right portion of each discipline, we should have die experience in 
product development... Widiout diat, people will easily become out of proportion, which 
leads to a domination of a discipline in [cross-functional] teams. That what happens in die PLI 
[Program]. [To understand die right portion of each function] we need die experience because 
it is not written. (John, Design Centre. January 1999).
Even the Chief Engineer himself noted that his team caused concerns:
Sometimes, I have die impression that [Technology Divisions] do not trust us... (Robert, 
Chief Engineer. November 1997).
The more explicit statements about lack of experience in the Design Centre came 
from some of its supervisors, as one of them, for example, said:
No one of die current [Design Centre] members experienced die hectic of [the PLP Program], 
... [These young engineers], do tiiey know what it was like being here 24 hours, [including] 
Saturday and Sunday, and had not gone home for weeks...(Roger, Design Centre, November 
1997). ’ ’
Within the Design Centre to which most o f the concerns were expressed, most of the 
engineers had considerably high levels o f education, mainly master degrees in various
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engineering specialisations. Yet, most o f them were young and inexperienced 
engineers. Most o f them also admitted that the PLI Program was their first, and that 
they were ‘learning by doing’. However, most were confident that they were capable 
to do the job and in some cases implied that their seniors might not be better than they 
were, as one o f them put it:
Here, seniority does not mean senior. Maybe he is senior because he is older... (Susan. Design
Centre. March 1998).
This situation was in contrast with Westaco practices, which only assigned 
experienced design engineers to its large-scale development programs, as one of 
Indaco’s ex-interns recalled:
When [Westaco] was developing [the PLX]. I was there. They took mv Lead [Engineer], the 
best in mv team, the most knowledgeable person technically. They posted him in [the PLX] 
Program. They took many Lead [Engineers] and made them configuration managers. When a 
company develops a brand new product normally there are a lot of ‘ifs \ It is a matter of 
common sense to assign experienced engineers, isn't it? (John. Design Centre, January 1999).
Although most concerns were about engineers at the operational level, there were also 
concerns o f the lack of competency at the managerial level. Those who were 
concerned pointed out that the Program Manager, the Chief Engineer, and the Chief 
of Operation had never been part o f the managerial level of the previous programs. 
One design engineer expressed in the interview:
... Tire Program Manager also lacks of experience. He has no life of experience and he is 
unable to see that everyone in his Design Centre has to be able to express their creativity. 
Without creativity thev could not do the best. This can only be achieved after experiencing 
design job. [The Program Manager] does not see this. He thinks by following [the Technical 
Adviser's] advice, everything must be OK. He has not yet understood the essence of the 
problem. (John, Design Centre, January 1999).
One engineer from the Operation Centre expressed his concern about the Chief of 
Operation and supervisors in the Operation Centre with the following:
There is a tendency that [some members] do not trust them [because] they do not have the’ 
guts to decide tilings. ... I am fully aware that they had never been worked directly down [in 
the production area], ... Their experience in this particular matter is relatively low. (Peter.
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Operation Centre, November 1997).
Similarly, an engineer from Design Centre admitted the indecisiveness o f the Chief 
Engineer as follows:
... sometimes he is indecisive. ... If there were two options, then he asked for more study. He 
was often unable to make up his mind even though the study has been completed (Frank. 
Design Centre. March 1998). .
The Program Manager's lack of experience was, in particular, considered by his team 
as a major factor contributing to his indecisiveness and his reluctance to inform his 
team about the update o f organisational restructuring plans during the economic 
turmoil. This further demotivated some of his team members who saw it as a betrayal 
of his previous confidence in the team. As a team member recalled:
At the beginning, he highly praised us saying that we were selected people and that many 
others strongly wished to be in the program. Then he said . "I cannot tell you yet about this, 
please be patient." ... Those were contradictory statements ... (John. Design Centre. January 
1999).
Obviously, it was not the intention o f the company to assign so many inexperienced 
engineers to the PLI Program. In the beginning o f the CE initiation process, there 
were several attempts to acquire more experienced engineers for the Program, 
particularly for managerial positions. However, the limited number of experienced 
engineers and the existence of other programs that competed for the scarce personnel 
resources resulted in this situation. The company-wide shortage of competent 
engineers was expressed by one o f the engineer as follows:
We have 3000 [engineers] in [Technology Divisions]. They are all specialists. But only 50 
[could] functioned as Lead Engineers. For [the PLI] we may only need 250 engineers, [but] 
20% of them should be Lead Engineers. (Roger. Design Centre, November 1997).
In comparison to this remark, at the time of the case study, the Design Centre had 
over 60 engineers, but on the basis o f their involvement in previous programs no more 
than 5 engineers could be considered as experienced lead engineers.
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The company-wide shortage o f competent engineers became a real problem for 
human resource allocation particularly when the PLP program experienced a massive 
delay, which forced Indaco to run parallel programs requiring similar specialisations 
at the same time. In addition, a derivative program of the PLC that was launched at 
the same time as the PL1 Program turned out to be much bigger than expected, and 
subsequently required a substantial number o f engineers. This problem was the main 
trigger o f the ongoing strain between the PLI Program and Technology Divisions, as 
well as the trigger of some changes in the structure and working approach.
Many organisational adjustments resulted from this lack of competency. At least five 
management issues in the PLI Program arose from, or responded to, this lack of 
qualified personnel, which affected the program structures and CE initiatives:
1) changes in program structure,
2) changes in working approach,
3) a lack of trust between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, and
4) conflicts between the Design Centre and functional design units
7.3.2.1 Changes in Program Organisational Structure
At the beginning of CE adoption, i.e. in the engineering matrix stage, the PLI 
Program had difficulty acquiring appropriate lead engineers for the TOP and 
engineering specialist groups due to scarcity of competence engineers. This led to an 
integration structure that merged TOP and engineering specialist groups into four 
design integration teams in the engineering integration stage. Even with fewer lead 
engineer positions, the Program struggled to acquire fully dedicated engineers for. 
some of its design integration teams. Within these engineering matrix and engineering
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integration stages, many names o f experienced engineers that initially appeared in the 
program structures could not be retained to support the PLI Program, as one 
interviewee remembered:
They were non-active, only names. At that time they were asked [to join in]. You might hear 
that they were fighting over names and putting those names [in the structure], [ButJ [those 
peoplej did the design [for PLP], so they could not be in [the PLI Program], ... [The PLI 
Program] have a lot of new people. Top engineers never been seen in TOPs. That’s why they 
kept changing (the structure]. ... (Kevin. Tooling Engineering. January' 1999).
Organisationally, there were two possible reasons for this situation: either the persons 
already occupied managerial positions in the functional design units or they could not 
resign from their involvement in other programs that were still in progress at that 
time. The Chief Engineer admitted this:
So. I resigned from my other position in the [Technology Division] and became a manager 
responsible for the Design Centre. ... [Prior to that], some [engineers] were fully dedicated to 
the program, [but] mostly at the operational level. At the managerial level, there was just 
[John] and me. [Lance] was asked but he could not join because of his involvement in [the 
PLP], There were a lot of such cases. [Joel] was still involved in [tire derivative program]. So. 
they were replaced with others. (Robert. Chief Engineer. November 1997).
Engineers mentioned in the above remark were regarded as Indaco’s best engineers in 
their areas and had held managerial positions in functional design units. Faced with 
the demand from the PLI Program to be fully dedicated, these engineers opted to 
remain in their previous functional units in which they could support more than one 
program. Traditionally, their involvement in a program was indirect, via their staff as 
representatives, as the Chief Engineer said:
Previously, we threw work packages over [to Technology Divisions] and they sent the 
representatives. But only one or two people really knew about the issue and they typically 
held [managerial] positions, either as head of departments or supervisors, and most of them 
were full time in [the PLP Program], ... Under pressure of the [PLP] continuous delay, they 
panicked mid took all resources to that program. (Robert, Chief Engineer, November 1997).
This led to the engineering integration structure in which most leaders of design 
integration teams, while they had authority to control the members, had far less
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authority in design decisions due to their youth and inexperience. The move to an 
autonomous program division in the design-production coupling stage can be seen as 
an effort to secure the best available talents for the PLI Program so that they could not 
being disturbed by demands from other programs. The Chief Engineer explained in 
the interview:
Therefore, it is better for ine to have a clear cut in people [arrangementj and a set of 
engineers. Engineers that I can control and recognise their capabilities. For sure. I would 
always doubt their output if they were not the best [engineers]. But, 1 could consult the output 
either back to their functions or somewhere else in the industry. (Robert, Design Centre. 
November 1997).
7.3.2.2 Changes in Working Approach
The working approach intended by the PLI Program Manager since the engineering 
matrix stage, was teamwork in which specialists from company-wide functions 
worked together and were fully dedicated to the Program and collocated in one area, 
as he stated in the interview:
CE concept is the basis to improve QCD [quality', cost, and delivery'] ... CE is actually cross­
functional teamwork. ... It involves not only engineering but also all functional units that 
involved with the product. ... The product actually integrates those organisational units. So 
CE is product oriented, teamwork oriented and tire output is the excellent product. That is a 
fundamental of tire [PLI] program ... The most important thing is a real team in one site. Tire 
factual integration occurs at working level in which everybody that works together and also 
sits together at tire same room. ... If someone, e.g. material representative, is not required on 
daily basis, he may handle three or more parts. The space should be optimised. ... 
Engineering, tooling, manufacturing and production planning people, but not direct workers, 
have to meet on site every' day. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)
The internalisation of design-related functions into the program structure in the 
engineering integration stage and later the production-related functions in the design- 
production coupling stage were part o f the scheme to fulfil this intention. However, 
with the second best engineers as part o f the Program team and the company-wide 
shortage o f competent engineers to fulfil the demands from other competing
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programs, the initial intention to provide empowerment and full delegation to the 
cross-functional teams at the operational level could not be achieved.
Further, instead of having empowered and fully delegated engineers, the process in 
the design teams (TOP teams and design integration teams) remained involving 
managerial decisions from functional design units (albeit informally in the design 
integration stage) and, hence, added one more step into the process as the Chief 
Engineer commented:
Sometimes |functional engineers] have worked well, but they did not lune authorisation to 
hand out the result to us. Thai's the problem, they were uncertain about the result wlule their 
supervisors were not having time vet to have it checked. Should they sent it to us. we could 
had reviewed it together. (Robert. Chief Engineer, November 1997).
The concept o f autonomous division in the design-production coupling stage was 
intended to reduce this intervention from functional units and rely more on functional 
expertise within the Program, i.e. the technical advisers and the leaders of design 
integration teams, to provide guidance for engineers.
The removal o f aeronautic engineers from design integration teams by the Chief 
Engineering to be put as a separate group later in the design-production coupling 
stage caused disintegration of design integration teams and contributed to the 
deviation from working approach intended by the Program Manager earlier (i.e. 
product-based cross-functional team). The reason behind this decision was:
Aerodynamics could not work partially. It should be part of [aircraft] integration group. 
Because the responsibility of Wing Integration Team is [wing] configuration, structures and 
systems, [the Supervisor] may not comprehend all aspects of aerodynamics. ... So, he had to 
rely on his aerodynamic engineer. But. aerodynamic engineers [should] conceive aerodynamic 
integration as a whole. [For example] he could not see only the aerodynamic of the nacelle 
because there is interference between nacelle and wing. [In his analysis], he has to include the 
aerodynamic of wing section as well. Therefore, I merged all aerodynamic engineers together 
under my direct supervision. (Robert. Chief Engineer. February 1999).
Although did not explicitly point to competency concerns as the main reason, this
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explanation implied that the Chief Engineer was unsure whether the design 
integration teams were capable o f providing proportionate balance between 
specialisations and thorough consideration o f every aspect (including the global 
aircraft configuration) at the outset o f each component design.
In the design-production coupling stage, the Program failed to establish single cross­
functional teams incorporating both design and production functions, and instead 
established two separate teams, the Design Centre and the Operation Centre. Despite 
all efforts to integrate the component-based teams from these two Centres, they 
remained separated. The cause of this failure was the perceived lack of experience of 
the designers as discussed earlier. There was a worry that the more experienced 
engineers from the Operation Centre would drive the design process, which, in turn, 
could force the inexperienced young engineers to give up product performance over 
the manufacturing or cost considerations. The Chief Engineer partly admitted the lack 
o f competence in his team had put him in a defensive position in co-operating with 
the Operation Centre:
[Members of the Design and Operation Centres) have to be physically close each other ... It is 
better for them to stay nearly. It would be easier for them if they need to meet, sit and discuss 
together. ... [But] surely, they should have not to work too close and [design engineers] 
should not let the manufacturing take the drive... (Robert Chief Engineer, November 1997).
This led to the deviation in communication mechanism between the two Centres. 
Instead o f having collaborative inter-team communication, the communication 
mechanism was dominated by formal communication. Even some collaborative 
relationships that flourished in the beginning was reduced and replaced by increasing 
lack of trust between the two Centres. This issue is discussed in the next section.
In the production area, operational representatives from tooling engineering and other 
functions that were excluded from the Operation Centre were also dominated bv
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young and inexperienced engineers. This also altered the intended development 
process. In tooling engineering, engineers assigned to the Program were required to 
present their work for approval from the supervisors in functional tooling department. 
This was because the supervisors in this department were not sure that the assigned 
designers had considered all matters when developing their tooling designs. In short, 
there was a lack of trust in the capability o f the tooling engineers. Therefore, the 
conceptual design of the tools remained under the control o f the functional tooling 
supervisors. One supervisor explained:
In tiie design process, [tooling engineers] are authorised in detail design. We provided them 
with a design authority to complete and to check the task but not to sign off the conceptual 
design. Fortnightly they have to make a presentation. ... The jig designs have to be internally 
presented first [in tooling engineering]. [The tool engineer] should explain liis idea and we 
help him in [developing] the concept. ... When a tooling engineer makes a jig, the jig should 
be checked with the master [tool]. He has to consider how die master tools work for quality 
inspection]. Because of the limitation of his knowledge, he focuses only to the jig.... (Kevin. 
Tooling Engineering. January 1999).
7.3.2.3 Lack of Trust between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
The noticeable lack o f experience of many engineers from the Design Centre had both 
advantages and disadvantages for the introduction o f CE. One advantage was that 
they were willing to learn and to co-operate with engineers from the Operation 
Centre. These inexperienced engineers showed significant interests to the 
production’s points of view. These design engineers welcomed and appreciated input 
from the Operation Centre, at least at the beginning o f the design-production coupling 
stage. Some of them commented in the interview:
... die Operation Centre’s engineers were die ones who explained things to me. ... They sent 
us something [to be reviewed]. When we got confused, we just made a phone call and they 
would explain it to us. That’s good for us. We get much closer... (Susan, Design Centre, 
March 1998). •
It is cool. .. . A metal forming guy often took us to die plant. If we want to know [about
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' manufacturing] we can just go down there. We were taken to the machining [plant] by [the 
machining specialist], (Frank, Design Centre, March 1998).
This attitude fostered the intensive interaction between the two Centres at the 
beginning of the stage. The expected resistance from design engineers to work 
together with production engineers, which could have created obstacles for CE 
implementation, did not happen, albeit with some concerns from the Operation 
Centre. This revealed in interviews as follows:
In my opinion, both parties are active. When I needed guidance, like on how to make [a part] 
because I could not imagine how the machine work. I phoned and asked them. I [also] 
provided them with suggestions on how's if we did tliis by this. etc. They made an initiative to 
run a [familiarisation] course about fabrication. That's good. The trainers were experts from 
the field. They also made a manual for our reference, such as the proper radius we should use 
(Darren. Design Centre, March 1998)
We provided a short course for the Design Centre on how to make manufacturing process 
easier. It took about three sessions, the Design Centre [engineers] was very positive toward 
tins course. They think they really need it. (James. Operation Centre. March 1998)
There is a willingness [to co-operate]. But just the attitude is not enough. If there is 
willingness but the skill is not adequate, it would remain design for design not design for 
manufacturing ... I think they lack [engineer's] intuition. ... It should be supported by 
experience. Tire experience could not be bought. ... It might be OK for now. but I don't know 
how it will be after we enter the detail phase ... (William, Operation Centre. December 1997)
However, when significant design decisions began to be made, the inexperienced 
design engineers had to refer to the Chief Engineer or the Technical Adviser. Often, 
these inexperienced engineers could not defend the result of collaboration with their 
Operation Centre counterparts. This apparent powerlessness of the designers was 
derived from their status as inexperienced engineers:
There is a lot of input from [the Operation Centre].......As long as it did not divert the design.
we changed it. but sometimes they just have to conform [to design criteria] and at the end it 
will go to [Chief Engineer] or [the Technical Adviser], To date, everything should go through 
[the Technical Adviser], ... One example is the window concept ... We made a study together 
with [the Operation Centre's] engineers. Although [based on the study] the concept with rivet 
[method] is better, the bosses decided in favour of machining ones. I don’t know why... 
(Frank. Design Centre, March 1998).
Last tune, [the Technical Adviser] stud that the stabiliser front spin should become one part 
with die fitting. Then [Albert] said it could not be like that. He made an analysis about the 
difficulty, die man-hours [needed]. We discussed it together with [the Technical Adviser] and 
got his OK: it could be cut. Then, we put it in paper ... but [the Technical Adviser] later 
changed his mind (Darren, Design Centre. March 1998).
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This situation dissatisfied engineers from the Operation Centre. They felt betrayed by 
their counterparts in the Design Centre. This dissatisfaction led to a growing lack of 
trust toward the Design Centre and scepticism about their commitment over 
operation-related issues. The Chief o f Operation, in particular, expressed concerns 
that the Design Centre simply did not respond to input from the Operation Centre:
We prepared producibilitv analysis. We sent this analysis to the Design Centre. We told them 
the constraints: the radius should be like this because of the machine and the cutter: the 
maximum movement of the machine etc. There are also assessment results, ... e.g. whether 
[window frame] should be machined one by one, or using forging, etc. We made assessments 
on both technical and economical viability. ... There is a lot of input, but there is no response. 
It is not clear, but I tlunk the problem is the level of skill. There are a lot of new comers [in the 
Design Centre]. (Howard. Chief of Operation, December 1997).
Further more, the Operation Centre asserted that the lack of competence o f design 
engineers was the only reason that the previously unscheduled material and 
technological tests of wing box and skin panel became a necessity and caused a 
significant delay in program schedule. The tests aimed to find the best alternative 
panel designs in terms of its structural strength against a certain amount o f static and 
dynamic loads. One tooling engineer commented:
When we were equally senior, many problems could be resolved in a short time. [We were] 
quick to understand [the problem]. But if our partner [said.] "what do you 016011'' or "we want 
to test it first”, it would take a very long [time]. They call it concurrent process but I call it 
learning process. ... Newcomers are newcomers, no experience. (Kevin, Tooling Engineering. 
January 1999).
This indecisiveness was even admitted by one o f Design Centre supervisors, 
reflecting to the situation within the Design Centre itself:
There are several factors. The first one is lack of experience; they are very young teams. They 
went to the left [then to] the right, but could not focus. The result is they could not complete 
the important ones. The DR&O never really completed; they keep changing the mission & 
objectives. They have dispatch & reliability but there is no structural design requirement, no 
system design requirement. ... That is our problem as a team. In my opinion, most problems 
are actually because of lack of experience that unable [us] to focus on what we should do 
(John. Design Centre. January 1999).
Lack of experience among design engineers also hampered the communication
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between tooling engineers from functional tooling department and design engineers. 
This was due to the design engineers lacked of familiarity with the terminology being 
used and with the level o f detail information required by their counterparts. This 
resulted in further unnecessary delays. The following incident between tooling 
engineering and design engineering over the master gauge information illustrated the 
nature o f this communication problem, as revealed in the interview:
Actually, [the Design Centre] already have a significant amount of output but they did not 
know that we need that output. [For example,] I asked for gauge info, they did not know what 
gauge info looked like. They understood tire term differently. After several interactions, they 
said, "oh that, we already have had that a long time ago. I don't know it is needed'....
Secondly, they do not know tire need of production.......  Thirdly, some of them perceive
[information] as top secret and refused [to provide it]. With a rough gauge info, we might 
proceed as many as 60% of tooling design work. ... The other 40% are tire detail design after 
they complete the design. Then, when [these designers] agreed to provide it. they thought that 
they had not done it completely and hesitated to send the half-cooked information ... We do 
understand that such data is an estimation that might be changed later on (Kevin, Tooling 
Engineering, January 1999).
The situation worsened as some members o f the Operation Centre discredited design 
engineers for using the input from the Operation Centre for their own benefit without 
acknowledging its source, as one of the Operation Centre’s engineers expressed:
Sometimes I could not accept that. There is a lot of work done by the Design Centre, which 
actually used our input. But, they put that as if it was prepared by them. It is destructive. ... 
(William. Operation Centre, December 1997).
On the other hand, the Design Centre viewed the Operation Centre and its assembly- 
focus as part of an unnecessary bureaucratic red-tape mechanism, particularly in 
dealing with the tooling and detail part manufacturing aspects, which were the main 
issues faced by the Design Centre at that moment. This led to some reservation from 
the Design Centre to foster further collaboration with the Operation Centre.
As a result, the communication and relationship between the Design Centre and the 
Operation Centre worsened under three conditions. Firstly, the lack of expertise of the. 
Design Centre members led to hesitation from the Design Centre managers to hilly
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collocate their members with the Operation Centre because the more experienced 
Operation Centre members were seen as threats that could dominated design 
decisions. Secondly, lack o f authority in the lower level teams o f the Design Centre 
led to increasing lack of co-operation because the Design Centre teams, even when 
they were able to make design decisions, were unable to defend the decisions they 
made together with the Operation Centre members. Thirdly, the lack o f authority of 
the Operation Centre in tooling and detail part manufacturing issues led to a lack of 
co-operation because the Operation Centre could not make decisions on behalf of 
functional production units.
7.3.2.4 Conflict between Design Centre and Technology Divisions
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Technology Division, a central function of design and 
technology had been divided into seven divisions since 1989. The development and 
the expansion of these functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) directly 
related to the development process o f the PLP, the first indigenous 50-passenger 
airplane. At the beginning o f the PLP Program, the Technology Division only had 
several departments, which then expanded in size and became relatively independent 
divisions. Obviously, most o f the managers within this central function regarded the 
PLP Program as a source o f pride as well as the artefact o f their personal 
achievement.
With this background, the attitude of the managers from Technology Divisions 
toward the PL1 Program was twofold. Firstly, they expected that a large portion of the 
Program would be handed over to them just like the PLP Program, particularly as they 
now had hands-on experience. Secondly, as the PLP was still underway, their first
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priority was to complete that program. This attitude was emphasised when the top­
management declared that the PLP Program should be higher priority over the PLI 
Program during the economic crisis.
To the dismay of those managers, the PLI’ Program Manager opted to establish an 
autonomous team that limited the involvement o f Technology. Divisions to merely 
that o f “resource pools”. This dissatisfaction was apparent in conversations with many 
functional managers. The conflict was also apparent at top management level as one 
member recalled:
It seems there are different interpretations over the distribution of tasks between the Design 
Centre and [Technology Divisions] as resource centres. [The Technology Division] perceived 
that the Design Centre should only [cover] tins [design aspect] only. The Design Centre 
perceived that [the Design Centre] also covered all other [development] aspects. As such that 
made the Technology Divisions commented that they themselves had no longer of any use. 
[The head of] Technology Divisions said. "So take [the PLI] as theirs, but do not put us as the 
[one who] responsible'7. ... He also commented. "But. the constraint is we do not have 
enough manpower for that77. While when those tasks were their responsibility', they could 
optimise [the use of manpower]. However, this is their opinion. It may contain vested 
[interests]. (Brian. Top Management Member. April 1998).
One engineer from the Design Centre who was also a supervisor in one of 
Technology Divisions tried to ‘down-play’ this conflict and stated:
There are some [functional] managers that wanted the tasks to be handed over to them and 
became the ones who were responsible. But I drink diose are not many. [The Program 
Manager] and the Chief Engineer saw diat as the cause [of conflict] perceiving those 
[functional managers] wanted to be in control. I drink it was not like dial (John. Design 
Centre. January 1999).
However, this dissatisfaction was widely recognised by the members o f PLI team. In 
turn, these members were suspicious that the decision to give the priority to the PLP 
Program over the PLI Program had other reasons:
Yesterday, it had just been decided diat die number one priority' is PLP [certificadon phase], 
.... [Thev said] diev still need 3000 designers ... What would all those designers do anyway'7 
... Are they redesigning die aircraft'7 (Ray. Design Centre. November 1997)
As their sense o f belonging toward the PLP was higher than toward the PLI, it seemed
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that managers o f the Technology Divisions tended to put themselves and other 
experienced engineers into the PLP Program and allocated the less experienced 
engineers to the PLI Program. Many engineers from the Design Centre complained:
I cited that the qualification [needed] was lead engineer, that caused conflict [with 
Technology Divisions], ... The names [of lead engineers] I asked for in my list caused the 
problem. They would never release them because they are key... (Roger. Design Centre. 
November 1997). ■
When we had a problem we asked these [engineers from functional units] to come and sit 
together in front of CATIA. That's the ideal. But, most of them were tied up with other tasks. 
... The allocation of manpower to the programs remains unclear due to tire limited available 
manpower. (Victor. Design Centre, March 1998).
Some members o f the PLI Program attributed this to a company-wide lack of 
competence, but others attributed it to rivalry between the PLI Program and the 
Technology Divisions. This is confirmed in the interviews as some engineers stated:
[Technology Divisions] have numerous engineers, but engineers allocated to [tire PLI 
Program] were not so many. We cannot complain because of this [perceived] shortage. But. it 
makes me wonder though, because [Indaco] do have many engineers (Victor. Design Centre. 
March 1998).
Have vou read tire previous letter from [Technology Division]? The substance was just one: in 
tire case of [PLI], it was not [Technology Divisions] who got the experience, so [for them] 
there was no technology transfer (Ray, Design Centre. November 1997).
7.4 Protocols and the Effects of the Lack of Systematic Protocols
7.4.1 The Existence o f  Systematic Protocols in the PLI Program
One stark contrast between Westaco and Indaco was the availability o f systematic 
protocols for program development and CE implementation. Westaco had 
documented and internally published procedures and manuals that systematically laid 
out the course o f actions and deliverables for each step, as well as the objectives and 
benefits of the approach. The Indaco’s PLI Program entirely lacked any formal and 
committed protocols to support the implementation of CE and to provide detail course
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of actions to achieve the Program’s goals.
At Westaco, although most of the decisions in a creative process o f developing the 
product were taken on the spot, the process itself was systematically planned at the 
outset. For each development program Westaco systematically laid out all applied 
manuals and procedures, their integration, and their link to other relevant manuals in a 
written protocol specific to each program. This protocol listed and described all 
applied initiatives and methods for the program. The availability o f such protocols 
provided a clear guideline on what needed to be done and how the effect of their 
variations resolved. The protocol provided a brief description o f each development 
phase and the typical activities from each function. A more detailed version of the 
activity description was provided in a separate manual.
Ample reports revealed that team members followed the process set out in the 
protocols. ‘Bending the rules’ was not seemingly acceptable. Subcontractors 
commented that Westaco’s staff typically regarded the manuals as their ‘bible’6. 
Indaco's engineers who experienced the internship program at Westaco confirmed 
this. This attitude was also confirmed as a particular characteristic of Westaco, as 
noted by a representative from a European aircraft manufacturer7 in Indaco.
The Indaco’s PLI Program had attempted to implement the approach modelled closely 
on what had been adopted by Westaco, in particular the DRX program. Despite the 
availability o f various Westaco protocols in implementing CE, there was no specific 
protocol to guide the CE implementation process in the PLI Program. During the field 
study, there was an attempt by the Chief Engineer to issue a procedure for governing
h Based on personal interview in the subcontractor's site in 1997
Based on personal conversation dated back to 19S9
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interactions between the PLI Program and functional design units. It was more of an 
ad-hoc attempt in response to rising conflict between the Program and those units.
7.4.2 The Effects o f  the Lack o f  Systematic Protocols
CE implementation is a great leap from functional silos toward functional integration. 
It involves a significant amount o f organisational change and needs to be carefully 
managed. Much change management literature suggests that the availability of the 
standards and procedures ensure that the result o f change lasts and does not bounce 
back to the old way (Kanter, 1989, Belasco, 1990, Carnall, 1991).
In Indaco, the lack of written protocols to guide the process played a significant role 
in shaping the course of introducing CE in the PLI Program. This negligence was a 
result of the assumption that the Westaco model could be applied in the Indaco’s 
context without much difficulty and that Westaco’s protocols could be used to guide 
the implementation of CE in the PLI Program. The Westaco’s protocols on CE 
initiatives were widely available in Indaco. At a later stage, the Sidina group started to 
realise the need of such protocols and attempted to establish one protocol specific to 
the PLI Program. However, this attempt had not been completed.
The absent o f systematic protocols had four significant effects. Firstly, there were 
mismatches of expectations between the PLI Program and the functional design units 
due to the lack of well-defined CE concept and common approach. These mismatches 
led to later disappointment, conflict, and mistrust that fuelled the conflicts over the 
gradual integration of design engineers into the Program structure. Secondly, the 
communication between Design Centre and Operation Centres were hindered by
276
Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change
three factors: (1) there were no clear exit criteria around which they could discuss and 
negotiate their different views; (2) there was very little clarity and mutual 
understanding on the roles of the participants; and (3) there were different, conflicting 
and chaotic forms of communication initiated by different members. Thirdly, it 
hindered the Sidina group from developing integrated computer support, as there were 
no real standards to guide them. And fourthly, the lack of working procedures and 
other lacks o f clarity resulted in uncertainty, chaos and distrust, and provided an 
opportunity for some members to start imposing views and actions that were opposed 
to CE.
Overall, this lack of systematic protocols had a major effect in effective development 
of CE integration. Conflicts and tensions over CE, taking the form of organisational 
changes, were fuelled by this lack o f protocols, as there was neither up-front 
discussion nor understanding on the way of implementing CE. As a result, the 
integration arrangements were shifted over time and more likely to be influenced by 
problems and issues faced later on in the process rather than overt major negotiated 
conflicts and differences at the outset. This lack of protocols also had the effect of 
freeing up individual actors to change their course o f actions quickly if they wanted 
to, as there was no embedded CE structures and ideas to bounce off. This issue is 
discussed further in the following chapter.
Four major problems derived from the absent of a written guiding protocol for CE 
implementation in the PLI Program and significantly hampered the intended CE 
model to perform in the PLI Program were:
1) Lack of a well-defined CE concept and common approach,
2) Lack o f commonly agreed operating procedures,
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3) Lack o f commonly defined exit criteria and deliverables, and
4) Lack o f standard operating manuals for the enabling technology.
Detailed discussion on the effects o f each o f these main problems to the complex 
transformation process is provided in the following sections.
7.4.2.1 Lack of Well-defined CE Concept and Common Approach
At the macro level, the lack o f written and systematic concepts played a role in the 
on-going strain between the PLI Program and the functional design units (i.e. 
Technology Divisions). On its introduction to the top management, CE was praised 
by the Program Manager as the vehicle to improve quality, cost and delivery (QCD) 
and to foster co-operation across functional units. However, how this CE approach 
would be applied in the Program had never been discussed or committed at the outset. 
As a result, some functional units had their own interpretation and that led to 
expectations incompatible with the concept intended by the Program Manager.
In the absence o f protocols on CE and detail program implementation, most 
functional design units presumed that the Program Manager would allocate some 
responsibilities in product definition (work packages) to their units according to their 
specialisation. Therefore, some experienced engineers were parts o f the program 
structure at the beginning o f the CE introduction at the engineering matrix stage. 
From the persistent demand of the Program for collocation and full-dedication, these 
functional design units later realised that this was not the case. This late realisation 
triggered a sense o f deception in some units that contributed to the ongoing tension 
between the Program and those functional design units. Expressions, such as “[the 
PLI Program] was too arrogant” and “If they do not need us, fine!”, often expressed
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by managers from those units in personal conversation. As a result, most experienced 
engineers resigned from the PLI Program, which left the Program with the less 
experienced ones. This led to several structural changes as the Program adjusted itself 
to this response from functional design units,
At the micro level within the PLI Program organisation, the lack of CE protocols 
caused anxiety and confusion in both Design Centre and Operation Centre at the 
design-production coupling stage. They never knew whether the way they operated 
was on the right track with the intended CE. In an initial co-ordination meeting with 
Sidina group in April 1998, engineers from both Design Centre and Operation Centre 
expressed this concern as follows:
Actually, we are still confused, maybe [SidinaJ could tell us the lesson learned from the pilot 
project (Victor. Design Centre, April 1998).
Could what I am doing with Victor's group be labelled as CE? Could [Sidina] give us 
illustration based on the door [pilot project] experience? (Peter, Operation Centre. April 
1998).
Unfortunately, this co-ordination meeting that aimed to establish a written protocol 
for CE implementation in the Program failed to progress further.
Despite the rhetoric, such as “there is no problem in the relationship between the 
Operation Centre and the Design Centre” and “we always act as a single unit”, 
expressed by both Chief Engineer and Chief o f Operation, they approached the 
integration issue in different ways as discussed in the previous chapter. The Chief of 
Operation took formal meetings as the preferred medium while Chief Engineer 
believed that formal meetings were “wasting engineers’ precious time” and therefore 
opted for on-the-spot informal meetings and discussions among engineers. Chief 
Engineer’s perspective was amplified by the Technical Adviser who preferred to 
isolate design engineers from operation engineers because “[operation engineers]
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distractedXdesign engineers]’ concentration”.
This led to chaos and contradiction in communication and decision-making 
mechanisms, particularly when involving inter-team relation between Design Centre 
and Operation Centre. The regular co-ordination meeting between Design Centre and 
Operation Centre was reduced and by September 1998 ceased altogether following a 
heated meeting concerning the progress of a technological test. Since there was no 
constraining regulated procedures set for the PLI Program, these uncertain, chaotic 
and distrustful circumstances allowed the Technical Adviser to impose his approach, 
which was incompatible with CE, and dominated the process. As a result, on-the-spot 
discussions between engineers from the Design Centre and their counterparts from the 
Operation Centre decreased due to the hesitation of operation engineers to come over 
to the Design Centre following this growing dominance o f the Technical Adviser. 
One engineer from the Operation Centre expressed:
When we came over [to the Design Centre], [the Technical Adviser] always looked 
suspiciously at us. I did not like being watched like that. It was like we were disturbing them. 
The worst of it, he even once said that all die output of the Operation Centre could be better 
off in rubbish bin. (Phillip. Operation Centre. December 1998).
7.4.2.2 Lack of Commonly Agreed Operating Procedures
In the design-production coupling stage, both Design Centre and Operation Centre 
attempted to establish operating procedures that would govern the interaction between 
them and other functional units. Within Indaco, procedures that involved more than 
one unit were termed as operating procedure agreements and required approval from 
each of the involved units before being put into practice. Some drafts of operating 
procedure agreement had been initiated and reviewed by both Centres (e.g. operating
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proced'ures~on Statement of Work, the Design Centre and Technology Division 
Working Relationship in the PLI Program, TIP Co-ordination). At the end of the case 
study, however, only the operating procedure agreement on the Statement of Work 
had been officially approved. Since the program management claimed that the PLI 
Program would be handled in a specific way and different to other programs (i.e. in 
financial management and CE implementation), the lack of the operating procedures 
caused uncertainty among functional units supporting the Program.
In the production area, for example, it was unclear whether the Fabrication Division 
would support the PLI Program in the management o f raw material inventory, as was 
usually the case in other programs. The Statement of Work issued for the 
manufacturing o f tooling and part specimens did not mention this particular issue. The 
short notice request by the PLI Program asking the Fabrication Division to store and 
manage the PLI’s raw material was made only after the raw material had arrived. This 
had been seen as a ‘fait accompli’, which hampered the future interaction. One 
manager from the Fabrication Division expressed her disappointment as follows:
They are so spoilt. They seem to assume that everybody ought to support them regardless of
w hatever problem they might cause for other people. They just never care. (Tracy, Fabrication
Division, February 1998)
This, in turn, reduced the reputation of the Operation Centre over their ability to 
handle the production issues in the eye o f the Design Centre and contributed to the 
reduced communication between Design Centre and Operation Centre.
In the design area, the lack of operating procedures, particularly on the issue of 
human resource support from the functional design units, added to the tension 
between the Design Centre and the Technology Divisions. Several meetings had been 
carried out to resolve this issue. At best, these meetings gained some partial and
Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change
individual- agreements that were mainly ad hoc in nature. In general, this ongoing 
tension between the Design Centre and Technology Divisions remained apparent until 
the end of the study due to the ad-hoc and unclear operating procedures. This 
contributed to the ineffective communication between the Design Centre and 
Technology Divisions as evident in the Configuration Review meeting described in 
Chapter 6.
7.4.2.3 Lack of Commonly Defined Exit Criteria and Deliverables
Although the master phasing plan of the PLI Program had been established in 1996, 
the deliverables of each phase were never clearly defined. These deliverables should 
have been in the design requirement and objectives (DR&O) as the exit criteria of the 
conceptual design phase. The level of detail o f the DR&O was never clearly set up 
and resulted in a dispute even among engineers within the Design Centre. Some 
engineers believed that they had already achieved the target set up in the DR&O on 
time at the end of the conceptual design phase. Others said that that DR&O was too 
superficial to become a reference for the preliminary phase. These engineers argued 
that this level of DR&O caused more uncertainty in the design and this, in turn, 
reduced the speed of the development process.
The real DR&O never existed. Riot] the DR&O that I knew of. The one that has enough detail 
to do the design. What we got is the mission and objective. We wanted the product [to be 
able] to fly fast [in a certain range] and come back again [to its hangar], things like that. It is a 
mission & objective. A DR&O need more than that. It is not enough, far from enough. (John, 
Design Centre, January 1999)
The Chief Engineer admitted that the DR&O resulting from the previous conceptual 
design phase was a high-level one. Besides undertaking the preliminary design tasks, 
his team was also refining the contents o f the DR&O to provide adequate detail.
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Likewise, the deliverables for the preliminary design phase were never clearly 
defined. Many believed that these deliverables should contain the fifth level definition 
of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), as was the case in the PLP program. With 
the whole aircraft configuration typically referred to as the first level of Work 
Breakdown Structure, the fifth level would contain the detailed structure, such as the 
flap and the slat of the aircraft wing. It meant that the deliverables should contain 
definitions of all components or sub-components at those levels.
The Chief Engineer, however, had his own interpretation. For him and some members 
of his team, the deliverables o f preliminary design phase should contain a well- 
defined primary structure of the aircraft (e.g. the wing and the body section that holds 
the wing). It meant some components might be well detailed into the sixth or seventh 
level as necessary. For example, there would be a detailed design of main joints, e.g. 
the wing to body joint. But for other components that are not part of the primary 
structure the third or fourth level was enough. However, none o f these interpretations 
were documented. The understanding o f these deliverables, therefore, varied. The 
Chief Engineers explained his interpretation as follows:
At [this] preliminary design [phase], we defined the configuration with a level of certainty' to 
enable us to continue to the detail design. ... When we complete the preliminary7 design phase, 
the primary structure must not be changed. So we should go to the detail and define how to 
attach other systems. If the primary structure changes, the concept of structural strength might 
be affected and it would affect other configuration. For example, if wing joint must be 
changed, it might caused a change in landing gear position. This might affect the definition of 
pneumatic system of the landing gear, which in turn might affect the centre of gravity'.
[The definition of preliminary design] in the [aircraft] industry varies. From my point of view, 
the primary structure is the wing. It cannot stand-alone. It is hold by the body, so the structure 
in section 44, the big frame that holds the wing should also be defined; it becomes critical. It 
means that I should know its structural and the dynamics calculation to ensure that my design 
envelope is safe. I might make some refinements, such as weight improvement in detail design 
[phase] later. In wing, for example, I should think about the joint between inboard wing and 
centre wing box. I should know the detail of the bolt diameters because we know the highest 
structural force is in the back. Tlus detail sometimes makes people confuse about the 
preliminary design phase. There is a misconception that the preliminary' design should not be 
[that] detail. In contrary, from design philosophy point of view, it should be that detail.- 
because it could not be changed [later]. The devil is in the detail.
On the [previous PLP Program], we thought that we have defined the main hard points in
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' preliminary design, but, at times, vve did not know whether they were the correct solutions 
without going into the detail. Even to date, you will get different perceptions if you talk to 
different people... (Robert, Chief Engineer, February' 1999)
These undocumented and competing interpretations confused the younger and less 
experienced engineers in the design integration teams even more. As a result they 
became more dependent on the direction from the higher level leaders (i.e. the Chief 
Engineer or the Technical Adviser). This led to higher power differential between 
lower teams and higher teams and increasingly less authority o f the lower team.
The lack o f common exit criteria in each development phase created a sense of loss 
within the Program teams, as they could not benchmark themselves against certain 
criteria. At the micro level, many engineers from both Design Centre and Operation 
Centre understood that their tasks needed to be carried out in several stages. Without 
well-defined exit criteria, engineers from both Centres struggled to find a common 
ground in defining the deliverables at this micro level. Due to the increasingly lack of 
openness between the two Centres, this issue was never really resolved until the end 
of the PLI Program. This perpetuated the lack of openness environment despite some 
attempts made during the course of development process. In a group meeting 
between Sidina, Design Centre and Operation Centre, an engineer said:
Sometimes, we just wonder whether our line of thinking in the Operation [Centre] is tire same 
as of the Design [Centre], Do we have the similar approach? For example, we divided the 
development process front the preliminary design to the final assembly into seven stages. We 
broke down each stage into tasks and responsibilities. We are expecting [any] feedback from 
the Design [Centre]. With that, we hope our supplier [the Design Centre] can make analysis if 
we doing all of that,, how they could support us (Peter, Operation Centre, March, 1998).
This situation contributed to the decreasing level o f communication between Design 
Centre and Operation Centre because the basis o f negotiation between them was not
available.
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7.4.2.4 Lack of Standard Operating Manuals for Enabling Technology
Standard operating manuals that could guide engineers in operating within the 
enabling technologies, such as CATIA, Digital Product Definition, Digital Pre­
Assembly, or a configuration management system, were not available for the design 
engineers early in the beginning of preliminary design process. Therefore, each 
engineer typically followed his/her own preferences, which led to the problem of 
compatibility even after the standard operating manuals were available. By doing this, 
they limited the design integration capability o f the enabler technology to that of a 
computerised drawing board. Although the design could still individually be linked to 
the manufacturing area for further processes, such as tooling design and NC 
programming, the overall design integration capability could not be exercised.
In the design-production coupling stage, the significant feature o f the enabling 
technology, in which the integration of all individual designs was simulated in a 
three-dimensional image, could not be utilised yet because this feature needed 
systematic compatibility, e.g. for data storage and filing system. Interference between 
one individual part/component and other parts/components could not be checked 
either. Therefore, the identification of interference between components, which would 
help designers to make early adjustments, could not be provided. A continuous 
reminder from the Sidina's technical officers on this issue did not make these design 
engineers aware of the importance of standard operating manuals. The technical 
officer responsible for the Digital Product Definition application expressed her 
concern:
I have talked to them again mid again. I think it is too late now. I give up. It is so difficult to 
talk them into it. They always said that it would take so much time to revise the data all over 
again [in order to comply with the recently published standard operating manuals], mid they 
apparently did not have that time (Laura, Sidma. Febmary 1999).
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Furthermore, within the unwritten interpretation o f the deliverables from the 
preliminary design phase, the designers drafted the main structural components and 
all detail designs associated with that component in one drawing to simplify their 
work. Apparently, this practice was incompatible with the system developed by the 
Sidina group and the PLFs Configuration Management Department, which was based 
on a unique drawing number as part identification. This system required the 
consistency that one drawing (with one unique drawing number) represented only one 
part. By identifying the drawing as merely the attribute of the part, the part would 
have a single identification number throughout its life cycle. The objectives of this 
system were to ensure design traceability for certification purposes and to ease 
configuration management in tracking down the aircraft configuration at the serial 
production phase. With more than one part included in one drawing, the system lost 
its ability to trace the configuration since some parts could not be identified. Only 
after prolonged dispute, the Chief Engineer tried to resolve this conflict through the 
offer to provide a basic aircraft design course for the Sidina engineers to increase their 
familiarity with the design process.
7.5 Organisational Context
As outlined in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3, there are four organisational 
factors that influence the change process: the organisational structure and co­
ordination mechanism, the organisational culture, the organisational sub-cultures, and 
the stage of development of the company. This section analyses the contribution of 
each factor in the process and in the shape on organisational integration and 
communication and decision-making mechanisms throughout CE introduction.
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The detailed analysis is provided in three sections. The first section analyses the 
contribution o f the company-wide organisational structure and co-ordination 
mechanisms. The second analyses the contribution o f the organisational culture and 
the dominant functional culture. The third analyses the contribution of the company s 
stage o f development. The summary o f these analyses is provided in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: Influence o f the Organisational Context
Organisational Context General Effect Contribution to 
Organisational Integration
Contribution to Communication 
& Decision-Making Mechanisms
Structure and Coordination Mechanism
- Highly differentiated structure
- Highly centralised structure
- Restructunng toward product-based 
organisation in 1997
- Merging production functions into 
program dvisions
- Sib effect in functional units
- Limited power to control activities 
in functional design units
- High power differential between 
high and bw level managers and 
between superiors and 
subordinates
- Problems in carrying out matnx and 
heavyweight program at all levels 
throughout stages
- Increasing integration of production 
functions throughout stages
- Autonomous division at Design- 
production coupling stage but with two 
parallel design and operation teams
- Sliding back to functional arrangement 
m Design-production coupling stage
- Mainly high power differential 
between high and bw level 
teams throughout stages
- Only a few decisions made 
by lower teams particularly 
toward the later stages
- Tendency to ignore bwer 
team decisions particularly in 
later stages
Organisational Culture and Sub-cultures
- High technobgcal onentation
- Domination of design and technobgy 
sub-cultures
Strong and well-connected founder 
with strong onentation to design and 
technobgy
- Technobgy imperatives
- Functional design units as the 
'golden kid" pnor to PU Program
- Rivalry between the PLI Program 
and functional design units and 
resulted in ongoing tensions
- Company-wide jealousy toward 
functional design units
- Strong support for CE from 
functional production units
- Changing structures to adjust to 
functional design units responses
- Design functions in the main role 
for the first three stages
- Tremendous support from production 
functions to the program teams since 
the beginning of Engineering matnx 
stage led to the formation of the 
Operation Centre in Design-production 
coupling stage
- Focusing on computer technobgy 
to foster communication in CE
- Hampenng communication 
between Design Centre and 
Operation Centre
- Poor Communication between 
the Program and Technobgy 
Divisions
Stage of Development of the Company
- 'New kid' in the aircraft industry
- Euphona from the success of the PLP 
flight test
- Competing schedule between PLC 
denvative. PLP. and PLI programs 
particularly due to PLP certification 
problems and unexpected design 
changes in DRI
- Immatunty in term of organisational 
tacit knowledge leading to lack of 
competence
- Engagement in consultancy and 
internship proyams
- Secunng financial source specific 
to the PLI Program
- Jealousy of functional design units 
toward the PLI Program leading
to on going tensions
- Very heavyweight Program Manager
- Difficulty in keeping heavyweight 
program teams at the lower levels
- Problems in acquiring delegated and 
fully dedicated representatives from
functional design units throughout 
stages
- Quick response of functional design 
units in puling out their support to the 
PLI Program
- Communication difficulties 
across functions
- Ability to afford a 'state of the art' 
enabling technology specific to 
the PLI F ' im
- Poor ccr.m'ji.ication between 
Program and functional design 
units
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7.5.1 Company-wide Organisational Structure and Co-ordination Mechanism
As described in Chapter 5, the organisational structure and co-ordination mechanism 
of Indaco were high in centralisation, high in formalisation and high in differentiation, 
which in general reflected both industry and societal contexts in which the company 
operated. Three particular organisational developments influenced the implementation 
process o f CE:
1) The increasingly important role o f the Program Manager in integrating activities 
across functional units.
2) The increasing number of specialisation departments in the Technology Divisions 
as a result o f the previous PLP Program, which was the first indigenous 
development experience.
3) The company’s organisational restructuring toward a more product-based 
organisation, with a flatter organisational structure in 1997.
The PLI Program was initiated within the above contextual circumstances. The 
Program Manager clearly wanted to smooth the interaction between the Program and 
functional units as he stated early in 1996:
... We are implementing CE not only to increase quality, decrease cost and speed up delivery, 
but also to increase co-ordination [between functions] not only among engineering 
[functions], but also among all other [functional] organisations related to the product. The 
orientation is to tire product ... The product-based program actually integrates those
[functional] units.......The product [team leaders] are tire co-ordinators, they have to work
together with other [functional] units. But tire real integration is at tire working level. (Clive, 
Program Manager, June 1996)
However, the intention of the PLI Program to attain more direct control over work 
done by functional units could not be fully established through the matrix mechanism 
adopted by the Program during the program’s early stages o f CE introduction, i.e. in 
the engineering matrix and engineering integration stages. The major problem 
occurred in the relationship with functions within The. Technology Divisions. The
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managers o f the Program felt that they did not have enough power to secure the 
required level o f control over the design activities undertaken by those functional 
design units to ensure that the process and product performance were within their 
expectations. Some reasons for this have been discussed in the previous sections, e.g. 
the lack of competence and the lack of systematic protocols.
The underlying cause for this problem was the ‘silo effect’ o f the Indaco’s highly 
differentiated structure that had been adopted since 1984 and become part o f the 
company culture. The members of functional units tended to focus inwardly to 
achieve optimal solutions in terms of their own specialisation. An aeronautical 
engineer presented this attitude in an interview:
In designing a wing, I want it as aerodynamic and as light as possible. I want it to be like a 
paper [airplane] wing the first time around. I don’t want to think about what the [airframe] 
structure people would say. We certainly will discuss it in the next iteration and I may have to 
make some compromises. [But.] for the start. I will do just like that. (Ralph. Aircraft 
Technology Division. February7. 1998)
This attitude remained with most functional members when they became functional 
representatives for the PLI design teams. Due to the high centralisation in the 
structure, the functional leaders were typically consulted before such a technical 
solution was applied. This triggered various integration and communication problems 
discussed in the previous chapter and led to the formation of an autonomous division 
in the design-production coupling stage.
The relationship and organisational arrangements with the functional production units 
(i.e. Production Divisions) were less complicated than the relationship with the 
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). In part, this was attributed to the 
company-wide restructuring scheme that commenced in 1996 and was realised in 
1997. This restructuring scheme proposed a more product-based organisation in the
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company’s existing production lines. Within this scheme, the production support 
divisions, such as Production Engineering and Industrial Engineering, were 
eliminated and their functional specialists were merged into the program divisions. 
The change o f the PLI Program organisation into an autonomous division was in line 
with this scheme.
Unlike lndaco’s other programs that maintained a matrix arrangement with functional 
design units, the PLI Program attempted to free itself from matrix and instead, asked 
the engineers to become full-members o f the Program. When necessary, individual 
engineers were ‘hired’ from functional design units to work on the Program. 
However, as previously discussed, the PLI Program could not achieve the planned 
autonomous and integrated team and, instead, was divided into the Operation Centre 
and the Design Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
From the perspective of the Program Manager, the existence of this major partition 
within the PLI Program despite the initial intention towards an integrated cross­
functional team, was seen as a necessary but temporary compromise to gain 
functional support for the intended total integration. The evidence discussed later on 
the politics and actions in Chapter 8 indicated that this might be seen as one necessary 
increment step within a ‘non-threatening’ change strategy employed by the Program 
Manager that seemingly fitted with the surrounding circumstances that were deeply 
entrenched into functional silos. Within this perspective, the next planned step would 
be the integration of Design Centre and Operation Centre, which was expected to be 
easier to achieve.
At first, these design-production coupling arrangement looked like as if they would 
work well. The combination of more experienced engineers from the Operation
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Centre, who viewed the approach as a chance to ease their tasks in the production 
phase, and the less experienced but willing to learn engineers from the Design Centre 
provided the bridge for integration at the operational level as indicated in the previous 
chapter. However, the movement to break down the functional silos was not easy. 
Such organisational change has the potential to ‘slide back’ to the previous 
arrangement (Carnall, 1991), as illustrated in the following two instances.
Firstly, the Chief Engineer took out all the aeronautic engineers from the design 
integration teams and put them in an integrated aeronautics specialisation group that 
supported all design integration teams within the Design Centre. The combination of 
continuous design problems, the scarcity o f competent human resources, and the lack 
of clear implementation protocols played a significant role in this movement. The 
Chief Engineer expected that under such isolation from other component-related 
design issues, aeronautic engineers would be able to deliver an optimum integrated 
design solution, as opposed to an optimum solution for each component design team. 
However, this decision modified and reduced the scope o f cross-functionality o f the 
design integration teams due to the exclusion o f those aeronautic engineers.
Secondly, the Operation Centre's focus on assembly led to the exclusion of some 
tooling and manufacturing functions, which in turn, made the Operation Centre rely 
heavily on a functional production unit, i.e. Fabrication Division, that housed those 
functions. From the Design Centre perspective, this arrangement made the Operation 
Centre the unnecessary liaison that mediate the Program (i.e. the Design Centre) and 
that functional unit and preventing the Design Centre from directly interact with 
specialists from those functions. These issues caused much tension between Design 
Centre and Operation Centre as discussed previously, which was eventually resolved
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by an agreement that empowered the Design Centre to interact directly with those 
functions. However, tension was created within and between design and production 
functions despite the efforts to establish harmony at the beginning o f the Program 
(e.g. through the formation of the design build process team, TIP teams, Production 
Co-ordinator, and Operation Centre). This incident illustrated that even between the 
production-related functions barriers existed, and in turn made it more difficult to 
break the larger barrier between design functions and production functions.
Highly centralised structure led to high power differential between superiors and 
subordinates because the power was typically centralised in the superiors at all levels. 
This contributed to the presence o f a power differential between the program’s higher 
and lower level teams throughout CE implementation stages. It also contributed to the 
fewer decisions made by the lower level teams and the ignorance o f the decisions 
already made by the lower level teams in the Design Centre, particularly in the later 
stages when the design integration teams consisted of many younger and 
inexperienced engineers. This happened despite the Program Manager’s best intention 
for a truly CE at the working level.
7.5.2 Organisational Culture, Sub-cultures, and the Strong Founder
Beside high centralisation and high differentiation, the Indaco culture was also 
dominated by a ‘high technology’ orientation. This culture was acknowledged 
internally and was seen as the result o f the aircraft industry characteristics that 
continuously deal with advanced technology. However, ‘hi-tech’ had a deeper 
meaning to Indaco than the mere advance in technology. This was born out in the- 
Indaco’s mission statement, which clearly stated that the company was “a vehicle of
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technology transformation” within the nation. As a state-owned company, Indaco 
claimed that it was expected to be “one o f the nation’s Centres o f Excellence” that 
would bring the country toward a “prosperous industry-based nation” in the future8. 
This has led to over emphasis on technology acquisition and technology 
transformation. The previous PLP Program, for example, suffered from this as one 
engineer commented:
At [the PLP], [they said] we wanted this and that kind of technologies, and [the PLP’s] price 
went out of control. [The price] became so high; who wanted to buy it [at that price], (John, 
Design Centre, January' 1999)
Equally typical was the response given by the Ex-Project Engineer for both the PLP 
and PLI Programs to defend this situation, as he expressed in the interview:
There are people who argue that tire cost [of the PLP] would be too high. No, it is not true. 
The price of one configuration is set by itself. We call it 'tire duty of configuration' (Mark, Ex 
Project Engineer. July 1998)
Indaco’s vision and mission were mainly developed by its founder in the late 1970s. 
Beside his position as the President Director o f the company, he was also an 
influential Cabinet member of the Government. To fulfil its mission, Indaco was 
equipped with billion of dollars investment in state o f the art facilities for aircraft 
development and production process. The President Director’s position in the 
Government was crucial in securing the government’s direct investment to acquire 
such facilities.
In line with this strong tendency toward technology orientation, an immediate 
initiative in introducing CE in the PLI Program was to set up and invest in the 
computerised enabling technology. In fact, the enabler was seen as the major part of 
the CE adoption as reflected by the following statement by the Program Manager:
* Item (88) and (108). Appendix-B
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[Westaco] calls it enabling technology. With tins technology, they can work optimally. ... So 
are we in [the PLI], There is no compromise, 100% digital. The [product] definition will be
made with CATIA, 100% digital and it will also be used for the digital mock up.......  So
everything can be computer simulated, part manufacturing, tool manufacturing and its 
interface with the part, system interface, ergonomics, maintainability, etc. For the PLI, we will
use that.......We have to totally upgrade our [human resources]. ... This month, Sidina project
will go ahead. ... Other than Westaco, I don’t know ... [but] there is a prerequisite [for CE], 
have to have this enable technology. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)
In a complex development process such as the development o f PLI, the use of such 
technology was inevitable. It is also the typical engineering focus which remains 
dominant in engineering literature (e.g. Gunasekaran and Sarhadi, 1997). 
Nevertheless, an over-emphasis on enabling technology led to the danger of 
neglecting other aspects of CE (e.g. organisational and human resources), which in 
turn, became disastrous for the process as discussed in the previous section.
The Indaco’s founder was also influential in the establishment o f an engineering sub­
culture as the dominant culture within the company. Trained as an aeronautical 
engineer and with a significant academic career in that specialisation, he enjoyed the 
time he spent with design engineers discussing various technical issues o f the 
development process. He often allocated a significant portion o f time during his visits 
to the plant for such discussion, despite his busy schedule and other demanding 
matters within the company. He also knew many key engineers by name. He regarded 
engineers, the design engineers in particular, as the company’s most valuable assets. 
This view was expressed in various meetings and gatherings within Indaco. In order 
to retain these valuable engineers, the nominal value o f the individual incentive was 
skewed in favour of engineers from the functional design units. One top management 
member confirmed this in the interview:
Of course [the difference] is huge. ... It is a huge [gap], but not for all. There is a gap between 
[design] engineers and our engineers or specialists [in Production Divisions). At the 
operational level, the apprentice graduates for example, in Production they may get one 
hundred or fifty [thousand Rupiahs], there [in Technology Divisions] they get two hundred 
and fifty [thousand Rupiahs], (Steve, Top Management Member, April 1998)
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These circumstances led to the dominance o f the functional design units (i.e. 
Technology Divisions) in the company. Top management placed design-related issues 
first. In the past, product features were mainly defined by capabilities and interests o f  
the functional design units. In the development process o f the previous PLP Program, 
for example, technology-related considerations were the main determinants o f the 
product features and the development process rather than marketing, financial or 
operational considerations. Functional design units also had all the time they needed 
to accomplish their task regardless o f the schedule, and left functional production 
units sandwiched between the targeted flight test schedule and this extended 
completion time of the design, which meant less time available to manufacture and 
assemble the aircraft. Within the compressed time, the functional production units 
also had to deal with numerous engineering changes.
Other functional units typically believed that, due to the perceived importance o f their 
tasks, functional design units always got what they asked for regardless of the 
program’s budget. Some facilities they requested were regarded as unnecessary but 
‘nice to have’. Any rejection by the Program Manager or the Investment Board could 
be by-passed by directing the request to the President Director who often over-turned 
the rejection. Some rumoured that the formation of additional divisions in the 
Technology Division was due to favouritism by the President Director as appreciation 
of some engineers’ contributions to the PLP Program rather than a real necessity. In 
short, the functional design units were often regarded as the President Director’s 
‘golden boys’.
The introduction of CE in the PLI Program and, in particular, the push from the 
Program Manager to make the Program independent from the influence of functional
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design units by asking fully delegated, fully dedicated and collocated members, 
created a sense o f rivalry in the Technology Divisions. This was the underlying cause 
of the on-going tension between the PLI Program and the Technology Divisions that 
led to poor communication and several changes in program structure as the program 
management tried to adjust the Technology Divisions response to their CE concept 
and arrangements throughout the implementation stages.
Within this dominant culture, other differentiated and fragmented functional sub­
cultures (Martin, 1992) eventually emerged. These were mainly based on the 
resentment over the domination o f functional design units knowing that nobody could 
compete with them. Typically, this resentment was expressed by downplaying the 
undoubted technological achievement o f the Technology Divisions. The failure of the 
PLP Program to meet its certification target, for example, was seen as evidence that 
the functional design units did not deserve undue attention from top management. 
This perspective was common among members from Production Divisions who 
typically worked on a tighter schedule and under tighter managerial control than their 
design counterparts. Non engineering-related functions, such as Finance and Human 
Resources Divisions, typically felt left out because top management favoured 
engineers over non-engineers. These functional units often perceived engineers as 
cost centres, spoilt and hard to manage.
Company-wide, these fragmented and conflicting sub-cultures were often seen as a 
lack o f company culture, as one member of the Operation Centre stated:
It seemed that [Indaco] does not have a culture, so it does not have any standard [of 
behaviours]. Some [employees] even spread bad words about [Indaco] outside, because of the 
lack of such organisational culture. ... T hat's why Eve suggested splitting both the Design 
Centre mid the Operation Centre [from die rest of Indaco], 1 did not want to be exclusive, bill 
it is for die establishment of die so-called company culture (William. Operadon Centre. 
December 1997).
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The existence o f these sub-cultures with the perceived united strong technological 
culture o f Indaco, was clearly expressed by the above member as he continued:
At the first flight of [the previous PLP], production [people] was furious, because among 
four people that got patted by the President Director [in the national television] none from 
production. It was not fair. Did it mean there was no contribution of production [people] to 
[the PLP I? Then, who assembled it? ... That’s why these functions do not get along; it starts 
Irom the very' top and goes down to the lower levels. Tliis incident raised some protests from 
[production] people who did not sleep for days to build and assemble the product; why 
Production [Divisions] were not represented in such event. (William. Operation Centre. December 1997)
Understandably, the announcement o f CE introduction in the PLI Program was 
welcomed by the staff o f other functions, particularly within the functional production 
units, who viewed CE as a means of creating a more balanced culture within the 
company. This expectation triggered the enthusiasm o f several middle managers from 
functional production units to embrace the Program during its early stages and led to 
the formation of the Operation Centre as part o f the program structure in the design- 
production coupling stage. In the previous PLP program, involvement in the 
preliminary design phase had been the sole prerogative of engineers from functional 
design units.
However, some of this resentment remained even after the formation of the Operation 
Centre and was often manifested in under-estimating the design engineers’ capability. 
The effect of the lack o f seniority among the majority of the Design Centre’s 
members, for example, was often exaggerated by the Operation Centre’s members, 
particularly in analysing disputes between Design Centre and Operation Centre. To a 
much lesser extent, the Design Centre’s members sometimes expressed their doubt on 
the capability o f the Operation Centre’s members due to their relatively lower 
education level. This contributed to the tension, which in turn hampered the inter­
team communication between Design Centre and Operation Centre.
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7.5.3 The Com pany’s Stage o f  Development
The PLI Program was publicly announced following the success o f  the first flight o f  
the previous PLP Program. Within the company, the first flight o f the first indigenous 
aircraft marked the success o f Indaco in undertaking its third phase o f development, it 
indicated its readiness to move on to the fourth phase, the implementation of R&D in 
future technology, which was to be manifested in the PLI. Indaco also enjoyed nation­
wide support and admiration due to this success, which was seen as a ‘national pride’ 
event and proof that the country would soon become industrialised. This led to the 
success o f Indaco in arranging a unique financing and financial management strategy 
for the PLI Program with the establishment o f Prico (discussed in Chapter 6). This, in 
turn, provided more discretion for the Program to use the allocated money, free from 
Indaco’s financial regulations and performance. This financial arrangement 
contributed to the assertion that the Program had a very heavyweight management.
Meanwhile, the certification process that followed the first flight o f PLP was not as 
smooth as planned. It dragged along due to various technical and non-technical 
problems that had not been fixed until the end of the field study in 1999, far behind 
the 1997 target and considerably over budget. Meanwhile, the sales prospects o f other 
programs diminished during the 1990s. The only.product selling was the PLC, a 
product co-developed with a European company that entered the market in the mid- 
1980s. The PLC production line also struggled to meet its delivery schedule due to 
technical and, later, financial problems. The value o f such sales was enough to cover 
the PLC operational expenses but could not cover development expenses and other 
overhead costs. Therefore, Indaco was in financial crisis and continuously appealed to 
the government tor additional financial support to cover the development expenses of
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the PLP Program. The overall company’s financial situation was in stark contrast with 
the secure financial situation of the PLI, at least during its early phases.
The above situation, which made the PLI Program appear as an exclusive division, 
created resentment and increased organisational rivalry. This contributed to the 
hesitation o f the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) to provide full 
support to the Program because it was they who were used to be the ‘golden boys’. 
Furthermore, the fact that many functional design units were formed as a result of the 
PLP Program led to a sense of belonging toward the PLP Program, which in turn, led 
to some suspicions from the managers o f the PLI Program that these functional design 
units would prioritise the PLP over the PLI. This contributed to problems of acquiring 
appropriate representatives from the functional design units throughout all the stages.
When the crisis finally hit the PLI Program, due to financial problems faced by Prico, 
and had temporarily terminated the program after preliminary design phase, the 
functional design units, in particular, were quick to respond by retracting some of 
their support. This response worried the Chief Engineer who struggled to complete 
the preliminary design phase. The organisational rivalry between the PLI Program 
and the functional design units contributed to this quick and immediate response.
In term of business and technology maturity. Indaco was inexperienced and naive 
within the aircraft industry. Many companies have been in operation for more than 50 
years, while Indaco after approximately 20 years had just flight-tested its first 100% 
indigenous design. The management of the company acknowledged that they were 
immature, particularly in term o f organisational tacit knowledge and, in order to 
overcome this, engaged in various technical and managerial consultancv and 
internship programs with renowned companies such as Westaco. For the
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implementation of CE, this immaturity created a sense o f anxiety in some managers, 
which was derived from the recognition that the company as the whole might not 
have enough experience. They were not so convinced that CE, the prominent concept 
within the aircraft industry, was the right approach, given the internal context and the 
stage of development of Indaco. For them, the adoption o f such an approach was 
more of a ‘technology-push’ from the industry trend rather than a necessity.
The Ex-Project Engineer, who was one of the most experience engineers in Indaco, 
expressed his opinion in the interview:
In my opinion, the competency of [Indaco] engineers is not mature enough. The [enabling 
technology] system could not override the accumulation of experience. ... People who could 
apply CE should have 4 or 5 times experience in designing products (Mark, Ex Project 
Engineer. July 1998)
Considering a technical issue and relating this issue to the current attempt to model 
Indaco’s CE on Westaco’s, one Operation Centre’s member recalled:
At that time, I emphasised that Westaco and us were so different. Firstly, we do not have a proper 
database. We started from scratch. Secondly, our competence people could not join the program. 
(William, Operation Centre, December 1997)
Furthermore, this also contributed to the different interpretations o f the CE concept, 
even within the Program team, and communication difficulties and confusion across 
functions because the terminology had not been properly shared nor standardised.
7.6 Summary
Other than a serious attempt to acquire enabling technology similar to Westaco’s, 
Indaco’s CE initiatives in other aspects were much less developed. Even the attempt 
on enabling technology did not provide a significant positive contribution on the
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internal organisational integration and the communication and decision-making 
mechanism across program teams. The significant differences from the Westaco 
practices were the absence o f external integration (i.e. supplier and customer 
involvement in the program team), the absence o f systematic protocol for 
implementation, and the lack of competence. At the termination of the PLl Program, 
the Indaco’s ‘specific model’ o f CE was represented by a ‘frozen emergent’ 
arrangement, which characterised by:
1) An autonomous product development team instead of a heavyweight program.
2) Parallel design and production teams instead of single integrated teams.
3) Increasing hostile environment instead of teamwork within the Program teams.
4) Unsystematic utilisation of the enabling technology.
Detailed analysis o f the rest of CE initiatives in the Indaco’s PLI Program reveals that 
two most significant factors that influencing the changing and final shape of 
organisational integration and communication and decision making mechanisms were 
the lack of a required level o f tacit and explicit competency, and the lack of 
systematic protocols for CE. Further, the absence o f these two initiatives contributed 
to the failure to effectively utilise the enabling technology set for the Program.
The lack of competent engineers played a major role in the formation of various 
program structures and working mechanisms as the Program struggled to adjust and 
fit the CE approach to reality. During the initial stage, in which the task was tackled 
by a small group led by an experienced engineer, this was not a significant issue. 
When the technical tasks grew and the size of the Program team increased, this human 
resource factor became more critical. It was behind a stream of structural changes in 
the Program. It was the root cause of the ongoing conflict between the Program’s
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Design Centre and functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). It was also the 
primary cause o f the increasing lack o f trust between Design Centre and Operation 
Centre. Ultimately, this lack of competence was the major factor in the schedule over­
run, as various unplanned tests needed to be. undertaken and various incidents further 
delayed their completions.
The lack of systematic protocols caused confusion among both members and non­
members of the Program team as they moved from the old sequential approach 
without clear guidelines towards a new one. The absence o f such protocols caused the 
solutions taken to deal with the lack of competence were often inconsistent with the 
initial intention in implementing CE. It reinforced pressures to return to the previous 
sequential approach. This was particularly evident in various developments during the 
design-production coupling stage, such as the removal of aeronautical engineers from 
the design integration teams, discouragement to work with the Operation Centre, and 
ignorance over the systems developed by the Sidina group.
The transformation process of CE into a ‘specific model’ that differed from its 
original model was also influenced by the wider organisational context. Indaco 
organisation could be characterised as ‘centralistic-bureaucration’ with a strong 
technology culture in which a dominant design engineering sub-cultur^ coexisted and 
often competed with other various functional sub-cultures (e.g. production sub­
culture). It was a relatively young and immature organisation in terms of its 
accumulative tacit and explicit knowledge in the aircraft industry.
The silo effect of Indaco’s highly differentiated structure combined with its 
knowledge immaturity caused problems in carrying out matrix mechanism that led to 
autonomous program division cut off from functional resources. Within the Program
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team, this led to the formation o f two parallel centres (i.e. the Design Centre and the 
Operation Centre), rather than a single integrated team. This reflects the sliding back 
to functional arrangement that reinforced by the lack of systematic protocols. 
Meanwhile, the high level o f centralisation infected the Program’s decision-making 
mechanism with the tendency to ignore the decisions and commitments made by the 
lower-level teams.
The strong and dominant technology culture influenced the strong emphasis on 
enabling technology in the overall initiatives to foster communication and interaction 
across functions and less emphasis on human resource readiness, such as teamwork 
and team building. The previous domination of design-related functions was 
influential in the early welcome of the CE approach by functional production units 
that made the early stage of implementation process ran smoothly. On the other hand, 
this created rivalry between ihe Program and the functional design units that 
contributed to the on going tension and conflicts, particularly over human resource 
allocation that led to the lack of competency in the Program team.
Overall, these findings emphasise the importance to consider the organisational 
context in the decision to implement CE to an organisation. CE initiatives 
implemented should suit the overall nature of the organisational context to be 
effective. Furthermore, the selection of the right configuration o f CE initiatives at the 
outset plays an important role in ensuring the success o f implementation.
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CHAPTER 8
POLITICS OF CHANGE
8.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the role o f both individuals and groups in shaping the 
introduction o f CE in the PLI Program from the initiation through to the elimination 
of the program due to financial and economic circumstances. The analysis provides 
important details in the organisational politics that were crucial in shaping the CE 
initiatives in the Program. It also shows how actions by some individuals and the 
decisions they consequently made or did not make, significantly affected some issues 
in the CE implementation process.
Using the tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), this chapter 
reviews various actions of six key individuals throughout the CE implementation 
process. The review is arranged chronologically despite the inevitable overlapping. 
The power sources, will and skill, and context and structure o f each individual were 
analysed in relation to their actions (or in-actions) that contributed to the changing 
nature and final shape o f CE. These individuals were chosen because they were key 
players in shaping the CE in the implementation process. They are (in pseudonyms): 
Mark, the Project Engineer; Clive, the Program Manager; Alan, the Sidina Co­
ordinator; William, the Production Planning Supervisor in the Operation Centre;
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Lucas, the Technical Adviser for the PLI Program; and Robert, the Chief Engineer of 
the Design Centre.
Actions and interactions made by each o f these individuals were driven by particular 
interests. Their behaviour and attitudes were also shaped by their experiential, 
contextual and cultural factors. Together, these six individuals played the most 
significant roles in shaping the organisational integration and communication and 
decision making process in the introduction of CE to the PLI Program. As we shall 
see in this chapter, the actions and interaction of these key individuals, both within the 
Program and in the broader context, contributed to the enthusiastic promotion of CE 
ideas which later was not adequately followed up by their implementation, the lack of 
integrated technology support for CE, continuing tensions with the functional design 
units (i.e. Technology Divisions), the lack of implemented system protocols, and the 
division between design and production functions in the final phase of the Program.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 8.2 analyses the actions of Mark, the 
Project Manager when the program was initiated. Mark contributed to the 
development o f a cohesive enthusiastic group of young engineers that remained the 
core engineers o f the Program in later stages. The actions of Clive, the Program 
Manager, are explored and analysed in Section 8.3. Clive was an all-powerful 
Program Manager who introduced CE into the Program. Section 8.4 reviews and 
analyses the actions o f Alan and his Sidina group. Alan, the CADCAM Manager, was 
the adviser whom Clive relied on to establish the Sidina system, the enabling 
technology for implementing CE. Section 8.5 analyses the actions of William. As a 
young supervisor originally from Production Division, William played an important 
role in the establishment of the Operation Centre, the significant part of the Program
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that reflected its CE intention. Section 8.6 analyses the actions o f Lucas and the 
implication o f his interactions with Robert, the Chief Engineer. Lucas was the 
Technical Adviser assigned by Clive to assist the Chief Engineer and his teams. Lucas 
increasingly became more powerful and was responsible for the deterioration of CE 
near the end of design-production coupling stage. Section 8.7 provides summary o f  
the chapter.
8.2 Mark: The Project Engineer at the Program’s Initiation
Mark was one of the few experienced engineers involved in the PLI Program. 
Trained in aeronautics, he joined Indaco at the end of the 1970s. He had been 
involved in the development o f all two Indaco’s platform products, the co­
development PLC and the first indigenous designed PLP. Starting as a new graduate, 
his involvement in the design process grew. By the middle o f the 1980s, he became 
the Project Engineer for the PLP Program and was responsible for the overall 
engineering performance of the aircraft. He was also the Manager o f New Product 
Development (NPD) Department in the Technology Division that was responsible for 
facilitating for the development o f any new product or derivative. The tripartite 
analysis o f Mark influence in the CE implementation is summarised as Table 8-1.
Mark’s power source came from his position as the Head of NPD Department, his 
experience and his excellent reputation as the Project Engineer of the previous PLP 
Program, which led to his direct and strong links to the President Director. Mark was 
a devoted aeronautical engineer. He was keen to involve young engineers in design 
exercises and believed that the company should continue to accumulate design 
knowledge in strict functional-based specialisation to achieve knowledge maturity
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prior to implementing an integrated approach such as CE.
Table 8-1: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Mark
Stage Program Initiation Stage Engineering Matrix Stage
Role | Program Manager |
f«PO
l £ :
, _ x ..................
: f^ e c i Eflötaeef: : : :
1----------------------— H-------------------------------------1 ïÿ:Oepüty:Prog War
De sign G io up Oesg n Group Design Group I Business Repr -j Prog. Mgmt Office J
Head of NPD Department
Finance Repr j-
,----------------------*---------------------,
] Eng Specialist Groups | | TOP Airplane | | Eng. Operation
Project Engineer/ Deputy Program Manager
Power
Sources
Hierarchical position as NPD Head
Reputation as Project Engineer of the PLP Program
Direct link to the President Director
Hierarchical position as Project Engineer
Structure 
and Context
Strong technology focus
Strong autonomy within Technology Division
Leaking reputation of the Program Manager
Skill and 
Will
Strong will for cohesive team  
Emphasis on functional-based expertise
CE was not yet suitable
Not active due to other managerial assignment 
indifference and lack of will to impose his opinions
Impact on CE  
Introduction
Strong fully dedicated and cohesive design team  
in the beginning of CE implementation
The implementation of CE with various problems 
associated with lack of competence
Hence, according to the tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), 
Mark had significant power sources and structure to influence the process. Mark used 
both his ‘power sources’ and ‘context and structure’ capability in developing a 
cohesive and enthusiastic design team which consisted of various design 
specialisations and supporting the program to secure its financial support.
When the President of Indaco suggested developing a 100-passenger jet airplane in 
mid-1993, he assigned Mark to explore its possibilities. Armed with less than 20 
newly-graduated engineers and a few experienced engineers, Mark carried out this 
task as part of the activities within the NPD Department. This task was carried out 
enthusiastically as expressed in various program reports. In the documents written 
early in 1994, for example, team members were regarded as “mostly graduated abroad 
in aeronautics, highly motivated, highly dedicated”1.
1 Item (4).  (7)  and (8) A p p e n d i \ - B
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Some engineers admitted that they regarded the task, at least in the beginning, simply 
as a hypothetical exercise, as one engineer recalled:
At that time. Mark assigned some engineers to start the PLI. I was a new (comer), just 2 
months ... I just followed it through casually. Somebody worked on configuration: I helped 
with bits of small calculations. I calculated a bit of weight and balance, a bit of G point, a bit 
of payload configuration system, etc. (Frank. Design Centre, March 1998)
This attitude might have fostered influenced the enthusiasm. It was apparent that by 
treating this task as an exercise, Mark deliberately established a free environment for 
the engineers to explore all design and technical possibilities. He emphasised, 
however, the need for mastering specialisation and took an approach similar to the 
previous programs; a functional compartmentalisation approach. He explained:
i developed [PLI] in the same manner of [PLP], I continued the capability accumulation 
process based on specialisation. ... A good aircraft is only made possible if each of its 
elements is optimised. It means it we talk about wing: it should be the best wing. To conceive 
the best wing, aerodynamic engineers have to assess more than 30 types of wing and only 2 or 
3 will be tested in wind tunnel. This process should be done in isolation: aerodynamic
engmeers cannot interact with others...... Then there is a comparative analysis, comparing one
configuration with another. ...[Only] after that you could go to the next step: is it an optimum 
configuration? Could we optimise the process? Could we optimise the cost?
The initiation approach for the [PLI] was similar to the [PLP]. They were divided into system 
and structure. ... What I did in PLP and PLI was making imaginary building blocks for 
aerodvnamics and others, but in the way they behaved they were integrated. So in 
aerodynamics, for example, when they reviewed the wing, it was as an integrated part that 
could not be separated between the structure and the aerodynamics. We usually earned out 
discussion and dialogue reviewing the design in the ground floor ... The PLI Program should 
have continued that way, but I don’t know I am not involved [any longer], (Mark, Ex Project 
Engineer. July 1998)
Mark was popular among younger engineers and mixed well with them. Many 
engineers proudly admitted that they had worked with him. He was often seen by 
many young engineers across the company either as a formal or an informal mentor.
His team, at its peak consisted of 23 engineers, was loosely divided into nine groups 
with overlapping membership. This overlapping membership allowed technical 
information to flow freely among the team, which not only facilitated the 
developm ent process but also increased the team cohesiveness. Within this
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environment, the team presented their work at meetings chaired by Clive, the future 
Program Manager, between March to June 1994. During these meetings, the team not 
only presented and reviewed their concept of the aircraft but also suggested a way of  
working for the development team. .
Hierarchically, the appointment of the meeting’s chair person was unusual since at 
that time Clive was an engineer finishing his doctoral degree in aeronautics abroad. 
However, it was widely speculated that he, notably a close relative to the Indaco’s 
President, would become the Program Manager. This might partly be explained by 
considering the Indonesian cultural tendency to accept high power differential 
(Hofstede, 1984) and leaking reputation (Trompenaars, 1994). In such culture, being a 
close relative o f the 'man at the top’ working in the company was typically enough 
for the subordinates to perceive that something further was expected and, hence, to 
behave accordingly.
The acceptance o f Clive as the chairperson could also be related to Mark’s personality 
and his passion for the aeronautic profession. His egalitarian nature might make him 
feel indifferent towards an otherwise offending circumstance, i.e. a mere engineer 
chaired his team’s presentation meeting. His devotion to the aircraft development 
process made him always pursue excellent aircraft development over anything else. 
Such devotion might partly explain why the previous PLP Program, in which he was 
the Project Engineer, was far over budget. In the interview he expressed:
For me. there is no airplane better than [PLP], ... All the state of the art technologies are 
certamlv there. It is highly appraised by others. Front marketing point, it would be a success, 
whv not0 ... When [Boeing] 737 was launched to the market, no one said it was the best, and 
so with [Boeing] " ’ 4 7 .  Tliev all were in doubt, in panic; they could lose their money. And so 
was with [.Airbus] A300. ... They should dunk in reverse. You have invested 800 million 
dollars and now asking whether it is competitive. It is a crazy question that would kill die 
program ... The important dung is having a room for modify'. The modification cannot be one 
and for all, it is a pile of serial improvements. ... In a scary experience of a big flow of cash 
out. I know there would be a bottom line. The scare of big cash outflow caused many 
erroneous policies I by-passed some of them. (Mark.-Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)
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Such devotion was also apparent through his continuing involvement in this PL1 
Program as a Vice Program Manager after the Program Manager was appointed in
1995. He played a significant role in the conceptual design phase o f the PLI Program, 
during which the Program Manager spent most o f his time abroad. He also made a 
signiticant contribution establishing the business plan of the program which secured 
its tinances. Only after the financial scheme was established at the beginning of
1996, did his involvement cease.
As the Program Manager, Clive was handed over a rough concept of the aircraft and a 
relatively cohesive small team o f engineers by Mark. Clive expanded the membership 
of the team, and announced the adoption of CE as the approach for the development 
team. Mark did not agree with the adoption of CE because of the lack of competence 
among the engineers involved. He later argued that CE involved cultural change and 
the introduction of enabling technology was not sufficient to successfully implement 
CE. He expressed his opinion in the interview:
What they call CE [here] is first, people sit in one place. Second, that place had an integrated 
software and everything is computerised. ... The objective is. so they said, to increase 
efficiency, less cost increase quality, less person... In my view, what they are doing in [the 
PLI] is not CE. the philosophy is not right. ... [Indaco] engineers are not mature enough. The 
system could not override the accumulation of experience. ... The [first] iteration should be 
specialisation-base. During my time, we still had aerodynamics, a distinct specialisation, and 
then we increased the communication, the interaction, the dialogue. Essentially, they need to 
remain in a tightly specialisation-base because they have not had experience to provide 
judgement yet. Dialogue involved judgement. People could not be involved in negotiation 
before they understand what it is: otherwise quality suffers. We are not ready yet. ... People
who apply CE should have 4 or 5 times experience in designing products.......In technology.
the acculturation process is earned out through the accumulation of experience. Without 
accumulation of experience, there is no CE. (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)
However, he lacked the will to use his power sources to confront the CE and Sidina 
concept pursued by the more powerful Clive or to create a political 'agenda' at the top 
management level by opening the issue of whether to use CE or not in the PLI 
Program. Factors in the context and structures (e.g. cultural tendencies of power
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distance, his lesser degree o f involvement in the Program, his new assignment) can be 
attributed to this lack o f  will.
It was strange that such an opinion from such a respected engineer as him was not 
taken into consideration. It is possible, however, that at that time Mark was not 
pressing his argument, given the cultural tendencies and his own personal traits which 
inhibited him from doing so. If he had clearly and openly opposed these concepts, 
with a ‘compromised but contextually-proper’ approach, a potentially successful 
implementation might have been obtained. The criticism o f the lack o f competence 
was widespread within the Technology Divisions and at times served as arguments to 
increase scepticism to the CE pursued by the Program Manager.
In summary, Mark actions and in-actions contributed to the shape o f organisational 
integration aspect of the PLI Program. In the program initiation stage he contributed 
to the formation of a relatively cohesive and highly motivated design team, that later 
became the basis o f design-related cross-functional team in the beginning of CE
hi Program. In engineering matrix stage, although remained 
actively supporting the Program, he did not make significant action in shaping the 
organisational arrangement o f the PLI Program. While having a depth understanding 
of Indaco’s engineers’ competency, he was indifference toward CE, which he 
believed was not compatible with such level o f competency. As a result, he also 
contributed to the decision adopting CE and its associated organisational arrangement.
In a sense, the whole relation between Mark, the Project Engineer, and the adoption of 
CE approach was ironic. He had established the team that would be perfect for CE 
implementation in terms of its cohesiveness and openness, yet he was opposed to CE 
within Indaco perceiving that the engineers were not competent enough for such
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approach at this time. Mark had a significant argument in his opposition in regards to 
the engineering competence because he had worked closely with this particular team, 
yet he apparently did not express his argument clearly enough. The significance o f  his 
argument became evident throughout the case study.
8.3 Clive: The Power of the Program Manager
Clive's power in promoting CE came from various sources including his close 
relationship with the CEO of the company and was supported by his structural 
position as the Program Manager o f the PLI and later as the Head of the Airplane 
Group. This power supported the PLI Program into a heavyweight position within the 
company. The summary o f tripartite analysis o f Clive power and its contribution to 
the implementation of CE is provided in Table 8-2.
After being appointed as the Program Manager, Clive often flew to the U.S. to finish 
his internship. The daily operation o f the program was run by the Manager of 
Program Management Office. Although he was away, the Program enjoyed the full 
benefit o f the fact that the Program Manager was closely related to the Indaoc’s 
President. Supports were easily secured. Statements, such as “[Clive] wants tins to 
b e...”, were usually enough to acquire the necessary support from other senior 
managers, such as in the establishment o f the Program’s master phasing plan, and 
gaining approval for the Program’s enabling technology facility.
Besides the Indonesian cultural tendency discussed in the previous section, 
organisational structure was another contextual explanation for this situation. Due to 
its delicate state as an infant development program, the PLI Program reported directly
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to the President Director. Historically, the previous two programs had also enjoyed 
this privilege in their early stages and so there was a precedent for this arrangement. 
Although, when those previous programs were initiated, the Indaco structure had not 
been as developed. This precedent provided a comfortable justification among many 
top management members. Through this position, the Program gained tremendous 
support company-wide as it also indicated the relative importance of the Program and 
its Program Manager within the company.
Table 8-2: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Clive
Stage Engineering Matrix, Engineering Integration and Design-Production Coupling
Role
¡¡lllii il (vision; • ' 
Manager
i
Chief Engineer ■——j Prico Coordination
Chief Operation
Operation Center Business Management
--------- 1______
Finance
______!______
Design Center |
Program Manager
Power
Sources
Hierarchical position as the program manager 
Closely related to the President Director 
Young, clever, broad-minded, well-educated
W ill and 
Skill
Implementing CE, but often absent and later busy with other assignments 
Unclear description of CE as a strategy to get CE off the ground 
Maintaining harmony in the top management council
Context
and
Structure
High power distance and leaking reputation led to respect superior relatives 
Cultural tendency to maintain harmony
Dissatisfaction of production and other functions on design centric environment 
Unique financial arrangement of the program
Program's position as an infant program with direct line to the President Director
Other assignment as the Director of Airplane Group in last stage
Golden boys' positions of functional design units prior to initiation of the PLI Program
Effect on CE 
Introduction
Attract staff to join the program at earlier stages
Gain support from functional production units but rivalry from functional design units 
Lack of detail protocols and implementation plan of CE concept 
Resistance that in turn required adjustment in organisational arrangement 
Confusion at the lower level, competing concepts, lead to conflicts and tensions 
Provide opportunity for others to impose approaches different from the intention
However, substantial support was also gained through the personality and attributes of 
the Program Manager. A doctorate in aeronautic engineering, he was seen as young, 
clever, broad-minded, well educated, and well connected both within the country and
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within the global aircraft industry. One o f the top management members emphasised:
Of course his name has a significant effect. He has a hotline to the President Director. But we 
do not look at it as a negative tiling, but in a positive way. If something was not in line with 
die boss's vision, we could know it straight a way. This is the positive side. ... Oh, another 
point, he might have his name, but he is also smart, his idea is often brilliant, his point is 
logical. (Brian, Top Management Member, April 1998)
Many saw him as promising a bright future for Indaco. His decision to adopt CE and 
the price target he set for PLI were seen as a breakthrough for Indaco’s experience 
and a solution to the ever present problems o f cost and schedule over-run o f the 
previous programs. One engineer expressed his support in the following way:
The driving factor is right. We have the right product and we have the right approach. ... 
Clive announced that we wanted to sell the product around US$ 22 million range. We got it 
wrong in PLP, we said we wanted that kind of technology, but in [aircraft] price we were at a 
mess. (John. Design Centre, January 1999)
The adoption of CE and the Program’s cross-functional team, in particular, won 
support from many people functional production units (i.e. Production Divisions) who 
had been disappointed with the design-centric environment o f previous programs. 
These people believed that Clive could make the difference. The effect o f these 
personal attributes was more evident at the micro level. Many engineers throughout 
the company applied or decided to join the Program. Some application letters were 
dated as late as 1998. These applicants expected that they would have a better work 
environment in the new program under Clive, the new leader:
The top man is great, he ran several review meeting. That is very important in encouraging 
us... So he knows what we are doing ... There are some superior who do not know what their 
subordinates are doing ... (Darren, Design Centre, March 1998)
Others who were assigned by their functional units as focal points expressed similar 
enthusiasm. The establishment of the master phasing plan was an illustration of this 
enthusiasm in resolving conflicting goals and schedules between functions. Many 
regarded this task as an exercise toward a truly cross-functional team and a test of
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whether they were ready for it. Many focal points voluntarily put more time and effort 
than they were expected or required to in supporting this Program. Without such an 
enthusiasm, the Master Phasing Plan, which became the single reference point for the 
program, could have not been established. -In short, during the engineering matrix 
stage Clive actions with all his attributes were able to attract company-wide support to 
the PLI Program and his CE.
At the Executive Management Council (EMC) however, this enthusiasm was lacking. 
There, Clive often played The lack of clarity’ game providing inadequate details in 
order to obtain senior management commitment. For example, the Program Manager 
explained CE simply as an approach to effectively achieve quality, cost, and a 
delivery schedule without detailing its implication on functional units across the 
company. One senior manager recalled Clive’s presentation to the EMC:
As far as I can remember, CE has never been fully introduced [Indaco]-wide. But I might be 
wrong ... [Clive] informed us about the basic principle, that the core of CE is to shorten and 
to reduce bureaucracy between functions so that involved functions are in one place to 
develop the design. That is the idea, isn't it? He told us that, but not the exact form of it and 
[neither] how he would proceed. [For example] I am not so sure, is it part of CE tliat design 
groups have been taken over by the Design Centre"? (Brian, Top Management Member, April 
1998) ’
Considering that the literature on CE was widely available in Indaco, this account did 
not indicate that those functional managers were not aware of the implication of CE. 
It indicated, however, that they were not sure of the Program Manager’s 
implementation plan. It seemed that the issue o f company-wide implication of 
introducing CE was deliberately meant to remain unclear. Such further clarification 
might have opened the inevitable shift in organisational ‘balance of power’ since the 
implication o f CE was heavily related to this balance of power across the company 
(i.e. between the PLI Program and the functional units). The functional design units, 
for example, would have a less direct role in defining the aircraft features than they
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used to have in the previous programs, which in turn, might offended some top 
management members. It seemed that the management was not ready for such 
organisational-wide transformation. In this sense, all parties intentionally, although 
covertly, decided not to put the clarification on their decision-making agenda. Clive 
started this ‘non-decision’ by not offering the detail o f his concept at the first place.
In promoting CE he was widely supported, notably by the Production Divisions who 
were concerned with continuous cost and schedule overruns o f the development 
process. However, without the clarification o f its implication to the top management, 
the political arena o f CE implementation moved to the periphery and was manifested 
in various tensions and problems between the Program and the functional units, 
notably the Technology Divisions as discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. These 
tensions and problems became more intense in the next Engineering Integration stage 
when the Program adjusted the organisational structure and internalised functional 
specialists from Technology Divisions as members o f the Program.
Clive’s decision to abandon the matrix system in favour o f an autonomous system in 
the Design-Production Coupling stage was seemingly an effort to reduce the effect of 
this power struggle on the Program. However, eliminating the Program’s dependency 
to functional design units proved to be impossible due to the limited number of 
competent engineers. The PLI program remained dependent on the Technology 
Divisions as its source of manpower, particularly in the area o f system engineering 
and detail engineering analysis. This manpower issue contributed to the political 
battleground between the Program and the Technology Divisions.
The hard-line position taken by the technology divisions can be related to the 
functional and organisational cultures o f Indaco discussed in Chapter 7. Clive's
Chapter 8: Politics of Change
intentional change from technological dominated into a cross-functional teamwork 
process in the stiong technology oriented culture was a very difficult venture. The 
Program, in its later stages, suffered from this failure to change the culture. The 
separation o f the Design Centre and the. Operation Centre instead of a single 
integrated cross-functional team, the reliance and emphasise on enabling technology 
and the domination of the Technical Adviser illustrated this problem.
The continuation of this power struggle was also reflected at the operational level. 
Many Design Centre members simply ignored the feedback offered by the 
Technology Divisions in a Configuration Review Meeting between the PLI Program 
and the Technology Divisions mentioned earlier in Chapter 6. Some stated that the 
aim o f the review with the functional design units was not to acquire feedback from 
them. Others believed this feedback was hardly necessary':
Oil, that's the comment from [one of Head of Divisions]. Sometimes his feedback is different 
from Lucas's ... and I trust Lucas. He is smart Therefore, the aim of the review with 
functional units was to present the progress, not to gather feedback but to let them know what 
our design look like. At the end we will pass it to them for detail design. (Darren Design 
Centre. March 1998)
Nevertheless, Clive's power sources, notably his close relation to the CEO and the 
cultural tendencies associated with that, prevented other senior managers to demand 
further clarification and hence, created a blockage for the issue to go on the 
management agenda. In his part, this was seemingly a necessary pragmatic political 
strategy to get the CE and PLI Program off the ground.
However, this blockage moved the problems into the micro level, and were 
manifested in particular in hesitation of the Technology Divisions to provide full 
support (e.g. to provide experienced engineers), which caused deterioration in the 
competency o f the program team. His coping decision to move to an autonomous
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program in design-production coupling stage, deteriorated the situation even further 
as most experienced engineers opted to remain in their functional units. At the end, 
the Program mainly consisted o f inexperienced engineers who relied on the powerful 
Technical Adviser who was not aware o f the initial intention of implementing CE as 
discussed later in this chapter (i.e. Section 8.6).
Lack of detailed clarity in Clive’s CE also created confusion within the Program 
teams in which each group pursued its own version (e.g. the Operation Centre’s mini­
factor/, the Design Centre’s preliminary design approach, and Sidina’s enabling 
technology) which were not compatible one another and caused tensions and conflicts 
among them. In an early interview, Clive stated his concept was not going to integrate 
production’s operators into the development process as in the mini-factory concept:
They have to meet everyday. But it does not include tire hardware. It involves die planning, 
manufacturing planning, tooling engineering, but not the people from the [Production] floor. 
There is a concept that involves shop-floor, but we do not go to that concept ... where the 
design people sit in die manufacturing company as a design bureau.... I have seen it in some 
units of Westaco: they tried it. ... There is a small building where engineers and planners sit in 
one corner and die hardware workers in die other comer. So, die communication between 
diem w orks well. But diat's a different concept. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)
However, one Supervisor in the Operation Centre had exactly this in his mind when 
he referred to the CE concept:
.in  TIP is we divide [the program] into 4 stages. First it is as die process integration. Then, 
it becomes [a design produedon team] diat works concurrently with die design [teams]. We 
are in this stage now. Then, it becomes product integration and at the end it becomes a mini 
factory. So. die TIP members will become shop-floor people. That’s why we plotted shop- 
floor people diere. ... That’s my idea since die beginning. (William, Operadon Centre. 
December 1997)
This Supervisor expressed his opinion in various documents that had been submitted 
to the Program Manager (e.g. The 1997 Operation Management Charter). These 
documents had informally become references in the conduction of the Operation 
Centre. One TIP Co-ordinator, for example, explained the function of TIP as:
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In principle. TIPs will be the incarnation of program executor. They will reincarnate to 
become the assembly line. In the assembly stage later on, therefore, it will be impossible that 
the assembler making a fuss saying it is not right or it is wrong because they have followed 
the process. It is possible that during the time [Phillip] will be the shop manager of the 
fuselage, other will be the shop manager of the centre body. TIP co-ordinator will become the 
assembly manager. It will be much easier, we can say. you were there at that time, so you 
have 10 be responsible. (Peter. Operation Centre, November 1997)
However, these conflicting opinions were never put forward or resolved. Even, the 
whole Operation Centre was seemingly unaware o f the difference since the above 
Program Manager’ intention was never clearly documented. This apparent lack o f  
clarity about the applied concept might simply have been the result of cultural 
gestures such as hesitation to express differences, face saving, or protecting harmony. 
But it might also be intentional as a part of organisational politics considering the 
Operation Centre was a significant part of the Program that differentiated it from 
previous programs. Any internal conflict within the Program might be seen as 
reducing the reputation of the Program in adopting CE.
The political action using the deliberately imprecise issue was also apparent in Clive’s 
decision to introduce an additional program-based reward system in his program, 
which was later abandoned. He did not provide the top management members the 
precise details o f this reward system nor did the top management demand clarification 
on details, partly due to the separate financial arrangement, as two top management 
members commented:'
They introduced this reward system, they said it based on the Work Breakdown Structure. 
[Clive]' defence was that the good people have worked and met schedule with less cost; that 
people elligible for bonus. That what he said. (Brian. Top Management Member. April 1998)
Tire way [the PLI Program] did that would cause problem. They attached tire bonus system to 
die Statement of Work packages. ... [Clive] felt like he and the Program owned die money 
because he got it directly front [Prico] for each package. He took, for example 5%. for dus 
reward system. This is different from odier programs, in which all die inflow go to [die 
Finance Division] and die outflow should be based on die budget. (Steve. Top Management 
Member. Apnl 1998)
According to some members of the PLI Program, the actual allocation and calculation
Chapter X: Polilics of Change
of the system did not involve the Work Breakdown Structure nor Statement o f Work 
package that have been completed except as a source o f money. Instead, the allocation 
was based on the performance appraisal that, in a sense, was similar to the one that 
the company already had. However, after furious opposition from most senior 
management members, the reward system was cancelled after only a short 
implementation period.
These conditions that preventing CE from developing indicate that the ‘non-decision 
making7 in Indaco’s organisational politics played as significant role as active 
decisions (e.g. the move toward autonomous teams) in shaping the CE throughout the 
process. If Mark’s opinion in the earlier stage had been taken more seriously and a 
better coalition involving Technology Divisions, C ADC AM, Production Divisions 
had been built in negotiating and setting up a detail implementation plan, CE in the 
PLI Program might have been more successful.
Following the introduction of a new organisational structure in June 1997, beside his 
position as the PLI Program Manager, Clive was also appointed as a Director of the 
Airplane group. In this position, he was not only responsible for the PLI Program but 
also for fabrication and ail other airplanes. As the airplane production was the core 
business o f Indaco, this position was very important. It provided him with tremendous 
power that was beneficial for the PLI program. For example, the need for tool 
designers and assemblers from Fabrication other divisions to support the test 
experiments was secured by a directive from the Director of the Airplane Group 
requesting all divisions to support the project and release from other tasks any 
member required for the Program.
However, the position was very demanding and took most of his time and made him
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very busy. Particularly because o f the unfolding Indonesian economic crisis, he spent 
less time on the Program. In a way, he lost some direct contact with ihe process and 
relied heavily on the Technical Adviser. Clive still had weekly regular meeting with 
the PLI Program leaders including the Chief Engineer, Chief o f Operation, Business 
Manager, and Financial Manager. Often these meetings were not solely dedicated to 
the PLI program, but covered issues relating to the Airplane Group and involved 
managers from other programs. He lost almost all contact he used to have with the 
rest of the program members, except in the big formal meetings such as design review 
or operation review. He also became less sensitive toward the development o f the 
team. One engineer stated:
The next operation review will be in 2-month time. Recently. Clive does not focus on detail 
... and focuses more on the business side. I observed that he made only a few comments on 
technical meetings. He relies on us. So he works less on the program's side and more on the 
director's side (William, Operation Centre, December 1997).
Apparently, Clive was not aware o f a growing anxiety among engineers over the role 
of the Technical Adviser, although he seemed aware o f his domineering attitude He 
was also seemingly not aware that with the Technical Adviser’s guidance the 
development process was deviating from his intention with CE implementation. The 
Chief Engineer could not take any action because officially the Technical Adviser 
was responsible directly to the Program Manager.
This situation led to the CE implementation process resembling March and Olson 
(1983) 'garbage can’ model and it had difficulty sustaining "the attention of major 
political actors” (p.286). Furthermore, this situation allowed "less central actors to 
move into foreground and inject competing definitions of the situation” (Buchanan 
and Badham, 1999, p. 164) as represented by the Technical Adviser, who took over 
the development process ignoring the previous change intentions
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In summary, Clive had enough power sources, skill and will, and supporting context 
to initiate CE in the PLI Program, e.g. establish the matrix with the Technology 
Divisions, and, later, form the Design and Operation Centres; but not enough to 
overcome barriers and make it work. He- employed a strategy not addressing the 
detailed concept o f CE up-ffont in order to get the CE implementation off the ground, 
but this led to unintentional incremental changes: continuing integration problems 
with a tendency to slide back to the traditional functional-based approach.
8.4 Alan and the Sidina Group: The Power of Enabling Technology
Alan joined the company in mid 1980s as an engineer in the Information Technology 
Division. By the end of the 1980s, he was involved in a study that aimed to find a 
computer system that was suitable for supporting the development of a new aircraft 
platform (i.e. PLP) particularly in the area of design and manufacturing process. The 
study assessed various business processes across the company. Alan was appointed to 
assist the ex-officio leader o f this study team to deal with daily operation. Following 
the proposal o f this study, Indaco decided to implement the CATIA system, 
established a C ADC AM Division in Technology Divisions and appointed Alan as the 
Head o f Division. The Division provided technical support to CATIA users, provided 
CATIA and related systems training courses, developed the necessary software 
systems, and monitored the development o f advance computer technology in this area
Alan’s influence in CE was primarily based on his C ADC AM Division expertise and 
his link to Clive, the Program Manager. The tripartite analysis o f Alan is provided in 
Table 8-3. When the PLI Program Manager announced the intention to implement 
CE, he expected Alan’s division to support him in providing the enabling technoloitv.
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Although Alan’s involvement started in the early stage, the effect were mostly 
appeared in the last Design-Production Coupling stage where the development of 
computer system started to take form. Ironically, rather than eased the development 
process the system brought more tension-in the Program particularly due to its 
incompatibility with the habit developed among engineers in using computer 
technology.
Table 8-3: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Alan
Stage Engineering Matnx/Engineering Integration Design-Production Coupling
Role President and  
C EO
_______ !_______
------------1_______  1 _______ _________________ 1_______
PLI Program C A £ mm
jAerop lane Group !
j P U  Program
Head of CADCAM Division Leader of Sidina
Power
Sources
Hierarchical position as Head of CADCAM Division at the beginning of Implementation 
CAD/CAM, expertise
Link to the Program Manager and later to the Director of Aeroplane Group________
Will and 
Ski!!
Developing a 'state of the art enabling technology
Emphasis on maintaining vertical commintment to top management
Ignorance toward horizontal relationship with teams in the PLI Program
Context and 
Structure
Strong focus to technology 
Cultural tendency of power distance
Unique financial management of the Program and financial crisis at the later stages
Effect on CE 
Introduction
Heavy investment plan of Sidina system, but the acquisition less than planned 
Ignorance toward the Sidina system, particularly from the Design Centre 
Complaints, such as not user friendly, not provide necessary support 
Unintegrated and stand alone system_______________
In providing enabling technology for CE, Alan proceeded through a similar manner as 
with the previous CATIA implementation. He formed a cross-functional assessment 
team made up of his staff at its core, convinced the Program Manager to lead the 
team, and put himself as the daily operations manager. The team had a weekly regular 
meeting and later was divided into several subgroups to tackle detail assessments. He 
typically oriented their actions vertically, constantly referring either to the approval 
from the top management on Sidina implementation or to many program directives 
that stated the group responsibility as system developer in the program. When the
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C ADC AM Division was eliminated in 1997 Indaco’s restructuring, Alan moved to 
become an expert cn the staff o f the Director o f Airplane Group (i.e. Clive) but all his 
staff remained intact as the Sidina group.
His deliberate actions in obtaining senior management commitment strengthened his 
position and, hence, shaped the PLI’s CE to be the one that emphasised the role of 
enabling technology. Although never directly involved in the PLI, he was regarded as 
a very important person behind the adoption of CE:
CE is Alan's idea: it is not Clive's but Alan's. ... (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)
This illustrated that Alan’s actions in mobilising his power sources and contexts had 
created the political ground that his group to become very influential in a process in 
which they were otherwise only marginally involved. Alan and his team were never 
part of the PLI Program team, yet their Sidina system was instrumental, if not the only 
tangible result from the experiment with CE.
The development of Sidina system was started by running three pilot projects: 
concurrent engineering, knowledge-based engineering, and configuration 
management. The CE pilot project used the task o f modifying the PLP’s door as its 
object. During the field study, the design phase of the pilot project was completed and 
the modified door was in manufacturing. Despite the intention to support CE in the 
PLI Program, only a few PLI members were involved in CE pilot project because its 
timing coincided with the PLI’s preliminary design phase during which most 
engineers were fully involved with their design tasks. The use of a PLP component 
naturally drew more people from the PLP program. This decision to use a non-PLI 
component as the object of the pilot project, while provided the opportunity to go on 
with his implementation plan, did not provide adequate help for the PLI team to work
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with the CE concept. This led to ignorance in the Design Centre and Operation Centre 
of the results o f the Sidina group, which in turn prevented the Sidina system to be 
fully utilised by the Program.
Not surprisingly, many engineers from the Design Centre and the Operation Centre 
were unhappy with the support provided by the Sidina group. They, ironically, argued 
that the Sidina group should work more closely with the PLI Program and familiarise 
themselves with the program environment so as to enable them to provide sufficient 
support as Sidina was established to support the PLI Program. They argued that the 
workshop and training provided based on the lessons learned from the pilot project 
was not enough to transfer the Sidina concept to the Program. One engineer 
commented in the interview:
Frankly. Sidina support was less than expected, but I cannot blame them. They are not 
designers: they do not have designers’ experience. It was not their fault We were fully 
occupied in the design process. We did not have a smooth interaction and, hence, there was 
less synergy between us. (Robert, Chief Engineer, January 1999)
... we haven’t seen its benefit yet. It might, partly, be our fault because we were not involved 
due to die time constraint. But it is also a weakness of Sidina group in transferring the result to 
us. ... [they] should train us. Or perhaps our group should get involved then, so that file 
transfer process was smoother. If we only inherit the document, most probably it won’t work.
... Sidina works in parallel with the program and, hence, the result cannot be implemented in 
file program. (Victor. Design Centre, March 1998)
In one meeting, the Design and Operation Centres both agreed to undertake a pilot 
project for the digital tool definition in co-operation with the Fabrication Division but 
without the Sidina group participation. This issue was then raised again in a review 
meeting with Clive the following week informing him that the Fabrication Division 
had its own pilot project on the digital tool definition after Sidina failed to established 
one for them.
The more serious conflict between the Design Centre and Sidina was a dispute on 
configuration management issue. It was exposed when the Design Centre carried out
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the design process for two technological experimental tests (i.e. the wing box panel 
and the skin panel tests). The objective o f these tests was to select the optimal design 
concept o f the panels and provide the technological proof for the selected concepts. 
These activities were also used to check the readiness o f the Program as a whole, 
including the systems surrounding configuration management, operation management 
and the enabling technology tools.
The dispute centred over the numbering system o f the drawings. Together with the 
Program’s Configuration Management Department, the Sidina group had established 
a configuration management system using a unique one to one drawing number to 
ensure traceability. With this system, one drawing number was designated to only one 
part number so that the number became the property o f the part not of the drawing. 
Alan explained in the interview:
We defined a unique single product structure. Because it is a single product structure, it 
should also reflect the requirement of manufacturing. The product structure is not based on 
designer's viewpoint but based on the product itself, the assembly sequence, so that designers 
will establish the design according the structure of assembly. The drawing and its numbering 
system are also arranged accordingly. We established one drawing for one part concept The 
unique identifier is the part, and the drawing is one of the part attributes, the container to place 
the shape of the part (Alan. Sidina, January 1999)
The Design Centre violated this system by designating a drawing number to several 
designed parts. With support from the Chief Engineer, the Technical Adviser (i.e. 
Lucas) urged engineers to design various related parts on one single drawing sheet 
and identify them with a single drawing number. The argument for this deviation 
from the established system was that the prototype drawings did not need to be treated 
as the serial drawings. The Chief Engineer explained:
The fundamental was that we changed the design concept. For the prototype, it is impossible 
to draw every part of the component. The drawings will be in the form of assembly drawings. 
These assembly drawings have enough detail to make both assembly and detail parts. To 
make it work, we need a prototype group in manufacturing as a partner who have high skill 
and is able to interpret these (drawings] into detail drawings ... We don't have time to make 
all the detail drawings in the Design Centre. Later in serial phase, we will have a draw ing for
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each part. It is supposed to be like that to ease the configuration management. ...We are 
searching for the best way. The biggest problem is the Sidina people have never been involved 
in the design process, so their solutions did not help. They try to help but they do not help us 
in solving our problems. (Robert, Chief Engineer, January 1999)
However, not many people were convinced by this argument. Rather, it was a 
widespread awareness that the Program should make it right in the beginning to avoid 
complications later in the process, particularly in terms o f compliance with 
certification process that required traceable configuration development.
The vision of Sidina is very good. They prepare the digital system to support our design 
process, to set up the configuration management system and, therefore to reduce mistakes in 
the design process and in tire shop floor. The configuration control will be much better. 
(Victor. Design Centre. March 1998)
But. [at a development program] we don't stop at designing the product, we should 
manufacture it. With this [new] way. there is a shift in our control base, from based on 
drawing in design to based on part in production. ... The formal reason for this backward 
movement from the PL1 [program] was that they ran out of time. But they also mentioned that 
tlie manpower were not familiar with the system and that they aimed to make the process 
more flexible and faster. But I am in doubt about the speed. It is not necessarily faster, it 
maybe faster in the beginning but causes more troubles in the end. It will cause problems in 
configuration control too. (Alan. Sidina. January 99)
These incidents illustrated the distance between the Sidina as a support group with its 
customer, i.e. the PLI Program. This distance was partly caused by the approach taken 
by Alan as the team leader of Sidina. By not seeking and, subsequently, not gaining 
support from horizontal peers, they, at times, lost sight of their main objective, 
supporting the Program, and instead focused on mastering the system as another 
knowledge achievement. In doing so, Alan ignored the necessary coalition with the 
PLI team, which was notably the main customer. This also implied that the interest 
was more on getting the new system the group wanted and using the PLI Program as a 
mechanism for this rather than toward the successful implementation of CE in the PLI 
Program. On the other hand, the objections from the Design Centre could also be seen 
as resistance to change to thing that was not ‘invented here’, given the strong 
domination of design engineering culture in Indaco.
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After months o f dispute, Alan slightly modified his approach in collaborating with the 
Design Centre. He asked the Technical Adviser and the Chief Engineer to provide a 
basic design course to familiarise support system engineers with the development 
process. The aim was to provide awareness, o f the design process that would enable 
computer system engineers to provide a more designer-friendly support system. This 
might be too late for the PLI Program. But, according to Alan the Sidina group had 
been directed by the Program Manager to continue with CE preparation despite the 
cancellation o f the PLI Program and, therefore, would have plenty of time to develop 
a sufficient support system either for PLI or for any other program in the future.
8.5 William: The Role of Middle Management
William joined the company in the early 1990s after finishing his masters degree in 
France as one ofIndaco’s sponsored students. He started his involvement in the PLI 
Program as a focal point from one of Production Divisions in 1995. His power source 
in the PLI Program initially came from his education level which relatively higher 
than other focal points from Production Divisions. The tripartite analysis of his 
influence throughout the process in provided in Table 8-4.
William was genuinely interested in pushing production aspects into design 
considerations. His influence in the process came from his ‘will’ to make a 
contribution in the PLI Program. During Engineering Matrix stage, he voluntarily 
took the initiative to co-ordinate and integrated support from all focal points from 
various divisions within the Production Divisions Later, this initiative was supported 
by the Director o f Production, who saw this as the opportunity to improve Production 
Divisions’ position in the development program. He recalled in the interview:
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At that time. I saw that representatives from Production Divisions did not have the same view. 
We were not integrated. Then, I tried to get them together to make a team. The group
consisted of representatives from divisions, a good [quality] people....... 1 co-ordinated all of
them ... We produced a lot of concepts, which later became the basis of the current system ... 
At the beginning, it was just voluntary, no formal assignment. ... Then we presented to [the 
Production Director], After the presentation, the team was established and formalised with the 
D irector's memorandum to the divisions. (William. Operation Centre, December 1997)
Table 8-4: Tripartite Analysis of Power: William
Staoe Enaineenno Matrix Enaineerino in tearation Desran Production Couplina
Role
-  Focal Point from  
Production Division
-  Leader of DBP team
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Production Co-ordinator Supervisor of the Production Plannma Departm ent
Power
Sources
-  Expertise
-  Support from  Director of 
Production
-  Early involvement and early idea o f production 
integration concept
-  Early involvem ent.
-  The 'owner' o f production integration concept 
that becam e reference in the Operation Centre
Siali and 
Will
-  Production Integration
-  Lobbying production's too  
m anagem ent
-  Co-ordinatina focal p a n ts
- Mini factory concept
-  Developing the concept into w ritten charter
-  Assembly as the  core business
-  Less influential due to his current position
-  Tne concept relayed to  the Program M anager 
via the Chief of Operanon
Effect on C 
in tro ducilo
-  Form ation of Design Build 
Process (DBP) team
-  Form ation of T IP  team s
-  A ttract production staff to  
loin the PU Proaram
-  Forma D o n  of the  Operation Centre tn a t had equal 
posioon with the Design Centre
-  Attract production sta ff to  join the PLi Program
-  The concept was never openly aiscussed by the 
m anagem ent of the  PLI Program
- Com peting concepts between Design Centre, 
Operation Centre, and Sidina led to tensions, distrust, 
and conflicts
This group of focal points came from various functions, such as manufacturing, 
assembly, manufacturing planning, tooling engineering, process development, facility 
planning, industrial engineering, quality control, material procurement, manufacturing 
resource planning and material development. William’s contribution in integrating 
production resources to support the PLI program was significant. The Program 
Manager was impressed. In the beginning of Engineering integration stage, he was 
appointed as Production Co-ordinator, a liaison role that interface the Program with 
the Production Divisions. He explained:
Then, parallel with that. I was appointed by Clive to be the Operation Co-ordinator to co­
ordinate operation activities. So. I had dualism in reporting, responsible to Clive and to the 
Director of Production. (William. Operation Centre. December 1997)
Durinu this stage, the group of production representatives was formalised as Design
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Build Process Team and production-related TIP teams aimed to prepare production 
aspect o f the Program. Additional members were added from the relevant functional 
units. In the Design-Production Coupling stage, these teams were merged as part of 
the program organisation, i.e. the Operation Centre, which together with the Design 
Centre became the main part of the autonomous PLI Program.
In this sense, William was influential in promoting CE and equalising the role of 
production functions to the same level as the design functions. However, the position 
of Chief o f Operation was given to Howard, a long serving manager, who was the 
Manager for Marketing and Customer Support Department in the previous PLI 
Program organisation. William was appointed as the supervisor of Production 
Planning Department in the Operation Centre. Most TIP members joined the Program, 
as members o f the Operation Centre and continued their activities as in the previous 
stage. This made William remained influential within the Centre, as he commented:
All those [organisational] boxes are actually under the my Department. In fact, the division of 
tasks is not well balanced because Clive wanted to continue the previous process ... So. I
haven't changed [an\thing].......Most tasks earned out by the Facility Planning Department.
for example, are based on our request. The requests about assembly facility came from TIPs, 
under my co-ordination. It is not well balanced but it is fine by me. (William, Operation 
Centre. December 1997)
Even the Chief o f Operation admitted his influence as he noted in the interview:
Most members of the Operation Centre] were actually pan of William 's group back then. 
William was [responsible for] Design Build Process, or whatever, but it was mainly 
producibilitv. They were pan of that, but we could not accommodate all of them, just pan of 
them. Then, there were TIPs that remain functioning [now]. We involve shop-floor people 
from [the PLP] and [the PLC] and Fabrication. I usually rely on William for recruitment, 
because he was the one who ran it. Back then, he co-ordinated up to 200 people for those 
teams. So he knows it quite well ... He has been involved since the very beginning. (Howard. 
Chief of Operation. November 1997)
However, the operation concept pursued and developed by William and his group was 
ditferent to the one put forward by the Program Manager and Sidina group, 
particularly the concept of mini factory’ (see Section 8 3 ) In this concept, the
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production activities, the assembly o f aircraft and major components in particular, 
were seen as the core business o f the program. Other functions, including the design 
engineering functions were seen as suppliers that supporting the assembly activities2. 
Stating that the Operation Centre’s core business was the assembly line3, each of the 
TIPs was projected to be an autonomous mini-factory that delivered components to 
the assembly line.
This concept conflicted with the Design Centre’s interests, particularly with respect to 
the supplier -  customer relationship between the Operation Centre and Design Centre. 
The Design Centre viewed that the objective o f the Operation Centre was to assist the 
Design Centre in developing a sound manufacturable design, and hence the Operation 
Centre was the supplier of the Design Centre. In contrast, the Operation Centre was 
convinced that the ultimate aim of the Operation Centre was to became mini factory, 
as William stated:
In the Operation Centre, we have four overlapping activities: firstly as process integration: 
secondly as design-production team [similar to Westaco’s], which is the role of TIP teams 
right now in relation with the Design Centre: then [thirdly] as production integration team [to 
build the prototype]: and finally to be mini-factories. That’s why we plotted shop floor staff 
here in the planning stage. (William, December 1997)
These conflicting views were, to a large extent, strengthened by the lack of any clear 
protocol in CE implementation. However, being a supervisor in the Operation Centre 
and cut-off from his original function decreased William’s power. As a supervisor he 
was not part of the program core team as he was as the Production Co-ordination in 
the Engineering Integration stage. His mini factory concept although internally 
adopted as the Operation Centre concept towards CE, for example, was never 
seriously discussed or considered at the program management level. Without its
: Item (80) Appendix-B 
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original champion at that level, the mini-factory concept was prevented from being 
listed on the program’s agenda because o f its obvious deviation from the Program 
Manager’s intentions.
Further, focusing on assembly as the core business o f the PLI Program excluded 
manufacturing and tooling functions from the Operation Centre. Without adequate 
links to Production Divisions, the Operation Centre was an unnecessary bureaucratic 
mediator. Although the Operation Centre gave attention toward the producibility and 
manufacturability aspects and even provided some courses on the subjects, most of 
the operational tasks in detail part planning, NC-programming and tooling 
engineering activities were carried out by engineers from the Fabrication Division. 
William and the Operation Centre, hence, acted as the co-ordinating medium to 
channel the flow of information between the Design Centre and the Fabrication 
Division. Increasingly, the Design Centre felt this co-ordinating mechanism was 
unnecessary and even slowed the flow of information, particularly after some 
incidents surrounding the manufacturing process o f the test specimens. These 
incidents indicated the powerlessness of the Operation Centre. One engineer of the 
Operation Centre explained:
We authorised the Statement of Work to the Fabrication Division in October 1997. Last 
December, a Fabrication staff reported in a meeting that some parts were completed. We 
believed this and told our colleagues in the Design Centre that some parts were ready, in 
[Januan 1998], [we] went to the shop and realised not even one part was ready. The 
Fabrication Division had a problem with NC-programming ... We came there last Friday, 
three weeks after we discussed with [the NC expert], it was OK. But. it was three weeks later. 
... The situation changes now because everybody involved is concerned. But we cannot 
change the priority [set by Fabrication management], the [PLI] is their third priority. Right 
now, our parts are already in queue but not to be put into the machine ... That’s why 
Fabrication said that the parts would be ready on the third of April Imagine how long we have 
to wait. (Nathan. Operation Centre. March 1998)
The Chief Engineer expressed his concern and dissatisfaction with the support 
provided by the Operation Centre as the following:
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[The Chief of Operation], and his group are becoming co-ordinators. It is their weakness. For 
example, when I have a problem in the manufacturing process of the wing, I need an expert 
who knows about 'wing forming’ directly from the shop floor. The objective of collocation is 
to avoid the "men in between". ... The problem is the Operation Centre has responsibility for 
operation but does not have the tool. Tooling engineering and other manufacturing functions 
remained in Fabrication Division. ... The Operation Centre only adds a node in the process. 
The procedure becomes lengthier than before. It is not right. (Robert Chief Engineer. Januan
Some engineers from the Operation Centre admitted that such a structure slowed
down interaction with their counterparts in both Design Centre and Fabrication:
Before, it was not too bureaucratic; we did not have to go through the co-ordinator like it is 
now. Before, when we were separated, we could just call,a design engineer who was 
responsible for structure. "Could we gather in TlP-Structure to discuss this?" At that time. I 
was m tlie Fixed Wing Division. The TIP had a weekly meeting. There was no im itation 
memo, no nothing, just on-call basis. But now. through the coordinators ... I don't know. (Phillip. Operation Centre. March 1998)
In the middle o f 1998, this issue was raised in a PLI management meeting. The 
discussion was heated and ended up with an open confrontation between the 
Operation Centre and Design Centre. The confrontation resulted in a resolution that 
activities o f the Fabrication Division for the PLI were not under the co-ordination of  
the Operation Centre. The Design Centre was encouraged to contact the Fabrication 
Division directly. This resolution, obviously, made William and his group very 
unhappy and significantly demotivated them during the whole period o f the second 
field study. He failed to further mobilise and strengthen the production functions 
within the program team.
8.6 Robert and Lucas: The Role of Expertise Power
Robert was one o f Indaco's senior engineers. He joined the company in 1984 after 
finishing his Master degree in aeronautical engineering abroad and was deeply 
involved in defining aerodynamic feature o f the PLP Robert had involved in the PLI
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Program since the Engineering Matrix stage as one of experienced representatives 
from Technology Divisions. Starting from Engineering Integration stage he was fully 
dedicated to the program and assumed the position as the TOP-Airplane Manager. In 
Design-Production Coupling stage, he became a full-member o f the Program and in 
charge of the Design Centre as the Chief Engineer.
Lucas was an expatriate who had been hired as the Technical Adviser since the end of 
1996. Together with four other expatriate advisers, his task was to assist the PLI 
Program in various aspects of aircraft design and analysis. He had more than 40 
years’ experience in a design division of a renowned European aircraft company and 
an expert in aeronautics and structural design. The tripartite analysis of Robert and 
Lucas is summarised in Table 8-5.
Table 8-5: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Robert and Lucas
Lucas Robert
Stage Design-Production Coupling
P LI C 
Program
ivi si on 
M anager
•: r̂ fcak&tAasffe«:' - 
------------!-----------
| O peration Center [B u s in ess  M a n a g em en t [ Finance | [ ötttgoCerner j
Role Technical Adviser to 
the Program Manager
Chief Engineer 
Manager of the Design Centre
Power
Sources
- Expatriate with 40 years experience in 
aircraft design
- Link to the Program Manager
- Education and experience
- Early involvement in the PLI Program
Skill and 
Will
- Willing to increase the quality of designers
- Strong and dominant personality to make 
things done according to his plan
- Ignorance toward the attempt to implement 
CE-related systems and concepts
- Willing to proceed according to the CE 
concept mutually agreed previously
- Avoid confrontation and seeking harmony
- Indecisive
Effect on CE 
Introduction
- Experienced engineers leaving the Design Centre due to conflicts with Lucas
- More inexperienced engineers with greater dependency to Lucas
- Tensions and conflicts between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
- Tension and conflict between the Design Centre and Sidina Group
- Tendency to slide back to the traditional sequential apporach
- Unutilised integration capabilities of Sidina system
Within the Program, Lucas expertise was highly respected. The Chief Engineer often
334
Chapter 8: Politics of Change
referred to him as a rare ‘dinosaur’, since it was getting hard to find people in the 
modern aircraft industry with his combination o f breadth and depth o f expertise:
Typically, there are groups of people who not only know about structure but also about 
aerodynamics and other disciplines. But they are very rare now; they are almost extinct, 
particularly due to the education system. Therefore, I told you that Lucas is a dinosaur. He is 
part of the generation in which one person knew everything. ... His mathematical ability' is 
very strong, so he knows aerolastics too. (Robert, Chief Engineer, November 1997)
Similarly, all engineers within the Design Centre referred him as a genius. They 
respected his expertise and were grateful for the technical assistance he offered. He 
also ran several basic applied engineering courses for the engineers to enhance their 
expertise. Some expressed their gratitude as the follows:
[Lucas] teaches us the very basic calculation to do the design so we have the ’feeling'. ... 
Now. we have several engineers working with us and under [Lucas's] direct supervision. That 
is good. Before, we had a lot of technical advisers but they were just telling us and were not as 
useful as him. He told us the basic of design, made us having the feeling about design. (Frank, 
Design Centre, March 1998)
[Lucas] is die champion. He not only knows structure, but also everything else. Whereas 
[Robert] is still young, hasn’t made many products, hasn’t got a lot of knowledge and 
experience. [Robert] once confessed to me that he and I are learning together in this program. 
(Darren. Design Centre. March 1998)
However, some were offended by Lucas’s manner in the Design Centre. He often 
raised his voice at and mocked those engineers whose work was not to his 
satisfaction. Most engineers, particularly the younger ones, accepted this as part of the 
‘eccentricity o f a genius’ and, in particular, because his help was worthy. The more 
experienced engineers were more offended. As one of them said:
[Lucas] is supposed to assist us only in technical matters, but he does everything else too. As 
a genius, his attitude is just like that There is no democracy in here, only authoritarian. 
(Roger. Design Centre, November 1997)
This particular engineer, a Supervisor in the Design Centre, later left the Program 
after a heated confrontation with Lucas over the wingbox technological experiment. 
Some others felt that Lucas did not respect others, including the Chief Engineer. One 
engineer, a Supervisor who often had confrontations.with Lucas said:
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[Lucas] is weird. I have worked with many technical advisers. We know [Indaco] need them, 
no question about that. But, it has to be based on respect. If we respect each other we could 
listen to each other. But, [Lucas], he might be a champion, but has no respect for us and does 
not hesitate to put people down and saying bad words. It is very discouraging. Our culture 
cannot accept this discouraging attitude. I am not sure about his position in the organisation, 
but I know he does not report to [Robert], The saddest thing is he does not respect [Robert], 
That’s the main problem for me. How dare he talking to [Robert] like that? As [Robert's] 
subordinate, I could not accept that. 1 don’t care that he is [Clive’s] people. He has no respect 
[toward us], that’s the problem. (John. Design Centre, January 1999)
Increasingly, others began to feel that Lucas had taken control o f the development 
process. At one point, he ordered design engineers not to go to a meeting conducted 
by the Operating Centre. He also ignored engineers from the Operation Centre who 
came to the Design Centre to discuss issues with their counterparts. He often referred 
to them as a group who had no job other than disrupting designers’ concentration. 
During the financial crisis when Indaco had to let go most foreign advisers, Lucas was 
the only one who remained. In a sense, this reflected that the Indaco’s top 
management respected him and relied heavily on his expertise to support the 
development process. This made him become more dominant in the PLI Program.
Lucas’s domination became a major factor that inhibited more experienced engineers 
from Technology Divisions in joining the PLI program. His approach was seen as 
Hocking the creativity out’ of the designers. Many questioned the effectiveness of his 
approach, particularly, in terms of building up the creativity needed in the design and 
development process. Inevitably, without support from more experienced engineers, 
the PLI Program had more inexperienced engineers in the design teams and, in turn, 
became more dependent to Lucas. One engineer expressed this issue:
A more driving force why people hesitate to participate is [Lucas], Because of the absence of 
creativity' freedom, senior engineers do not want to participate. I wanted to put the best people 
in die program, but I could not because diey argued "my experience would be of no use 
diere”. Therefore, I put die junior ones ... No senior engineers wanted to get involved in die 
program on a full tune basis. The lack of experience in die Program is getting worse. There is 
no school for designing, ... It is a matter of experience and a matter of creativity. You can be 
creauve on die basis of experience, we build our creadvity based on our experience. ... It is 
true diat Lucas has die experience, but m die aircraft development diere are a lot of other 
disciplines. This means the development process involves the way we work and interact, a
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more cultural issue. It should be a flexible environment. ... But with Lucas, it is based on his 
instruction; the creativity is not channelled. To be a designer we need to be creative, otherwise 
the designer is dead and becomes a coolie. (John, Design Centre, January 1999)
The Chief Engineer was seemingly powerless to deal with this situation and at times 
indecisive, particularly in the issues that previously had been mutually agreed with the 
Operation Centre. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, hierarchically Lucas 
was not under his control but reported and took orders directly from the Program 
Manager. Given the Indonesian cultural tendency, questioning Lucas might imply that 
he was questioning the Program Manager, his superior, which was not a proper 
behaviour. Secondly, professionally he respected Lucas’s expertise and knew that he 
needed him to complement his own lack o f experience and expertise in some aspects 
of the design process. Furthermore, he knew that most members o f his team were 
inexperienced and needed guidance that he might not be able to provide. Thirdly, 
personally he hated confrontation and most o f the time sought compromise to avoid it.
Many members characterised Robert’s leadership as ‘soft’ and ‘need o f more 
toughness’. Some o f them illustrated his leadership as follows;
As the Chief Engineer, [Robert] knows a lot about aircraft. But in managing engineers, we 
haven’t heard a lot from him. We heard that from [Lucas], [Robert] once said to me, ''Darren 
if something is going on with [Lucas], would you please tell me”. ... [Lucas] is very 
persistent, stubborn and tough. How could I call [Robert] [to face] with all the yelling and 
shouting from [Lucas], ... [Robert] is soft and very patient. (Darren, Design Centre, March 
1998)
In my opinion we need a tougher Chief Engineer. Theoretically, [Lucas] cannot make the 
decision; the Chief Engineer is the one who makes decisions. So tire Chief Engineer must be 
tough. Theoretically, [Lucas] is not the Chief Engineer, but he is so dominant. (Ray, Design 
Centre, November 1997)
For the Design Centre’s engineers the every day design activities were characterised 
by juggling between the officially scheduled tasks and those given by Lucas. The 
officially scheduled tasks were based on the schedule established by the Operation 
Centre. This schedule was derived from the Program’s Master Phasing Plan and
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consisted o f target dates for the design to release the engineering data for production. 
However, Lucas ignored the schedule and ordered designers to work according to his 
preference, Robert took no action. This situation partly explains the absence of 
schedule review in most meetings. A design engineer illustrated the typical every day 
situation as follows:
We are supposed to be schedule driven. ...But, our work is actually driven by Lucas. ... When 
we were doing something [based on the schedule], [Lucas] came and said.” I don't want to see 
this”... We want to do the official ones that based on the schedule, but there is also something 
from [Lucas], He is one man show: sometimes his show sacrifices other. ... I feel pity for 
[Robert], He was often caught in an awkward position. He wanted to co-ordinate us but 
[Lucas] is in the way. Hence. [Robert] took a compromise way. said. "You do whatever 
[Lucas] asks but don't forget other tilings. Manage your time.” At the end. it goes back to us: 
we have to manage the time. In the schedule we have to do the centre-line diagram. ... But 
[Lucas] goes directlv to [for example] vertical tail and defines its hard-points. ... According to 
hint hard-points are the most important tilings for manufacturing to enable Fabrication 
Division preparing tools. ... It is true, but the schedule is not like that. So. we just do our best 
to comply with both. (Darren. Design Centre. March 1998)
The confrontation avoidance of the Chief Engineer toward Lucas cost him the trust of 
his team. These engineers felt they could not rely on him to back them up, even when 
they were right and he knew it. An incident that happened in the later stage of the 
field study when the skin panel was finally tested illustrates the situation created by 
the combination of the nature of explosive Lucas, the indecisiveness and 
confrontation avoidance manner of the Chief engineer, and the immature engineers.
Before the on-site static test witness meeting with the Regulation Authority officers. Robert 
briefly met 3 engineers from tire body integration team near the test site. They discussed the 
current test result. Andrew, a structure analyst said that die result was different from the 
theory. He also provided tentative explanation suspecting the effect of both the mbber and the 
aluminium flat installed between the rubber and the omega stringer. Robert seemingly agreed 
with the logic of the explanation, thanked him and asked him to explain that result to the 
authority officers in the meeting. At the meeting, the authority7 officer directly took over the 
meeting, asking various questions of documentation and conformity of the process of 
developing the specimen. In die area of testing installation, the officer questioned die absence 
of setting strain gauges and doubted diat they were actually testing die criucal area widiout 
such gauges. The engineers tried to response and Robert tried to support his members but 
unconvincingly. At die end. die engineers agreed to install at least one of setting gage and 
asked the facility specialist to change die test installation who, in response said it would take 
about an hour.
While waiting. Robert discreetly questioned die decision not to put setting gage on place. 
Andrew said diat he wanted to put it on. but the facility expert said diey did not have it and 
installing it would take time. The fact diat die installation only took one hour amazed him. 
They discussed the discrepancies of the result. Robert then quesdoned die decision to put the
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aluminium flat between the rubbers. Three engineers looked at each other. Andrew said that 
he (and apparently all) was against it at tire beginning. Robert wisely asked whether it was 
Lucas idea, and all of them nodded. Robert said, ’’All right, do not finger pointing, but you 
have to explain this result to Lucas and that you suspect that the discrepancy was due to tire 
flat, and suggest to remove it”. He went on,” you should have confidence on your own 
concept and convince others dirough various different ways, try to be more straight in 
argumentation". He gestured that it should include argumentation with the authority officer. 
Andrew said. "yeah. 1 would feel confident explaining things that I belief, but it is hard to 
made argument on tilings you don't agree with, like tire setting gage. I could not argue with 
die officer since I knew dial he was right".
Lucas came and asked about die result. At first he looked at it- tentadveiv. did not fully 
understand die explanadon. Seeing die chart of stress versus pressures, he said diat die stress 
on die way back is not die same widi on die way up. Somediing was absorbing it. Being told 
diat diey suspected die discrepancy was because of the aluminium, he asked. ’’why did you 
put die aluminium diere?” and dien went on and on about how stupid die idea was and 
provided teclirucal reasons why it should not be diere. When he comprehended dial he was 
actually accused of being responsible of suggesting die idea, he burst out. "When you said dial 
1 told you to put aluminium diere. you are insulting me.” He was very angry. ’’I may be old, 
but my memory and my brain still perfect. I will remember tilings like dus." The engineers did 
not respond but when Lucas went out of the circle, diev said diat diev had proved it was Lucas 
idea. They still had die draft diey discussed with Lucas. They have tried 3 dines to convince 
liim not to put die aluminium. More importandy. 3 of them remembered die same version 
against Lucas denial. Then. Robert told die engineers, not to finger pointing and calmed down 
Lucas and said. "It seemed diere was a misunderstanding." One engineer whispered. ’’Look, 
no body stand on our side for diings like diis. Never!” (Field Study Journal. February 1999)
Obviously, this situation inhibited the implementation of CE in the PLI Program. The 
Operation Centre, in particular, was very' upset at Lucas’s domination and the 
deviation from a CE approach caused by him. Lucas’s interference in the supposed to 
be CE process was very apparent:
The drawing was wrong. The colleague from Design Centre told me diat Lucas was furious 
and got verv angrv to him. ... At diat time Lucas also said diat die Operation Centre should 
just back off and stay out of die Design Centre. According to Lucas, all assessments made by 
the Operation Centre could well go to rubbish bin. (Phillip, Operation Centre, January 1999)
We had a routine meeting witii die Operation Centre. But Lucas said we did not need diat. 
Only if we have problem we would run a meetmg and so it is.... Sometimes, we have problem 
but Lucas said we do not have to [have the meeting], (Frank. Design Centre. March 1998)
Engineers from the Operation Centre became reluctant to visit the Design Centre. 
They blamed the Chief Engineer and his inexperience for this threat to CE. The 
explosive confrontation between the Chief of Operation and Lucas in a program’s 
management meeting (i.e. September 1998) resulted in a complete breakdown in co­
operation between the Operation Centre and the Design Centre. In one of his
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explosive outbursts after this meeting, Lucas said that he did not want to talk to the 
Operation Centre any more, and instead asked an engineer from the Design Centre to 
explain things. Coincident with the growing anxiety over the continuation o f the PLI 
Program, this breakdown added to the demotivation o f Operation Centre engineers.
Similarly, the Sidina group was unhappy with Lucas’s domination. ‘The Lucas way 
of designing’ that dominated the development process was incompatible with the 
configuration management system they developed. On the other hand, Lucas and 
Robert accused the Sidina group o f developing a system that was not user friendly 
because they were not familiar with the design process as discussed previously.
Lucas’s power came from his technical expertise and his links to the Program 
Manager. In design-production coupling stage, within various conditions that 
prevented CE from developing as intended by the Program Manager (e.g. lack of 
competence in design teams, lack o f clarity in CE concept, the distance between the 
Sidina group and the Program, the failure of the Operation Centre to integrate all 
production functions, and lack of attention from the Program Manager), he 
increasingly became influential. His dominance was, in part, due to the lack of 
strength and power of the Chief Engineer in the face o f his idiosyncratic and forceful 
personality. All aspects of the Chief Engineer’s power were undermined by Lucas’s 
power. Lucas was more knowledgeable and the Chief Engineer needed his assistance. 
Lucas reported to the Program Manager and not officially under control of the Chief 
Engineer. Cultural tendency of non-criticism strengthened Lucas’s influence. The will 
and skill o f Robert, the soft-spoken Chief Engineer, was not a match for Lucas’s 
structural position and his forceful personality
Lucas’s domination, combined with Robert’s inability to take necessary actions.
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shaped the PLI’s CE to a form that deviated further from that initially intended. Under 
Lucas direction, the design process ignored the system developed by the Sidina group 
and did not use the full benefit offered by the Sidina system. He also discouraged 
design engineers to interact with production engineers. This interaction started to 
flourish at the end of the Design Integration stage and in the early o f Design- 
Production Coupling stage. He even ignored the official schedule for the PLI. These 
deviations remained until the termination o f the PLI Program.
8.7 Summary
The organisational politics as manifested by actions (or in-actions) and decisions (or 
non-decisions) of key groups and individuals, played an important part in shaping and 
transforming CE. The transformation of CE toward a model specific to the company 
was not only an adjustment process to fit the approach with its contextual factors but 
also a result o f political behaviour o f key groups and individuals in forcing and 
securing their own interests, sometimes through manipulation of contextual factors.
The analysis in this chapter shows that initially the Program Manager had the 
opportunity to introduce CE with strong support and company-wide enthusiasm, 
particularly from functional production units as reflected in their involvement in 
various program activities during engineering matrix stage. However, his lack of 
understanding o f the sensitivity and culture of functional design units led to actions 
that enhanced rivalry and created tensions with those units. This led to increasingly 
young design engineers being assigned to the Program during the engineering 
integration and design-production coupling stages. Meanwhile, key individuals from 
production and computer support functions also had their own interests and agendas.
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The functional production units longed for improving their position in the product 
development process, while the agenda o f the computer support people was to get 
their hand on state o f the art technology. Furthermore, the Program Manager was 
increasingly busy with other tasks. Combined with the lack o f systematic protocols, 
these led to confusion and raised the opportunity to the Technical Adviser to dominate 
with the approach that different from CE. The result was that CE ideas were not 
followed up by their implementation. Instead, the organisational arrangement and 
mechanisms were continuously adjusted throughout four stages o f change process.
It is also evident that cultural tendencies, particularly power distance and collectivism 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1991; 1984), influenced the actions of people involved in the 
process. The attitudes of Mark toward Clive’s appointment as the chairperson, the 
ambiguousness o f Clive’s CE presentation in the Executive Management Council, the 
harmony sought by Robert in dealing with Lucas, all can be, at least partly, attributed 
to high power distance and collectivism o f Indonesian society. These all contributed 
to the changing forms and final shape o f CE.
The result in reality was a messy process o f CE implementation in which various 
competing contextual factors and organisational power and politics were intertwined. 
The application o f tripartite analysis o f power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995) 
framework into the political actors’ actions is useful to capture such an involved 
process. It provides explanations why the process made a particular turn and not 
another. In general, this chapter strengthens March and Olson (1983) suggestion of 
reorganisation as a ‘garbage can’ in which the course o f events seem to depend less 
on properties o f the initial concept than on the happenstance of short-run political 
attention, over which the implementation team typically have little control.
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CHAPTER 9
THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE: SUMMARY
DISCUSSION
9.1 introduction
The main objectives of this chapter are to provide an overview o f the dynamics of 
introducing CE in Indaco and outline some of the ways in which the processual 
analysis captures its complex and changing character. The chapter is arranged as 
follows. Section 9.2 summarises the main stages o f change chronologically through 
four stages o f CE introduction. Section 9.3 outlines some of key drivers and barriers 
in the configuration of adopted CE that affected the form of organisational integration 
o f CE. Sections 9.4 and 9.5 describe the influence of some key features of 
organisational politics and the broader organisational context.
9.2 Case Study Findings: Four Stages of CE Introduction Process
Although modelled to Westaco’s CE that integrated all necessary initiatives, CE 
introduction to Indaco was characterised by strong focus on enabling technology 
initiatives, particularly its computer-based technology The most important
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organisational integration initiatives, such as cross-functional team and heavyweight 
management, were mentioned as important but never carefully prepared at the outset. 
Combined with the nature of Indaco’s organisational context, this ignorance created 
various problems and failures during the process.
The decision to introduce this kind o f CE was influenced more by considerations 
associated with the external context rather than by requirement to find an appropriate 
solution for the company’s problems associated with new product development 
process or serious consideration on its organisational context. Both industrial and 
national contexts provided a push to the same direction: an emphasis on computer- 
based enabling technology. CE was widely used in aircraft industry. It was spread 
and transferred to Indaco through aircraft industry’s common practices: technical and 
management consulting services and internship program. On the other hand, bearing 
the mission as the nation’s agent o f technology transfer, Indaco was interested most 
on the advanced of W estaco’s CE enabling technology and tried to mimic it without 
full consideration on its own readiness and the nature of its organisational context.
In term of its organisational integration aspect, the process of CE introduction in the 
Indaco’s PLI Program can be divided into four stages, each with different 
organisational structure and mechanism. These stages reflected efforts to find 
appropriate means o f achieving an appropriate organisational integration within a 
specific Indaco’s context and organisational politics. They also illustrated the ad-hoc 
nature of organisational integration initiatives. The summary o f the organisational 
integration mechanisms and the contribution of contextual factors and organisational 
politic in each stage is as follows:
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1) Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 -  August 1995)
This stage was a pre-CE stage. The PLI development was carried out by engineers of 
a functional department, namely New Product Development (NPD) Department of 
Technology Division. Consequently, the scope o f the development team was limited 
and only involved design engineers. However, this stage provided a relatively 
cohesive, highly motivated team that became the basis for CE introduction and 
enabled CE to develop in the next stage. The formation of such a team was made 
possible due to the mixed o f senior leader and junior engineers, overlapping 
membership pattern, two-way communication pattern, and extensive collaboration.
To a large extent, the leadership o f Mark, the head of NPD Department and the 
Project Engineer of the PLI Program, contributed to the shape o f such a CE- 
conducive team. His leadership and actions encouraged young and inexperienced 
engineers to tackle the obviously daunting tasks in a manner that emphasised on 
mastering and exploring various engineering specialisations while at the same time 
encouraged collaboration within a relatively unrestricted environment. Other than his 
personality, M ark’s approach was also influenced by his understanding on the state’s 
o f Indaco’s technological capabilities, particularly on the level of the accumulative 
tacit and explicit knowledge o f its engineers. His approach was also made possible by 
the combination of his close link to the Indaco’s President Director, Indaco’s highly 
centralised structure, and Indaco’s strong technology orientation, that provided the 
team with more than enough resources to play around.
2) Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 -  October 1996)
This stage was the beginning of CE adoption. A major change from the previous stage 
was the upgrading of the Program’s position from a functional department led by a 
middle manager to become a heavyweight organisational division led by a senior
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manager. In line with CE adoption, the PLI Program involved company-wide cross­
functionality although only design-related functions played the main role in the 
development process. The design teams were divided primarily based on integrated 
end product. The Program set up a matrix arrangement between its design teams and 
engineering specialist groups from the functional design units, which viewed as 
resource pools for the Program. Due to engineers involved in the matrix were 
mostly inexperienced and collaboration across teams were limited functional design 
units had a significant influence in technical decisions, which dissatisfied the leaders 
of the PLI Program as they saw it as eroding their control in the development process.
This stage was characterised by enthusiasm of non design-related functions, 
particularly production-related functions, to get involve in the development process. 
However, it also characterised by growing tension between the Program and 
functional design units, particularly concerning the issues of design decision 
responsibility and human resource allocation. To a large extent, this tension led to the 
change of organisational structure in the next stage.
Several factors can be accounted for the state of organisational integration on this 
stage. Firstly, the strong technology orientation often put other functions in ill-fated 
situation in the previous development programs. CE is seen as an opportunity to alter 
this situation and improve their status. Secondly, focusing on computer-based 
technology, all these major organisational changes were executed without substantial 
preparation in human resources or in protocols that guide the new company-wide 
arrangement while the intended computer-based technology required a significant 
time to be developed. Thirdly, in pushing his intention on CE, the Program Manager 
failed to build necessary coalition with experienced key personnel in functional 
design units. Should he, for example, have taken benefit of Mark’s understanding on
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the contextual situation, he might pursue his intention differently. This cost him and 
the Program not only the necessity to change the organisational structure and 
mechanism, but also the growing rivalry and tension with functional design units in 
the next stage. -
Fourthly, his ignorance on the need to set up the necessary protocols in undertaking 
CE approach did not provide the program teams with guidance to proceed according 
to his intended approach which were significantly different from the way most team 
members and other fellow employees knew and practised. This was exaggerated by 
his ignorance on the need of team-related training courses, such as team building and 
interpersonal communication skill.
3) Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 -  June 1997)
This stage was characterised by more intense tension and conflict with functional 
design units and continuous enthusiasm from production-related functional units in 
supporting the Program. Three major changes in organisational aspect occurred in this 
stage. Firstly, the internalisation of engineering specialists from the matrix between 
the Program and Engineering Specialist Groups. This made engineering specialists to 
become fully members of the Program’s design teams. Technical decisions, therefore, 
were fully in the hand of the Program. Secondly, the increasingly younger and less 
experienced engineers involved in the Program. Thirdly, the establishment of several 
Co-ordinators as fully dedicated functional representatives to perform liaison role 
between the Program and functional units, most notably the Production Co-ordinator.
To a large extent, the development in this stage was contributed by the fact that the 
Program Manager was unaware of the implication ot the previous PLP Program and 
its subsequent first flight success on the pride of engineers in functional design units
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either as an individual or as a group. The internalisation o f engineering specialists and 
conceiving functional design units as the resource pools not only buried the 
expectation o f most leaders and engineers from functional design units to continue 
their company-wide domination through their design decisions but also directly and 
openly challenged this pride. On the other hand, the growing activities in production- 
related functions fostered by the Production Co-ordinator, who got strong back-up 
from the leaders of functional production units, created awareness in the Program 
Manager on the importance o f production-related functions. These two were major 
factors that led to another organisational change that marked the final stage o f CE 
introduction process.
4) Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 -  June 1999)
Three major changes in organisational integration aspect distinguished this stage from 
the previous one. Firstly, the Program became an autonomous division that cut-off 
from the influence and resources o f functional units. Secondly, the formation o f two 
centres, the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, which in effect provided 
production-related functions with an equal status to the design-related functions in 
product development. Thirdly, increasing number o f young and inexperienced 
engineers and team leaders that led to increasing ignorance and disrespect toward the 
technical decisions made by the lower-level teams that frustrated both design and 
production engineers. Overall, this stage was characterised with increasing tensions 
and conflicts between the PLI Program and functional design units, increasing 
frustration among engineers involved in the Program, and increasing attempt to 
impose approach that clearly deviate from CE through separation of design and 
production functions in the Program, the lack o f effective matrix organisation 
between the Program and the functional units, authoritarian leadership, and one-way
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communication in the design development process.
At its abrupt termination due to the continuing Indonesian economic crisis, the CE 
introduction in the PLI Program froze at the following characteristics of its 
organisational integration, communication, and decision making mechanisms:
1) an autonomous product development team instead of heavyweight program team,
2) parallel design and production teams instead of single integrated teams,
3) increasingly hostile environment instead of teamwork within the program teams 
and between the program teams and other involved functions,
4) reduction o f lower level team s’ participation in design decision, and
5) failure in utilising computer technology as an integrating mechanism as suggested 
by engineering literature (e.g. Norman, 1990; Volk, 1992; and Fan, 1995) due to 
the stand alone and ad-hoc nature of the current system.
Several major factors significantly contributed to this development. Firstly, due to the 
development in the company and its wider context, the Program M anager tied to other 
assignments and could not intensively supervise the Program. Secondly, the Program 
Manager had not established a successful coalition with functional design units but 
rather increased rivalry through the autonomous program division. In response to this, 
functional design units pulled out most of experienced engineers from the Program. 
The Chief Engineer and young engineers remained in the Program became vulnerable 
to the actions o f a domineering technical adviser who imposed contrasting approaches 
including discouragement to interact with the Operation Centre and ignorance toward 
the schedule. Thirdly, unavailability of guiding protocols on the intended CE left the 
inexperienced program teams off-guard upon imposed different approach. Fourthly, 
the lag in the preparation of the computer support system provided inadequate support 
for the engineers and forced them to invent their own systems, such as data storage
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and retrieving system and the drawing identification system, that were incompatible 
with the intended support system.
During the process of the four-phase of CE introduction, there were many episodes in 
which aspects of CE were partially implemented; for example;
1) High level o f collaboration during the program initiation stage and, at least in 
some part o f design teams, at the beginning o f CE adoption (i.e. engineering 
matrix stage).
2) Heavyweight management team although for most o f the time it was limited at the 
highest level of the program management (i.e. the Program Manager).
3) The formation of matrix arrangement between the Program and functional design 
units and the assignment of focal points from company-wide functional units to 
support the Program in engineering matrix stage.
4) Active involvement of production-related functions in supporting the Program 
since the beginning of CE adoption (i.e. since engineering matrix stage).
5) Formai equalisation of the role and status of production-related functions with the 
role and status of design-related functions through the formation of the Design 
Centre and the Operation Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
6) High level o f collaboration between design engineers and production engineers in 
the beginning of design-production coupling stage.
However, the final form of Indaco’s CE was far from the intended Westaco model 
except for its equalisation of the status of production-related functions and the 
heavyweightness of the Program Manager. The form that emerged could hardly be 
called a CE process although it can be argued that the abrupt termination forced by 
the external context did not provide the opportunity to further shape the final form of 
CE in the PLl Program. "
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9.3 Drivers and Barriers of Integration in the Adopted CE 
Configuration
The case study findings illustrate the vagueness o f CE concept. CE means different 
things to different product development undertakings across companies and even in 
the same company. In this respect, assessing CE adoption and implementation 
through its operational initiatives become crucial. This operationalisation enables to 
see CE concept ‘in action’.
The case study shows the importance o f not only selecting which technology or 
approach to adopt (i.e. CE approach), but also the selecting the right configuration of 
the appraoch (i.e. the combination o f CE initiatives) (Thomas, 1994). In this respect, 
CE introduction in the case study suffered from five major obstacles:
1) The heavyweight Program Manager’s lack o f seniority and organisational clout in 
driving the implementation of a CE structure.
2) The chaotic and ineffective nature of the ad-hoc character o f shifting 
organisational arrangements to deal with ongoing problems of horizontal 
integration.
3) The lack o f integration of the development o f enabling technology with an 
evolving product development process.
4) The lack o f competency, including necessary explicit and tacit skills and 
knowledge, o f the Program team.
5) The lack o f systematic CE protocols and plan for their implementation.
From amongst these factors, a particular feature of the case study was the way in 
which it highlighted the importance of competent staff and systematic protocol for 
organisational integration. The increasingly young and inexperienced engineers in the
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Program caused both technical and non-technical problems in the development 
process. Other than the assignment of technical advisers to assist in solving technical 
problems, the PLI Program did not make significant effort to increase the competency 
o f the program team. A technical adviser .might solve the technical problems by 
imposing his technical opinions but did not contribute to the accumulation of 
internalised tacit knowledge that according to Nakayama (1997) necessary in such 
development. Such knowledge could only be internalised through fieldwork 
knowledge (e.g. intuition, experience and analogy), that helps in understanding 
overall circumstances and actively re-framing or integrating various technologies. 
Although engineering literature has mentioned the importance o f tacit knowledge in 
the product development (e.g. Nakayama, 1997), the defining factors of tacit and 
explicit knowledge are mostly taken for granted and embedded in CE. It seems that 
the term ‘skill competence’ had said it all, whilst this difference between tacit and 
explicit knowledge has a very significant implication in the implementation process.
The necessity o f systematic protocols involves two issues: What CE initiatives are 
carried out (i.e. CE-related manuals) and how CE is implemented in the organisation 
(i.e. CE charter and implementation plan). The case study shows that the lack of these 
two types of protocol in the PLI Program caused at least four problems include the 
absence o f a well-defined CE concept and commonly agreed approach, operating 
procedures, exit criteria and deliverables, and standard operating manuals for the 
enabling technology. These problems caused inconsistency in management decisions 
particularly in dealing with the issue of lack of competency. These problems also 
caused confusion among those involved in the Program as they embarked on the 
change from traditional sequential approach but without clear guidelines for the new 
one and contributed to tensions within the Program teams and between the Program
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teams and company-wide functions supporting the Program. Such confusion and 
tension contributed to the failure o f CE and the infusion o f contrasting approaches.
The case study also shows that organisational integration, both structurally and 
processually, is the most important feature o f CE. Instead o f focusing on initiatives in 
these two categories, CE in Indaco’s PLI Program emphasised on initiatives in 
enabling technology, particularly computer-based technology. In organisational 
integration aspect, the most consistent initiative was the heavyweight Program 
Manager, which decided at the outset and kept throughout the process. This initiative, 
though, had its weakness due to the relatively junior status o f the Program Manager in 
term of his tenure that later cost the Program because o f his lack o f organisational 
clouts and thus inability to build coalition with the key individuals in functional 
design units. Organisational arrangement to achieve cross-functional team was 
continuously adjusted to fit in with the developing situation. This ad-hoc nature of 
organisational arrangement reflected the program management’s ignorance to the 
organisational aspect of CE. The Program kept changing its structure to reduce the 
influence from outside, which perceived as eroding the Program’s control and 
authority in the development process.
The communication and decision making process were also ad-hoc, according to the 
preference of the leader of each team. This ad-hoc nature prevented the collaboration 
to occur within and between teams, the information to be shared systematically, and 
the interlocking communication structure to exist. Further, design decisions and 
commitments made by the lower-level teams were increasingly disrespected and 
ignored. This prevented the necessary collaboration across lower-level teams. These 
initiatives, though, were not totally independent, but also dependent upon initiatives 
from other aspects. They can be seen as both part and result of CE initiatives.
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In the case study, the weakness of the above initiatives was failed to be complemented 
by initiatives in the computer-based technology, the focus of the CE adoption in this 
case. The focus on this technology in effect treated CE as a tool that was indicated by 
over excitement in supporting computer .system development. This led to the 
ignorance to the needs o f the current development process. This ignorance to some 
extent was also contributed by the obvious failure o f the approach taken by the PLI 
Program in adopting CE: developing the computer-based enabling technology in 
parallel with developing the product. The success of CE initiatives in W estaco’s 
product development programs could not be separated by the state o f their in-house 
computer support development. But, CE initiatives in each product development 
program relied on the ready to use computer support systems that have been achieved 
rather than the support system that was in the development process.
9.4 The Significance of Organisational Politics
The empirical findings of this case study confirm that organisational politics is central 
to the technological change process as has been recognised by Thomas (1994). 
Thomas (1994) argues that innovation and change in technology and organisation 
may be as much products of internal political action as they are products of 
exogenous forces, conscious design of top leaders, or efforts of units formally 
sanctioned to it. In this CE introduction process, intentional actions and non-actions 
of key individuals significantly shaped the nature of change process. These key 
individuals were not necessarily the important leaders of the Program. Rather, they 
also included a lower-level manager within the Program, an expatriate technical 
adviser, and a manager from outside the Program team, all with their own sources of
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power.
The case study also shows that the uncertainty nature o f the adoption (Madison et al., 
1980; Tushman, 1977; Hickson et ah, 1971) and the interests of people involved 
(Thomas, 1994; Guth and Me Millan, 1989; Wilkinson, 1983; Porter et al. 1976) were 
the main reasons for increasing political activities in the process. Two types on 
uncertainty occurred in the case study: the uncertainty due to the major transformation 
from traditional sequential approach to CE (Riedel and Pawar, 1991) and the 
uncertainty due to the absence o f clear direction of CE configuration implemented.
This uncertainty interacts with the self-interest activities of individuals and groups in 
the organisation. The case study shows that the contribution of interests of individuals 
or groups of individuals were immense, particularly considering the unbalanced 
domination of one functional group (i.e. design engineering) over the other (i.e. 
production engineering). Indeed, status inequality between design engineers and 
production or manufacturing engineers in high-tech industries, not to mention other 
staff from even lower status functions, had been noted by many researchers (Kunda, 
1991; Thomas, 1994).
In this case study, CE was seen as a potential vehicle by manufacturing and 
production engineers to show their existence, enact their worldviews, and in turn 
attain greater influence in the development process that previously dominated solely 
by design engineers. This was reflected by their effort in increasing functional 
involvement in the process and later imposing the mini-factory concept. The success 
of this effort could significantly alter the existing structural context and power 
relation between design engineers and production engineers as noted by Thomas 
(1994) in his case studies. In this case study, however, this balance of power could not
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truly be achieved despite o f the structural formation of both Design and Operation 
Centres. The effort o f production engineers lose a significant back up power in 
relation to decreasing power sources o f its main champion due to the alternation of its 
structural context included the cut off from the production-related functions and 
relatively insignificant hierarchical status of the main champion. Despite this failure, 
this case study clearly shows the role o f organisational politics in the change process, 
in which CE was regarded as an opportunity to attain greater power and improve their 
status particularly by the production-related engineers and their functions.
In relation to the computer-based technology initiatives, the interest of a particular 
group rather than the integral interest o f the company, or in this case, the product 
development process, was a dominant explanatory variable. For the computer support 
(i.e. Sidina) group, the PLI Program and its CE introduction were not the objectives, 
but rather a means that could enable them put their hand in an advanced computer- 
based technology. This helps explaining the ignorance of this group in building 
horizontal coalition with the PLI Program team. It also helps explaining the decision 
to use a component from other Program.
9.5 The Significance of Contextual Factors
Contextual factors influenced the shape of the changing process and the final form of 
CE in two ways: 1) directly, through imposing constraints and limitations to the 
process and 2) indirectly, through providing a constrained arena for political actions 
that influences the process. It should be noted, however, that the context was not only 
constrained the process and political actions, but it could also be altered as a result of 
a process or political action. The latter can be seen in the changing nature of the
356
Chapter 9: The dynamics of Change. Summary Discussion
program structures throughout the process, each with different boundaries for political 
arena.
The case study was intended to focus on the contribution of organisational context, 
but the findings also show a significant contribution o f the industry and national 
context in the process. The individual level o f analysis in discussing organisational 
power and politics revealed the contribution of societal culture in the process that 
worth further discussion. These findings clearly confirm Thomas's (1994) strong 
recommendation for extending both organisational and temporal context.
Within the organisational context o f the case study, a major significant factor was the 
nature of stage of development o f the company, particularly in the aspects of 
individual and organisational knowledge accumulation. As shown in the previous 
chapters, most problems encountered in the PLI Program were associated with lack of 
competent engineers in the Program teams. In respect o f the product development 
process, Indaco had not yet had enough knowledge, particularly the tacit design 
engineering knowledge. This situation is understandable since such tacit knowledge 
could only be accumulated through experiencing various product development 
processes while Indaco had completed only one co-development process (i.e. the PLC 
Program) and its other program (i.e. the PLP Program) was in the certification phase. 
Hence, the number of experienced engineers was limited and some of them had 
already been promoted into managerial positions hence unavailable for detail 
engineering tasks.
In this state of engineering competency, the PLI Program had to compete over the 
valuable experienced engineers with other programs, the PLP program that 
encountered huge engineering problems in its certification process and the PLC
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derivative program that considered essential to boost PLC market after its more than 
12 years field operation. Unfortunately, the PLI Program had not yet had as strong 
attachment to the engineers and design-engineering functions as the other two 
previous programs. Such a strong attachment was related to the fact that the PLC was 
the only selling product contributed to the company’s revenue, hence the employees’ 
pay-cheque, and that the PLP Program, to which most experienced engineers were 
previously involved with, played a crucial role related to greater domination of design 
engineers and functional design units.
To make the matter worse, instead o f forming a coalition with key individuals in 
functional design units, the Program iManager dealt with such situation through 
limiting the Program’s exposure from the functional design units with internalisation 
o f engineering specialists and forming an autonomous program divisions. These 
actions triggered a sense of rivalry in those units. As the result, the PLI Program had 
to cope with the increasingly less experienced engineers in its design teams that leads 
to conflicts and tensions within the Program between the Program and those 
functional design units.
Other major contextual factors were the organisational culture that had strong 
technology orientation and its subsequent domination o f design-related functions. 
This was strongly fostered by the founder of the company, an aeronautic engineer 
who almost single-handedly built Indaco. The domination of design-related functions 
was not only in the design development process but also in the organisational status as 
reflected by the parity of the pay-cheque between design-related engineers and 
production-related engineers and between those engineers and non-engineering staff. 
As discussed in the previous section, CE introduction was seen as an opportunity by 
production engineers to alter their status, settle a more balance environment, and
f
enact their worldview or what their perceived as a better way for the company. 
Consequently, the PLI Program with its CE was seen as a threat to their domination 
by the funtional design units, particularly after the Program internalised the 
engineering specialist group and later became an autonomous division.
By extending its organisational and temporal contexts, the case study shows that both 
industry and national contexts fostered such domination. In high-tech industries the 
domination o f design engineers is common (Kunda, 1991; Thomas 1994). Kunda’s 
(1991) empirical qualitative study shows that such domination often intended and 
carefully planted as part of organisational means to control the engineers. Thomas 
(1994) case studies also show such a domination that triggered production-engineers 
to involve in various political manoeuvrings to create an opportunity to improve their 
status and to enact their own worldviews.
In this case study, the domination o f engineers, design engineers in particular, was 
also triggered by national interest. Indaco was a state-own company that had 
technology transfer and industrialisation as parts o f its mission and contribution to 
national development and economic growth (Todd and Simpson, 1986). This national 
contextual factor also helps explaining the strong emphasis in computer-based 
enabling technology. The acquisition o f such technology, rather than the optimal used 
of it, was sufficient to convince the nation that the technology transfer was in process. 
This national interest also helps explaining the eagerness o f the Government’s official 
to assist the company bearing the financial burden of such aircraft development 
program by fostering the establishment of the private company (i.e. Prico) as the 
Program's financial backer.
Another contextual factor that worth further discussion is the contribution of the
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societal culture, particularly the Indonesian tendencies on power distance and 
collectivism dimensions (Hofstede, 1991), in the whole process o f CE introduction. In 
contrast with the Western country in which the Indaco’s CE was originated, 
Indonesian culture has a strong tendency o f higher power differential and 
collectivism. The case study, particularly from the analysis o f the processual aspects 
of integration (i.e. communication and decision making mechanisms) and 
organisational politics, shows that this cultural tendencies reinforced the negative 
effects o f competing subcultures (i.e. design and production) and hampered the 
problem solving communication.
The tendencies of collectivism reinforced functional compartmentalisation because 
functional representatives remained with strong attachment to their functional units 
with which they were formerly identified and were not yet ready to merge with others 
from different functions. Through all stages o f CE implementation, the Program 
struggled to establish a cross-functional team with fully delegated functional 
representatives as its members. This strong attachment toward functional units 
hampered the unification of a cross-fimctional team. Such a strong attachment is less 
likely in Western countries where people are more individualistic and relatively 
independent from association with one another and, hence, are able to move more 
easily from one working coalition to another. This tendency towards collectivism 
reinforced differences among functions and made integration more difficult. The 
formation of an autonomous program team in the last stage can be seen as the 
decision to cope with the failure to acquire such a cross-functional team.
The acceptance of high power differential between superiors and subordinates 
hampered the crucial authority delegation from functional supervisors to the 
specialists. The managers were not prepared to delegate, while the subordinates
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typically hesitated to accept delegated authority and tended to rely on their managers 
for direction. During the process, this cultural tendency seemed to reinforce the effect 
o f the lack o f competence. There seemed to be reciprocal behavioural tendencies 
between functional supervisors and their subordinates. The superiors were doubtful 
about their subordinates' competence and therefore often acted to directly control their 
detail work. They hesitated to delegate authority to those subordinates who became 
representatives in the Program team. Likewise, the subordinates did not have the 
courage to fully accept delegated authority, although this was demanded in the 
Program, and often relied on their superiors for detailed directions. Within the PLI 
Program, this tendency also explains the low level o f respect showed toward the 
decisions made by engineers from the lower level teams and the acceptance of such a 
behavioural attitude by those engineers, despite all the rhetoric about full delegation. 
Generally, such an attitude was perceived as the superiors’ prerogative, accepted and 
regarded as normal.
The combination of high power differential and collectivism also created a tendency 
to be less open in the interaction as argumentation in open dialogue between superiors 
and subordinates was sometimes regarded as improper and distracting harmony. This 
cultural tendency explains the engineers’ hesitation to defend their calculations and 
analyses when questioned by their superiors, even when they were sure about their 
conclusions. Arguing with superiors was regarded as unacceptable behaviour. The 
incident regarding static and fatigue test of the skin panel described in Chapter 8 
illustrates this hesitation and its significant effect on the development process.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 Case Study Conclusion: Variation in CE Implementation
Although CE implementation in Indaco was originally modelled on W estaco’s, the 
case study revealed that the implementation brought about a complex and dynamic 
change process. During this process, the ‘actual’ initiatives did not conform to the 
intended model. Different types o f initiatives emerged and the Westaco model was 
not entirely realised. The ‘realised’ model specific to Indaco was not fully established 
due to the program’s premature termination.
The complex and dynamic change process is reflected by the presence of four stages 
o f CE introduction: (1) Program Initiation (prior to CE adoption), (2) Engineering 
Matrix, (3) Engineering Integration, and (4) Design-Production Coupling. Each stage 
could be seen as part o f the transformation process of CE initiatives as they 
encountered, and were subsequently adjusted and shaped by, specific contextual 
features o f Indaco and the actors involved in the implementation. Each stage had a 
distinctive organisational structure reflecting the struggle to achieve adequate 
integration. CE initiatives also varied from one stage to another. This changing nature 
of CE was not in a linear fashion, but revealed complex and multidimensional 
processes and sub-processes, each with a different but- interweaving path.
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This research also notes that CE practices vary not only across countries but also 
within an organisation as shown by different protocols across development programs 
at Westaco. The so-called ‘Westaco model’ had been developed over a period of time 
through several distinct initiatives in previous programs. In further contrast with 
Indaco’s attempt, it had also been built on very extensive experience in the aircraft 
industry through which Westaco could draw on a vast pool of resources inside and 
outside the company. The implication o f these findings is the classic argument of the 
contingency theory: there is no ‘one best way’ in implementing CE. Rather, both 
internal and external contextual factors are influential in determining which set of CE 
initiatives is selected and the way it is implemented in a product development 
program.
10.2 Conceptual Contribution of the Thesis
10.2.1 Definition and Application o f  an Operational M odel o f  CE
The concept of CE started to appear in the late 1980s combining two different 
knowledge domains: engineering, manufacturing automation in particular, and 
management of technology and innovation. Early discussions on CE we«-e dominated 
by conceptual development of its approach and technical development of enabling 
technology for its implementation. Empirical research on CE implementation started 
to appear in mid 1990s. But, detailed case studies remain rare, particularly concerning 
the implementation of CE within a particular context. This present study, therefore, is 
an attempt to fill this gap by specifically looking at the change process during CE 
implementation and providing some explanation for such a process in terms of its 
contextual factors and organisational power and politics surrounding the
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implementation.
In order to view the change process in CE implementation, this study has 
operationalised CE into a set of initiatives derived from a largely descriptive literature 
and often used as means to achieve CE objectives. This operational model of 
assessing CE implementation can be seen in Table 10-1. Through-applying qualitative 
measurements along the dimensions and sub-dimensions of each initiative, this model 
contributes to the development o f CE concept. Such measurements construct key 
characteristics of CE that are significantly different from the traditional product 
development process. This model, therefore, helps in reducing the vagueness of CE 
concept.
10.2.2 Definition and Application o f  Context and Politics o f  CE Process
Using a processual approach, this study is able to reveal explanation for the complex 
CE introduction process and for its variation from the intended model. In analysing 
strategy implementation process in organisations, Mintzberg and Quinn (1996) found 
that organisation strategies were often applied not in the way they were intended, and 
therefore argued for strategy formation, rather than strategy formulation. During an 
implementation process, other issues and approaches emerge which lead to the 
realisation o f a strategy or an approach that is different to that originally intended. The 
processual approach can also be used to explain this strategy formation process: the 
intention, the emergence, and the realisation of strategies. The generic model of 
processual approach as in Figure 10-1 is proposed as a model to analyse such 
changes.
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Table 10-1: Operationalisation of CE through CE Initiatives and Their Dimensions
Cateqory CE Initiative Dimension Subdimension
Organisational Cross-functional Team Size and architecture Number of member
Integration
Scope
Number of (sub)team 
Number of layer of teams 
Division of program team 
Number of function
Level of functional representation 
Role of functions
Membership pattern Position at functional unit 
Nature of member activity 
Level of dedication 
Temporal characteristic 
Multiple membership 
Higher team composition
Heavyweight Management Hierarchical position 
Nature of delegation 
Seniority of leader
Formal structure
Authority of program leaders
Delegation from program manager
Delegation from function
Tenure
Age
Education
Communication Fomal Communication Communication mode Richness of media
and
Decision-Making
Frequency
Direction
Mechanisms
Type of data conveyed
Timing
Type of data released 
Type of data used
Collaboration Interactional relationship pattern 
Conflict and negotiation process 
Presence of collective goal 
Presence of shared vision
Inter-team Communication Formal communication 
Collaboration
Decision-Making Mechanism Authority of teams
Respect to lower team decision
Power differential perception in low and high level teams
Enabling
Technology
Computer-based Technology Support individual design task 
Integrate across function 
Assist information management 
Support collaboration work
Collocation Collocation area 
Space layout
Formal CE Methods Direct utilisation
Utilisation of informal methods
Systematic Protocols Formal description of CE-in-practice 
Implementation strategy and planning
External
Integration
Supplier Involvement Number of supplier 
Position in the team 
Temporal characteristic
Customer Involvement Number of customer 
Position in the team 
Temporal characteristic
Human
Resource
Competency Educational background
Experience
Multiskilling
Knowledge and skill parity
CE-Related Training Team -related training
Training on CE concept and initiatives
Human Resource Policies Recruiting
Career development and training 
Performance measurement
Reward system
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Figure 10-1: Generic Model of Processual Approach for Strategy Formation
In this study, detailed analysis of each of CE initiatives in the Indaco’s CE revealed 
the importance of human resource competency and systematic protocols, particularly 
in shaping the organisational integration aspect of CE implementation. The 
importance of these two factors has been strongly indicated in various accounts and 
occasions throughout the process of implementation in the PLI development process. 
The lack of competency and the lack of CE definition and protocols, accompanied by 
the inability of the change agent, i.e. the Program Manager, to impose intentions and 
build a coalition led to a messier process and the enforcement of approaches that were 
incompatible with CE in the later stages.
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CE literature acknowledges the importance o f technical skills, multiskilling, and tacit 
knowledge in product development process (e.g. Riedel and Paws, 1991; Iansiti, 
1993, Klein, 1994; Klein and Maurer, 1995; Volk, 1992, Nakayama, 1997). In 
discussions of CE, however, the defining factors o f tacit and explicit knowledge are 
mostly taken for granted and embedded in CE. It seems that the term 'skill 
competence’ had said it all, whilst this difference between tacit and explicit 
knowledge has a very significant implication in the implementation process.
Perhaps, the fact that CE originated in technologically 'm ature’ companies 
contributed to this lack of discussion because the concept was developed in the 
context in which tacit knowledge was not part o f the concern. Hence, it is an 
embedded assumption in CE that some level o f knowledge maturity has been acquired 
prior to the implementation. The stage of development in Indaco, in contrast, had not 
yet reached such a knowledge maturity, and hence the lack o f competency became a 
crucial issue in CE implementation process in the Indaco’s PLI. Many problems faced 
by the program management were associated with this issue and caused several 
adjustments in vertical and horizontal integration. It also caused several interaction 
difficulties within the Program and between the Program and the supporting 
functional units. This study therefore, provides rare empirical evidence on the 
strategic important of competency and knowledge maturity in CE adoption and 
therefore provides a significant contribution to CE literature.
Some CE literature have emphasised the importance of rules and procedures in CE 
implementation (e.g. Pinto and Pinto, 1991; Cleland, 1991). This case study showed 
that a lack o f systematic protocols caused problems for CE implementation effort. The 
absence of systematic protocols was one of the primary reasons for the failure in the 
attempt to implement the originally intended CE. This lack of systematic protocols
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caused inconsistency in management decisions particularly in dealing with the issue 
of lack o f competency. It also caused confusion among those involved in the program 
as they embarked on the change from the traditional sequential approach but without 
clear guidelines for the new one. Furthermore, these weaknesses were not 
complemented by the result of computer-based technology initiatives, which were the 
focus of the Program. The main reason was that the development in this enabling 
technology wras undertaken in parallels with the product development itself. Overall, 
this study shows the important issues are not only selecting and implementing CE. but 
also selecting the right configuration of CE initiatives that are compatible one another.
Applying the processual analysis in a single longitudinal case study of CE 
introduction process contributes to the CE literature by providing detailed empirical 
findings linking the CE implementation process to organisational context and politics 
- issues rarely addressed in the literature. This study shows the significant effect ot the 
organisation’s stage of development that relates to knowledge immaturity, and the 
organisational culture, which dominated by technology orientation with the dominant 
design engineering sub-cultures. Within this context, political manoeuvrings from 
individuals or groups of individuals, such as production engineers and computer 
support group, in pursuing their interests played signiticant roles in shaping the 
process and the final form of CE.
Extending the organisational context into its national and industrial contexts, this 
study notes the adoption of a 'W estern' approach, such as CE, by a company from a 
developing country' was often driven less by business objectives, such as marketing 
demand and reducing development time, but more by the technological development 
goals of the country'. As the societal culture of Indonesia is different from 'Western 
culture, the detailed analysis of actions and in-actions of key indiv iduals taken to
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assess the organisational politics in the process also provides some interesting 
tentative findings on the effect o f such cultural differences, particularly in the 
Hofstede’s (11984) cultural dimensions o f power distance and collectivism. Such 
findings worth to be considered prior adopting an approach originated from other 
culturally different countries.
10.3 Limitations of the Thesis
While this study provides an understanding on the dynamics o f a major 
transformation process embedded in CE introduction and implementation as well as 
the influence of organisational context and politics in such a complex process, this 
form of study has several limitations. Firstly, the study used a single case study and is 
therefore exposed to problems of generalisability to all settings. Secondly, this case 
study examined only one CE introduction program in the company due to earlier 
premature termination of another program that was initially part o f the study. This 
eliminated the chance to compare two different CE implementation processes in a 
single setting.
Thirdly, even in such a complex case only partial insight into the whole picture of CE 
introduction could be obtained. This study only focused on organisational integration, 
communication, and decision making mechanism aspects of the process. Other 
aspects were only briefly discussed. Fourthly, the case study only represented partial 
introduction process and was unable to provide a full implementation cycle of CE due 
to the premature termination of the program under study. Thus, the results of CE 
implementation in term of quality, cost, and timely launching of the new product 
could not be provided. The above limitations have implications on the directions for
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future research in this field, which are taken up later in this chapter.
10.4 Practical Implications and Recommendations
The practical implications of this case study can be summarised in the following three
issues:
1) The decision to implement CE is a strategic decision that involves technological, 
organisational and cultural changes within the organisation. Therefore, a thorough 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the implementation should be 
taken prior to the decision. Particular consideration should be given on the 
readiness and capabilities of the organisation and its contextual elements to 
engage in such changes. Various audit procedures have been developed to assist 
practitioners in this assessment (e.g. Couchman, 1998; de Graaf, 1996; Chiesa, 
Coughlan, and Voss, 1996).
2) A thorough preparation at the outset is important in ensuring the sustainable 
application of CE. This should include, but not limited to, top management 
commitment; selection of a set of CE initiatives that best suit the company’s 
internal and external context; a detailed implementation plan; detail protocols, 
standard procedures and operation manuals; and the familiarisation process of the 
approach through training and familiarisation courses.
3) The change champion, i.e. the initiator of CE implementation, should be strongly 
committed to the implementation, not only to get the implementation off the 
around in the early stage, but also to ensure that the process remains as originally 
intended and achieves its objectives. As promotion and job rotation are inevitable.
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this includes a thorough briefing at the hand-over from the original champion to 
the selected substitute officially assigned to follow up the process.
Furthermore, practitioners may take advantage o f the operationalised CE initiatives 
and their dimensions by developing a performance measurement of each initiative, 
which can be used as in-progress performance measurement to assess and evaluate the 
level o f success o f CE implementation. This in-progress performance measurement is 
particularly important for new product development process that requires a long 
development time prior the result and feed back in term of the product cost, quality, 
and timeliness can be measured.
10.5 Implications and Recommendations for Further Research
Considering the limitations of this thesis, more CE research needs to be done on 
implementation in order to capture the detailed change process in various different 
contexts. This study could only focus on CE initiatives on organisational integration 
in order to make the research manageable. To obtain a more comprehensive picture of 
CE dynamics introduction process, the similar researches focusing on initiatives in 
enabling technology, external integration or human resource management are 
recommended. Furthermore, this case study could not observe the whole 
implementation process due to the nature o f a lengthy development time of a new 
platform airplane and the unfortunate economic situation of the country. Therefore, if 
future research should engage with another complex product development process, 
one with a much shorter development time should be used. This would provide a 
better chance for the researcher to longitudinally investigate the whole process from 
its conceptualisation to market launch. -
Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the advantage o f the processual framework, the researcher recommends the 
adoption o f this framework for further study o f CE implementation. In the aircraft 
industry, the investigation of the development process of various aircraft systems and 
equipment are recommended. Further, comparisons across development programs 
within a company, across industries, and across countries are also recommended, as 
they would increase the understanding o f the inherently complicated process of 
introducing CE. The above researches would eventually provide a clearer operational 
CE model and framework. CE research with operational concerns in mind would, in 
turn, assist practitioners to be adequately prepared prior to adopting CE. This would 
immensely increase the chance o f successful implementation.
Several precautions should be taken by researchers in conceptualising and 
operationalising the implementation of an approach in developing countries, as the 
national development program often drives such initiatives. These precautions involve 
consideration of more generic issues that often have become embedded assumptions 
in Western approaches, such as the level of staff competency and the consideration of 
market and competition issues in the decisions, as well as consideration of cultural 
differences between the country of origin and the adopter country.
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Appendix A
Appendix A
List of Meetings Attended by the Researcher during Field Studies
Meetings at the PLI Program:
1. Design Centre and Technology Divisions Coordination Meeting, October 1997
2. Basic Aircraft Design Course, November 1997
3. [The PLI Program] Coordination Forum (Regular, Weekly), October 1997 -  
April 1998
4. Design Review Meeting, November 1997
5. Operation Review Meeting, December 1997
6. Configuration Design Review Meeting, December 1997
7. TIP-Body’s Internal Meeting, February 1998
8. TIP-Body and Body Integration Design (BED) Teams Meeting (Regular, Every 
second Week), January -  February 1998
9. Suppliers’ Presentations and Discussions, 1998
10. Aircraft Design Familiarisation Course, February 1999
Meetings at the DRI Program:
1. Program Task Force Meeting (Regular, Twice Weekly), October 1997 -  April 
1998
2. Engineering Review Meeting (Regular, Weekly), November 1997 -  April 1998
3. Production Review Meeting (Regular, Weekly), November 1997 -  April 1998
4. Detail Engineering Meeting: Fuselage (Regular, Weekly), January -  April 1998
5. Detail Engineering Meeting: Nacelle and Engine Mounting (Regular, Weekly), 
January -  April 1998
6 Detail Engineering Meeting: Aileron (Regular, Weekly), January -  April 1998
7. Detail Engineering Meeting: Centre Wing (Regular, Weekly), January -  April 
1998
8. [DRI] Program’s Schedule Meeting, March 1998
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List of Indaco’s Documents Reviewed during Field Studies
1. [Indaco] and IBM Joint Application Study for [the PLP] Product Information 
Management System, August 1989.
2. [PLX] Favourite Process, 1991.
3. [PLI] Project: Conceptual Design, January 1994.
4. [PLI] Kick-Off M eeting’s Document, March 1994.
5. [DRX] Road Map, April 1994.
6. [DRX] Favourite Process, 1994.
7. [PLI] Second Meeting’s Document, April 1994.
8. [PLI] Third M eeting’s Document, June 1994.
9. [PLI] Program Activities (Draft), June 1994.
10. [PLI] Development Schedule, July 1994.
11. [PLI] Preliminary Design Team: Way of Work (Not Organisation Chart), 
September 1994.
12. TOP Fuselage’s Plan of Work (Draft), November 1994.
13. [PLI] Technology Program, December 1994.
14. TOP-300 Body: Workflow and Target, January 1995.
15. [Westaco] Teaming for Product Definition: New and Derivative Airplane 
Program, May 1996.
16. Introduction of the [PLI] Program, August 1995.
17. Financial Scheme for [PLI] Development Program ([Indaco] Proposal), 
August 1995.
18. [Indaco]’s Manufacturing Capabilities, [Indaco], 1995.
19. Reference for [PLI] Program Planning, August 1995.
20. Technical Note: Movable Florizontal Tail Structural Design Concept tor the 
[PLI] Program, September 1995.
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23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
J  J  .
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41
Appendix B
Technical Note: [PLI] Material and Process Map and Planned Activities, 
October 1995.
Assessment for [PLI] Program (Production Viewpoint), October 1995.
Minutes o f Meeting: Program Master Phasing Plan Meetings, September- 
December 1995.
Laporan Studi Skenario Program [PLI] (Report on Scenario Assessment for 
the [PLI] Program), 16 December 1995.
[PLI] Master Phasing Plan (Draft), December 1995.
[PLI] Program Dictionary for Operation Area, January 1996.
Diskusi Eksekutif Program [PLI] (The [PLI] Program’s Executive Review), 
January 1996.
Space and Facility Requirement Estimation for [PLI] in Fabrication Area, 
February 1996.
[PLI] Financing and Organisation Structure, March 1996.
Pra proporsal of Extruded Part for [PLI] Wing Panel, March 1996.
CAD/CAM System: Sidina System for [the PLI] Program, June 1996.
Notulen Rapat Master Phasing Plan [PLI] (Minutes of Meetings: [PLI] Master 
Phasing Plan), June -  December 1996.
Design Factors that Influence Product Quality o f Tube Forming Parts: 
Assessment for the [PLI] Program, August 1996.
Design Factors that Minimised Production Process in Metal Forming: 
Assessment for the [PLI] Program, August 1996.
Perjanjian Kerjasama Pengembangan, Rekayasa, Rancang Bangung Pesawat 
[PLI] antar [Prico] dan [Indaco] (Co-operation Agreement on Developing, 
Enginereering and Constructing of the [PLI] between [Prico] and [Indaco], 
August 1996.
[Indaco]: Developing Nation Resilience through Aerospace Technology, 1996.
Information Technologies on Manufacturing Planning: Assessment for the 
[PLI] Program, October 1996.
[PLI] Program Organisation Structure, October 1996.
Computer Investment for the [PLI] Program, October 14 1996.
Planning and Scheduling System for Cellular Manufacturing: An Input in 
Establishing Manufacturing Strategy at [Indaco], November 1996.
Design Factors that Influence Machining Productivity: Assessment for the 
[PLI] Program, December 1996.
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42. [PLI] Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), December 1996.
43. Resume Rapat Team Sidina (Resume of Sidina Team Meeting), April 1996 -  
June 1997.
44. Aircraft Integration Directive: Withdrawal o f the Coordination Memo, 
February 1997.
45. Bahan Presentasi Tim Sidina kepada [PL1] Leadership Team (Sidina 
Presentation Material to [PLI] Leadership Team), 25 March 1997.
46. Statement of Work Guidelines [PLI] Program, April 1997.
47. Feasibility Study [PLI] Development, April 1997.
48. Business Process Flow (External Operation [of the PLI]), April 1997.
49. OPA: Product and Process Integration (Draft), 1997.
50. OPA: Kerja Sama Rekayasa Rancang Bangun Pesawat [PLI] antara Divisi 
[PLI] dan Direktorat Teknologi. (The [PLI] Engineering Development 
Cooperation between the [PLI] Program and Technology Divisions (Draft), 
1997.
51. SOW (Draft): Wing-3 Design, May 1997.
52. Configuration Management Guide Book: Drawing and Part Numbering 
System, May 1997.
53. Manual, Operating Instruction: Prosedur Pemeriksaan, Approval dan Perilisan 
Gambar/Dataset for [PLI] (Draft) (Procedure for [PLI] Drawing/Data Set 
Verification, Approval and Release (Draft)), May 1997.
54. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI ] Planning Session (Design Centre), May 1997.
55. [PLI] Division: Airplane Business Unit, Organisational Structure, June 1997.
56. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI] Planning Session (Operation Centre), June 1997.
57. Activity Breakdown Structure (ABS) [for] [PLI]), June 1997.
58. Distribusi Perangkat {Computer per Unit Organisasi per 31 December 1996 
(Computer Facilities Distribution to Organisational Division per December 
1996)1997.
59. Summary of Equipment Capability Data: Fabrication Division, July 1997.
60. Struktur Organisasi [Indaco] (Indaco’s Organisational Structure), July 1997.
61. Manual, Operating Instruction: Penilaian Prestasi Kerja Karyawan -  Staff 
(Employee Performance Evaluation), August 1997.
62. Evaluation Result on Preliminary Design of Body Empennage Stmctural 
Concept as Producibility Input, August 1997.
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63. Knowledge-Based Engineering Implementation. Targets, Strategy, Objects 
and Resources, September 1997.
64. Research Proposal: Development of Optimation Procedures for Aircraft 
Structural Design, September 1997.
65. Design Philosophy Flight Deck [of PLI], September 1997.
66. Structural Concept and Assembly Planning for Section 42 and 46 [Body 
Compponent], September 1997.
67. Manual, Engineering Operating Procedure: Operational CATIA Standard 
Library (Draft), September 1997.
68. Producibility Assessment: Machining Consideration for Frame Bulkhead, 
September 1997.
69. Assessment for the [PLI] Program Quality Control Organisation: Rekomendasi 
System Kerja Rekayasa Serentak dan Terintegrasi (Recommendation for 
Concurrent Engineering and Integration Working System), September 1997.
70. Regulation and Procedure Assessment: Production Certification Process [for 
PLI] (Draft), September 1997.
71. Design Practices Assessment for Machining Part, Volume 1, Version 1, 
September 1997.
72. SOW: Wing Box Experiment (DPM), September 1997.
73. Front Pressure Bulkhead Proposal, October 1997.
74. Price Analysis for Window Frame, October 1997.
75. Buku Panduan Media Korespondensi Program [DRI] (Guideline for the [DRI] 
Program’s Correspondence Media), 1997.
76. Work Breakdown Structure for [DRI], October 1997.
77. Technical Document: The [DRI] Configuration Civil Version, November 
1997.
78. SOW (Draft): Assessment of Automatic Drilling and Riveting Machine 
(ADRM) to Increase Quality and Productivity [PLI Program], November 
1997.
79. SOW (Draft): Maintenance Management System, November 1997.
80. Management Operation (Charter) Operations [PLI], November 1997.
81. Business Flow: [PLI] Material & Manufacturing Technology, November 1997.
82. Number-1 Flow Schedule for [PLI’s] Wing-box and Fuselage, 1997.
83. [PLI] Passenger Aircraft: The Regional Breakthrough, [Indaco], 1997.
84. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI] Coordination Forum, October 1997 -  March 1998
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85. Evaluation of Keelbeam and Bulkhead Frame Design Concept, January 5 
1998.
86. Minutes o f Meeting: BID and TIP Body Meeting, January -  February 1998.
87. Garis Besar Program [PLI] Tahun 1998 ([PLI] Program’s Broad Outline for 
the Year 1998), February 1998.
88. Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1998 [Indaco] (the [Indaco’s] 
1998 Annual Planning), February 1998.
89. SOW: Capability and Capacity Analysis of Wire Bundles and Electrical 
Boxes, March 1998.
90. OPA (Draft): Test Article Delivery for Testing, Development and 
Certification, April 1998.
91. Quality Plan Concept, Quality Plan Requirement, April 1998.
92. SOW: Test Rig Wing Box Experiment, April 1998.
93. SOW: Assembly Jig Wing Box Experiment (Fixture), April 1998.
94. Report: [PLI’s] Quality Planning Activities Target and Progress, Problems, 
and Alternative Solutions, May 1998.
95. Report: Activity Status of [PLI’s] Production Planning, May 1998.
96. Supplier Document Evaluation and Audit Check List for [PLI], May 1998.
97. SOW: Technical Assessment Fuselage Skin Stringer Panel, May 1998.
98. SOW: Design and Manufacturing Wing and Pylon Models to be Tested in 
Transonic Wind Tunnel in August 1998, May 1998.
99. SOW: Fuselage Panel Test (DPM), May 1998.
100. SOW: Rig Fuselage Panel Test, May 1998.
101. Production Planning and Control: Business Process [PLI Program], June 1998.
102. SOW (Draft) for the 3D Full Model o f [PLI] Wing-Fuselage-Nacelle High 
Speed, Low Reynolds [Wind Tunnel] Testing, June 1998.
103. SOW: Assembly Jig Manufacturing Development, June 1998.
104. SOW: Assembly Jig (Fixture) Fuselage Panel Experiment, July 1998.
105. Engineering Cost Estimate [for] Wing Box Test ([Indaco] Proposal): Design of 
Test Rig, Test Rig Assembly, Strain Gauge, Reporting and Documentation, 
July 1998.
106. SOW (Draft) for the Model Design and Construction of [PLI] Half Model Low 
and High Speed, High Reynolds Wind Tunnel Testing, August 1998.
107 SOW: Quality System and Standardisation, August 1998.
Appendix B
108. Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1999 [Indaco] (the Indaco’s 
1999 Annual Planning), November 1998.
109. Keputusan Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham: Pengesahan Rencana Kerja dan 
Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1999 [Indaco], (Shareholder General Meeting 
Decision: Ratification of the Indaco’s 1999 Annual Planning, November 1998.
110. Familiarisation to Aircraft Design Process: Material for Internal Course, 
December 1998.
111. Fuselage Fatigue Test: Pemilihan Konsep “Skin -  Stringer -  Frame Joint” 
pada Struktur Fuselage Akibat dari Fatigue karena Perubahan “Cabin 
Pressure” (Fuselage Fatigue Test: Concept Selection of “Skin -  Stringer -  
Frame Joint” at Fuselage Structure considering Fatigue due to “Cabin 
Pressure” Change), January 1999.
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Appendix C
Time-Line of the PLI Program
Top Management Level
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
N D J F M A M J  J A S O N  D J F M A M J  J A S O N D J F M A M J  J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M j  J A S O N D J F A M J
^ P o s s ib i lity  erf undertaking PLI program first discussed 
7] PLI conceptual design. 130 passenger (draft)
|M  M anagem ent kick off meeting preliminary DR & O  
A j2 n d  meetmg:fusetage or wing mounted engine 
[7] 3rd meeting: 3 year milestone
f j  The PLI program activities (draft)
7] The PLI schedule 1994-2006
[i~ | Preliminary design team way of working concept
N  D
0
j  F M  A N I  J J A S O N D  
1 9 9 4
The PLI 2-year conceptual design planm I
[a j Announcement of the PLI program, program manager and program structure (Engineenng Matnx)
Program planning reference  
Focal points assgnm ent to program team
[a ]  Development cost estimation (draft)
[F |D o cu m en t: development cost estimation, feasibility study (prelim), program item dictionary
J~| Program Master phasing plan
[a ]  Financial scheme Indaco-Prico (proposal
IF" M O U  Pnco-lndacosigned
ItiTEstablishment of Prico as a private company 
A Pnco-lndaco cooperation agreement (draft)
m ]  Indaco top management meeting, contract review 
[Â ]  Pnco-lndaco cooperation contract signed
[a J  Program meeting: production facility and investment plan 
[7] Hangar scenano
fo jN e w  Program structure (Engineenng Integration)
m I I
[o jD R & O  baseline. S O W  workpackage, jcbcard
|F  Formation of the PLI Investment Board
m ]  Investment budget plafond for each functional division
[T js id in a  (integrated digital system) formation
M Sidina presentation 
M Sidina excecutive commitment signed
a ] Program request for feedback on plan & budget
m I
|A |  The feasibility study of the PLI development
New program structure (Design-Production Coupling) | 7 j
Development optimation team [A____
T IP  membership SJ
Program Directive Temporary halt after preliminary design phase [7]
I n
Indaco management decision Friday nonwerkmg day [MJ
J F M A  M J  J A S O N D  
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O N D  
1 9 9 6  " ”
Prico liquidation [ 7
Estimated completion time for preliminary design phase [7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D  
1 9 9 7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D  
1 9 9 8
J F A M J  
1 9 9 9
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Middle Managem ent Level
1 9 9 4
f i m a N j  J A S O N  D
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O  N D
1 9 9 6
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 8
J F M  A M J  J A S O  N D
1 9 9 9  
J F M  A M J
[n TOP-fuselage plan of work (draft)
Top fuselage, propulsion, wing, system members (draft) 
TOP-fuselage workflow and target (draft)
F Typical TOP plan I
m ]  TO P -b ody schedule (draft)
[ T ]  Presentation from functional divisions about th a r  scope & expenenc
n  1 1I s  industrial Engineering ( IE i local point: Load projection HR  requirem ent from IE local points 
O  IE focal pant: S pace estimation 
O jM a n  power requirement, tooling, planning
0 Design Build Process Team  (DBP): Space and facility requirement 
[a J d BP: revised space ang facility requirement 
[ m JProgram requesting M H budget based on standard  
[ j~ j IE focal pan t: Manpower requirem ent
Initiation of m a|or milestone establishment
M ater phasing plan w eekly meeting, functional focal p an ts  
M aster phasing plan draft 
^ P r o g r a m  dictionary for operation
IM  Preliminary review of cost structure 
0  List of people involved |
[a ~ Ma|or milestone review
Engm eenng Operation (E O P ) m eeting: Production structure discussion 
M aster phasing plan review
Preliminary assem bly sequence  
Production drawing release m ilestone clanfication 
Com puter investment: O pen distributed computing 
N | Budget plan and S O W  proposals from divisions
(ÊE O F  m eeting: Digital Assem bly (D A S ), Advanced System  Development (A S D ). Enterpnse Resource Planning (E R P | 
P H  I [ j  | [o~| Sidina group meetings
Product Data M anagem ent (P D M ) presentation
PLP door for Sidina A
Sidina A meeting: M anhour budget
Manhour for door
|s  D B P  process assessm ent meeting 10 prototype 
o j  D B P  meeting: PLI assessm ent j
0 D B P  m eeting: Matrix T IP s & production specialist group 
[^ M e e t in g :  T IP  & Specialist report
[o' Design review T O P s , engineenng specialists, DBP
DB P meeting: review work breakdown structure (W B S )
DB P meeting: quality planning, space requirement, wing. W B S  
Intorducton of PLI W B S  (draft)
T lP -S ystem  presentation  
T IP -Fu selage progress report section 41 -4 2  
Discussion: obstacles and lesson learned
[^ P ro p o s a l:  Extruded part for W ing skin panel (W S P )
Pilot project (W S P )
Proposal 3 alternatives of W S P
J Decision: Procure material and use available matenal 
r a  lish tool material team
1 9 9 4
F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 6
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 7
J F M  A V I  J J A S O N D
1 9 9 8
J F VI  A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 9
J F M A M J
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1 9 9 4
F M  A M  J J A S O  N  D
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 6
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
H
1 9 9 8
J F M A  M J  J A S O N D
J J jR & D  and Production m eetings
Titanium  m anufacture |
M |R es id u a l stress, d ad  difussion 
Shot peening forming 
j j L o w  strain rate cold forming
P M O  m eeting’ numbering system  
M jD B P  meeting design standard limitation
|A  ¡Docum ent: S O W  guidelines ,
|M  Planning session: Design Centre product focus
J Planning session:Operation Centre assembly focus 
J Activity Breakdown Structure (A B S ) (draft)
[ o ]  Budget Plan 1997 (draft)
Operating Procedure Agreement (O P A ) product & process integration/TIP
O P A  T IP  training
Tooling experts: not collocated nor dedicated EL
Design C entre and Operation C entre collocated M 
P U  Business Process: Production planning and control J ||\S\ Certification meeting
j [a " Certification meeting
Parallel Type Certificate (T C ) and Production Certificate (P C ) MJ
S O W : Quality system & standard [a ~|
Directive: Design C entre  leads all development design activities [s~|
Familiansation course on aircraft design process for Sidina group
Skin panel test, onsite meeting with the authonty
1 9 9 9  
J F M A M J
1 E J
F M A M J J A S O N D J F  M A M J  J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A  M J  J A S O N D J F M A M J
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
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Op e r a t i on a l  Level
1 9 9 4
F M A  M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 6
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 8
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 9
J F M A M J
[F Mo 
[ ° ]
vable part structural design 
CM PLI material and process map
D 8 P  document: Design (actors influencing quality tubelormmg 
DB P docum ent Design (actors influencing quality tubeforming 
J F J d BP  docum ent IT on manufacturing planning assessment
[ d | d BP document: Design factors influencing machining productivity
Airfram e Specialist Group Alcoa
O  A irfram e Specialist Group: Preliminary matenal wing box 
N A irfram e Specialist Group: Trip report
[cT TO P -F u se lag e  communication m em o (C O M ): nose. mid. em pennage skin splices 
TOP-Fuselage: Avionic component |
D C O M  Radom configuration concept and matenal 
D C O M  Typical fuselage structure concept
[f ~ |T echnical Meeting: Superplasticity forming
TIP-Bo<fy meetings: Producibility fuselage 
Fuselage: section 42. 44, 46, manhours, flow days, jigs 
Skin cutting section48 
D Skin cutting section 44
Fuselage, assembly sequence prototype & senal
Machining standard and actual hour
New fuselage configuration, leveling system
TIP-Body/Body Integration Team : Skin splice section 41 £
Structural concept 42  46  48. assy plan £  
TIP-Body: Skin splice, assy sequence, jig requirement S 
TIP-Body/Body Integration Team : chem  milling m atenal. spin lathe 10 
Document: Machining consideration fram e bulkhead £
C O M : Front spar rib machining analysis £  
Document: Design practice machining assessm ent £  
Docum ent: Front press bulkhead proposal
Docum ent: pnce analysis window fram  
C O M : Vertical tail concept analysis
£ 
£  
£
Docum ent: Keelbeam/bulkhead design evaluation u
[q  Focal p a n t meetings: Assem bly plan 
N jT a s k  alocation
[F js O W :  Fuselage skin stnnger panel
F Status review
F Assem bly sequence and tooling readiness
M W ing jig alternative, assembly sequence reviewed 
M S pace requirement, 2 assembly concepts: prototype and serial 
M Space optimation. 2 alternatives manhours and space calculation
[D jT IP  assembly and test Assem bly and test plan
F T IP-system  meetings: S O W  and plan 
F Assessment:Production capability for mechanical system  
M S O W  for mechanical system lesson learned (draft)
M S O W  for electncal system, lesson learned tubing 
TIP-S ystem  /  System Integration team assem bly and test system concept fi~|
[ f  |M a tenal tooling meeting:
|M  O ptim ise procurement plan, alternative sources, detail schedule
1 9 9 4
F M A M J  J A S O N  D
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 6
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
Unique format of matenal list, procurement flow 
Report to Program M anager
1 9 9 7
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 8
J F M A M J  J A S O N D
1 9 9 9
J F M A M J
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1 9 9 4
f m a m j  j  a  s  o  n  d
1 9 9 5
J F M A M J  J A S O  N  D
1 9 9 6
F N A A M j  J A S O N  D
1 9 9 7
J F M a M J  J A S O N  D
1 9 9 8
J F I v A A M J  J A S O N  D
1 9 9 9
J F N A A M J
| j  fprc
13
jA ss em b ly  facility meetings
Production rate, equipm ent requirement, site analysis 
J |  M odem  assem bly equipment review  
[s~ Facility Planning Charter
O Facility Planning progress report 
n J  Facility Planning action plan
|77 W in g  Skin Panel (W S P ): integral m achinm g+rubber hydraulic press
production specialist group to provide cost benefit for each W S P  alternatives 
2 contour methods: hydraulic press and age forming 
[m J to o I matenal procurement meeting
[j~ j Tool & Jig matenal approved by the program
[s~ W ing  integration team /T IP -W ing  meetings: Front spar assy 
Meeting: non cut W S P  12 m
Meeting: matenal order by Fabncation 
TIP -W ing: W ing -  Body assembly concept 
D Meeting: surface treatment, spin lathe body 
Matenal order for wing test [ m ^
Man power support from P IP  for wing test j Borrow PLP tools for wing test
Reorder standard part for wing and fuselage panels
C O M : W ingbox test: tolerance T D
Quality Control (Q C ) document: production certification process (draft)
Q C  assessm ent meetings
Q C  docum ent for Operation Centre review [/T  
j Quality plan concept (draft)
Docum ent: Supplier evaluation audit check list
F M  A M J  J A S O N D J F M A M J  J A S O  N D J F M A M  J J A S O N  D J F M  A M J  J A S O N  D J F f A A M J  J A S O N D J F K A A M J
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
J
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Master Phasing Plan of the PLI Program
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